KURDISH JOURNALISM CULTURES;
SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY UNDERSTANDINGS AMONGST PROFESSIONAL ROLE ORIENTATION OF JOURNALISTS

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BA AND MA IN MEDIA STUDIES

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the School of Arts and Humanities at Nottingham Trent University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication, Culture, and Media Studies

2017
DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

This doctoral dissertation is an inquiry into the “role perceptions” of media workers in understanding and professionally dealing with violations of personal privacy in one of the post-conflict regions in the Middle East. By examining the phenomenon of media intrusion into people’s private lives in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, this thesis aims to identify the relationships between shifting boundaries of privacy understandings and professional role orientations of Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures.

This research project explores the multiple linkages between the concepts of privacy and professionalism in journalism cultures based on 142 survey questionnaires and 15 in-depth interviews. This study involves prominent media policymakers, academics, experts, and leading journalists along with selected participants with an editorial responsibility in media organizations, including senior managers, junior managers, and non-management staff of different gender, age, occupation, political affiliation, and length of practice in Kurdish journalism. It also seeks to understand and rethink how information privacy invasions may be rethought in some cases by promoting the professional role orientations of journalists, particularly when they need access to private information to do their daily journalistic work. It also explores to what extent Kurdish journalists use their professional ideology, social and political status, along with position, to invade the privacy of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures in the case study of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. Ethical theories and the adopted Priority Model of information privacy have been applied in examining the professional activities of Kurdish journalists toward their acquisition and revelation of pieces of private information that could constitute an invasion of privacy. The key theories of Mill’s negative and positive liberties, new-Gramscian conceptions of hegemony, and Habermas’s national democratic public sphere have also influenced this study.

The data analysis of this study shows that the notions of information privacy and journalistic professionalism have an inadequate theoretical, legislative basis in public debates in the Kurdish media landscape so far. While there are mixed and ambiguous interpretations of respect for individuals’ private life amongst Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures to date, the Populist Disseminator and Detached Watchdog are the most predominant models in this fragile region. This is one of the deepest insights of this study that portrays the reality of current Iraqi Kurdish society, where partisanship dominates and professionalism is subordinated as a result of the distribution of media ownership - and consequently the ownership of privacy - since the news organizations and their media workers are dominated and frequently used by the prominent political ruling parties. They also aim to silence opposition voices in Iraqi Kurdish society by using various practices, such as gathering and revealing the information privacy. The right to free speech, media freedom, journalistic professionalism, and the right to be free from unwarranted social and political surveillances are still too limited due to several barriers, including political and media transitions from dictatorship to democracy and the lack of a media industry in terms of ownership, regulation, and education.
Without gaining the support of particular political parties and their affiliation, the hegemony of the journalist’s professional role does not apply, and has been open to abuse by different methods from time to time, particularly during the political crisis and the general election campaigns; there are no free environment for good journalism practices and no guarantees for professional journalists. The current power dynamic of media ownership, and the rapidly growing technologies of convergent journalism practices that produce and reproduce the contemporary vision of the Kurds and Kurdistan in Kurdish journalism cultures, are studied extensively. The aim is to offer a deep insight into the issues related to journalistic professionalism and information privacy in an increasingly fragile and fragmented post-conflict society. In the meantime, this doctoral dissertation makes a valuable contribution to existing knowledge by transferring and updating the global debates beyond convergence culture and cultural hegemony. In addition to the traditional critiques of professionalism in journalism, it also contributes to current civil liberties debates over the right to an individual’s privacy weighed against the public’s right to know. Therefore, to facilitate further studies on the daily evolutions of cultural convergence and convergent journalism practices, several recommendations have been suggested in the final conclusions of this research project.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Academically, implementation of this study would not have been possible if I did not have the support of many individuals and organizations. Accordingly, I would like to declare my heartfelt gratitude to all of them. First and foremost, this thesis owes a debt to the executive supervision team, including Dr. Colin Alexander, Dr. Janroj Yilmaz Keles, and Dr. Andreas Wittel for their academic support who made it possible for me to produce a final version of this research. In particular, I wish to express my wholehearted thanks to the director of the study Dr. Alexander, who assisted me in completing this research project during hard times. Also, I am extremely grateful to Dr. Keles whose intellectual and emotional support was invaluable through all stages of this study. Additionally, Dr. Wittel has become my second supervisor in the final step of the research; he has extensively contributed this project through his valuable feedback. I would also like to acknowledge and thank my external examiner; Dr. Omar Al-Ghazzi from the Sheffield University and internal examiner; Dr. Roy Smith. I am thankful for their knowledge, insight, comments, suggestions, and feedback. I would be remiss not to thank each of Prof. Timothy Youngs, Lloyd Pettiford, Martin O'Shaughnessy, Gill Allwood, Dr. Olga Bailey, Patrick O'Connor, and Hongwei Bao who have all given their guidance and assistance during my study at Nottingham Trent University. Similarly, I express my heartfelt gratitude to all the academic and librarian staff at British and Kurdish Universities.

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<td>Great Kurdistan</td>
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<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
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<td>Ḧkumeti Herêmî Kurdistan</td>
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<td>Asia Minor Agreement</td>
<td>Rêkkewtînayeyî Asiyayî Biçuk</td>
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<td>Arab Ba’athist Socialist Party</td>
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<td>International Media Support</td>
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<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
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<td>International Federation of Journalists</td>
<td>Komşiyonî Nêwdelewleti Rojnamenûsan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLD</td>
<td>Centre for Law and Democracy</td>
<td>Nêwendi Yasa û Dimukrasi</td>
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<td>IWPR</td>
<td>Institute for War and Peace Reporting</td>
<td>Peymangayi Rojnamewaniyê Bo Ceng ú Aşîti</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Internet Service Provider</td>
<td>Dabinikeri Xizimetgurariyê Înîrenêt</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Radio Authority</td>
<td>Dameziraweyi Êştgeyi Radiyo</td>
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<td>Office of Telecommunication</td>
<td>Nûsîngeyi Peywendiyîkrdin</td>
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<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
<td>Dameziraweyi Pexşkîrdinî Berîtanî</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Press Complaints Commission</td>
<td>Lîjneyi Skallakrdinî Çapemenî</td>
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<td>Cultural Hegemony Theory</td>
<td>Tîyorî Hejmünê Kulturî</td>
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<td>Terror Management Theory</td>
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<td>KJS</td>
<td>Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate</td>
<td>Sendikayi Rojnamenûsanî Kurdistan</td>
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<td>KNN</td>
<td>Kurdish News Network</td>
<td>Torrî Hewallî Kurdi</td>
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<td>RMN</td>
<td>Rûdaw Media Network</td>
<td>Torrî Midiyayî Rûdaw</td>
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<td>Nalia Media Corporation</td>
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<td>Radiyo û Telezvîyînî Naliya</td>
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<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
<td>Dewlletî İslâmî le Êraq ú Suriya</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>Endamî Perleman, Perlemanîtar</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>Komelleyi Hawkarî Milîyi Nerwîci</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Pey mangayî Dimukratî Nişîtmanî</td>
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<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>Nottingham Trent University</td>
<td>Zanikoyi Nottingham Tirênt</td>
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<td>Encumenê Twêjineweyi Komellayetî û Abûrî</td>
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<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>Rêkxirawî Netewe Yekgrtuwekan bo Kultur, Zanist û Perwerde</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>USSC</td>
<td>United States Supreme Court</td>
<td>Dadgayî Ballayî Wilayete Yekgrtuwekan</td>
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<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
<td>Şîwandinî Koendamî Zawuzêyi Mêyine</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
<td>Komkari Wllate ‘Erebîyekan</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
<td>Encumenî Harîkari bo Wllatani Kendaw</td>
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<td>Privacy International</td>
<td>Taybetmendêti Nêwdewleîtî</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
<td>Bellêninameyî Nêwdewleîtî Taybet be Mafe Şarstanîyî û Ramiyarîyêkan</td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>MGN</td>
<td>Mirror Group Newspapers</td>
<td>Desteyî Rojnamekani Miror</td>
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<td>PSB</td>
<td>Public Service Broadcasting</td>
<td>Xizimetguzarî Pexşî Gşîti</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
<td>Public Television Service</td>
<td>Xizimetguzarî Televiziyonî Gşîti</td>
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<td>RTI</td>
<td>Right to Access Information Law</td>
<td>Yasayî Mali Bëdesthêndanî Zaniyârî</td>
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Research Introduction

CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSIONS INSIDE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. PREFACE

There are mixed and ambiguous interpretations of respecting individuals' private life amongst Kurdish journalism cultures due to the absence of civil liberties, the lack of journalistic professionalism and the partisan domination of political parties over the Kurdish media industry. While preserving the balance of human rights, most journalists working in the Iraqi Kurdish media are being accused of having the least standards of the journalistic professionalism and limited knowledge of privacy concepts (Syan 2015; Ismaeli 2015 and Aivas 2013).

Given the priority of achieving political rights in the past, the Iraqi Kurdish culture did not precisely see privacy as an individual right that should be respected and protected. In the case study of Kurdistan Region, there have been tentative theoretical, legislative and public debates about individualism and the right to privacy, including the protection of individual rights and freedom from different powers. Particularly within political, social and electronic surveillances, the protection of privacy rights in the private and public spheres has received less attention. These circumstances result in a lower awareness of the political party system, and vagueness around the legal system of penal statutes, as well as an increased mixing or misunderstanding of the Islamic Sharia Laws with oriental social manners along with the ongoing conflicts between dominated and subordinate class in the society. Importantly, the balance between the individuals’s right to protect private life or private information and the public’s right to know public information has been slightly discussed amongst Iraqi Kurdish media regulators and professionals. This gap became a cornerstone for the main arguments of this study, which focuses on the media intrusion into private lives in the transition society of Kurdistan as an oriental culture. On a social basis, the Iraqi Kurdish society has a powerful social relationship amongst individuals and also there are no clear boundaries between an individual’s private space and those of their family and surrounding community.
The latter includes extended family members, teachers, and elders; therefore these cultural norms reflect the public sphere, political and media systems. In this context, media workers interfere in people’s private lives without seeing this as an invasion of the right to privacy. These unwritten social norms are particularly common in the privacy cases of marriage and career, predominantly for women and especially in conservative, rural or small urban areas. Furthermore, prominent political parties and their politicians elite have mostly used the partisan or even nonpartisan media organizations and their news workers to invade others privacy rights due to political, social and commercial motivations. For similar reasons, this dissertation aims to explore the Iraqi Kurdish journalists’ understanding of privacy in their reporting and in relation to their professional roles. In other words, this project aims to deeply identify the relationships between shifting boundaries of privacy understanding and professionalism dimensions amongst Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures. In addition to what extent do the Kurdish journalists use their professional motivations, mainly ideological hegemony to invade information privacy of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures in the case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). In view of that, this study has worked on five core objectives as following:

I. To investigate how the Kurdish media regulators, academics, experts, and journalists define and use key concepts of ‘privacy’.

II. To critically examine the common forms of intrusion into private life and to test the concepts of privacy invasion in the Kurdish media environment.

III. To precisely identify the professional role orientations of the Kurdish journalists; including ethical ideologies; epistemological orientations, and the institutional roles.

IV. To examine the motivations that influence Kurdish journalists’ decision-making when encounter privacy issues.

V. To evaluate interventionism orientations of the Iraqi Kurdish journalist’s role regarding “the importance of setting the political agenda, influencing public opinion, and advocating for social change” (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, and Lauerer 2016: 1).

The debate on media intrusion into private life continues to various degrees amongst different cultures (Jamal 2013; Al-Amri 2012; Nissenbaum 2010 and 2004; Solove 2009 and 2006; Morrison et al 2007; Tavani 2007 and 2000). For that reason, the first overview of this introductory chapter will examine the research questions and conceptual discussion on the research theoretical framework. Later, the significance of the case study, contribution to knowledge, limitations of the study, and finally an outline of the dissertation chapters will be shown.
1.2. QUESTIONS OF THE STUDY

It is evident that the essential step for qualitative and quantitative data collection is clarifying the research problem precisely, for example, predicting an outcome, explaining causes and consequences of a phenomenon. Also, evaluating and describing a phenomenon, developing good practice, empowerment, and comparison questions, which encourage the researchers to focus on the problem to be studied (Bryman 2012). For similar reasons, since writing a Masters dissertation on the *Right to Private Life in Law and Ethics of Journalism*, several results have been revealed and others yet remain unsolved. For instance, the vast majority of Kurdish media organizations are financially supported by the political parties and the ruling class of politician elites. In addition, the development of independent or professional media is too slow and too limited because of the domination of partisan media and unbalanced competition between media outlets to access information sources for media professionals. As a result, the ownerships and audiences of the Kurdish media outlets are frequently divided amongst diverse ideological directions. The Iraqi Kurdish journalists have faced a lack of awareness in professionalism orientations and ignorance of their accountability. Also, the mixture of professional and personal values between their right to reveal private information and the public’s right to know. Additionally, the protection of individual privacy rights is restricted to different groups of the Iraqi Kurdish society (Aivas 2013). While the groups of celebrities and public figures have fewer privacy rights than ordinary people, the invasion cases of the right to privacy of the public figures have been considered as one of the main red lines in front of Kurdish journalists.

Choosing the current study topic came from prior work experience and the personal background of the researcher who started his writing activities for print media in 1999, including journalistic columns and news stories, then as a presenter of a radio news program, political reporter and a senior editor in print and broadcast media, and lately editor-in-chief for a cultural weekly newspaper of the *Nünüm* (drop by drop). He also published three books in the field of communication, journalism ethics, and the right to privacy. This extensive background and professional experience helped him to form the key problems and hypothesis of this study, particularly in the revelation of many features and benefits of media content regulation and the environment of journalism practices that must be examined for their importance to Kurdish culture.
In addition, there is a shortage of modern education and academic research in the field of privacy policy and professionalism in Iraqi Kurdish journalism practices. The current research topic has been developed in order to renew and affect the Kurdish media regulation through following up the conclusions and recommendations of this research project. More importantly, the researcher discovered the main barriers and characteristics of Iraqi Kurdish media developments which were challenging topic for the researcher to study. In particular, the media and its journalistic working play an indispensable role in transitioning post-conflict societies or countries working towards a democratic system. Thus, the current project attempts to answer the following questions, which are divided into five main problems:

I. What is the role of political and media systems in the transition of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to democracy?

II. What are the attitudes of the media policy-makers, academics, journalists, and commentators to recent developments in privacy and professionalism in Iraqi Kurdish journalism practices?

III. Whose privacy is respected and whose privacy is not in the Iraqi Kurdish context and how can the power relations that determine journalistic practices in relation to privacy be explained?

IV. To what extent do the differently positioned Iraqi Kurdish journalists use their professional hegemony to invade the information privacy of various individuals? Also, what is the link between hegemonic struggles, political change, and cases of information privacy invasion?

1.3. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

This study applied triangulation methods of data collection to measure the recent developments in the professional role orientations of Iraqi Kurdish journalists and their understanding of information privacy invasions. For similar reasons, between the period of July and September 2015, the primary data of this study was collected by conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews with many relevant people and conducting a questionnaire survey with working journalists on the topic of the research. Furthermore, a software package of the SPSS Statistics Programme was used for statistical data analysis from 15 September and 15 October 2015. In addition to the qualitative data insights gathered from interviews, the researcher also collected quantitative data from January 2013 until October 2015, therefore the data from the research is up to date. In this context, the priority was to ensure information accuracy and avoid bias, which is one of the main advantages of using the triangulation methods of a case study, in-depth interviews, and a questionnaire survey.

1. Multiple sources have been used to promote the reliability of the evidence in the case study. In data gathering, quantitative measures would usefully supplement and extend the qualitative data analysis. In the case study, using multiple sources is more useful to promote the reliability of the evidence; also quantitative measures in data gathering would usefully supplement and extend the qualitative data analysis.

2. The semi-structured in-depth interview is another qualitative approach that is used in this study, which is a more accessible and flexible method. In this study, in-depth interviews were conducted with journalists who share their professional relationships and values with both the ruling and opposition political parties. Also, an extensive range of journalists who are not affiliated with political parties was interviewed, along with commentators, academics, and media policy makers. Some of these people are closely affected by the current research questions surrounding journalism cultures and the right to privacy. In total, around 15 people were involved in various backgrounds of gender, age, education, political affiliation, professional role, and experience. A variety of these social groups represents the reality of the Kurdish media environment and its developments.
III. Within data collection methods, a quantitative questionnaire survey was used to measure the perspectives of journalists who have “editorial responsibility for the preparation or transmission of news stories or other information” (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986: 168). In this study, 142 journalists including two freelancers from 29 media organization were surveyed. They were all regularly working in different outlets of the newspapers, magazines, radios, televisions and web journalism sites, including news websites and news agencies. This survey was also distributed amongst, official or unofficial partisan media, and those media organizations consider themselves as the Iraqi Kurdish independent media.

In terms of the current study limitations, during the period of this research project (January 2013 and January 2017) several unpredictable limitations emerged, notably between July and September 2015, when the research data was collected. The researcher has faced some serious difficulties as a result of the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their continuing battle with Kurdish Pêşmerge forces, and then the welcoming of 1.8 million refugees from other parts of Iraq and Syria. The war has caused economic and political instability in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and has created challenging working conditions and environments for Kurdish journalists and policy makers. Despite this problem, this study has managed its schedule to collect the data on time, though it took longer than expected to complete my fieldwork. In collecting the research data, the researcher has been confronted with financial difficulties because of the KRG, as the official sponsor of my study, decided to suspend all scholarship funds in 2014 due to the economic crisis; thus the economic situation has affected the current research project and its fieldwork in different ways. This instability has resulted in ongoing political and financial conflicts with the Iraqi central government, the rise of ISIS, low oil prices and near-bankruptcy in the region, along with Kurdish partisan conflicts on the extension period of the Kurdistan Presidency Law which has affected the media practitioners on whom this study has focused. While conducting the fieldwork, the researcher encountered the challenge of managing interviews and surveys with Kurdish media workers, including the editorial staff of the news organizations, who have a tight calendar. Security was another issue, in that the victims of privacy invasion and unofficial partisan media were unwilling to be questioned, while the researcher made many appointments and proposals to those who were enthusiastic to be interviewed in a brief interview time-span and according to
the timelines of the interviewee. This restriction also happened during the division of the survey questionnaires, and in the course of one month, the researcher had to go on at various intervals to obtain the survey questionnaire forms. As a final point, most of the primary and some of the secondary sources used in this study were in the Kurdish language, which took too much time for the researcher to correctly translate the data and transcribe the answers of the research quotations from the interviews.

1.4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

In this study, several arguments have been debated including how the global journalism cultures affect local journalism cultures, in addition to the extensive debates about professionalism amongst journalism cultures, privacy concepts in relation to journalists’ professional roles. On theoretical principle, the Gramscian concept of hegemony and its contribution have been used in this study to read and understand the linkage between dominated and subordinate class in Iraqi Kurdish media. Also, through applying the prominent pillars of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere and its using in analysing political and media transitions from dictatorship to democracy, notably in the case study of Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq. Additionally, the Iraqi Kurdish legal definitions and interpretations of privacy along with the defamation laws in place within media content regulations.

In a global context, Hanitzsch et al., (2016 - 2007) examined four professional milieus of journalists in 21 countries which have differing media and politic systems; the journalistic perceptions of a particular professional role have been significantly distributed across diverse societies. For example, a journalism culture of the Critical Change Agent in the Middle East was mainly stable, while in most Western countries, a journalism culture of the Detached Watchdog dominated. Journalists in a journalism culture of the Critical Change Agent are most eager to motivate their audiences to participate in civic activities and political discussions. They also hold critical attitudes towards the government and business elites, but they are mainly driven by an interventionist impetus. In this culture, journalists are less oriented towards the audience; on the other hand, they have least supported an opportunist approach to journalism. In particular, they emphasize the importance of advocating social change, influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda.
However, journalists in a journalism culture of the *Detached Watchdog* see themselves as watchdogs of the political and business elites, and they find it important to provide the audience with political information. Thus, a defining characteristic of this cluster is the relatively high regard the journalists have for their role as detached observer. In order to reach their audiences, journalists in this group feel that even political news needs to be interesting in order to sell well. At the same time, they are clearly less interventionist than their colleagues in other milieus, and also they are the most opposed to the idea that journalists should support official policies (Hanitzsch 2011). By contrast, in numerous authoritarian, developing and transitional countries, a journalism culture of the *Opportunist Facilitator* reigns supreme. Also, the *Populist Disseminator* in all countries of the world exists as the genuinely global model of journalists and within the framework of this group, journalists inhabit a fairly middle ground in steering the frequently challenging and complex realities of their career (Hanitzsch 2013). Journalists in a culture of the *Populist Disseminator* share the strongest orientation towards the audience, therefore they are most likely to provide interesting information and news that attract a wide audience. Within this group, the monitoring function of journalism is least appreciated, but journalists have a stronger professional orientation towards an understanding of the journalist’s role as detached observer. However, the core characteristic of journalists in the culture of the *Opportunist Facilitator* is their relatively opportunistic view of journalism’s role in society, especially as constructive partners of government in the process of economic development and political transformation. They also pay the least regard to the detached observer role, the political information and mobilization functions, and the watchdog role (Hanitzsch 2011). From the characteristics of these journalism cultures, it can be noticed that there is still an extensive “sense of vocation among pressmen, they feel a call somewhat as sailors feel the call of the sea, journalism is like seamanship, it cannot be without professionalism” (Rau 1968: 36) that is common to all. For that reason, the *Detached Watchdog, Critical Change Agent, Opportunist Facilitator*, and the *Populist Disseminator* have been used in the current study as four global journalism cultures to test orientations and identify the nature of the professional roles of Iraqi Kurdish journalists.

In a local context, Aivas (2013) found that the vast majority of Iraqi Kurdish journalists lack an academic background and specialised training in professional standards of
journalism ethics. There is no appropriate ethical code or legislation to cover all media types, which leads to the absence of an extensive law that specifically protects individual privacy rights in both mainstream and alternative media content regulation. This issue is significant to the development of democratization due to the important role of media and of its accountability. Without such clear and democratic media content regulation, Iraqi Kurdish journalists will face several hazards, such as kidnapping and even death, from those who see themselves as victims of media intrusion into their private lives. While the Press Law No. 35 of 2007 in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is much better than the Publication Law No. 10 of 1993, which removed censorship as the main barrier affecting the issuance of periodicals (Syan 2015), the 2007 Press Law covers only the print media rather than the convergent media, such as audio, visual and web journalism.

Given that reason, the 2007 Press Law is criticised for being open to abuse, most likely because it has chiefly been interpreted for media types other than print media. It is also premature to gauge its commitment to imposing professional balance (Hogan and Trumpbour 2013). In addition, there is no clear distinction between crimes of defamation and invasion of privacy rights in the 2007 Press Law. In this case, there are several limitations on lawsuits for both victims and perpetrators of privacy rights invasion, which compounds the already widespread unfamiliarity with the privacy concept in Iraqi Kurdish culture. There is also a lack of legal support that leads to the victims of privacy violations being unable to follow up their legal cases. Not only is there a general absence of awareness amongst the public on how to file lawsuits against journalists and owners of media companies, but also there are no provisions or support programmes along these lines available to guide the public. This status is another key element of this study that will be critically discussed in the following chapters. Iraqi Kurdish journalists have breached global standards of professional journalism ethics by disseminating personal pictures, surveillance of family life, publishing personal communications or correspondence, interfering with individuals’ political opinions, particularly during general election campaigns and political conflicts, along with manipulating footage of women’s sexual activities without their prior authorisation (Aivas 2013). These issues also happen in Western journalism cultures; for instance, the topic of ‘revenge pornography’, or the sexually explicit private property of one or more people disseminated without their permission through any
RESEARCH INTRODUCTION: Conceptual Discussions inside Theoretical Framework

medium is being widely studied (Citron and Franks 2014). As former scholars have discovered, journalists are not earnestly considering the right to privacy, and consequently they have been required to make a clear distinction between privacy rights accountability of public figures, celebrities, and ordinary people mainly amid public locations and particular positions (Gerard 2012; Morrison and Svennevig 2007; Conboy 2004; Sissela 1988 and Belsey 1992). This point of view has been raised within this study as a question about media effects on those individuals whose privacy rights are being breached. In addition to rethinking relationships between the public interest and the right to privacy, there is a focus on news values, practices in journalism cultures, and the wide development of social surveillance. In this thesis, the professional ethics and practical logic of journalists when gathering and reporting on private life or private information are applied to the understanding of a theoretical structure of privacy (see Chapter IV). Within these legal and ethical debates, the current study aims to find out the depth of understanding of privacy as a core code of journalism ethics amongst Iraqi Kurdish journalists, and how they classify their professional role orientations, notably in dealing with cases of information privacy invasion. A brief exposition of privacy and journalism cultures will be followed by an outline of the ongoing theoretical debate about convergence culture and cultural universals of human behaviour that has arisen out of the development of media convergence and convergent journalism practices. This debate will be helpful to a better understanding of media intrusion into people's private lives and the personal and professional motivation of media workers to breach privacy ethics or the right to privacy. The cultures of journalism and the professional role orientations of journalists have been altered by the varying concepts of convergence, a polysemous and ambiguous term with a multiplicity of dimensions and character in the view of many researchers, which has been used in various disciplines from the natural sciences to the social sciences and humanities (Latzer 2013; Artz and Kamalipour 2012; Meikle and Young 2011; Grant and Wilkinson 2009; Flew 2008; Deuze 2008 and 2004; Huang and Heider 2007; Domingo et al., 2007; Jenkins 2006, 2004, 2001; Pavlik and McIntosh 2004).

In today's new digital culture, an important identifier of numerous diverse trends is ‘convergence’, and it is not simply a buzzword (Deuze 2008). The perceived ambiguity in the convergence concept refers to its being used in different ways, in terms of new
complexities emerging when something converges, in addition to the meaning of convergence in networks, terminals, and social practices such as privacy and professionalism in journalism (Storsul and Stuedahl 2007). According to Huang and Heider (2007), the word convergence is broadly used to mean two or more things coming together, and this meaning leads to the inclusion of the performance of moving to consistency or combination as a process of convergence, which means various people utilize it to mean various things. Then, the convergence culture has been divided by Artz and Kamalipour (2012) into three broad categories of media convergence, participatory culture, and collective intelligence. Likewise, Jenkins (2006) observed that the collective intelligence can be attributed to participatory culture and media convergence. In view of that, individuals as members of society receive many combined habits and abilities, including morals, law, art, faith or belief, and knowledge. Most of them have been named as essential concepts in culture and anthropology, though, in contemporary philosophical and social science debates, the concept of culture can be defined in many ways. Given that, the set of values, traditions, and customs of a society, together with the ethnic group or nationality, are being used as the features of a culture. When mutual respect and values grow as various cultures peacefully coexist in the same area, this leads to building up multiculturalism. Sometimes, to explain particular practices inside a subgroup of a society, a subculture like a ‘counter-culture’ or a ‘bro-culture’ is used as another meaning of culture. Gerber and Linda (2010) view that in all human societies some aspects of human behaviour can be discovered to be cultural universals, such as expressive forms, technologies, and social practices, including journalism cultures. Besides, the intangible cultural heritage of a society comes from the immaterial aspects of culture, in this case, social institutions, practices of political and media organizations viewed as the principles of the social system, philosophy, mythology, science, along with written and oral literature. This research desires to examine the professional behaviours of journalists in relation to covering private life based on the journalist’s social practices amongst various journalism cultures.

As Pyszczynski et al. (2015) explained that the material conditions of human life have been derived from the human symbolic culture. More than three decades ago, Terror Management Theory (TMT) examined three general questions about the roots of human behaviour and motivation; why do people who are different from each other
have such a hard time peacefully coexisting? Why do people need to believe that out of all the possible ways of understanding the world, there is the one that happens to be correct? Why do people need self-esteem? Within this theory, a series of worldviews and activities have been posited as the meaning of culture that gives humans the reason for understanding themselves as “person[s] of worth within the world of meaning” (Ibid.). These questions can be further answered by positing that any evaluation fundamentally resides inside the value system of a given culture. Therefore, the cultural differences cannot simply be evaluated or objectively ranked because of our own rational and ideology position of cultural relativism. For instance, the understandings of privacy and professionalism are being constantly altered by different cultures or even inside a particular culture from time to time. However, a cultural relativist perspective has been taken by many anthropological and sociological theorists who counter the existence of cultural universals. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Emile Durkheim, Donald Brown, George Murdock and others have presented the human universal or an anthropological universal as a synonym of the cultural universal, in other words, an institution, trait, pattern, or element that is common worldwide to all human cultures (Schacter et al. 2007). Also, the human condition comes from the whole body of cultural universals; thus the traits or behaviours that happen universally in all cultures are adequate candidates for evolutionary adaptations. Furthermore, biologically inherited behaviour is a question of ‘nature versus nurture’ or to what extent these universals are ‘cultural’ in the narrow sense (Ibid.). Similarly, Brown (1991) defined the ‘human universals’ as involving those characteristics of language and cognition, psyche, behaviour, society, and culture for which there is no known exception, also he suggested a list of hundreds of items as universal features. Consequently, the convergence of media technologies have been defined by Deuze (2005) as multimedia, and the sociocultural complexity is viewed as multiculturalism. According to Hanitzsch (2007), the term ‘culture’ is broadly used as the collection of ideas such as beliefs, values, and attitudes with the purpose of practices of cultural production, and artefacts like texts and cultural products. This collection leads to journalists’ thinking and acting, which are manifest in journalistic culture, and this is mostly intended to describe the culture of news production or newspaper cultures, journalistic culture and news culture of news workers. For Esser (2004), the cultural diversity in journalism cannot be understood as harmonies of the same values, but rather hybrids between the traditional internal components and international components that combine dynamically with
each other. However, the attitudes of journalists are strongly rooted in a culture of journalism that consists of common traditions and values (Berganza-Conde et al. 2010). The interchanging of various cultures is a result of the global economy, which means that offline and online business activities among different nations can foster stronger relationships and cultural diversity. A case in point is where a concourse of various cultures is usually an important component in the new digital age. This cultural convergence plays a vital role in media convergence, which “fosters a new participatory folk culture by giving average people the tools to archive, annotate, appropriate and recirculate content. Shrewd companies tap this culture to foster consumer loyalty and generate low-cost content” (Jenkins 2001: 93). Likewise, the relationship between media companies and media consumers in production, includes advertising via the Internet as a part of media convergence, which is an excellent example of cultural interchanges. Furthermore, individuals enjoy the advertisements, and also sometimes since they think that without advertising there would not be more appropriate choices for them to have. Others believe that marketing manipulates shoppers, with the intention to persuade consumers to buy manufactured goods, which will make them happy. It can be criticised that people currently live in a consumer culture as they are satisfied to follow the newest model and are encouraged to associate specific brand names with higher status (Jenkins 2006).

What is more important, people nowadays are living in a self-colonialism that can be defined as dissenting and rebellious, however, its rebelliousness is enmeshed in a redemptive difficulty that prevents authoritarian and colonial claims to redemption and salvation. In this sense, a deep redemption of the self-colonialism means suffering acts as an index of the dialectic relationship between power and culture. Hence, every expression and action in this civilization and culture represent a political attitude (Kadhim 2004). In this day and age, national or local cultures have been threatened under the hegemony of universal cultures that expanded across the world, notably from corner to corner of the post-conflict countries. In this process, norms and values of the native cultures have not been considered. Al-Misawi (2006) studied culture and power in Iraqi politics conflicts. He revealed a clear result that the resistance-suffering dyad of the Iraqi authors was nearly the same under the Western colonial and Saddam’s regime. This means that there was no valuable differentiation between each type of the Western and self-colonialisms. As a result, the concept of culture has been
politically used as a medium of the elites to create a false consciousness and manipulate the lower classes (Pyszczynski et al., 2015). As aforementioned, cultural convergence is a significant field of multiculturalism across the world and it is usually a linkage thread for individuals’ personal privacy wherever and whenever by Lingua Franca (Jenkins 2006). Therefore, privacy interests are culturally relative, because if a distinct behaviour against people's privacy is considered a serious invasion of privacy in one culture, the same action may be an entirely acceptable behaviour in another culture (Kemp and Moore 2007). This argument is another key debate in this thesis that finally needs to be answered precisely because, in reality, Kurdish understanding of privacy differs from a British or Swedish understanding of privacy, and even Iraqi Kurdish understanding of privacy differs with privacy understandings of Kurds in diaspora or between other oriental cultures. Given that reason, many scholars are attempting to theorise privacy through focusing on one of three features; the nature of privacy rights, potential reprisals from holders of private information, and the practical legal reforms that might offer better protection of online information privacy (Lipton 2010). With regard to the current study, the privacy aspect and its common forms in Iraqi Kurdish culture can be interpreted by focusing on attitudes or behaviors of a social group, the journalists, as they have used threatening actions in gathering and presenting information privacy.

In this research project, private life or information privacy has been broadly interrogated as a controversial or much-disputed subject within the field of media content regulation. Therefore, invasion of privacy rights has become a prominent issue for media regulators, media workers, and also individuals whose rights are being violated. As Ess (2009) considered that the digital media networks are one of the green areas of information privacy invasions, and also this type of human rights violation has grown as a contemporary phenomenon in the global media environment that extends across local journalism cultures. Historically, growing new technology and yellow journalism were the leading causes of intrusion into the people’s private life. For instance, the Company of Eastman Kodak in 1884 invented a smaller, less expensive version of the camera, which needed less time to set up and encouraged individuals to become photographers in their own right. Whereas, only professional photographers up to then frequently worked on such media violations, “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 207). Similarly, Warren and Brandeis (1890) indicated that invasion of privacy often causes emotional and spiritual harm, rather than physical harm; therefore sensation, emotions, and thoughts require statutory recognition. In today’s new digital age, the invasions of information privacy, namely in relation to the private life of celebrities, public figures, and ordinary people, have been considerably increased in such a way that has never been witnessed before. Conceptually, “the right to be left alone” was firstly defined as a legal “right” or “entitlement” concept of privacy (Cooley 1888: 29). Within this classical definition, privacy was seen as a humanitarian issue that should be respected and protected as well. According to the definition provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks” (UN 1948: Article 12). This definition means that nobody is allowed to invade others’ privacy rights without prior consents or a court order. In a broad spectrum, this justification is often proven to be true for everyone in every circumstance, including for those who are committing wrongdoing against the law and eventually arrested for. What is more, the meaning of privacy has extended nowadays to specifically cover the right to informational self-determination (Jamal 2013; Al-Amri 2012; Warren and Brandeis 1890). Schoeman (1984) measured privacy as a ‘state of limited access or isolation’, hence individuals are mostly attempting to protect privacy rights via demanding that others do not enter their property or private space. Despite that, some celebrities willfully refuse a private life, and some people view that the sacrifice of their private sphere is acceptable to defend them from threats, but the majority of people do not want to reveal information or be overstepped without their prior permission. Moreover, they do not wish to read their correspondence, including the messages from social networking accounts and may choose not to remember or reclaim their past and so on (Gerard 2012 and Stahl 2004).

Tavani (2008) explained the philosophy of privacy using various concepts, and each one of these concepts provides a wider understanding of privacy with one or more connected notions of solitude, secrecy, autonomy and liberty. Unlike the dynamic parts of technical, social, and political characteristics, privacy is a non-static conception. Among other aspects, the concept of privacy consists of the solitude in one’s home,
control over one’s body, and control over personal information. In addition to include freedom of thought, freedom from surveillance, protection from searches and interrogations, and protection of one’s reputation (Solove 2009). These extensive meanings help the current research project to specifically define what privacy means in the context of Iraqi Kurdish culture. In this study, the concept of privacy has been used as one of the universal rights of the individuals to be protected against intrusion into their private life and affairs, or those of their family, through information dissemination or through direct physical means. This targeted definition has been consistently adopted in this study as the fundamental approach to a better understanding of the media intrusion into the people’s private lives. Taking it from here, the current study has regularly defined the concept of the information privacy as an essential principle of human rights and professional ethics in journalism. Thus, this approach has been justified by providing more critical discussions that engage with both professional journalism cultures and cultural differences of privacy (see Welsh et al., 2005 and also see Chapter IV).

Privacy in Western cultures is usually related to notions of the individual and liberty, derived from the Liberty Theory formulated by John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873). Mill discussed the limits and nature of the power which can be legitimately practiced by society over the individual in different ways: Firstly, rights or political liberties can be obtained through recognition of certain immunities; the second way is provided by the founding of a system of ‘constitutional checks’. He understood that the struggle between Authority and Liberty is the most prominent feature of history. For that reason, despotism or authoritarianism can be viewed as “a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians” (Mill 1966: 18-19). In other words, the government has drawn the boundaries of civil liberties, including free speech and media freedom within media content regulation, in order to determine when media intrusion the people’s private lives constitutes invasion, or to balance between the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s right to know. In this sense, media ownership and privacy ownership can be defined as a dual power in preserving and publishing private and public information. Despite this, Mill’s concern for liberty does not spread to all societies and all individuals; Boling (1996) found that a form of power affords privacy, therefore the theft of that power can also be understood as the invasion of privacy.
In this sense, the individual has been provided with a measure of power against the rest of the world, other members of the community and the government by personal privacy. This power of privacy, when respected, serves to protect people from others, and from more powerful individuals, groups, and institutions in particular. In this way, privacy “serves as a valuable counterweight to the power of others” (Gauthier 2002: 26). In addition to the rest of his work, John Stuart Mill identified the difference between liberty as the absence of coercion and liberty as the freedom to act. The distinction between these two perceptions was officially formulated by Berlin (1958), as the two opposite concepts of negative liberty and positive liberty. The former indicates a negative condition in which an individual is protected from tyranny and the arbitrary exercise of authority, while the latter refers to the opportunity or means to do things. In other words, negative liberty means freedom from external restraint on one's actions, as opposed to positive liberty, which means the possession of the capacity to act upon one's free will in addition to freedom from internal constraints that may involve a concept of positive liberty (Taylor 2008).

With regard to the current study, negative and positive liberties in journalism cultures can be manifested in response to their public or private interests. For instance, some cultures of journalism are more flexible than others in embracing media intrusion into people’s private lives; similarly, some journalists are more likely to embrace the interventionist role and some others are less (see Chapter VI). Taylor (2008) argued that the concept of positive liberty consists of two central notions of structure and agency; a person should be free from the restraint of social structures in the application of their free will in order to be free. The possession of sociological agency mainly comes from positive liberty, which is reinforced by the capability of citizens to contribute in government and have their interests, voices, and concerns known and acted upon. In this sense, mass media communications as the current public sphere can be accessed by everyone in order to participate in public affairs. According to Berlin (1958), a person or group of persons in the sense of negative liberty should be left to do or be what he or she is able to do without interference by other persons. With negative liberty, external restrictions are imposed on a person. Accordingly, news organizations and media workers can be legally required to respect people's private lives, or invade the right to privacy because of public interest. In spite of that fact, Mill (1966) advocated utilitarianism and presented the concepts of mutual liberty and soft tyranny with his principle of harm.
When discussing liberty, the harm principle is significant in understanding the concepts of mutual liberty and soft tyranny since they represent pieces of the puzzle identified as freedom. Philosophically, morality must replace tyranny in any legitimate system of government; otherwise, individuals are left with a societal system rooted in regression, disorder, and backwardness. Thus the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Federation of Journalists alike have recommended that journalists respect the right to privacy of individuals regardless of situation or position of power. Consequently, media intrusion into people's private lives has been described as one of the most harmful activities of journalists, who should be carefully and professionally dealt with. For similar reasons, the concept of privacy involves different interests for different individuals. Some wish to control access to one’s location or to control personal information out of curiosity; others might want to obtain independence, maintain a level of secrecy, and preserve one's private development (Solove 2009; Morrison and Svennevig 2007; Welsh et al. 2005).

Within negative liberty, individuals are free to do what they want without intrusion into their private life by media, government, or business companies. This idea confirms that everyone has a full right to privacy and nobody, including journalists, can invade private information under any circumstances. Nevertheless, journalists have professionally justified their methods of information privacy invasion as serving the public interest. Importantly, the main question here is whether those people who have chosen public life have a full right to privacy. Alternatively, should they expect to endure a degree of observation, and even intrusion by the media? In the current digital age, the shared conceptualization of privacy concerns control over personal information known as information privacy (Jamal 2013). Thus, privacy has been measured as a ‘control’ in the field of information technology and social science research, including media and journalism (Gerard 2012; Culnan 1993 and Westin 1967). Meanwhile, online privacy concerns in the contemporary information era have often been framed in terms of individual human rights (Jamal 2013 and Rotenberg 2000), though more recently issues around national security have added another dimension. For example, the United States has implemented the USA Patriot Act as part of their new anti-terror legislations, particularly after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. In addition, the Patriot Act was extended on 26 May 2011 for three essential provisions: 1) Roving wiretaps; 2) Searches of business records, and 3)
Conducting surveillance of ‘lone wolves’ - individuals suspected of terrorist-related activities who were not linked to terrorist groups (Mascaro 2011). Within this Act, several aspects of the right to privacy have been invaded for security reasons. Given that, Boyd (2008) stressed that when viewers are not identified clearly, online information is stored permanently, is searchable, and is replicable, that is, it can be copied and ‘invisibly read’. All this may lead to invasion of privacy rights as an outgrowth of the anti-terror laws.

Now let’s turn to the question of media ownership and privacy ownership in journalism practices by debating a Gramscian concept of hegemony in analysing journalistic professionalism. As a consequence of the process of news production, Hanitzsch (2007) described the global journalism cultures using three primary levels of analysis. At the first level, the cultures of journalism become the foundational structure on the foundation of which the understanding and analysis of news and news work occurred. This point clearly explains in the attribution of news values to events, such as some pieces of private life information about celebrities and the public figures. At the second level, journalists’ professional worldviews are being focused by different cultures of journalism, for instance, ‘role perceptions’ and ‘occupational ideologies’ in the cases of ‘investigative journalism’ and ‘objective journalism’. At the third level, the cultures of journalism affect the way journalists conduct their professional work, for example in the formatting of news and reporting methods in the information privacy invasions. In other words, the dimensions of cognition, normalcy, and evaluation shape journalistic practices, chiefly unconsciously, also these deep formations perpetuate within the performance of professionalism. Given these dimensions, the professional role perceptions of the media workers are examined to identify the professionalism orientations of Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures. While a variety of definitions of the term ‘professionalism’ in journalism have been proposed, this study will use the definition first suggested by Deuze (2005: 442): “the emergence of a professional identity of journalists with claims to an exclusive role and status in society, based on and at times fiercely defended by their occupational ideology”. While the debate over professional identity differences from professionalism is somewhat comparable to social science academia, from this definition can be remarked that the journalists are constantly looking to differentiate their professional identity from other professionals as professional identity leads to access and power among non-
professional groups. Hence, the particular role and status of journalism cultures and professionalism orientations of journalists in the case study of the post-conflict region of the Kurdistan can be compared, where the media is not an independent industry, economically, politically, or professionally. While most media organizations are well known as a partisan instrumentalization and are less professional, how is the occupational ideology of the Kurdish journalists applied in their daily work? Though the journalism’s ideology is located in a ‘class spirit’ (McMane 1993 and Elliott 1988), the journalists employ ‘collective knowledge’ that comes from the occupational ideology of journalism (Zelizer 2004a).

Within that argument, the current study believes that the political links of journalists make them less professional because they cannot make a balance between their personal or political and professional identities. In particular, this situation appears in oriental, post-conflict and undemocratic cultures; therefore professionalism can only be found with independence from any effects of non-professionalism, notably during serious crises and political conflicts. Thus, the collective knowledge of journalists surely represents a professionalism ideology of journalism, at least in the Middle East societies, as journalists working in electoral democracies speak of similar values and share similar characteristics. However, to make sense to what they do, journalists apply these similarities in a variety of ways. In this sense, journalism’s ideology is carried by journalists in all media types, genres, and formats. As a result, multiculturalism and multimedia can be considered valid growths of how the ideology or professional identity of journalism takes the profile and is formed by worldwide recognized relevant matters of the day (Deuze 2005). Within Deuze’s (2005) definition, a “shared occupational ideology among newsworkers,” refers to journalism culture that embraces five ideal values which are being practiced by journalists: Firstly, journalists provide a public service through acting as a watchdog and information collectors and disseminators. Secondly, they are objective, impartial, fair, neutral, and credible. Thirdly, they must be autonomous, independent and free in journalism work. Fourthly, they have a sense of actuality, immediacy and speed especially inherent in the notion of news. Finally, journalists have a sense of ethics, legitimacy and validity. By this definition, anybody who has applied the aforementioned professional roles can be named as a ‘professional journalist’, since unprofessional workers do not care about professional standards that restrict activities from journalists to non-journalists.
That view is well recognized in the academic literature on journalistic role perceptions, and to a lesser extent in the realm of practitioners. In this sense, several studies have examined the concept of role perceptions as a “shared set of professional parameters or imperatives” (Relly et al., 2015: 4; and see Pihl-Thingvad 2014; Pintak and Nazir 2013). This concept has been studied by some scholars as the secularization of news media system models or the “limits of homogenization” (Hallin and Mancini 2010: 154). Thus, it is difficult to accept any media worker as a ‘professional journalist’, especially in newly democracies where the vast majority of people have spurious claims to consider themselves bona fide representatives of the Fourth Estate (see Chapter III). Despite an occupational ideology in journalism refers to ‘cultural knowledge' which builds 'news judgment' that is intensely rooted in the awareness of communicators (Schudson 2001). As opposed to other public communicators, those who have a deep cultural knowledge and good judgment in the practices and principles of journalism make a professional journalist. Since there are no truly independent media anywhere in the world, this research project prefers to use the term ‘professional media’ rather than ‘independent media’. The independence concept is relative and there is no consistent understanding of independence in the media. For instance, when people watch a football game between two rival teams they absolutely cannot be independent and not support one of the teams. The same criteria are true for media owners and their news workers in choosing and covering items of public and private information. This is particularly true in post-conflict countries and emergent democracies, where most media ownerships are directly or indirectly affiliated with the prominent political parties, the political elite, and their stakeholders. In his review of the occupational ideology of journalism, Deuze (2005) referred to the professionalisation process of journalists, these processes are seen “as the emerging ideology served to continuously refine' and also represent a consent regarding 'who was a ‘real’ journalist, and what (parts of) news media at any time would be considered examples of ‘real’ journalism”. These evaluations within that definition “shift subtly over time”; however constantly serve to keep the dominant sense of what is and should be journalism (Deuze 2005: 442-447). With regard to this study, professional ideology is explained as a strong feeling of the cultural hegemony of Western occupational measures across local methods of practicing journalism, as shown on the Asian values of discussion (Hanitzsch 2007).
It is evident that the professional ideology of journalists is concerned with power, and within this study, the *Cultural Hegemony Theory* (CHT) has been used to examine the occupational ideology of Iraqi Kurdish journalists’ power. As Cox (1989) explained that the term 'hegemony' originated from the Ancient Greek word ἡγεμονία that means ‘rule’ or ‘leadership’, this logic covers the generation and regeneration of knowledge and of the social institutions, morals, and relations which are necessities to the generation of physical goods.

Historically, the hegemony theory of Gramsci (22 January 1891 _ 27 April 1937) has been intensively studied as a significant evolution from the ‘economic determinism’ related to Marxist theory. In this sense, a social structure of base and superstructure is the foundation for the Marxist historical materialism. The concept of the base includes forces of production and relations of production. Thus, these material relations are understood as defining all aspects of a society life embracing forms of thinking and acting, political and ideological connections that make the superstructure (Keles 2015). This debate can be relevant to the current study in terms of the journalist's professional hegemony that includes the production and reproduction of private information or information privacy in the social relations, organizations, and rights that are prerequisites to the production of bodily goods. For instance, the media intrusion into private lives of public figures or parliament candidates during the general election campaigns become riskier, particularly in the transitions post-conflict countries or in the undemocratic cultures, where the results of the election and alteration the authorities, are not easily accepted. Gramsci viewed culture as politically significant as the economic power in the ruling class searched for moral and intellectual leadership, although other Marxist thinkers considered culture as 'ancillary' to the political struggle (Ibid.). Joseph (2000) explained, as indicated by the political and ideological leadership of the proletariat in the socialist revolution, the concept of hegemony was previously used by Vladimir Lenin. On Gramscian theory, hegemony was considered as the struggle of the dominant group for a position of ideological domination which would allow it to establish its power over subordinate social groups. In a capitalist society, power relations were between social groups, rather than just social classes (Hall 1986:16). As proposed, a social group “becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well” (Keles 2015:23).
In the Gramscian analysis, coercion and consent are the two main types of control which are required for dominating a social group, by physical, direct force along with a “set of social institutions and practices;” the coercion control displays itself, allows and legitimates the dominant social group via the courts, police, and army (Litowitz 2000). In this study, mass media communicators and journalists are considered as a social group who have been dominated by the political ruling parties to silence any oppositions inside or even outside Kurdish society. Particularly when they gain access to private information during political conflicts and general election campaigns, therefore having information privacy is being considered as a tool to control others. For example, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has used this method to ignore opposition political parties who intended to amend the Kurdistan Regional Presidency Law in June 2015. Furthermore, there is usually a set of civil society institutions involved in consent control that manifests itself in the dissemination values and belief system of the dominant group within the media, education, and popular culture that provides a structure in which a particular form of life and understanding is dominant (Williams 1960). This type of control includes subduing and co-opting dissenting voices and the distribution of the dominant group’s viewpoint as natural and universal, to the point where the dominant practices and beliefs become a stubborn constituent of common sense (Litowitz 2000). By the same token, common sense has been characterized as an idea that, even in the brain of one individual, is incomplete, inconsequential and incoherent, in conformity with the cultural and social position of the people whose attitude is not something immobile and inflexible, but continually altering itself, inspiring itself with scientific philosophies and with philosophical views which have come into being in normal life (Gramsci 1971).

A Gramscian concept of hegemony is related to the nature of hegemony or power, and how this manifests itself through the media and in the relations between the dominant social group and subordinated social group. The dominant group, that is the ruling class or ruling political parties in the case of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), attempts to have the intellectual and moral leadership to achieve hegemony over others. Regarding this study, the professional identity of media workers is shown to be dominated by their media owners, particularly official and unofficial media organizations, which serve to silence opposition from other classes and groups in society.
In this context, the Iraqi Kurdish political parties and their politicians elite control a large proportion of media channels in the Kurdistan Region and this means that the vast majority of Iraqi Kurdish journalists are the mouthpiece of the ruling class or political parties. They also use information privacy invasions of rival candidates and political parties to weaken them in the public eye, in the course of the hegemonic struggle of different political parties for power. Otherwise, the Iraqi Kurdish journalists generally may or may not produce and reproduce private information based on the balance of news values between the right to others' privacy and the public’s right to know.

Given that, this study attempts to answer an essential question; to what extent do the differently positioned Iraqi Kurdish journalists use their professional hegemony to invade the information privacy of various individuals? Within this debate, an essential way to build consent and gain hegemony is, then, to partially use common sense. In a complex process, unequal forces negotiate common sense as the subordination and protection of the workers are organized and reorganized (Exoo 1987). This argument can be applied not only to classes but also to other social groups of unequal power (Hall 1983). Consequently, the Gramscian understanding of common sense is helpful in imagining professionalism hegemony; how it is created as common sense, distributed by media ownerships (including those who are affiliated with the political parties and their politicians elite), widely reproduced in Iraqi Kurdish civil society, then trusted and taken for granted, even by subordinated social groups like the Iraqi Kurdish media workers. In making hegemony as common sense, the media play a significant role as the “key terrain where ‘consent’ is won or lost” (Hall et al. 1978: 220). Likewise, subordinated groups accept the common sense of the ruling class. In other words, the subordinated groups place their implicit trust in the economic and political system, ideology, and the values of the ruling cluster. By itself, hegemony depends on a shared common sense. It depends on a culturally and politically unified society sometime that provides an agreement to be ruled (Keles 2015). This view is true in the case of the political ruling parties’ media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Thus, it can be concluded that the majority of news media workers, through their professional perceptions and praxis, are performing a dominant occupational ideology of journalism. Nonetheless, the professional hegemony of journalists across media is differently interpreted, used, and applied to journalism cultures (Shoemaker and
Reese 1996). A further ideological perspective has been suggested by Reese (2001), who observed it as a global factor of influence on decision-making in journalistic processes. This study will examine how the Iraqi Kurdish journalists make a decision in revealing information about private life. Providing this perspective helps the current researcher to analyze the connection between the content of symbolic media and larger social interests; between the service of power and its construction of meaning. In the context of an occupational ideology, power must be interpreted as the power to explain what is ‘real’ journalism, determined for instance within access to mainstream discussions concerning the quality of journalistic practices (Deuze 2005). Consequently, to clarify the links between journalists’ professional ideology and hegemony, this study has referred to professional ideology in journalism cultures as ‘crystallizations’ of distinct collections of journalism-related ethics, predispositions, and orientations. These are evident in the case of objective journalism when articulated as a dominant professional culture. These professional ideologies thrive in the culture of journalism and define themselves against other ideologies related to journalism conduct. A journalism culture is more than ideology, therefore; it is a site of contestation in which several professional ideologies compete for dominance in understanding identity and social function in journalism (Hanitzsch 2007). With regard to current study, a journalism culture includes the professional worldviews of journalists in the chain of news production. In this sense, hegemony is linked to the theory of power and ideology through negotiating consent. While Gramsci did not accurately write about the hegemony of media practitioners in their contemporary meanings or manifestations, Gramsci’s theorising is suitable for the study of the journalists’ professional role orientations. In other words, Gramsci’s theory proposes a non-reductive method to culture, class, ethnicity, region, and religion using the hegemony concept, which is multi-arena in character and is multi-dimensional. Therefore, this understanding includes not only the “economic and administrative fields alone, but encompasses the critical domains of cultural, moral, ethical and intellectual leadership” (Hall 1983: 8).

Within cultural hegemony theory, the dominant group builds an alliance and forms compromises with various social groups to create hegemony. For that reason, a ‘historical bloc’ can be generated from the union of these social forces (Gramsci 1971). In this sense, a national social order comes from what the historical bloc reproduces
and disseminates. This can mark the beginning of a potential to generate and mimic a nationalist common sense and create moral and intellectual governance over subordinated individuals by consent or force (Keles 2015). In the case of the Kurdistan Region, according to the concept of media hegemony, the media ownerships reproduce and disseminate their ideological common sense onto the Iraqi Kurdish society, particularly those who are affiliated with the ruling class. In other words, the government offers the institutional structure for the execution of hegemonic plans and safeguards ‘the unity of the ruling bloc’ (Joseph 2002). This conceptualisation is helpful to grasp the professionalised common sense and the directions in which Iraqi Kurdish media workers challenge it through hegemonic struggles for the recognition of a professional ideology. Conversely, according to Pratt (2004), Gramsci was unable to show how subordinated groups (workers) can effect change in their struggle or counter-hegemony in a ‘war of position’ inside civil society in a contradiction of the existing hegemony. This is worth bearing in mind in understanding the challenges faced by those Iraqi Kurdish journalists who are not affiliated with political parties or the ruling class. While the concept of counter-hegemony was not applied by Gramsci, it is approximately adopted by the new-Gramscians scholars, such as Schwarzmantel (2009), Pratt (2004) and Joseph (2000). It can be defined as “resistance through the juxtaposition of a subordinated group’s common sense to that of the dominant historical bloc” (Keles 2015: 27). Gramsci differentiates ‘war of manoeuvre’ (frontal attack or sudden incursion) and ‘war of position’ as two types of struggles. The first category relates to further of a tactical than a strategic function (Gramsci 1971), while the second one needs stable penetration and subversion of the multifaceted and multiple devices of ideological dissemination (Femia 1981). This type of struggle needs a long time to create or occupy new locations for alternative moralities, identities, and forms of life inside the boundaries of existing state, economic, and social structures (Carroll and Ratner 1999). Accordingly, the current study focuses on the ‘war of position’ rather than the ‘war of manoeuvre’ in the case study of professionalism role orientations in the Iraqi Kurdish journalism.

In connection with this research, cultural hegemony theory has been investigated in two different ways and means. First and foremost, it is used to understand Western professional norms or the ideology and power of journalists’ professional worldviews over local modes of practicing journalism.
The primary aim here is studying the hegemony of Western journalism cultures over practicing Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures. How and why does the cultural power of Western professional norms affect the Iraqi Kurdish journalism culture? Following this, the theory of cultural hegemony is used to examine the class relationship between the ruling political parties and professional role perceptions of journalists in Iraqi Kurdish society. In recent years, it can be remarked that the ruling class or ruling political parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have been using the companies of media convergence to keep their ideological power and leadership in society. For similar reasons, Gramsci’s theory has applied to conceptualize the exercise of ideological power within consent and coercion in the context of the Kurdish ruling class and their media outlets. Although the Kurdish media is diverse, the professional ideology of the Kurdish journalists is reproduced consistently; therefore, a strong common sense predominates over otherwise differentiated media. Subsequently, the alliance between government and civil society, including Kurdish political parties, non-government organizations, and the media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq will be explained. In this case, the Kurdish journalists challenge the “supremacy of a social group” that “manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971: 57). Besides, the political and ideological influence of the negotiated power struggle in changing media and their news-worker groups, including their tactics, symbols, dreams, concepts, and values, is examined, as is the role of 'intellectual and moral leadership' in the cultural and political reproduction of the hegemonic form 'partisan media' by the politicized process being played out in the media environment of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In addition to the journalistic disagreement, the central areas of journalistic interventionism, distance to ruling powers, and their market orientation are identified, which splits the journalist’s profile into four professional milieus, such as the Detached Watchdog, Critical Change Agent, Opportunist Facilitator, and the Populist Disseminator (see Chapter IV).

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE STUDY

To contribute to the existing literature, the Iraqi Kurdish journalists have been chosen to examine their professional role orientations amongst global journalism cultures in their dealings with information privacy in their daily media coverage. Given that, reviewing political and media transitions to democracy will be the key area of debate in
this study. It measures a significant and timely analysis in an understudied context of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, which is an interesting context in which to examine the power relations between cultural differences in notions of professionalism and privacy in journalism practices. Thus the case of Kurdistan has a significantly contribution to make to the existing literature because the Kurdistan Region of Iraq stands out as a subnational region, which is also part of a nation with aspirations for independence and unification. It is a post-conflict region, while it is also in a country of multiple conflicts, notably religious and ethnic in their nature.

As native speakers call it, Başûrî Kurdistan (Southern Kurdistan) is located in Northern Iraq and declared its a de-facto separation from Iraqi central government following the first Gulf War. It also has been liberated from the Iraqi Baathist regime because of a public uprising since March 1991. When the United States (US) intervened in Iraq under the presidency of George Bush Sr (1989-1993), they established a non-fly-zone to prevent the attacks from Saddam Hussein's regime against the Iraqi Kurdish people. They later participated in the first general elections in 1992, when this election was monitored by external observers who judged it to be ‘free and fair’. Results of the general election led to the formation of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) by the two ruling parties in the capital city of Hewlêr (Erbil). As the two dominant political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) terminated their shared central government due to the Civil War in 1994 and from 1994 to 2005, the KRG remained separately within two administrations lead by the KDP's 'Yellow Zone', and the PUK's 'Green Zone'. After the intervention of the US and its coalition in 2003, the autonomous status of the Kurdistan Region (Herêmi Kurdistan) was officially recognised as an exclusive entity within the federal Republic of Iraq. Also, the forces of Kurdish Pêşmerge (those who stand in front of death) were classified as the legitimate military power of the Kurdistan Region, based on the new Iraqi constitution in 2005 (Hogan and Trumpbour 2013). Hence, political pluralism and media powers flourished, particularly after the 2009 general elections when the opposition parties, including the Gorau - Change Movement (CM), the Yêkirtû - Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Komell - Kurdistan Islamic League (KIL), won more than one-third of the Kurdistan parliament seats. In the following election, Partî - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Yekêtî - the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), as the two old main ruling parties, together with prior opposition parties established the new cabinet for the period between 2013-2017. However, the KDP dramatically suspended the political working of the Change (movement) representatives, including the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, and also his minister colleagues in the KRG due to political conflicts about re-extension of the Kurdistan Presidency term lead by Meşud Barzani. As a result, this event has been locally and internationally described as a coup of the Kurdistan emerging democracy (see Chapter II).

From the comparison study of Hallin and Mancini (2004), it can be concluded that the Mediterranean Model is closest to read and understand the characteristics of the political and media systems in the Kurdistan Region. In this example, the Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures have been shifting from the authoritarian model to the Polarised Pluralist Model. Over the past twenty years, there has been a significant development in the Iraqi Kurdish media practices due to several factors. The first reason refers to the collapse of the former Iraqi central government and the system of the Social Baathist Party (SBP) led by Saddam Hussein. This political change in 2003 produced a free environment and fresh air to journalism practices in the Kurdistan Region and the rest of the new Iraq. Since then, the role of media has changed from defense of the dictatorship to democratisation through producing new media content regulations and establishing lots of partisan and government media outlets. Also, the number of non-partisan and private media companies has grown, and Western advisors have been invited to teach the post-conflict generation of media workers. This media change expanded and introduced society to new-old issues of ethical and legal complications, such as information privacy invasions, which have still remained unresolved. In this context, Kurdish media and its journalism practices have been affected by the political conflicts. In some cases, Kurdish digital media, including social media networks, have become the serious medium for attacking individuals, groups, political parties and prominent figures, in particular during the coverage of the general election campaigns. As a result of this, the period of political crisis becomes the controversial season to measure the trustworthiness of media coverage, as many could easily lose stability through the dissemination of unfair and inaccurate reporting about information privacy of the public figures. In addition to the increasing number of murder and suicide in ‘honour-related crimes’, minority groups and women have
mostly become victims of revealing private information, such as sexual relationships. These attacks are later reproduced by individuals together with journalists in both mainstream and alternative media contexts. This legal and ethical issue results in misusing new media technologies such as the smart mobile phone to invade women’s privacy rights. Accordingly, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament approved the *Law on the Prevention of Abuse of Communications Devices* No. 6 on 20 May 2008, and the *Combating Domestic Violence Law* No. 8 of 2011.

One more reason to examine Kurdish media is the emergence of globalisation and its characteristics within cultural hegemony across the world which have had affected several regions. For instance, media convergence companies are being expanded from West to East and rapidly increasing the number of online activists, including Web journalists, and their ability to voice perspectives along with the transfer of knowledge gained. According to Dashti (2012), journalists are now one of the largest user groups of online digital media to convey new information and produce first-hand news stories as an essential source. This global change led to the decrease in traditional readers of printed media. While the growing influences of new media technology are not being stopped, the extended financial crisis led to a new issue, where most media outlets which are not affiliated with political parties and their elites have closed down or reduced the number of staff and moved to smaller premises. Similar to other places in the world, the number of print readers is decreasing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and business companies stop publishing their advertisements in the mainstream media. In the Iraqi Kurdish context, more than 850 newspapers and magazines along with many television satellite channels have been closed down during the period of 2014 and 2016, when the ISIS battle and a fall in oil prices were being extended (Sbeiy 2016). In contrast, a large number of indirect partisan media organisations, also known in Kurdish literature as the *Midìyayî Siêber* (shadow media), have been financially supported by the prominent political elites and ruling powers. They have robustly expanded their media company to retain the status quo in the Iraqi Kurdish society. For instance, Rûdaw Media Network (RMN) was established on 13 May 2013 and is financially supported by Nêçîrvan Barizani, who has been the Prime Minister of the KRG for the last 12 years. Rûdaw considers itself to be a private media company that struggles to promote human rights, freedom, and democracy in the post-conflict society of Kurdistan (Ismaeli 2015), though Rûdaw has also been defined as a KDP-
dominated media company. In fact, the current Kurdish media environment in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can be well defined as chaotic since the majority of media outlets misrepresent their ownership and quality of information sources (see Chapter III).

Within that assessment, understanding the associations between media ownership and privacy ownership is another key component of this study. Kurdistan in northern Iraq is an interesting context in which to examine the power relations between professionalism and privacy in journalism practices. However, the historical cases from Balkan countries show that post-conflict regions and countries can move from fragility to a stable and functioning state. Political leaders and governments can be held accountable with the passage of time. Since 2005 and then, based on the second round of the general elections, the converged administrations of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (IKRG) has consistently expressed its desire to comply with international standards in the rule of governance and law. In addition, improving the status of media content regulations and providing a free environment for Iraqi journalism practices have been considered as essential aspects of this goal. Even the Iraqi Kurdish government seeks to describe itself as a new democracy, citing its quasi-democratic system in support, but different types of authoritarianism, corruption, and clientelism are still prevalent. This emerging region is still undergoing a period of transition, where a power struggle continues between differently positioned political parties or tribes, who have ideologically manipulated principles of dictatorship and democratization to date. In this transitional region, the development and functioning of the political party system, power sharing, civil society and economic growth are often fragile. This fragility causes serious difficulties in developing a democratic political system and in building a stable and plural society with formal accountability mechanisms and institutions that can hold authorities accountable. This power struggle between the ruling political parties is extensively reflected in the ownership of Iraqi Kurdish media productions. This is why the case of Kurdistan is extremely important to the global debate about respecting the right to privacy and abiding by the rules of professionalism. Accordingly, the hegemonic struggles of the media ownership and privacy ownership will be the main focus of this study in order to critically evaluate the power relations between dominant and subordinated classes in Iraqi Kurdish society with particular regard to its media professionals (see Chapters II and III).
Since the existing study is extensively about political and media transitions to democracy, it could be reasonable here to answer a vital question: Why democratization is more important for developing countries and post-conflict societies like the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. According to Eijaz (2003), one of the main reasons to allow a peaceful resolution of conflicts is that the democracy makes more favorable amongst other models of the government. This point does not mean that the democracy can be adopted as an object to reduce conflicts and build a utopia. Alternatively, a democracy wants to establish institutions, including mass media communications, to prevent such conflicts from exploding into a strong confrontation. In addition to the society’s development, a crucial role can be achieved by mass media. Within all collective dimensions of the nation, the development comprises a frequently powerful invasion of the mass media communications system. When rehabilitating post-conflict countries who are adopting democracy, the mass media communications play a major role. In developing countries, six classical and “essential functions” of mass media communications have been verified as following: 1) To help to teach the necessary skills; 2) to help to extend the effective market; 3) to prepare the people to play their role as a nation among nations; 4) to be the voice of national planning; 5) to prepare people to play their new parts; and 6) to contribute to the feeling of nation-ness (Schramm 1972). In addition to the watchdog role that can be performed by the mass media communications and their professionals as an outstanding function in the democratisation process by establishing a constitutional system for political and media environments that keeps political and media producers accountable to the public. As Voltmer (2006) observed, with determining the actions and orientations of other participants; the media are enthusiastically participatory in the democratisation process. Within this statement, the critical media channels in the Iraqi Kurdistan society are necessary for improving people’s attitudes towards the latest political system. Likewise, “the media’s performance might be of crucial importance in shaping the way in which citizens think about the new political regime” (Voltmer and Schmitt-Beck 2006: 199).

On the contrary, there is evidence that the mass media communications rarely function as a watchdog anymore in the post-conflict countries, and even in some developed countries. For instance, the United Kingdom had the Leveson inquiry, which was a judicial, public inquiry into the culture, practices, and ethics of the British press following a phone hacking scandal related to the News International (see the
Daily Telegraph on 13 July 2011). In the last ten years, the British mainstream media, including a daily middle-market tabloid newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, owned by the Daily Mail and General Trust, has been accused of corruption, churnalism, and propaganda (Byline Investigations 2017). It seems that the recommendations arising from the Leveson Inquiry have been largely ignored by some media organizations and their news workers. This may be seen as a good excuse to increase churnalism and the propaganda model across the world, hence the mimicry in Iraqi Kurdistan of the dark side of the British media model in relation to media intrusion into private life.

1.6. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This dissertation can be contributed an outstanding knowledge in the field of global journalism cultures. It is significant for media content regulators, media workers, and also media violation victims in order to understand the shifting boundaries of privacy phenomena that come from Western cultures. Also, for those post-conflict societies that do not have an adequate regulatory mechanism and best practices for privacy protection. Likewise, it will be useful for people who are not aware of their civil rights. This study will encourage Kurdish barristers and media policy makers to introduce and implement new and effective legislation to regulate the Kurdish media industry and to protect citizens from privacy violations committed by the Kurdish media. Additionally, it contributes to the discussion of privacy ethics amongst media scholars who are interested in studying information privacy as an essential element of the human rights, and professional journalism standards in understanding the level of civil liberties and media freedom in all nations. In journalism education programmes and features, this study is helpful for media students to understand the current developments in international journalism cultures, and the study influences the professional role orientations of local journalists in relation to invasions of privacy rights. Meanwhile, it is necessary to appreciate the professional accountability of journalists when they make a decision about disclosing private information. The importance of this study is to effectively address debates concerning convergence culture features and cultural hegemony theory. This research project will also contribute to current knowledge by providing an investigation into abiding institutional roles, ethical ideologies, and epistemology orientations of global journalism cultures. One of the main motivations of the current study is the lack of scholarly references in the education system of developing countries, which creates a barrier for the post-
conflict media learners who want to improve their professional skills with using native languages (Syan 2015 and Aivas 2013). Another motivation of this study is to include the Kurdish case study among the extensive and global debates on privacy issues, such as the extent to which the news media organisations and journalists are professionally dealing with information privacy or people's private life. Given that, it will make clear to the non-Kurdish speakers the phenomenon of privacy as a Western concept in Kurdish society, furthermore, this research project will contribute to the ongoing discussion about the position of journalism ethics and media content regulations on privacy rights. It will be helpful to the different scholars through providing wider consideration of the connections between the issues of privacy with freedom of expression, media freedom, new media technologies along with its convergent journalism practices, and democratisation processes in post-conflict countries. In addition to the negative consequences of misusing new media technologies on information privacy, this research will be a valuable source for future learners, media experts, and journalists as well as for invasion of privacy victims. Also, this study will be contributed to understanding and rethinking of how information privacy invasions may be restricted in some cases by promoting the professional orientation of journalists, particularly when they need access to private information to do their daily journalistic work. Additionally, confirming the power of partisan and non-partisan media on privacy invasions is an extra knowledge contribution of this study.

1.7. OUTLINE OF THESIS

This thesis involves seven chapters and starts with an introduction chapter of the conceptual discussions inside theoretical background behind choosing the current research topic and its contribution to knowledge. As well as a broad summary of the major aims, objectives, questions, the significance and limitations of the case study. Followed by using the Gramscian concept of the Cultural Hegemony Theory to find out the hegemony struggle of the ruling political class in Iraqi Kurdish society.

The second chapter offers a historical review of the Greater Kurdistan and its media developments in Northern Iraq by providing a brief history of Kurdistan and its autonomous region from the first distribution up to the current date. In addition to providing a historical development of the Iraqi Kurdish media amongst distinct periods of the former and current rule of the Kurds.
The third chapter considers an extensive analysis of the Kurdish media and prominent pillars national democratic public sphere of Kurdistan Region of Iraq based on the Habermas theory of the Public Sphere. Also, Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s framework has been used to understand the current characteristics of the political and media systems in a post-conflict region of Kurdistan that compare with other emerging democracies. Later, the role of political and media systems in the democratization process is presented.

The fourth chapter offers an extensive literature review of the global journalism cultures based on the relevant works of Hanitzsch and his colleagues between 2007-2016. In this chapter, professional role orientations of journalists have been examined to understand the dimensions of journalism cultures across four distinct clusters. This chapter further offers a theoretical debate inside shifting boundaries of privacy cultural differences, and also the academic theories of Solove (2009 and 2006) and Tavani (2007 and 2000) have been used to define the classification of privacy concepts. Prosser (1960)'s four different types of harmful activities within privacy have been applied to understand the common forms of intrusion into private life and types of privacy invasions in Iraqi Kurdish culture. In analysing the Kurdish media cases of information privacy invasions, Gauthier (2002)'s three ethical models of the Kantian, Utilitarian, and the Transfer of power have been observed. In addition to the Priority Model which has been suggested by the current study to evaluate the possibility of preserving and presenting the information privacy or private information of the personalities.

The fifth chapter focuses on the research design and methodology by using three quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection that consist of a case study, in-depth interviews, and a questionnaire survey. This chapter explains the primary procedures for data collection, and also the data analysis used in the current case study is defined.

The sixth chapter provides the descriptive data analysis of data obtained from the interviews and questionnaire survey forms. In this section, the primary results of the case study are categorized in relation to Kurdish journalists’ profiles behind information privacy invasions.
The seventh chapter and finally, the chapters of the research project are included with an extensive discussion of the research findings and further recommendations are given for the future researchers.
Literature Review I:

KURDISTAN IN TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

2.1. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Terminologically, the common motherland of the Kurdish people is named Kurdistan which is located in the Southern of the Caucasus Mountains. Since the twelfth century, the term “Kurdistan” has been in usage and is now widely understood to be located inside reasonably well-defined boundaries (Sheyholislami 2011; McDowall 2004 and Van Bruinessen 1992). Historically, the Greater Kurdistan was first divided across various nations and cultures in the Middle East after the battle of Chaldiran on 23rd August 1514, in which the Ottoman Empire recorded a decisive victory over the Safavid Empire. For the first time, Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq were annexed by the Ottomans from Safavid Iran (Lapidus 2014). The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the re-mapping of the modern Middle East led to the Asia Minor Agreement (AMA), which was a secret agreement between two British and French diplomats, Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot. These two diplomatic representatives started their negotiations in November 1915 and concluded in March 1916. Two months later, the Sykes–Picot Agreement was signed and revealed to the public for the first time on 26th November 1917 in the Manchester Guardian (Sicker 2001). Within the terms and conditions of this agreement, the governments of the United Kingdom of Greater Britain and the French Third Republic, along with the assent of the Russian Empire, demarcated their suggested spheres of authority and control in South Western Asia. They agreed that in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I, should the Triple Entente succeed (Fromkin 1989), the Greater Kurdistan would be divided amongst the new countries of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Although as Beşikçi (2004) pointed out, each of these countries has its own Kurdistan, only Kurdistan has no real national sovereignty. Indeed, after the Arabs, Persians, and Turks, the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East is the Kurds who comprise one of the largest stateless nations in the world (Meho and Maglaughlin 2001). As a result of this, many stateless nations struggled for national identity and independence, whereas others were assimilated into a federative structure and accepted their subordinate position (Oommen 2004).
The breakdown of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 are considered to be three vital events with profound implications for future mass media development, along with the political fate of various nations in Asia and Eastern Europe. This fundamental and substantial transformation arose from the end of the various communist regimes and dictatorships, leading to the restructuring of political and media systems in many countries all over the world. In this sense, all aspects, whether economic, political or social, of the Soviet Bloc were affected, including its mass media communications industry which was utilised as a powerful mechanism in building the new society (Syan 2015; Marin and Lengel 2007; LaMay 2001). According to Krasnoboka and Kees (2004), through approved legislation which favored freedom of speech and media freedom, the governments of the new democracies in former communist and Eastern European countries reformed their media content regulations. In the process of this kind of regime transformation, the influence of mass media communication is complicated as freedom of speech and democratization are only just being acknowledged. Still, system transitions in mass media communications in Eastern and Central Europe remain fraught with difficulty because of the inherited cultures that affect the implementation of the new policies of democratization (Marin and Lengel 2007). Similarly, there are no immediate easy answers to all the questions raised by authoritarian politics; new and sometimes unexpected challenges for mass media communication will be faced during the transitional period. Meanwhile, the reality of the new political system, as well as its media, is likely to fall far short of the outcome anticipated.

Within the authoritarian and emerging democratic framework, mass media communications are expected to play quite complex roles and may have limited time to prepare for the transition to democracy. Then again after a prolonged period of authoritarian rule, new democratic governments are required to learn and adapt to democratic politics; in the same way, norms and routines of professional democratic journalism need to be learned. In this sense, to accommodate new functions and duties within the political system, the sector of mass media communications may have a short time in which to perform a multitude of roles and functions that have not been experienced before. Thus, several serious issues regarding the most suitable system of media structure, organization, and accompanying responsibilities remain unresolved in the rush to reform (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012).
In the case of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, there are various ethical and legal issues around the professional accountability of mass media communications and journalists which are still to be resolved, including media intrusion into people’s private lives. Accordingly, the primary goal of this chapter is a better understanding of Greater Kurdistan transitions and its nationalist struggle to be an independent state. Later, the characteristics of Iraqi Kurdish society and its political system from dictatorship to democracy will be evaluated. All of these will be helpful in answering some critical questions of whether Kurdistan as a post-conflict region in the Middle East has completely left its former dictatorship stage. Is it still moving forward towards democracy or backsliding towards more authoritarian practices? Would comparisons be possible with other newly “democratized” countries in the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and Asia, which have been through similar political and media transitions? How does the transnational case study of the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq contribute to the existing literature, and how does this non-Western case relate to the global debates on journalistic professionalism and understanding of privacy? To answer these and other, related questions, this chapter begins by laying out and arguing for the case study of Kurdistan and its contribution to the current literature.

2.2. GREATER KURDISTAN AND KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Let's firstly focus on the historical context of the largest part of Greater Kurdistan which is nowadays located in Eastern and Southeastern of Turkey, Northern Iraq, Western Iran, Northern and Northeastern Syria, Armenia, and the Azerbaijan (see Figure 2.1). In these regional states, the Kurdish people are among the largest groups claiming the status of a stateless nation (Gunter 2005; Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996). In the modern world, one of the strongest forces for the gaining of political rights is nationalism (Billig 1995; Hutchinson and Smith 1994). In the 20th century, Kurdish nationalism was mainly advanced as a stateless ethnic reaction in opposition to the authoritarian official state nationalisms of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (Gunter 2013). Kurdish nationalism can be defined as a political movement of a particular group, who feel the need to be separated from others by culture, history, and language, all of which are related to the concept of nation.
Moreover, the ethnicity of a state and the idea of nationalism are linked together through the process by which a dominant ethnic ideology is developed by an ethnic group of a nation. Thus, symbolism and particular ideology are required from the successful nationalist movement (Arakelyan 2013).

Figure 2-1: The regional distribution of Great Kurdistan in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria

Source: Pronk Palisades (2014)

In exploring the emerging paradigms of Kurdish nationhood in the Middle East, Arakelyan (2013) examined the role of Southern Kurdistan in developing Kurdish nationhood in Syria, Iran, and Turkey, arguing that the central governments of these countries have always suppressed the growth of Kurdish nationalism movements. Within this region and also in the diaspora, Kurdish nationalist movements have been inspired by developments in the Kurdistan autonomous region in Northern Iraq, although this region has less influence over northern and western parts of Greater Kurdistan. Indeed, the Kurdish diaspora has been influenced in the 1980s, and increasingly in the 1990s by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and its ideology has been put in practice in Kurdish areas of Syria since 2014.
However, Arakelyan (2013) observed that the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Syria led to the development of cultural and political autonomy. In the case of Iran, recognition of fundamental rights, including political activities is often demanded by the Kurdish political parties. In Turkey, the Kurdish nationalist movement is mainly concerned with recognition of Kurdish democratic autonomy and cultural rights.

According to O’Leary and Salih (2005), establishing a Great Kurdistan was not a more realistic and practical goal due to many internal and external factors. Any autonomous entity for the Kurdish people had been refused by the countries of Turkey, Iran, and Syria, as they considered that this autonomy would bring the Kurds one step closer to demanding a sovereign state from south to north, and from east to west of Greater Kurdistan. As Sheyholislami (2011) argues, any pan-Kurdish ambition could seriously damage regional activities and struggles to guarantee more cultural and political rights for the Kurdish people in states other than Iraq. Consequently the Southern Kurdistan declared an unofficial separation from the rest of Iraq in 1991, which led to the formation of the semi-autonomous entity constitutionally inside the new Republic of Iraq since 2005.

In February 2016, Mes’ud Barzanî, as President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, called political parties for preparation in holding a referendum on the Kurds’ statehood. He believed that Kurdistan has just as much of a historical, geographic, and human rights case as Scotland, Catalonia, Quebec, and others do. “The same way people in those places have the right to decide their future the Kurds too have that right and this is not open to argument” (EKurd Daily News 2016). A few days later, Alireza Ayati, a leading Iranian nationalist analyst replied to Barzanî, confirming that some countries have shown support for Kurdish independence in secret, but no state has endeavored to help them practically. He maintained that the Kurdistan State would destabilize the Middle East, due to Israel with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria being the only groups that would benefit from the possible independence of the Kurdistan Region. Hence, a united Iraq is needed for regional and international security (Rûdaw 2016). On the contrary, Ismail Beşikçi, a Turkish sociologist, voiced support for the referendum and Kurdish independence. For him, nothing could stop the Kurdish people if they wanted independence, Beşikçi claimed that 95% of the vote would be in favor of statehood (Rûdaw 2015). Likewise, a former British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said that:
Today’s reality is that Iraq and Syria as we have known them are gone. The Islamic State has carved out a new entity from the post-Ottoman Empire settlement, mobilizing Sunni opposition to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Iran-dominated government of Iraq. Also emerging, after years of effort, is a de facto independent Kurdistan. (Rûdaw 2015)

Regardless of positive and negative perspectives, it can be seen that building an independent state of Kurdistan is a historic dream of the Kurdish people, not only for those who are living in northern Iraq but also for all Kurds across the world. More than eight decades ago, a Kurdish historian, Emîn Zekî Beg, declared that the extent to which the Scottish people converted to become English would be the same for the Kurdish people in becoming Iraqi (Beg 1935). The reality of this view is correct for other Kurdish populations in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. However, addressing the internal issues, such as cultural as well as political factors, and economic infrastructures, have become the most significant priorities for the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.

2.2.1. Kurdish People Struggle: 1900-1991

The contemporary roots of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq specifically developed after the First World War as a reaction to the efforts to construct “a modern Arab state that would permit no more than a minimal amount of Kurdish autonomy” (Gunter 2013: 36). Chronologically, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Kurdish-populated areas in the oil-rich Ottoman vilayet of Mosul were occupied by the British forces. Later, Mosul became a new province of the Iraqi state under British mandate along with Emir Faysal, appointed as the first king of Iraq (Syan 2015; Mawlood 2011 and BBC 2011).

Şêx Meîmûd Berîncî (1878-1956) was an influential Kurdish leader of several uprisings who started the first nationalist revolution against the British mandate on 22nd May 1919. He declared a Kurdish Kingdom (1922-1924) and became the first King of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. In 1920, the defeated Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sèevres under the agreement of the League of Nations that offered the Kurdish people settlement in the vilayet of Mosul according to Article 64 that was considered the best option for a future independent country of Kurdistan. However, the Treaty of Sèevres was rejected by the Turkish parliament after Kemal Ataturk's
Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, alternatively, the new Treaty of Lausanne was signed, but was not favorable to the Kurds' demands for autonomy (Mawlood 2011). This situation encouraged another rebel Kurdish leader, Mela Mustafa Barzani, to lead several uprisings in the 1930s, eventually controlling the vast areas of Badinan and Erbil in northern Iraq in 1943. Barzani fled to the Soviet Union in 1946 when the Republic of Mahabad (Komarî Mehabad) collapsed under the attack of Iranian forces. In this case, Qazi Muhammed, a Kurdish leader from Eastern Kurdistan (Iran), founded the first independent Kurdistan Republic (1946-1947) in the capital city of Mahabad in Northwest Iran. While Barzani remained in exile, a new generation of Kurdish nationalists nominated him as the president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Meanwhile, İbrahim Eşme, the de facto leader of Barzani’s party, preferred close ties with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). After many years in hiding, Barzani returned from exile as a consequence of the Kurdish national rights being recognized in 1958 by a new Iraqi constitution that permitted Kurdish political movements to organize political activities openly. From then to the end of the 1960s, the Kurdish opposition groups and the Iraqi government had troubled relationships, culminating in the government’s failure to dissolve Barzani’s party after Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq (Romano 2006). Following a long history of fierce fighting and conflict, the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish opposition parties, including Barzanî's KDP, signed an Autonomy Agreement on 11th March 1970 to establish Kurdistan as an autonomous entity. During the peace period (1970-1974), the Iraqi constitution was amended to assert that the Kurds and Arabs are the two main nationalities of the Iraqi people. Similarly, the two official languages of the country are Kurdish and Arabic. The peace agreement was terminated in March 1974 when the Kurds refused the Iraqi regime conditions for controlling the oilfields of Kirkuk under Iraqi Arab-dominated central government rule. Another round of bloody conflict and uprisings ensued. The Kurdish rebellion collapsed due to the cessation of Iranian support based on the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran on 6th March 1975, which led Barzani to withdraw from the political arena and four years later he died.

On 1st June 1975, the Kurds’ New Revolution (KNR) started from the city of Damascus in Syria, declaring the establishment of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Celal Tallebanî, a former senior member of the KDP. After several political conflicts, the KDP and PUK military forces, as the major Kurdish parties in
Northern Iraq, joined with a smaller number of Kurdish factions to build the Kurdistan Front (bereyi Kurdistanî) in 1987, led by Mes'ud Barzani and Celal Tallebanî. In the final stages of the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), the Iraqi government commenced the al-Anfal ethnic cleansing campaigns, which were genocide operations conducted in eight different phases between February and September 1988. In these campaigns, six geographical areas were targeted, in which more than 2600 Kurdish villages were destroyed.

The “Anfal” concept, meaning “spoils of war”, is the title of the eighth chapter or Surat of al-Anfal in the Qur'an. It refers to the Muslim prophet in the wake of his initial jihad against the non-believers. This concept was used by the earlier army of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime in a series of military campaigns. Based on their ethnicity, the central target of the Iraqi government was principally the Kurdish Muslims, and then other non-Arab populations in the North of Iraq; for instance, Kurdish Shabaks; Kurdish Yazidis; Mandeans; Assyrians, and Turkmens. By using the term “Anfal”, the Iraqi government planned to prepare support from inside the state and to legitimize the process in Muslim society, representing the Kurdish people as a non-Muslim nation.

In the extensive report on The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published the details of that process. These military campaigns have been described as the systematic attempt and deliberate genocide of at least 50,000, and up to 100,000 Kurdish civilians and fighters ended up in mass graves, with hundreds of thousands more forced into exile. As a consequence of gas attacks, bombardment, and the ordeals of the exodus to Turkey and Iran, many more died in the Topzawa, Nûgra Salman, Dibis, Salamy, and Nizarka camps (Hardi 2011 and Black 1993). As a result of this and earlier episodes, it can only be concluded that the Kurdish nationalist struggles between the period of 1900 and 1991 have faced a series of considerable and significant obstacles, including the historic problem of non-united Kurdish people across the diaspora along with the long-standing lack of internal and international support.
2.2.2. Kurdish People Authority: 1991 and the present

More than two weeks before the New Kurdish Year (Newroz) on 21st March 1991, the Kurdish people in the north and Shi’as in the south of Iraq rose up against the ruling Ba’ath regime. Despite significant casualties, the Kurdish Pêşmerge freedom-fighters succeeded in claiming the north from the Iraqi army in October 1991. To protect the Shi’ite Muslims and the Kurdish people, the aircraft patrols of the American, British, and French declared two separate no-fly zones (NFs). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 banned all Iraqi aircraft, including helicopters from flying inside both Northern and Southern Zones (Syan 2015 and BBC 1998). The aftermath of the First Gulf War in 1991 led to the former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, withdrawing his forces and official administrations from the Kurdish governorates of Erbil (Hewlêr), Slêmanî, and Dhok in the North of the country (see Figure 2.2).

After decades of Ba’ath Party rule (1968-2003), a general election was arranged by the Kurdistan Front (Bereyi Kurdistanî) in the face of the challenges presented by a double embargo and an administrative vacuum imposed by the Iraqi government. At the beginning of the democratization process and polarized pluralism, the first parliamentary election in the history of Iraqi Kurds occurred on 19th May 1992. The BBC News Network (2011) revealed that the candidates of Tallebani’s PUK gained 49.2% of the vote while Barzanî’s KDP took 50.8%. Finally, the results of these regional elections accepted to build the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) for three essential functions: Firstly, to examine proposals for new laws; secondly, to scrutinize government policy and, thirdly, administration, along with debating the major issues of the day. One of the primary KNA decisions was to retain the Kurdistan Region as part of Iraq and to abide by all national laws that did not violate universal and human rights. Then, to fill the administrative vacuum, the first cabinet of the KRG was formulated from the winning political parties, including the KDP and the PUK (see http://cabinet.gov.krd). Nevertheless, the new Kurdish entity was marked by a bitter Civil War in 1994 between the KDP and PUK military forces who distributed the region of Kurdistan administration into the subsequent Yellow and Green Zones. These split administrations following the Civil War mean that the provinces of Dhok and Erbil have become the central areas of the Yellow Zone, which is monopolized by the tribe of Barzani, who controls the KDP and exercises influence over the economy, security, and politics.


Conversely, the Green Zone involves the province of Slêmanî which is monopolized by the tribe of Tallebanî, who controls the PUK and exercises similar spheres of local influence (see Figure 2.3). Yellow and Green Zones are exhorted by Barzanî and Tallebanî tribes to advance their private interests within the legislative, executive, and judicial powers that receive support from the KDP and PUK media hegemony (The Pasewan 2015).

In the 2000s, the PUK’s Celal Tallebanî and KDP’s Mes’ud Barzanî both took part in the American-led military campaign against the former Iraqi central government to defeat the autocratic regime of Saddam Hussein. In June 2002, the Kurdish parliamentarians convened the first session of parliament after the Civil War in the capital city of Erbil. During a transitional meeting, they agreed to work together until fresh elections were held. On 9th April 2003, Kurdish Pêşmerge forces, along with American troops, participated in liberating Iraq, particularly in the Kurdish areas of Mosul and Kirkuk. In June 2005, the new round of the Kurdistan National Assembly chose Maş’ud Barzanî as the first president of the Kurdistan autonomous region within the new Republic of Iraq.
Four years later, the KRG exported 90,000-100,000 oil barrels a day from two northern oilfields to foreign markets, and the new Iraqi central government allowed its pipeline to be used in return for a division of revenues from the general budget. Economically, this extraordinary step encouraged Iraqi Kurdish leaders to think of faster independence, but the political and economic crises in later years led to several uprisings against the Kurdistan Regional Government in response to failures to provide monthly employees’ salary. On 25th July 2009, the strongest opposition party, the Change Movement (Gorran), won 25 of 111 seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, a development that seriously threatened the coalition of the KDP and PUK ruling parties (BBC 2011). Since then, the process of democratization and political pluralism has gradually accelerated, but the senior officials of the KDP and PUK have found it difficult to accept their failures and abdicate their powers according to democratic principles (The Pasewan 2015).
On 20th August 2015, after twice-extended terms of the Kurdistan Region Presidency, Mas'ud Barzanî refused to hand over power, which generated several issues for the legislative bodies. As a result, the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, Dr. Yousif Mohammed Sadiq, who was leading the opposition to the KDP’s efforts to maintain Barzanî in office, announced that Barzanî had lost his legitimacy. That event led to a termination of the KRG cabinet after the Gorran’s ministers or official representatives were banned from returning to their offices in Erbil. Afterward, the KRG was blamed for the defeat of the emerging democratic process, including freedom of expression and media freedom, of the Kurdistan public sphere (Al-Monitor 2015).

2.3. SOUTHERN KURDISTAN AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM

To read and understand existing media and political systems in Kurdistan’s transitions to democracy, it is valuable to re-examine the Three Models of Media and Politics as delineated by Hallin and Mancini (2004), along the Polarized Pluralist, Democratic Corporatist, and the Liberal Models. These models were compared to four Atlantic, five Southern European, and nine Northern European countries into Western democracies. The significance of this comparison for this study lies in its use of applicable and systematic approaches to analyzing similarities and differences in the relationships between political and media systems in the Kurdistan Region (Herêmi Kurdistan).

From Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) comparison can be understood that while each of the three models has certain distinctive features, the model of Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist bears the closest resemblance to the core characteristics of the political and media systems in the Northern Iraq, where defined as “the region of Kurdistan and its existing regional and federal authorities, at the time this constitution comes into force” (Iraqi Constitution 2005: Article 113). Constitutionally, a decentralized capital, regions, governorates, and the local administrations are created by the Iraqi Republic federal system (Ibid: Article 112). Concerning powers of the Kurdistan Region, it can be stated that:
The regional authorities shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this constitution, except for those powers stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government. ... In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the federal government, the regional authority shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. ... Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties, but having regard to its resources, needs and the percentage of its population. ... The regions and governorates shall establish offices in the embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow up cultural, social and developmental affairs. ... The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces and guards of the region. (Iraqi Constitution 2005: Article 117)

From the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, five core characteristics of the political system can be discussed in this chapter, including the political history; patterns of conflict and consensus; consensus or majoritarian government; individual versus organized pluralism; and the role of the State in relation to rational-legal authority (see Table 2.1). Along the Mediterranean model, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has a long political history of successive periods of conflict and consensus that have led to postponement of stages of democratization, and a current state of polarized pluralism in reality. The only federated region in the Republic of Iraq, also an autonomous entity of the Great Kurdistan, is the Kurdistan Region, which is a parliamentary democracy. This system comprises the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), or parliament involving 111 seats, the Kurdistan Region Presidency (KRP), and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is located in Northern Iraq, the capital city being Erbil (Hewlêr), in addition to further three governorates of Dhîok, Slêmanî, and Hellebice that cover nearly 41,710 square kilometers. The four governorates have an estimated population of more than eight million citizens and immigrants who, separately from Kurds, also consist of the internally displaced, refugees, ethnic and religious groups of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmen, Armenians, and Arabs. Arabic being the official, most widely spoken language, Kurdish, which belongs to the Indo-European languages family, is the second official language of Iraq. During the Iraqi political crisis of 2014, the Kurdish Pêşmerge forces took over much of the disputed territories of the north; now they are informally under the control of the Kurdistan Region, which is often called Southern Kurdistan (Başûrî Kurdistan).
### TABLE 2-1: Three models of political system characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model</th>
<th>North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model</th>
<th>North Atlantic or Liberal Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.g. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>E.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td>E.g. Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political History; Patterns of Conflict and Consensus</td>
<td>Late democratization; polarized pluralism</td>
<td>Early democratization; moderate pluralism (except Germany, Austria pre-1945)</td>
<td>Early democratization; moderate pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus or Majoritarian Government</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Predominantly consensus</td>
<td>Predominantly majoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual vs. Organized Pluralism</td>
<td>Organized pluralism; strong role of political parties</td>
<td>Organized pluralism; history of segmented pluralism; democratic corporatism</td>
<td>Individualized representation rather than organized pluralism (especially United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the State</td>
<td>Dirigisme, strong involvement of state and parties in economy; periods of authoritarianism, strong welfare state in France and Italy</td>
<td>Strong welfare state; significant involvement of state in economy</td>
<td>Liberalism; weaker welfare state particularly in United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational-Legal Authority</td>
<td>Weaker development of rational-legal authority (except France); clientelism</td>
<td>Strong development of rational-legal authority</td>
<td>Strong development of rational-legal authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hallin and Mancini (2004: 68)
The post-conflict region of Kurdistan has three main bordering neighbors, involving the Kurdish-inhabited regions of Turkey to the north, Syria to the west, and Iran to the east. In 1993, when the Kurdish Penal Code was formulated, Law No. 10 concerned regulation of the print media. Additionally, the Political Parties Law No. 17 provided for political pluralism, with political parties legally permitted to pursue their political rights and to have their own partisan media outlets. Consequently, the process of democratization, such as voting and political pluralism within opposition civil powers, flourished in recent decades, particularly after the 2009 general elections when the opposition parties won more than one-third of the Kurdistan Parliament seats. As Soderberg and Phillips (2015) revealed that the Kurdistan Region, during the period of self-rule starting in October 1991, expanded its economy and democratic institutions.

Based on the revenues gained from the oil sector, the Iraqi Kurdish government developed its infrastructure and supported construction projects embracing the launch of several universities, and developed good relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey. However, the Iraqi central government suspended its allocation to the KRG budget in February 2014 in reaction to disagreements over the export of Kurdish oil. Furthermore, progress was stalled when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked in August 2014. Despite this, approximately twenty political parties are operating today in conditions of partial tolerance. Among of them, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); the Change Movement (CM); Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) have formed the existing cabinet of the Iraqi Kurdistan government without the strongest opposition political parties. In other words, the political system of the Kurdistan Region is recently by consensus and predominantly majoritarian in a difficult period of governance. Hence, there is a substantial role for political parties regarding individual versus organized pluralism, rather than the official bodies. Within this system, no political party has comprised the whole cabinet; the two ruling parties, KDP and PUK, have semi-equally divided the KRG into two political zones since the beginning of Iraqi Kurdish Civil War in 1994. Given that reason, the trust levels of the Iraqi Kurdish journalists on social institutions, political business, and the state were examined in this study by suggesting a number of formal internal and external organizations (see Figure 2.4).
The participant journalists were asked to indicate their trust levels on five response options ranging from “complete trust,” “a great deal of trust,” “some trust,” “little trust,” to “no trust at all.” As results show, maximum of the respondents had no trust at all in the following institutions; politicians in general (44.1%); big corporations (39.7%); trade unions (37.9%); religious leaders (36.9%); political parties (35.9%), and the military (30.1%). A not dissimilar number of participants had some trust toward the news media (36.7%); the police (32.8%); charitable or voluntary organizations (30.9%), and the United Nations (30.5%). Interestingly, 11.15% of the participants had a complete trust on the Kurdistan Regional Parliament, Government, and the judiciary or the courts. These results show that the Iraqi Kurdish journalists largely do not trust politicians.

Figure 2-4: The Kurdish journalists trust on social institutions, political business, and the state.

According to aforementioned results, the role of the Iraqi Kurdistan government is weaker than that of the ruling political parties who exercise substantial intervention in all parts of daily life, including socio-cultural sectors, economics, politics, and media. This may have led to decreases in the trust levels of the Iraqi Kurdish journalists in these institutions because the ruling political parties of both tribes, of Meş'ud Barzani and Celal Tallebanî, have been monopolizing the Yellow and Green Zones of the Kurdistan Region.
Still, they are proud of their families’ revolutionary history in building the current self-governance of the KRG and its bodies which have become fully institutionalized so far, this primarily because of the influences and controls of older politicians. One of the richest political families in post-conflict region of Kurdistan is led by Mes‘ud Barizanî, who has been president for more than 35 years. Barizanî took over the presidency of the KDP from his father in 1979; he has also been the Kurdistan Regional President since 2005. A few years ago, Barizanî refused to hand over power on 30th July 2013 when two legal terms of presidency ended, then, based on the agreement with PUK, his time was extended to 19th August 2015. After his presidency term had been extended twice, Barizanî was still not prepared to hand over power, which created a massive political crisis in the Kurdistan Region. On 12th October 2015, Barizanî prevented the Speaker of Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament from returning to his office in Erbil due to his role in amending the 2013 Presidency Law. Number two in the Barizanî tribe is Mes‘ud’s nephew and son-in-law, Nêçîrvan Barizanî, who is currently vice president of the KDP, and has been the KRG’s Prime Minister since 1999, excluding the period of 2009-2011. In the meantime, he has cultivated extensive business relationships, mainly with Turkish companies, that have caused him to become better-known as a wealthy businessman than as a professional politician.

Following, the third character of the KDP leadership council is Mes‘ud’s eldest son, Mesirur Barizanî. He is the chief of the Dezgayi Parastin (intelligence agency), and has also been a chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC) since 2nd May 2011.

On the contrary, Celal Tallebanî initially developed as a political leader and founded the PUK in 1975, and still remains the general secretary after more than 40 years. He became the first Kurdish president of the Iraq in 2005, starting continguously with his close family and relatives, who are now prominent in the businesses and politics environment of the Kurdistan Region. He is currently quite ill and inactive in public life, but his family, particularly his wife, Héro İbrahim Efmed, have been dominant in the political decisions and the security, wealth, and media apparatus of the PUK. Celal’s second son, Qubad Tallebanî, leapfrogged several smart politicians to become deputy prime minister of the KRG. The tribe of Tallebanî extends to Qubad’s cousin, Lahur Tallebanî, who runs the anti-terror and Dezgayi Zaniyari (information intelligence agency) of the PUK.
Tallebanî’s party monopolizes most of the Green Zone, thus it is clear that the economic wealth, political power, and the hegemony of Kurdish media are monopolized by two tribes. In this sense, the Tallebanî and Barizanî families are now competing to become the wealthiest tribes inside and outside Iraqi Kurdish society. However, their only differences extend to international investment companies being invited to become business partners, mostly in the Yellow Zone, by the Barizanî tribe, whereas commercial partnerships with domestic firms have been developed by the Tallebanî tribe (The Pasewan 2015). In March 2016, after participating in a forum on the future of ISIS at the American University of Iraq-Slêmanîya, an American journalist, Thomas Friedman, stated that Tunisia and Iraqi Kurdistan are two fledgling democracies to have emerged in the Middle East. He also described the Kurdistan Region as a self-ignited democracy experiment, where, for example, it is considered desirable to emulate the liberal arts through building two American-style Universities in the cities of Slêmanî and Dhok. Despite this, he has explicitly criticized the Kurdish emerging democratic model as follows:

The Kurdish government, which was allowing a strong opposition party to emerge and a free press, is now backtracking, with its president, [Mes'ud Barizanî], refusing to cede power at the end of his term, and the stench of corruption is everywhere. The Kurdish democratic experiment is hanging by a thread. More U.S. aid conditioned on Kurdistan’s getting back on the democracy track would go a long way. (Friedman 2016)

Taking the above perceptions into account, it can be concluded that regarding rational-legal authority, the Kurdistan autonomous region has had a weaker development which has only produced the 2007 Press Law No. 35, rather than a general legislation for media content regulation in more detail. The 2007 Law is related to publications and does not cover broadcasting and converging media; this also represents a large shortcoming, preventing the law from regulating the bulk of media output. To date, the intellectual and political elites’ view of journalism has been very traditional, being mostly restricted to print. In addition to this, there is a fear among Iraqi Kurdish media-policymakers, media regulators and media professionals that the introduction of such laws would narrow their freedom of expression and media freedom, prominently in relation to the individual's right to privacy and the public's right to know information. Likewise, corruption, favoritism, and clientelism are common phenomena in the Kurdistan Region, which lead to the likely non-implementation of precisely such regulations or legislations. All reasons lead to the current study to further focus on the role of mass media communications into democratizing the post-conflict society. This valuable to measure the core characteristics of the media system in the Iraqi Kurdistan legislations which will be explained in the following sections.
2.4. SOUTHERN KURDISTAN AND THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

Within political and media transitions inside wider cultures of democratization, several scholars have reiterated that the media platforms are principally influenced by means of transformation of a political society from authoritarian rule to a democratic system. In regime transitions, mediated political communications play crucial multiple roles simultaneously, including watchdog; stabilizer; agitator; mobiliser; socializer, and educator. In addition to transparency and accountability, checks and balances are carried out by mass media when necessary for political productiveness and governance in a democratic culture, in producing the basis for political legitimacy and the agreement of new political patterns, routines, and practices. Citizen journalism and social media networks, including Facebook or Twitter, and blogs are new kinds of non-mediated communications which afford public space to the democratic principle of active public participation (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012; Voltmer and Rawnsley 2009; Rawnsley 2005; Mc Cargo 2002 and Skidmore 1993).

In today’s changeable world, significant sources of civic education and legitimization of democratic power are developed via mass media communications. Through their intercommunications with the convergent media of television, radio, magazines, and newspapers the political elites’ arguments meet dissident discourses and legitimize themselves. Within the daily media, including news bulletins, several ideas are consolidated with a general understanding of political institutions, political values, and the political authority of the state. In this sense, as the daily media methods of production and consumption have emerged on the national and international agenda, the feeling and concept of nations of the world are more solidly consolidated (Moreno 2006). For Weber and Grosz (2009), promoting mass media amongst individuals in society to generate public opinion has been identified as the primary function of the media, and also this is a crucial precondition for transition to democracy. Henceforth, the mass media communications can be used as a powerful medium for strengthening democracy through multiple information and opinions. Besides, they can be deemed as necessary for electoral democracy due to informing voters of relevant information that may encourage voters to consciously and voluntarily participate in the elections process.
The mass media communications also enable people to create conscious decisions with regard to their choices, although to deliver a true democracy, these media platforms will be required to be independent economically and detached from political and government institutions (De Smaele 2006). Out of the above considerations, one of the key debates of this research project arises regarding the importance of the role of media platforms in transitions to new democratic systems, which is a considerable process of ‘social experiments' affecting whole aspects of daily life. This effective process creates unique possibilities for developing logical and practical understandings of the democratic bodies functioning in distinctive political and cultural contexts (Voltmer 2006). As a result of this, the transitional progression to democracy has been determined according to three common pathways:

I. Transitions from the communist systems to democracy, such as in some Eastern and central European countries when divided from the former Soviet Union;

II. Transitions from military dictatorships to democracy, comprising the European countries of Portugal and Spain along with South America;

III. Transitions from a one-party dictatorship to a democratic country, including Africa, the Southeast Asian countries of Southern Korea, and Taiwan (Voltmer 2008: 26).

By using features of these pathways, the role of media transitions to democracy in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can be read and understood. Generally, the former Republic of Iraq was ruled and dominated by a single Arab Ba’athist Socialist Party (ABSP), led by Saddam Hussein between 1968 and 2003. During this period, a compound of these three pathways took effect, and also a bloody military coup supporting the Ba’athist Party led to rule of Iraq by the military dictatorship of one socialist party for nearly 35 years. In this case, keeping the territorial integrity of Iraq with regard to external threats, particularly from the State of Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and an ideological education and development of the country were the principal justifications for Saddam Hussein's continued power. While Israel has militarily never threatened Iraqi state but Saddam and his regime have claimed that Israel will attack Iraq, in doing so Saddam has created an imagined enemy for domestic politics and consolidation of his power in Iraq.
In addition, each minister or senior official within the government had a high military position, while the commander in chief of all of the armed forces, and the president of the state, were commanded by Hussein. Normally, within transformations of regime from a military or totalitarian dictatorship to a democratic system, countries will experience a period of instability in the media, culture, economics, politics and all aspects of society. Frequently, such a transformation process arises when an emerging tenuous democracy occurs in these societies (Syah 2015; Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012). In many new democracies, conflicts have been described as the result of political parties having no central organizing force in political life due to the lack of organizational power and the clear ideological profile of their Western European counterparts. On the contrary, other groups and division interests develop, such as regional affinities, religions, ethnicity, clientelism, or simply individual charismatic leaders rise to prominence. In some cases, a new conflict line in its own right comes from the conflict between support for the current and the former regime (Voltmer 2008).

In the case of the Kurdistan Region, it can be determined that the former Iraqi regime (1968-2003) was being rejected by Iraqi Kurdish people, who have been divided again by the KRG into pro and anti Iraqi government factions (2003-present). For most participants who have been interviewed in this research project, the Iraqi federal government and the KRG do not trust each other as they have not fully committed to their agreed settlements on the political and financial conflicts, including the oil deals. This situation also led to cuts in the Kurdistan public budget since 2014 by the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki (2006-2014).

Up to the present time, the Iraqi central government refuses to send the KRG’s share of oil revenue. Meanwhile, the KRG has independently produced and traded its oil and natural sources without coming back to the central government. In spite of this, the KRG is still not providing a standard budget for its monthly salaries for a governmental employee, or for services and project investments due to the corruptions of the KRG’s dominant ruling parties and their non-transparency on natural resources, including the agreements on oil and gas. Thus, a new conflict has arisen since the Kurdish people are split between those who support the current government of the Kurdistan Region and the former regime on the one hand, and the current Iraqi government on the other.
In such post-conflict countries and new democracy societies like Kurdistan Region, the genuine existence of the free media, and the resulting ambiguities has been an enduring controversy. In this case, the level of relationships between democratization and media freedom is being proportionally developed. Likewise, the political powers have been frequently required to provide enhanced freedom of speech and civil liberties. These processes will be accommodated to cultivate democracy, as media freedom needs thoughtfully formulated and debated public policies which deliver the basis for a pluralistic and well-funded free media, since democracy without such policies is impossible (Bole 2008). In any country, one of the most frequently noted standards for a state of democracy is the extent of independent media platforms. From transitional countries to full democracy models, similarities in political, economic and civil society aspects can be readily seen, but the sector of mass media communications struggle to operate separately from the political parties and their elite controls. Based on the political system, financial circumstance, social situation and other features of societal life in emerging democratic societies, a supportive environment for freedom of speech and media content regulation are crucial. In the meantime, a different monopoly, concerning media deregulation and globalization, has replaced state power as the driving force in the mass media communications sector. Despite this, some of the government's senior officials may be connected; consequently, the media messages are influenced by various interests. Reciprocally, due to allowed foreign investment in diverse aspects of emerging democracies, global organizations and other groups have driven the choice of particular policies in support of their intentions. In addition, these foreign investors and their financiers may also have their own private plans and agendas (Syan 2015 and Voltmer 2008). For instance, a non-government and non-profit organization of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); delivers American values to its partners, beneficiaries, and donors with its holistic, people-centered approach to connections supporting media content developments and reporting styles from Western journalism cultures. This media support can be seen as part of the cultural hegemony theory which is globally directed by the USA and all of these have been confirmed by the participants of this study.

While multimedia platforms struggle to serve public interests of the economic improvement, political stability, and also the national unity in maximum new democratic cultures, the governments in transition countries are frequently adopting these claims as an instrument to dominate the media contexts in their own society.
For that reason, misuse of media administration can be one of the main barriers hindering developments in mass media communications, which are also used as a medium to serve authoritarian governments and their privately funded sources. In addition to the media platforms which are expected to endeavor to work freely when these transformations occur can also lead to disputes between multimedia outlets and the new power elites.

Within many emerging democracies, governments usually place restrictions on the professional practicing of the media through the use of court proceedings. For example, many forms of perceived threats to national security as blasphemy, libel or defamation, and violations of national security or other emergency regulations. This judiciary system presents another obstacle to the media platforms since it is not normally well-functioning in emerging democratic societies. The previous political regime and its governmental and nongovernmental bodies had often dominated the news media as a way of achieving their goals. Journalists’ licensing requirements and severe limitations on universal human rights of access to governmental public information are characteristics of several emerging nations. Given that the new government, purposely or accidentally, may be powerless to grant secure protection for journalists’ freedom of expression, resulting in grave threats, as a result they may be threatening to manipulate journalistic outcomes. In this sense, both journalists and politicians have depended on the quality of political negotiations as ways of addressing the citizen’s needs. Also, any shortage of variety in the “marketplace of ideas”, or lack of critical debate or low quality of information, are not isolated issues for the media. This, additionally, is a result of the particular limitations growing from the relationships of media platforms with audiences and politicians, as well as the ways in which politicians convey their messages to voters (Syan 2015 and Voltmer 2008).

Another barrier in front of media freedom in post-conflict and emerging democracies can be that of financial support, as independent funding sources are considered a crucial condition for building independent, powerful media channels with skills and expertise. In this research project, the majority of the participants' perspectives have confirmed that the Iraqi Kurdish private sector of media organizations, particularly those who are not affiliated with political parties and their stakeholder elites in the KRG, are helpless or unable to attract their own independent media investments.
In some cases, private media platforms sector cannot pay monthly salaries to their editorial staff or technician employees due to excessive taxes or charges. Therefore, they are powerless in financing or developing their efforts, which leads, increasingly, to a shortage of professional skills in journalism practices. Within these emergent democratic societies, the powerful state or ruling parties have established various convergent media companies while not improving their basic services for citizens. In the same way, to decrease financial support to critical news media networks in such transforming societies, officials and political parties regularly use their influence to restrict media content and journalistic working practices. This restriction has been achieved through ending subsidies, stopping advertisements, and other financial restrictions which will impact upon their editorial policy and reliability. Consequently, there are many reasons why it is difficult to build and expand non-partisan and non-state media channels in such new democracies or post-conflict regions like Kurdistan. Since between journalism practices and government affairs, many cultural, legal or institutional barriers still remain, with the judiciary system being one of the most important institutional bumpers in the ruling parties’ vision of the role of media in society. Similar to other sectors, the judiciary system in the Kurdistan Region has been dominated by the KDP and PUK ruling parties since 1992. In this case, there are further traditional dilemmas that lead to the lack of generating a good and professional journalism industry, such as bribery or “envelope journalism”, and self-censorship in the name of cultural, societal and national values or traditions. In these new democracies, trained journalists have been faced with their key duties of professional role orientations, who cannot execute a watchdog role in surveying the government’s performance and the political elites, for example. In other words, discovering procedures in making the political figures accountable to the public is the crucial basis for transformations to democratization in post-conflict societies (Voltmer 2006).

Sometimes, local governments use their power to buy gifts, normally in the form of advertising effectiveness and promotion management, for the sake of bias or control of media platforms content. Remarkably, the media organizations and their journalism practices in emergent democratic cultures can be characterized as dependent on enabling economic, social, and political environments which, if they exist, are severely limited. Nevertheless, for continued financial support, the media channels regularly rely on the government, political elites, and their stakeholders.
Within that phenomenon, the independence and veracity of the media platforms’ content have been affected to the extent that they will hesitate to criticize the political parties and their policies. This can be visibly witnessed in the Kurdistan Region’s status quo that occasionally leads to media intrusion into people’s private lives, notably during heightened political conflicts and general election campaigns. Though challenging the new ruling regime is more important for the sake of a positively liberated society, this circumstance is truly complicated owing to legitimacy limitations and the fragility of the emerging ruling system in newly democratized countries. Consequently, too much should not be expected of the new political and media systems, especially in solving the prevailing financial problems and general insecurity. For similar reasons, a higher degree of structural reforms of the role orientations and rules of intercommunication inside the political communication system leads to the success of the transition process from a non-democratic regime to a democratic system. The actors joining in some transition processes might refer, however, to previous governments who may still play a significant role in rebuilding the balance of power between the new authorities and the mass media organizations. Therefore, one of the main features of mass media in current democratic cultures is often the reduction of critical discussion. Due to its influence on a high proportion of people in emerging or post-conflict societies, participatory journalism is more popular, particularly for those living outside the city centers or in the rural regions, also they are normally out of range for accessing the mass media communications, excluding governmental radio stations. Many will not have observed independent or powerful traditional news media organizations, which may be a further reason for the popularity of participatory journalism (Syan 2015; Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012; Voltmer 2008 and LaMay 2001). Regardless many serious dilemmas, involving higher rates of illiteracy, significantly isolated people, and poverty serve to restrict progress. Despite being the largest forum for promoting participatory journalism and interactivity, the Internet is unavailable as yet to the majority of the population owing to poverty and a shortage of technological resources; as a result, the benefits of internet services to society have not been widely adopted so far. Meanwhile, increasing the numbers of individuals who consider themselves journalists who are unqualified and untrained have been described as another characteristic of newly democratic nations. This phenomenon is further exacerbated in new or even in organized democracies by the Internet facilities whereby anybody can declare himself or herself to be a journalist (LaMay 2001).
In such societies, the professional role orientations of journalists which are very poorly developed, and also their understanding of information privacy invasions are too limited. In addition to most people who have not previously participated in the ruling and opposition political parties, as well as in helping to maintain the current trends, along with changing the public’s political attitudes. Especially, during the general election campaigns, the role of media platforms are quite central and fundamental (Syan 2015; Kostadinova 2014 and Voltmer 2006). As Nordenstreng (2001) points out that the developments of media platforms in emerging democratic societies do not only depend on their financial and legitimacy aspects, thus specialists, academics, and the public have been strongly recommended to assist in the improvement of mass media communications criticizing the media and its journalistic content. While media freedom is part of the constitutional frame, the power of the media does not mean it is unfettered from accountability, criticism, and monitoring. Predominantly, for the broadcasting organizations, accepting legal licenses, and more extensive policy support is dependent on the media companies having ties with official bodies which can later subordinate them. As a club with which to control the media, media policies have been used by such technical legal apparatus to threaten the continued existence of these media outlets (Herman and Chomsky 1994).

To be concluded, such cultures of media intrusion into the people's private lives in newly democratic societies arises from significant modifications in the political and other journalism practices. For instance, the claims of democratic rights to free speech, media pluralism, and the rising power of the market over state forces have prompted a noticeable decline in deference to authority. These rapid changes have fostered the growth of tabloid-style journalism in both broadcasting and print media. Thus, the mass media communications are intruding ever more enthusiastically into the private lives of celebrities and politicians, while the victims of privacy and even perpetrators of offenses, and their bereaved families and relatives, are nightly shown on television broadcasting with limited sensitivity. This issue has also started to lead to complaints of “trial by media” before violation cases of privacy have even shifted to the courtroom. The new methods of invasive reporting and regulating sensationalism have been a feature of many democratic societies (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012). For instance, the Combatting Domestic Violence Law No. 8 of 2011 and the Prevention of Abuse of Communications Devices Law No. 6 of 2008 have been issued by Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament to reduce the level of violations, including intrusion into private life.
2.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has outlined a fundamental historical debate about the national movements of Greater Kurdistan and its Southern autonomous region in order to explain the importance and timeliness of this thesis’s intervention in an understudied context of transitions in politics and media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. It is an interesting context in which to examine the power relations between Arabic and Kurdish authorities and the cultural differences within their ethnic or political conflicts in the same country. This case study has significantly contributed to the existing literature on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. While it is a post-conflict region, it is also in a country of various conflicts, which can move from fragility to a stable and functioning state, while such governments and their political leaders can be held accountable with the passage of time. Based on the second round of the general elections, the convergent administrations of the Iraqi Kurdistan government have consistently expressed their desire to comply with international standards in the practice of governance and law since 2005. As a result of this, this case study of Kurdistan will be relevant to the global debate about respecting the right to privacy and abiding by rules of professionalism rather than dominant partisanship in practicing mass media communications and their content regulation.

Hallin and Mancini (2004)’s framework has been used to understand the current characteristics of the political system in the post-conflict region of Kurdistan that compares with other emerging democracies. Within their framework, the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model is more closed-door to identify Kurdistan political system, which is still undergoing a period of transition, where a power struggle continues between differently positioned political parties or tribes, who have ideologically manipulated principles of dictatorship and democratization to date. In this transitional region, the development and functioning of the political party system, in terms of power sharing, civil society and economic growth, are often fragile. Also, this fragility causes serious difficulties in developing a democratic political system and in building a stable and plural society with formal mechanisms and institutions that can hold authorities accountable. Additionally, this power struggle is largely reflected in the media ownership and privacy ownership amongst Iraqi Kurdish media productions, especially during times of war, political conflict, and general election campaigns.
After the withdrawal of the former Iraqi regime in the Kurdish provinces in 1991, most governments in the Kurdistan Region have been majoritarian, predominantly by the two ruling parties, the KDP and the PUK. In terms of individual versus organized pluralism, these two parties have extensively dominated most aspects of daily life. In this sense, the role of the state or KRG is greater due to the extensive involvement of government and ruling political parties in the economy. During the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was divided into the two separate political administrations of the KDP's Yellow Zone and PUK's Green Zone. This division has remained in different aspects which constantly affects the development of rational-legal authority in governmental bodies and beyond.

The political and media transition periods from dictatorship to democracy play a central role in disseminating public and private information about the public and private lives of public figures, celebrities, and even ordinary people. In this case, the political conflicts amongst prominent political parties, political elites, and their stakeholders has led to the use of mass media communications as an important propaganda tool for surveillance and intrusion into rivals’ private lives. At the same time, the Iraqi Kurdish ruling class and their media hegemony produce and reproduces the national and nationalist symbols of "us" and 'them' and this creates contestation between pro- and anti-ruling political parties’ supporters, networks, and organizations in different parts of the Kurdistan Region.
Literature Review II:  

**KURDISH MEDIA AND PROMINENT PILLARS OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE**

### 3.1. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Within Middle Eastern countries, the Republic of Iraq has been equally fragmented by different segments of the ruling class who have dominated mass media communications and media professionals as a subordinate class via using them as a propaganda tool to maintain the status quo. This fragile status defines Iraq as a polarised state with political, religious, ethnic and other divisions. According to recent reports from International Media Support (IMS), Iraq remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world in which to be a journalist given its deteriorating levels of security which has become a barrier and a professional hazard for many media platforms. In addition, Iraqi journalists are prosecuted and jailed due to the challenges of breaching the ethical standards code and the press law in doing their daily job. For internal and external media observers, a crucial step towards avoiding propagandistic coverage and incitement to various conflicts and hatred is professionalization, independence, and strengthening the media sector. For that purpose, such non-profit organisations as the IMS are currently struggling to strengthen the capacity of mass media communications to facilitate dialogue, strengthen democracy and reduce conflict.

In the case of Iraq and its autonomous region of Kurdistan, multiple media platforms and journalism methods have been actively trained by international media support programs since 2005, aiming to unite political adversaries and resolve conflicts. While the security situation in the case of Kurdistan Region is marginally safer than the rest of Iraq, death threats against journalists are growing in this single federal region. A weak distribution system, the lowest online presence in the country, and the lack of economic sustainability of the media sector have been named as further challenges faced by Iraqi Kurdish media platforms (IMS 2017).
Similar to their counterparts in the rest of Iraq, the prominent political parties, political elites, and their stakeholders in the post-conflict region of Kurdistan have consistently used their media hegemony to stay in power since the 1991 uprising against the former Iraqi regime. Historically, a strong partisan media developed in the early twentieth century that was part of a long period of democratic transition, and before the 1990s the growing media environment for many decades was controlled by the regime of the Arab Ba’athist Socialist Party (ABSP) across all regions of Iraq. In the Mediterranean countries, whether linked to the Church, political parties or commercially owned, the media platforms have been absorbed for the most part by an educated elite involved in the political sphere (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In recent decades, unofficial media outlets of ruling political parties, political elites, and their stakeholders have gradually expanded in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and their ideological power has become extensive. The ruling political parties widely regulate content and ownership of the printing, broadcasting, and digital networks to maintain the current status quo as a common sense of Iraqi Kurdish society (Syan 2015; Al-Rawi and Gunter 2013; Mawlood 2011; Sheyholislami 2011; Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008 and Ebubekr 2002).

With regard to the current study on media intrusion into people’s private lives, this chapter critically reviews the historical development of the Kurdish media environment, which will be defined based on the methods chosen for this thesis. Following by classifying the historical stages of Iraqi Kurdish media development based on Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) framework, the core characteristics of media systems have been defined, especially after the collapse of the former Iraqi regime in 2003. This chapter aims to understand the extensive debates about national democratic pillars in relation to the experiences of mass media communications and media professionals in the post-conflict region of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In cultures similar to Kurdistan Region in the Republic of Iraq, such as Taiwan in the Republic of China, the apparent ability to enjoy the freedom of speech has been interpreted to mean a democratic license to trespass on the private lives of those in the public spotlight. This global media matter has encouraged the current research study to ask some research questions, including how are media developments influenced by these political changes, and what is the role of media platforms in the democratization of Iraqi Kurdish society?
What is the link between political change and privacy invasion in the Kurdish context? What is the current role of media content regulation in Kurdish legislation in protecting privacy rights? For similar reasons and also in addition to the multiple directions of social critical theory, Habermasian concepts of the Public Sphere and the Communicative Action have been used to explain the struggle in power relations between partisan dominance and media subordination.

3.2. KURDISH MEDIA TRANSITIONS

A hundred epistles and odes are not worth a penny, Newspapers and magazines have become valuable and respected. (Haji Qadir Koyi (1890) cited in Hassanpour 1996:221)

A year after Koyi’s death (1897), the first Kurdish print media, “Kurdistan”, was published in the diaspora and played a significant role in awakening Kurdish nationalist feelings. The Kurdistan newspaper had an instrumental role in using the Kurdish language outside the purely imaginative world of poetry and confirming that the Kurdish language could be used in different fields (McDowall 2004 and Omer 2001). In the history of Kurdish nationalism movements, Haci Qadiri Koyi (1817-1897) is a significant figure, who was the first poet to criticize the Islamic religious clerics (Şêx w Mela) for ignoring Kurdish national identity for the sake of their Islamic principles. Koyi advocated the use of the native Kurdish language and encouraged the liberation and building of an independent Kurdistan. To that end, he suggested the adoption of the modern medium of newspaper and magazines create a stronger national identity and a diversity of platform for mass media communications (Miran and Sharaza 1986). Consequently, the acquisition of media power became an important tool for the Kurdish Liberation Movement. To this day, the printing, broadcasting, and converging media networks are used to express nationalist attitudes amongst native speakers, and to promote and defend the notion of a Kurdish homeland (Mawlood 2011). To follow the rapid expansions in Iraqi Kurdish media environment and to contextualize the difficulties it faces as a result of democratization, it is first necessary to consider the opening question; how did Kurdish media fare under the Iraqi Arab Ba’athist Socialist Party’s system of tyranny prior to 1991?
Without reference to the role of communication technology, the appearance, and formation of national identities cannot precisely be understood (Morley 1992). In similar ways to many other ethnic groups, the Kurdish nation uses the newest media and communications technology for establishing nationalist projects. For instance, the Internet is being used as a public sphere for debates and opinions on prohibited topics, such as promoting the construction of nationalist identity or self-determination projects (Syan 2015; Keles 2015a and 2015b; Romano 2002 and Mills 2002). In this context, Kurdish native speakers are using the Internet services to maintain their “cybernation” or “logical state” known as Kurdistan, in “providing common points of contact and sources of instantaneous cultural and political information to its members around the world” (Mills 2002: 82). In other words, an active pan-Kurdish identity began to appear alongside several local identities, which means that the pan-Kurdish and regional, cultural and political, individual and collective identities are simultaneously making the Kurdish nationality. “The emergence, growth, and use of satellite TV and the internet are interwoven with the cultural and sociopolitical events and structures that have had some connection with the Kurds and Kurdistan” (Sheyholislami 2011: 181).

In his interview for this study, Dr. Janroj Yılmaz Keles who has conducted extensive research on the media, diaspora, and conflicts of the Kurdish journalism practices, he confirmed that there is no cross-national research to support the claims made by some Kurdish scholars in the context of “pan-Kurdish identity” or “greater Kurdistan”. Moreover, he disagrees with the scholars who assert that the trans-nationalized Kurdish media and the increased use of the internet have created a “pan-Kurdish identity” and the idea of “a greater Kurdistan,” arguing that, firstly, the Kurds have not created unified fields of exchange and communication that can contribute to the fixity of a common Kurdish identity. Secondly, he believes such approaches do not pay attention to the linguistic, political, geographical, tribal and cultural differences and diverse media consumption patterns amongst Kurdish audiences. Thirdly, different surveys conducted in North Kurdistan (Turkey) show that only 6% of the Kurds in Northern Kurdistan are in favor of an independent Kurdistan, and the pro-Kurdish political parties have difficulties in winning their votes. Similarly, the Kurds from East Kurdistan (Iran) remain silent and do not affiliate with the Kurdish political movements.
However, Dr. Keles concedes that the Kurdish print, audio-visual and digital media play a significant role in reconstructing Kurdishness territorially, through political, linguistic and cultural means in different parts of Kurdistan. These different perspectives can provide a useful starting point for rereading the historical developments of Kurdish media and applying such insights to the case of autonomous southern Kurdistan (Iraq). Since the Ottoman Empire banned the Kurds from printing any native language publications inside Kurdistan, thus the history of the media outlets goes back to the nineteenth century in the diaspora.

As aforementioned, the original print media publication, the Kurdistan newspaper, appeared in Cairo, published by Miqdad Ali Bedirxan, on 22nd April 1898 and continued until 14th April 1902 (see Figure 3.1). Fwad (2005) explained that the later editions of Kurdistan newspaper were printed in Geneva in Switzerland initially, before relocating to Britain; in London at first, then Folkestone. This newspaper was bilingual and published in Arabic script and Kurdish Kurmanji dialect to facilitate easier Kurdish communications. Regardless of several barriers, the first Kurdish print media production issued a total of 31 editions in its four-year duration. This was in a climate in which “early newspapers were tied more to the aristocracy, whose wealth was based on land rather than trade” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 91). Bedirxan was indeed from a Kurdish aristocratic family in Northern Kurdistan, located in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Besides, the first Kurdish print media were exile papers published under occupations by Turkish, Arabic, and Persian cultures that continued until the 1990s.

In this sense, the sharp political conflict and frequent oscillation between dictatorship and democracy of dominated cultures play a distinct role in the history of the Kurds. In other words, the Kurdish publications have for the most part developed as political print media with limited readership (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Like Southern Europe, the media developed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as an institution of the literary and political sphere rather than one defined by market competition. This primitive goal leads to delay the first Kurdish newspaper due to several reasons. Firstly, the feeling of patriotism was not present amongst Kurdish individuals. Secondly, poets and writers from Kurdistan were at a brilliant and joyful position in the center of government, but they did not use their power and position, therefore, they can live a real life. The third reason was that most of the Kurdish people were illiterate and did not have enough chances to educate and learn (Sepan 2000).
For similar reasons, it is hard to ignore the fact that the Kurdish political system was conventional in addition to not convinced so far, it was believed that only the mountains were the friends of the Kurdish people. The Turks, Arabs, and Persians were not only the roadblocks in Kurdish way to freedom, but they were also forced to leave their identity.

In Northern Europe and Northern America, the commercial bourgeoisie, whose success in a market economy depended on a steady flow of reliable information about trade, navigation, technology, and politics, played a key role in the development of the first newspapers. A mass circulation press then began to develop as increasing numbers of the middle, working, and agrarian class—including both male and females—entered the market and through the development of mass political parties—the political process. (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 90)
Within that statement, the launch of journalism has distinct histories in different parts of the world, pertaining to the political and social life of a particular country. The beginnings of Kurdish journalism were not only affected by the traditions and lifestyles of Kurdistan but also by other factors from outside. Neighboring countries’ lifestyles and intellectual traditions were some of those external factors in the creation and growth of journalism in Kurdistan (Ehmed 1978). The journalism developments in Kurdistan was slower than other countries, divided as it was amongst four countries, and under dictatorship for many years. Hence, Kurdish journalism was unable to develop the required new media technologies and resources, such as the printing press and a healthy workforce. Nevertheless, the first Kurdish newspaper, in comparison with other newspapers, had more independence and intellectual freedom (Isma'il 2001), being prepared by a revolutionary Kurdish aristocrat with his own resources and no connection with, or control by, the government.

Among Middle Eastern countries, Egypt was considered to be the safest place to publish his newspaper. Even though the situation for publishing the first Kurdish newspaper was laden with risks, the beginnings of Kurdish media, in comparison with other countries under dictatorship, fared much better (Mehmud 2001). Finally, after several conflicts and disputes with dictatorship authorities in Iraq, the environment of Kurdish media was liberated from the ruling class of the central government, especially in the final quarter of the twentieth century. Syan (2015) has separated the development and main features of the Kurdish press into five main steps, including the birth stage 1898, the British occupation and mandate (1918-1932), monarchy (Monarchical Iraq, 1932-1958), Republican Iraq (1958-1991), and the golden era (1991 onwards). In view of that, the current study has divided the Kurdish media environment in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq into three main stages, as discussed below:

3.2.1. Media Developments: 1900-1990

With the publication of a literary magazine, the Bangi Kurd (appeal of the Kurds), in the second decade of the twentieth century, the history of Kurdish printing media inside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq began on 8th February 1914. Before that date, only an elite of educated Kurdish speakers was able to access nearly 70 publications printed in Arabic and Turkish.
In the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad, the Bangî Kurd has been named as the first publication to be printed in the Kurdish language that targeted the encouragement of the growth of literacy and a nationalistic position. To this end, various articles on Kurdish history, culture, education and agriculture themes were published, between the commencement of the First and Second World Wars (1914-1939), a large number of Kurdish newspapers and magazines were published in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The British authorities and the Ottoman Empire had an influence on some of them, although the Kurdish Liberation Movement directly inspired others (Mawlood 2011). For instance, the Têgeîştnî Rastî (true understanding) published on 1st January 1918 in Baghdad, and the Peşkewtn (development) published on 29th April 1920 in Slêmanî, which these newspapers were published by the British troops to give details of their perspectives on daily affairs and politics to the Kurdish people, and to endeavor to minimize social turmoil (Emîn 2002a). Next, during his administration in Slêmanî (1922-1924), Şêx Meîmund Berîncî, as the first King of the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq, allowed four newspapers to be published. Bangî Kurdistan (appeal of the Kurdistan), Rojî Kurdistan (sun of the Kurdistan), Eumêdî Estqlal (hope of the independency), and Bangî Heq (call of the Truth) frequently covered political, social, literary and scientific affairs to encourage Kurdish independence and the Kurdish people to learn their own written language. More interestingly, the first Kurdish revolutionary newspaper of the Bangî Heq was printed in the Eşkewti Casene (the cave of Jasana), located in Northern Slêmanî (Hêcêdery 2004), only some issues of which have survived. The publishers were forced to cease production because of political pressures, the economic situation, censorship from the Ottoman Empire, the Iraqi authorities, and difficulties with printing devices (Mawlood 2011). Most of the historians and media scholars describe the period of 1924-1939 as a difficult time in the history of Kurdish print media. Many Kurdish journalists played an essential role in conflicts with the Iraqi authorities, before being arrested and having their licenses to publish withdrawn (Ebidulwañid 2007; Emîn 2002a and Omer 2001).

In the rule of King Faisal I, the first Kurdish radio program was broadcast on 19th November 1939 from the Iraqi Baghdad Radio. Through this radio station, Kurdish native speakers were able to listen to some Kurdish music (Emîn 2002b). Next, the magazine Gelawêj (a month in the Kurdish calendar, roughly equivalent to August) published for ten years between December 1939 and August 1949 that witnessed a
separate stage of Kurdish media history. Subsequently, the media environment in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was changeable and complex. Mawlood (2011) classified three different types of journalism in the 1940s. First and foremost, the private individuals who owned the publications at that time could be legally published. Foreign publications comprised the second kind of journalism, consisting of materials in the Kurdish language issued by the British and American powers for political purposes during the Second World War. The Kurdish political parties were not legally permitted to publish, hence the clandestine journalism which was the third type of Kurdish print media in this period. This latter kind of secret publication led to the growth the Kurdish Liberation Movement (KLM) in Southern Kurdistan (Iraq). In Eastern Kurdistan (Iran), there were some limited possibilities to publish this material, while in northern and western Kurdistan (Turkey and Syria), the Kurdish clandestine print media had no opportunities (Mawlood 2011). In this case, numerous Kurdish clandestine publications were published during the period 1938-1958, and in the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. As Salhi (2004a) explained, all clandestine publications, due to the pressures from the local regimes, contained few pages, were limited in size, appeared irregularly and continued for only a few issues. These publications were read in secret and kindled Kurdish nationalist sentiments.

The early Kurdish clandestine journalism was studied by Tofiq (2007) and Emin (2004), according to whom the Kurdish Revival Association (KRA) published the magazine of Niştman (homeland) on 1st July 1943 in the Iranian Kurdish city of Mahabad and then distributed to other Kurdish regions in Iran and Iraq.

The Kurdish political parties in Iraq published several periodicals in this period, for example, the KDP published Rzgarî (liberation), Xebatî Kurdistan (Kurdistan struggle), Nda Kurdistan (Kurdistan call), and Nrkeî Cutîar (the voice of farmers). After the Iraqi monarchy collapsed on 14th July 1958, the new Iraqi constitution approved Kurdish rights as a nation. To test their opportunities for further rights in the new media environment, the Kurdish people launched various publications. Between 1958-1961, more than 32 Kurdish newspapers and magazines were openly published, including the newspapers of the Rzgarî (liberation) on 10th February and Xebat (struggle) on 7th April 1959. However, only the Runahî (illumination) and Hiwa (hope) magazines along with the Jien (life) newspaper remained after 1961. On 8th February 1963, the Arab Ba’athist Socialist Party (ABSP) came to power and its government extended its authority over different leaders until 9th April 2003.
For that reason, all legal Kurdish print media ceased and publications were once again obliged to go clandestine. Moreover, several newspapers and magazines began to be published in the diaspora particularly, across Europe (Salh 2004b). Meanwhile, the first Kurdish television programs were transmitted by the Iraqi official broadcasts from Kirkuk and Mosul in the 1980s. Without prior censorship, the Iraqi Kurds were not allowed to receive any broadcasts from foreign media channels.

Until 1991 the Iraqi Government prevented the broadcast in Iraq of any Kurdistan-based television stations and this was part of Saddam Hussein’s regime general policies at that time which did not allow Kurdish citizens freedom of expression (either spoken or written), press freedom, personal liberty, free elections or free trade and prohibited any involvement in political matters. All Kurdish political parties were banned in the Kurdistan Region and in many spheres of life, particularly within the media, those who opposed the strategies of Saddam Hussein’s regime were simply suppressed. (Mawlood 2011: 67-68)

From the above, it can be concluded that the history of Iraqi Kurdish media during 1963 and 1991 can be divided into two dissimilar types. Principally, the Ba’athist media aimed to convey the messages of the Iraqi central government to Kurdish audiences. The ABSP, as the ruling political party, exerted their ideological dominance through the media channels on the Kurdish people as a subordinate class of society. The Ba’athist media hegemony was used to maintain the status quo of the Ba’athist regime. In opposition, the non-Ba’athist partisan media of the KLM sought to communicate with their fellow Kurds (Ebubekr 2002). Likewise, several media scholars observed that the earlier Iraqi Ministry of Information strongly controlled and censored print, radio and TV news outlets for more than 30 years before the fall of the ABSP regime of Saddam Hussein (Syan 2015; Al-Rawi and Gunter 2013; Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008; Sinjari 2006 and Najjar 2004). To function in the watchdog role of the media, journalists were not given room in this media system, in which they could only work as cheerleaders for the government in power. Thus, Saddam Hussein and his family were eulogized in the headlines and news reports of Iraqi broadcast and print media. Meanwhile, this style was also present in entertainment media, including music and films. On the Ba’ath media system, the Iraqi ordinary citizens were not permitted to use satellite dishes for watching foreign television services or to access the Internet for information about the outside world. Along with illegal ownership of equipment, these offenses warranted imprisonment (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008).
As Al-Rawi and Gunter (2013) have shown, the governments of the Ba’ath Party (1968-2003) controlled the Iraqi media and news-media workers who normally wrote in line with Ba’athist policies. Criticism of the government was not tolerated, and investigative journalism was rarely practiced. Al-Iraq, Al-Jumhuriyah, Al-Qadisiyah, and Al-Thawra in Arabic, and Hawkari (cooperation) in Kurdish were the main Iraqi daily newspapers at this time, and also they were considered very similar, due to frequently publishing large pictures of Saddam Hussein on their front pages and carrying similar if not identical news stories and reports.

Any kind of intentional or unintentional deviation from the party’s line was considered a crime punishable by imprisonment, torture or, in some cases, death. ... Under the Ba’ath Party rule there were four official television channels: two Iraqi national channels, Iraqi Satellite TV and Alshabab (youth) TV. Ownership of satellite television equipment was banned and any individual caught receiving satellite transmissions was either fined or imprisoned. (Al-Rawi and Gunter 2013: 43)

From these historical developments of the Kurdish media environment under the various Iraqi central governments between 1914 and 1991, this section makes clear that the lack of an adequate environment for media workers, and the independent media platforms were not allowed in Iraq to emerge at all. For similar reasons, this study has divided the history of the Kurdish media environment under Kurdistan autonomous rule into three key decades from the period between 1991 and the present.

### 3.2.2. Media Developments: 1991-2000

On 26th October 1991, when the former Iraqi central government withdrew all its governmental bodies, including media organizations from the Kurdistan Region, another separate phase of Kurdish media history began, which generated a more favorable environment for Kurdish journalists, and for the Kurdish population more generally, gaining rights and freedoms that covered all their grievances (İsma’il 2001). At this moment, many newspapers, journals, and many other types of publication appeared. The Kurdish media environment seemed to be more interested in quantity than quality, and this development changed the way people thought about more freedom in media and journalism practices (Ebubekr 2002).
One major criticism of a quarter century of autonomy is that the characteristics of the Ba'athist partisan media still existed in the professional practices of available media in the Kurdistan Region, particularly in the first decade after the 1991 spring uprising. This decade (1991-2000) was characterized by Zanger (2004) as a ‘media free-for-all’ due to the explosion of Kurdish media outlets in the new environment. According to Eḩmed (2006b) and Ebubekr (2002), the first Kurdish partisan television station; Gelî Kurdistan (Kurdistan people), started on 11th September 1991, based in Sîlemanî. The first partisan daily newspaper; Kurdistanî Nwê (New Kurdistan), launched on 12th January 1992 in the Kurdistan Region’s capital city of Hewlêr. On 26th November 1992, the Kurdistan Regional Government commenced the first government daily newspaper, the Herêm (region). Afterward, the Kurdish political parties launched numerous print and broadcast media outlets but no independent publication, radio, and television stations.

The number of partisan Kurdish television channels exceeded 20, broadcasting from the northern region of Iraq in which Kurds had their own relative independence from Baghdad. ... The ‘mountain journalists’ of Kurdistan were well-known throughout the 1990s for propagandizing against the central government and encouraging Kurds to join the Kurdish armed militia, the Pashmerga. Since 1991 all Kurdish media outlets have been affiliated with political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) being the most dominant. (Al-Rawi and Gunter 2013: 43).

From the above extract, many reasons for the complexity experienced in the Kurdish media in that time can be itemized. The first reason relates to generating the different multiple media, where new media workers were engaged along with various novelists and poets who were not well-versed in professional journalism principles. Also, many conflicts and battles in the relationship between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Region led to alteration of the political system that had extended the Kurdish political parties media. Additionally, the commencement of the transition process from the Iraqi central dictatorship to the emerging democracy in social structures, international relationships, economic affairs, and the political and media systems of the Kurdistan Region (Mawlood 2011). In this sense, the transition to democracy essentially affected all aspects of the society since they afforded a unique opportunity for developing both theoretical and practical knowledge of the functioning of democratic foundations in various political and cultural meanings (Voltmer 2006).
During the Civil War between the KDP and PUK (1994-1998), most of the post-1991 developments were damaged, and another stage of Kurdish media history began. The media environment in the Kurdistan Region was divided into the pro-Yellow Zone of the KDP and the pro-Green Zone of the PUK. In this period, and for many years afterward, the majority of the Kurdish media performed a propaganda role for the KDP or PUK zones rather than acting as objective and professional media for the whole of the Kurdistan Region. This later generated intense debates concerning partisan media practices versus journalistic professionalism. The two senior political parties censored media content based on their partisan ideology and powers, therefore the Kurdish journalists were mostly not allowed to work freely in either zone. Ebubekr (2002) specified that as a consequence of the Civil War, some broadcast media stations, and publications, sharply declined in influence on Iraqi Kurdish audiences. Alternatively, foreign satellite television channels were watched by Kurdish audiences in preference to the partisan local media, which represented the KDP or PUK rather than catering for the public’s right to know. In this circumstance, Kurds from Northern Kurdistan along with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) launched MED television on 15 May 1995 as the first Kurdish satellite channel in the diaspora. This PKK-affiliated channel represented a new stage of Kurdish media history development, and also provided the internal and external information of the Kurdistan Region for Kurdish audiences around the world.

What is more, the MED satellite television established relationships with Kurdish viewers as citizens of a Kurdish state (Keles 2015 and Hassanpour 1996). In that time, the “viewers experienced the citizenship of a country with its national flag, national anthem, national television and national news agency. Indeed, everyday MED-TV raised the Kurdish flag in about two million homes” (Sheyholislami 2008: 214). MED-TV was not principally viewed by those affiliated with the KDP and PUK, however, as a result of this, ownerships and audiences of Iraqi Kurdish media have since been increasingly distributed amongst commercial stakeholders, political elites, and their supporters. In the closing phase of the Civil War, the KDP launched international broadcasting media through the Kurdistan satellite television, first going live on 19 January 1999 from Hewlêr. A year later, in Slêmanî, the PUK general secretary’s wife launched the Kurdsat satellite channel on 1 January 2000.
Later, both partisan international channels developed their broadcasting systems from analog to digital, including High Definition Television (HDTV). This broadcasting system has been used by numerous Kurdish internal and international satellite and radio stations in recent decades (Elmed 2006b). Under the effects of the KDP’s Yellow Zone and the PUK’s Green Zone, all government or non-government bodies were distinguished into two parts. A well-known instance was the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS), founded in December 1999 to promote the professional skills of Iraqi Kurdish journalists (Aewnî 2000). However, this syndicate was not accepted by all journalists, therefore two separate unions of journalists were formed to represent the power zones of the KDP and the PUK between 2001 and 2005 (Locussol 2002). Even after unification both unions have several journalists as members, including some working for independent media who refused to join the KJS, which they described as another body of the political ruling class.

In the final years of the first decade of the Kurdistan autonomous region since 1991, to minimize the effects of dual partisan media powers, a few writers in Slêmanî (Green Zone) with no prior experience in journalism launched the Haûlatî (citizen) newspaper on 5th November 2000 (see Figure 3.2). It principally aims to expand freedom of expression, including press freedom along with the civil liberties of all citizens and to reaffirm that not all Kurdish audiences accepted the partisan media. The Haûlatî newspaper is widely acknowledged as the first real independent print media in Kurdish media history, being owned and supported by a private print house outside the political parties and its government. Moreover, both governments of the KDP and PUK were officially licensed to publish this newspaper across their Yellow and Green Zones (Aivas 2005).

Figure 3-2: Front page of the final issue Kurdish independent daily newspaper
On the other hand, Zanger (2004) strongly defended that the editorial board of the Haûlatî newspaper encountered several barriers, having worked to great lengths to keep both financial and editorial autonomy. After publishing 1747 print issues in fifteen years and four months, the Haûlatî daily newspaper ceased to exist on 25\textsuperscript{th} February 2016, owing to economic pressure. Many Kurdish readers appreciated the watchdog role of this newspaper in observing the political parties and governmental affairs, especially its objective criticisms and revelations of corruption. After the demise of the Haûlatî daily newspaper, independent journalism practices in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have been choked. For Mhemed (2016), the end of the Haûlatî has further enabled the autocrats to rebuff all reforms, thereby strengthening their power and position, particularly at a time when the wounds of the Kurdish people from the Civil War between the KDP and PUK military forces are still unhealed. As he observes:

> What made ‘[Haûlatî]’ so important was that the Kurdish media was divided between the PUK and the KDP just like everything else. ‘[Haûlatî]’, with its limited staff and budget, introduced the Kurds to what was happening behind closed doors. ‘[Haûlatî]’ played a significant role in providing a no-ideology platform for writers and journalists to publish their opinions and raise awareness about people’s rights and responsibilities because independent journalism is of crucial importance in consolidating the principle of democracy, promoting the value of free elections and the annihilation of despotism. Non-partisan media is one of the main foundations for a healthy society with the exchange of power. (Mhemed 2016)

From this positive perception, it can be concluded that the critical role of the Haûlatî newspaper lay in rethinking civil rights, including freedom of expression and providing a public sphere for Kurdish native speakers to publish their dissimilar viewpoints. However, the editorial staff of the Haûlatî was occasionally criticized as a political opposition group due to the absence of real opposition parties, particularly before the emergence of the Change (Gorran) Movement (CH) on 25\textsuperscript{th} July 2009. Since then, a new era of nascent democracy began, but this change has been dramatically suspended for multiple political, economic and security reasons, both internally and externally.
3.2.3. Media Developments: 2001-2010

In the second decade of Kurdish autonomous rule, the media environment developed apace. Professionally, the journalistic training was typically developed by Western non-profit organizations like the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), and International Media Support (IMS). Educationally, many academic courses of media studies were programmed by Kurdish universities and technical institutes. This period witnessed an unprecedented potential for political, economic, and socio-cultural growth in journalism, including the removal of Saddam Hussein and his attendant media system in 2003. Another round of general elections occurred, leading to the amalgamation of both administrations of the KRG in 2005. Legally, a new Press Law No. 35 of 2007 amended and formally issued in 2008, brought changes in regulation for the Kurdish print media that led to increased interest in launching new media organizations from media companies led by political elites indirectly, rather than official partisan media. These included the Rûdaw Media Company, which was followed by the launch of many oppositional media outlets over the next two years, such as the first opposition and partisan television news channel of the Kurdish News Network (KNN), Sbey (tomorrow) news website, and the Gorran (change) radio station.

Another media development in this period was the better-accessed Internet services for using new communication technologies in promoting local print media and broadcasting satellite channels. Later, the Internet services became an essential source of information, leading many newspapers and magazines to publish online versions. In the 2000s, the PUK’s Kurdistanî Nwê daily newspaper was the first Kurdish partisan print medium to publish a digital version online (Mehmud 2008). Independent or non-partisan media platforms were gradually expanded by new media proprietors, such as the Nalia Media Corporation. “In 2010, a group of freelance journalists came up with the idea of taking the lead to fill that void and launch the first ever independent media network, funded by Nalia, a construction company” (NRT 2016). However, this decade of Kurdish media development saw more quantitative change than qualitative, which means that the new digital media, like other media forms, face challenges which have been produced by the absence of media content regulation, in addition to which most of them are being directed under the hegemony of political ruling parties.
On the positive side, the internet can provide a useful outlet for those serious Kurdish journalists and bloggers who wish to write about corruption or other political issues under the protection of an assumed identity. On the negative side, the new media also provide the opportunity for anonymous individuals to write articles and blogs which contain inaccurate information or spread rumors and gossip about others’ private lives. (Mawlood 2011: 79)

From the above contention, it can be concluded that media content regulation and partisan ownership are the main barriers in front of Kurdish media development, sometimes leading to media intrusion into private life and invasion cases of the rights to information privacy. In short, the media in the Kurdistan Region, like other parts of Iraq, had “only begun to develop the free-speech protections, journalistic professionalism, media management skills, and supporting institutions necessary for a robust media sector that meets the information needs of citizens and contributes to government accountability” (IREX Report 2006: 164). Therefore, Iraqi Kurdish media still has many challenges ahead.

3.2.4. Media Developments: 2011 and the present

Since the beginning of this decade, many media platforms have ceased to exist due to the war against ISIS, the economic crisis, and a decrease in the numbers of print media readers switching to convergent online media. Meanwhile several partisan and semi-partisan companies have expanded their media platforms to launch new satellite TV and radio stations and opened international offices in Western countries as well as appointing non-Kurdish staff. In addition, many media platforms and media professionals have faced verbal and physical violations by prominent political parties, political elites, and their stakeholders. In the wake of economic, political, and security crises, the semi-successful story of Iraqi Kurdish rule in the transitional period from former Iraqi dictatorship to new democracy has terminated. This dark side has led to a decrease in political and civil liberties, including freedom of speech and other media freedoms and an increase in different types of surveillance and breaches of the right to privacy. In examining Iraqi Kurdish journalism practices in a state of change during the recent years, ten statements were proposed in this study. The participants were asked to indicate their perceptions on five response options from “increased a lot”, “somewhat increased”, “no change”, “somewhat decreased”, to “decreased a lot”.
As Figure 3.3 confirms that the Iraqi Kurdish journalists thought that the following modifications somewhat increased. For example, the freedom of journalists to make editorial decisions (60.6%); interactions of journalists with their audiences (47.4%); the importance of having a university degree (38.6%), and the use of Internet search engines (34.6%). Furthermore, some of the respondents believed that there was an increase in the importance of technical skills (29.7%), as well as in the importance of having a degree in journalism or a related field (18.4%). However, a significant minority of the Kurdish media workers felt that there was no change in the average working hours of journalists (31.1%), along with the time available for researching stories (29.5%). Interestingly, a few journalists (10.11%) who considered that there had been a decrease in the credibility of journalism and the relevance of journalism for society. These results suggest that the media environment in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is continually developing, from periods of greater censorship, followed by times of semi-liberation. In this sense, the Iraqi Kurdish journalists have gained more freedom in their daily professional practices. However, the levels of free expression and media freedom have not significantly improved since the beginning of the third decade of Kurdish autonomous rule in 2011.

![Figure 3-3: State of the change in Kurdish journalism practices](image-url)
While the unofficial partisan convergence media are launching and becoming more popular day by day, the independent media are increasingly smaller due to the economic crisis and political conflicts. For instance, whereas the Rûdaw Media Network now comprises two weekly newspapers, two radio stations, a satellite television channel (HD) along with multiple news sites inside a modern digital portal, several media outlets became smaller in size, and eventually closed down. Furthermore, the political crisis between the Kurdish political parties has led to decreases in journalists’ working freedom. A well-known example is the NRT and KNN Channel offices in Hewlêr, which were closed by the KDP security forces in the final months of 2015 due to their coverage of events.

3.3. KURDISH MEDIA AND THE MEDIA SYSTEM

Like other Middle Eastern countries, the media system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been frequently characterized as a politicization model which is used to impose media hegemony of a particular ideology over Iraqi Kurdish society. In this case, journalism studies classify partisan media as the prominent instance of non-professionalism, especially during political crises, including war and general election campaigns (Bali 2016; Syan 2015; Al-Rawi and Gunter 2013; Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008).

In an earlier historical period, Siebert et al., (1956) examined *Four Theories of the Press*, based on authoritarian and libertarian state systems. Within these theories, improving individual liberty and freedom of the press are emphasized by libertarian press systems. To contribute to civil life, and provide information and news for citizens, social responsibility is highlighted by the press system. Meanwhile, the authoritarian press system is interested on maintaining and stabilizing state power, in the Soviet Union, the media system was a secondary institution beholden to state interests (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008). From these theories it can be discerned that the press system in the Kurdistan Region as part of Iraq is a tightly linked mixture of the authoritarian and libertarian press systems. There are some semi-independent media platforms and commercial-based media; therefore, it would be difficult to categorize the media model in the Kurdistan Region within the Soviet Union model where the State owned, managed and used media as an ideological tool.
The main differences are that the political ruling parties, rather than the national government, control the media as an ideological medium. On the Soviet press model, the Iraqi media were subordinated to the interests of the State and harnessed to serve only the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraqi society during 1968-2003. In that period, it was hard to find Western journalistic styles of objectivity, balance and dependence on facts to tell a story within Iraqi media. In this context, it is clear that Iraqi journalists have obviously reported their personal views in their news stories as well as in non-editorial pieces. Regarding media freedom, the Western journalistic perspective has frequently considered the invasion operation of Iraq as a form of liberation.

On 9th April 2003, when the Iraqi populations were liberated from the Ba'ath ruling party, for the first time in more than three decades, Iraqis could read and watch diverse headlines and images on the front pages other than the formerly ubiquitous eulogies of Saddam Hussein and his friends (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008). Likewise, Daragahi (2003) observed that without supervision or control by government, the radio stations and newspapers in those first heady days freely reported what was happening. For American and other Western governments, developed media freedom along with moving towards a democratic society resulted in Iraqi autocratic rule transitioning to liberated rule. Nevertheless, a few years later the Freedom House (2008) classified the Iraqi media as “not free”. The initial euphoria of media freedom after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime had not continued for an extended period due to the start of a period of sectarian violence between the Shiites and the Sunnis. The number of insurgent attacks was increasing, along with roadside bombs and suicide bombers. Meanwhile, the new Iraqi government shifted the subsequent power from the minority Sunni Muslims to the majority Shiites. The emerging Iraqi media faced new legal restrictions along with “physical threats from insurgents, Iraqi and US armed forces and organized crime rings, and influence-peddling by political parties and religious groups” (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008: 579). This political crisis affected the Kurdistan Region in general and the environment of Iraqi Kurdish media in particular. In studying the post-communist era, Gross (1996) observed that the transformation of the media industry delivered some gains along with the huge influences of market economy reform and political liberty.
In Eastern Europe, as aspirations for media freedom increased, some governments dramatically decreased their control over the media. In this case, the explosion of media outlets was the first noticeable change; therefore, the media industry grew rapidly in this period, thanks partly to a new generation of inexperienced journalists. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, those rapid changes in the media system were observed by the Iraqi population, including Kurdish media workers. Many journalists in this political and social transition demarcated themselves as agents of the Fourth Estate, adopting the core journalistic value of the watchdog role. The situation was often misunderstood and entangled with partisanship media in Eastern Europe, in the case of Russia, the new political elites took over from the old guard, replacing the emerging media freedom and diversity. For instance, “Russian Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin tightened their grips on news media and, subsequently, news outlets critical of the Russian government were driven out of business” (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008: 580). This Russian model is more applicable to the media system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, especially in the partisan media practices which have monopolized Iraqi Kurdish media environment. For instance, the KDP ceased its political weekly magazine of the Bzaw (movement) as a result of its involvement in political dissent with PUK. Therefore, Syan (2015) has divided the principal barriers to the media platforms in Iraqi Kurdish society into seven main types: relationships between journalists and political figures; political interference, physical assaults and rival media; non-implementation of laws; access to information; financial problems of low circulation and few advertisements; absence of unified written language, and copyright. In addition to the current study results, it can be added further barriers in front of Kurdish media transitions to democracy, including media ownership, unequal competition amongst media organizations, and lack of media content regulation regarding the right to privacy protection.

In examining the media system, four dimensions of media markets, political parallelism, the professionalization of journalism, and the role of the State have been conceptualized by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The structure of media markets is the paramount media system dimension that affects the growth of a mass press. This can take the form of several variables that characterize a particular press system. These variables consist of newspaper circulation rates; newspaper-readership relationship (elite versus mass-orientation), and gender differences in terms of newspaper reach. Also to be considered are the relative importance of newspapers and television as
sourcingnews; theratiooflocall,regional,andnationalnewspapers,andthedegree
difflatseparationbetween sensationalistmass press and quality press. Additional
factors can include regional or linguistic segmentation of media markets, and the
influence of bordering countries on the national media system.

**TABLE 3-1:** Three models of media system characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model</th>
<th>North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model</th>
<th>North Atlantic or Liberal Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.g. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>E.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td>E.g. Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Industry</td>
<td>Low newspaper circulation; elite politically oriented press</td>
<td>High newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press</td>
<td>Medium newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation commercial press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parallelism</td>
<td>High political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance; politics-over-broadcasting systems</td>
<td>External pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press; politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy</td>
<td>Neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance; formally autonomous system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalization</td>
<td>Weaker professionalization; instrumentalation</td>
<td>Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation</td>
<td>Strong professionalization; non-institutionalized self-regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the State in Media System</td>
<td>Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)</td>
<td>Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, particularly strong in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting</td>
<td>Market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain and Ireland)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Hallin and Mancini (2004: 67)
As Table 3.1 showed in the Mediterranean Model, the media market structures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can be understood as a smaller mass press due to the global maturity of the technology, such as social media and smartphone versions, along with local economic pressures. In the most recent decade, several Kurdish publications have ceased to exist, including the Haûlatî daily newspaper. In the case of the Kurdistan, the financial crisis along with further economic pressures have affected newspaper circulation rates, and relationships between the print media and its readership, with marked differences between Kurdish males and females in newspaper reach. Within this statement, Iraqi Kurdish media has had a little benefit of the journal circulation due to owned or controlled by an elite politically oriented media outlets. For most Kurdish audiences, alternative media, including social network sites such as Facebook, has been used as key sources of information and news rather than local, regional, and national newspapers and television channels. Furthermore, there is no clear separation between quality press and mass sensationalist press, or between national and local publications or in terms of regional or linguistic segmentation of media markets. In the case of Kurdistan Region of Iraq, bordering countries have a strong influence on the national media system. Since the extreme parochialism of Kurdish media productions, with little to attract non-Kurdish audiences either regionally or internationally, and also this is one of the main reasons for the overall poor quality of newspaper and journalistic productions. Due to the vast majority of journalists in Iraqi Kurdish society are being affiliated with the ruling political parties, and journalism effectively being an instrument of the State, editorial autonomy is virtually non-existent. For similar reasons it can be noted that:

The Kurdish press is characterized by the absence of enduring dailies, low circulation, poor distribution facilities, dependence on subscription and single copy sales, lack of or insignificant advertising revenue, poor printing facilities, shortage of newsprint, and limited professionalization and specialization. These features are characteristic of the press in developing societies ... although their persistence and hindering impact on the Kurdish press has been reinforced by the division of the Kurdish speech community and political restrictions on the use of language (Hassanpour 1992: 276)

For this day and age, Hassanpour (1992)’s opinion is not entirely correct especially concerning media quantity, “single copy sales” and “poor printing facilities, shortage of newsprint” now being less of an issue. It remains true nevertheless that the Kurdish media has retained “limited professionalization and specialization” legally and ethically.
For Hallin and Mancini (2004), the dimension of political parallelism is characterized by the fact that media in some countries have distinct political orientations, while media in other cultures do not. To assess this dimension, seven factors can be established, including the extent of political orientation within media content, and organizational connections between media and political organizations. This can also be seen in the tendency of media personnel to take part in politics, and the partisanship of media audiences, as well as the role orientation and practices of the journalists themselves. For instance, journalists as advocates versus neutral arbiters; opinion-oriented versus information-oriented reporting styles, and clear separation versus blending of commentary and information. Internal pluralism, such as coverage of different opinions and perspectives within one medium, or external pluralism including coverage different ideas and views within one media branch such as the press, are further criteria for establishing the extent of political parallelism within a national media. Likewise, whether the regulation of public service broadcasting is, for example, controlled by the government, insulated from direct political scrutiny, and allows for proportional representation of political parties or socially relevant groups.

By using Gramscian concept of hegemony, it can be noticed that most of the political parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have had official and unofficial or shadow media outlets that use their ideological hegemony to retain the status quo as common sense of Iraqi Kurdish society. Consequently, there are no such national media as the BBC, due to the politicized culture among political parties who do not accept the concept of such public media for all Kurdish audiences without political discrimination. Though the Kurdistan Region has a high political parallelism, the appearance is misleading. Free speech and media freedom, along with civil liberties, are regularly under threat from the Kurdish ruling parties who, between them, own and control several news media networks in their authority zones (Yellow and Green). The resulting lack of professional competition amongst news media channels inhibits the emergence and sustainability of independent media (see Table 3.2). As explained in the methodology chapter of this research project, the Kurdish media outlets and their ownerships have been divided into three main media types: State or Government Media; Partisan Media: official and unofficial, and Private Media: non-government and non-partisan.
Table 3-2: Media outlet examples of Mes’ud Barizanî’s s Yellow Zone and Celal Tallebanî’s Green Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Outlets of Mes’ud Barizanî’s Yellow Zone</th>
<th>Media Outlets of Celal Tallebanî’s Green Zone</th>
<th>Media Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Satellite Televions and Radio Stations along with lots of local printing and broadcasting stations and online news websites. Three daily newspapers of Xebat, Hewlêr, and Avro with KDP online website. Zagros media network including a Satellite television and two radio stations with a News Agency.</td>
<td>Gêli Kurdistan, Badinansat, Kerkuk, Al-Hurra Satellite Televions and Radio Stations with lots of local printing and broadcasting stations and online news websites. kurdistancî nwê daily newspaper with PUKMEDIA online website.</td>
<td>Media Ownership of the PUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan24 Satellite Television, Bas newspaper and its online websites, with Wşe (word) Weekly Newspaper and its news website</td>
<td>Kurdsat Broadcasting Corporation, xak Tv and radio stations, Sulaimany News Network (SNN)</td>
<td>Media Ownership of the PUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korak Satellite Television, and channel 4 Satellite Television which are entertainment broadcasting media</td>
<td>Roşngerî (enlightenments) organization including a weekly newspaper of Çawdêr (observer) and its online websites.</td>
<td>Media Ownership of the PUK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hallin and Mancini (2004) considered journalistic professionalization as another characteristic of a media system, focusing on a spectrum ranging from independent to instrumentalized journalism. This dimension includes the degree of autonomy, and development of various professional norms and rules, including ethical principles or practical routines, such as the public service orientation of journalists, including the direction towards an ethic of public service rather than towards the interests of individual persons. Regardless of the quantity of growth in the media environment, most experts, and commentators interviewed in this study, believe that the direction of professionaliaation in the Kurdish media remains weak.
First of all, it can be seen that the political and media systems in the Kurdistan Region made it normal for news media workers to receive money from the government and ruling parties without this being regarded as a breach of journalism ethics. In this sense, Iraqi Kurdish media has many similarities and few differences with the West and democratic countries. As far as similarities in their understanding of the ethics of journalism, both Western and non-Western media ethics believed in publishing information truthfully, rejecting violence and discrimination between nations, sexual orientations, religious views, protecting information sources, and the right to privacy.

When interviewed for this study, Hevall Ebubekr (2015) as a Kurdish media scholar, explained that all the media outlets in the Kurdistan Region are political media, but they do not have a media policy which is related to media ownership, and suggested that is why breaches happen mainly in the partisan media. He also adds that the majority of Iraqi Kurdish journalists do not insist on the fundamental responsibilities of community, freedom, independence, loyalty, justice, neutrality and respect for private life. They maintain a distance from incidents, not witnessing them first hand, and not arriving in time at the place of an event, not necessarily through the fault of the journalist or the media. Journalists’ religious and nationalist sense of belonging and personal investment in the incident leads to fear of accurate coverage of the incident, contradicting the policy of their news media, including a fear of the receiver’s reaction. They have become an uncritical part of the social culture due to a lack of professionalism, awareness of media ethics, and experience in journalism.

Professionally, subject matter should not be distorted, amended or exaggerated and analyzed unfairly; Iraqi Kurdish journalists are nevertheless still allowed to impose their personal views on the news story, and to mislead the audiences. While, journalism ethics allows every type of competition in situations that do not cause damage to the public interest, the media professionals need to expand professional abilities, including their ability to monitor media productions and greater awareness of their duties. For instance, searching for truth, conveying the truths as they are, not as the journalist sees them, also to be resistant and patient in order to overcome the inevitable difficult situations they will face. In some cases, Iraqi Kurdish journalists have no loyalty to those sources that provide information to them, and media workers have specified the names of information sources where they promised to convey the information anonymously, even in cases where these sources are risking their lives.
Some of the local media workers have taken bribes, and been involved in espionage or intelligence work; they have ignored the legal and ethical principle that maintains a person is “innocent until proven guilty”; they have also reported the names of suspects pre-trial. Other journalists have used the name or identity of media outlets for their own interests, hidden their identity as a reporter, and obtained information in other non-acceptable ways. Occasionally, Iraqi Kurdish journalists ignore their professional morality and allow themselves to steal ideas from colleagues who are not informed. Another reason for the absence of professionalism in Kurdish media practices is the mixing of media power with judicial, legislative and executive powers (Interviewe with Hevall Ebubekr 2015).

In determining the structure and functioning of a media system, some scholars stressed the role of the State. However, “there are considerable differences in the extent of state intervention as well as in the forms it takes” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 41). Given that, five variables of media system have been verified in this study, including censorship or other types of political pressure; endowment of the media with economic subsidies; ownership of media or telecommunication organizations; the provision of regulations for media laws and licensing, and the state as an information source and “primary definer” of news (Ibid.). In the case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the current role of the government in the media system is not very strong due to the lack of classical censorship and promotion of partial freedom of expression and media freedom. The prominent political parties and their politician's elite have developed other types of political pressure. As Figure 3.4 indicates, the highest level of agreement was amongst Iraqi Kurdish journalists (47.2%) who thought that the corruption of the KRG institutions is the most widespread challenge. Next, non-implementation of laws including, civil liberty rights were deemed by 36.6% of the participants as another challenge, followed by 33.1% of the participants who considered that the government control over the media was a barrier. Physical violence against Iraqi Kurdish journalists is another challenge in the perceptions of 23.2% of the respondents. While only 7.1% of the journalists emphasized commercial company pressures, 13.4% focused on tribes and other social groups as another challenge for their daily professional working practices. Due to the political and financial crisis between the Iraqi central government and the KRG in linkage with their fight against ISIS, changes in oil prices have stopped the endowment of numerous Kurdish media outlets with economic subsidies.
That situation has chiefly affected independent print media due to their already limited financial resources; for instance, the Haûlatî daily newspaper and its previous editor-in-chief were fined nine million Iraqi dinars on 16th February 2016 for publishing an article entitled “the death of God in Islam” (Haûlatî 2016). This means that the religion and its leaders are another barriers facing Iraqi Kurdish media and their media professionals.

Figure 3-4: Core challenges in front of the Kurdish journalists

The ambiguity of financial sources is another core barrier for the media platforms that lead to manipulation among media ownerships. The ownership of media and privacy in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is changing based on the ideology and power of political parties and political ruling elites. With regard to the current study, ownership of information privacy and media remains important since both of them relate to the nature of social or cultural differences, in the political and media systems as well as in relation to the further diversification of voices (Craig 2004). In this sense, media platforms performance in Iraqi Kurdish society has been criticized as increasing attention from media owners is leading to a diminishing variety of public debate, and the media is being involved in unnecessary privacy invasions, due to a situation where that “news values lead to a distorted coverage of public life with an emphasis on scandals and conflict at the expense of a more constructive and reasoned approach” (Ibid:14). Currently, the reality of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq shows that the media is not an independent industry based on its production profits and revenue of advertising marketing. By using different justifications, local observers and commentators classified Kurdish media ownerships or telecommunication organizations into many models.
A partisan political commentator at Rudaw Media Network, Rêbwar Kerîm Welî (2015) believes that the patrons of Iraqi Kurdish media are the KDP and PUK, because of their financial power, but now within the KDP and PUK media, there are two or three types, as well as ostensibly independent media that purports to be principally supported by another source, it is well known who owns which media. In addition, Welî (2015) confirmed that:

Now, there is only one type of Kurdish media, which is the Partisan Media. Within the political parties, the media has distinguished between perceptions of those people who are managing the [political] parties. One has a liberal [thinking], his or her media is more liberal than another, who is a friend and sitting on the same table and they are discussing together. For instance, [in Yellow Zone] Mesîrur Barîzani owns Kurdistan24 TV, Nêçîrvan Barîzani owns Rûdaw Media Network, another organization like the KDP official media may be under the control of Mes'ud Barîzani, but the insights of each of them is different. It is similar to Sulaimani [or Green Zone]; the PUK general secretary's wife, Hêro İbrahim Efmed, owns the Kurdsat Broadcasting Corporation and other media is owned by somebody else. In Kurdistan, the media is not equally distributed as media organizations have not been professionally managed, and it is not fair inside. (Interview with Rêbwar Kerîm Welî 2015)

From Welî's (2015) understanding, two central points arise; the first refers to the lack of independent media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and the second is that the Kurdish media have been regularly used by their owners as a propaganda trumpet for the agenda of the political parties or political elites. As a result, the media has not been functioning professionally, and it is hard in such circumstances to generate a media industry which provides valuable information that can earn an adequate, sustainable revenue.

That debate has been partially rebutted by the general manager of the Awêne (Mirror) Company for Printing and Publication, Asos Herdî (2015), who claims that the Kurdish independent media is owned and supported by the private sector, depends on its revenue and works alone. For him, the Partisan Media is the first and most dominant type of Iraqi Kurdish media which is supported and owned by the political parties. He stresses that the political authority or ruling and even opposition parties are funding this type of media in the Kurdistan Region. It operates according to their interests, and it is evident that the parties’ wealth comes from the public budget. In his classification, Herdî (2015a) observed that the political character or elites support the third division, the Midîyayî Sêber (shadow media), which has only recently appeared.
This type of Iraqi Kurdish media pretends to be independent; the landscape of this media is wider than the official media of political parties, and talks about subject matter that the official partisan media does not allow. However, its lifecycle is tied to a political party and the authority that is secretly or indirectly fully funded by them. This classification also applies to online media, but the significant difference is that the technology offers easier and cheaper opportunities for creating websites that are affordable for everyone. Herdî (2015a) cited the Rûdaw Media Network as the well-known example of Shadow or Hegemony Media, which has markedly affected other types of media outlets, including the independent media and the wider Kurdish society as well, due to its superior technologies of printing, broadcasting and higher salaries for its staff (Interview with Asos Hardi 2015a).

In the case of political and media transitions to democracy in Iraqi Kurdish society, the controversy around media ownership types still continues, not least amongst Kurdish academic leaders. Ebubekr (2015) focused on a university classification that consists of four media types in the world: 1) Public Media is national media such as the BBC, which is supported by the parliament but it is for all people. 2) Official Media is funded by the state and represents the official view of the government. 3) Private Media involves all types, which are producing for commercial or marketing aims; regardless, the political parties and political figures have publishing or cultural institutions in this sphere. 4) Mixed media that includes the public, official and the private media. Based on this categorization, Ebubekr (2015) labeled all media types in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as the Private Media, but he supported Herdî’s (2015a) opinion that the political parties effectively fund their private media from the general budget, counter to the belief that the private media should depend on itself. He explained his view in more detail, as below:

In Kurdistan, the transparency, accountability, and revealed corruption affects two types of media. One was called opposition media in the past and the second one was named the private media. Financially, there is an independent media in Kurdistan, but nobody knows to what extent it is independent politically. There are attempts to have an independent media, but there are some barriers to having the media become independent at all. In print media, there are some independents, which are not more than the fingers of one hand, and there is one television channel. There is an effort to develop these but until now, owing to the competition that the state does with independent media, it has been failing. (Interviewe with Dr. Hevall Ebubekr 2015)
From the current research study, it can be concluded that the ownership of the Iraqi Kurdish media continues to have profound links to the political parties and their political elites, in particular, ruling classes of the KDP and PUK. Financially and professionally, autonomy orientations in the Kurdish media environment have not been precisely generated. As Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued, the Polarized Pluralist countries have powerful forms of state control of the journalism profession; however, these should be viewed as a significant manifestation of media closeness to the state rather than to its development as an independent profession.

According to the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS), which was represented by the Kurdish political parties, more than 800 print, broadcast and online media outlets with over 4,000 “journalists” have been registered. In provision of state regulations for the media through laws and licensing, control of media content in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is another barrier that has yet to be resolved by clear codes of practice of professional journalism ethics along with a mixture of independent bodies that support extensive public consultation. Meanwhile, the legal regulation of Iraqi Kurdish media is still not represented by statutory powers of particular legislation that cover all types of media platforms. The Iraqi Kurdish authorities have made concerted efforts to extend their range of media outlets by gaining control of the Kurdish media channels. They are typically believed to be non-affiliated; therefore, the independent and opposition media networks have answered these challenges by struggling to offer their audiences more transparent and informative news content than the government-affiliated media channels (Mawlood 2011). In this sense, the public and national broadcasting and the regulation of commercial broadcasting have still not emerged in the Kurdistan Region. Likewise, existing public broadcasting and broadcast regulation is yet to be designed based on the professional and democratic model, with relatively robust protection from political control.

With regard to the State as an information source and “primary definer” of news, Ebubekr (2015) reported that the KRG and its political system are one of the main barriers to the Iraqi Kurdish media becoming independent, particularly financially. Since the government has not provided equal opportunity to access information and a free market to similar competition among Kurdish media outlets. Even so, the political elites, through the offer of higher salaries, encouraged media workers to join the shadow media rather than the independent media.
In this region, the government or parliamentary model of broadcast governance and politics-over-broadcasting systems has performed unevenly. Alternatively, political conflicts among politicians and their parties result in their lacking the government's control over information sources as the primary definers of news. According to the \textit{Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model}, an elite-oriented press with relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media characterizes the media system in Iraqi Kurdish society. According to this model, press freedom and the development of commercial media industries generally came late; newspapers have often been economically marginal and in need of subsidy. Political parallelism tends to be high; the press is marked by a strong focus on political life, external pluralism, and a traditional of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism, which persists more strongly than in other parts of European societies (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Thus, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its environment of mass media communications have many similarities with other post-conflict societies that are trying to become emergent democracies. Still, there are too many questions on the desk of the KRG officials that await an answer, such as providing clear and non-partisan systems and judiciary procedures for media and its content regulation.

Media content regulation in Iraqi Kurdish rule is currently characterized by three main laws. Within these local legislations, the current study needs to elaborate on the legal framework, particularly in relation to how privacy is legally defined in Iraqi Kurdistan and the existing defamation laws. Of most relevance here is the \textit{Press Law No. 35} of 2007 which consists of 14 Articles and five chapters, such as definitions and principles, conditions for obtaining and conceding the right to publish journals, responses and corrections, rights and privileges, immunity, and final provisions. While this Law is much better formulated than the \textit{Law No.10 of 1993 to Establish the Rules for Publications} in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, it has also been criticized as the 2007 Press Law only covers the Kurdish printing media and ignores broadcasting media content, including radio, television, and convergent media, notably web journalism sites. Even though the ethical and legal accountabilities of journalists are markedly different, the Ethical Codes amendment of the 1954 International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has been adopted and attached as the key supplement to this law. Within the 2007 Press Law, there is no difference between the right to privacy and the claim of defamation and other types of media violations (see Table 3.3).
TABLE 3.3: The right to privacy in the Iraqi Kurdistan’ Press Law No. 35 of 2007 (selection)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article (9):</th>
<th>First: The journalist and the Editor-in-General shall be charged a fine of no less than 1 million ID and no more than 5 million ID for publication of one of the following:</th>
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<td>1. Sowing malice and fostering hatred, discord and disagreement among the components of society.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Insulting religious beliefs or denigrating their rituals.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Insulting and offending the religious symbols and sanctuaries of any religion or sect.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Anything related to the secrets of the private lives of individuals, even if true, if it offends them.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Libel, slander or defamation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Anything that prejudices an investigation or trial procedures unless publication is permitted by the court.</td>
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| Second: | A journal shall be charged a fine of no less than 5 million ID and no more than 20 million ID for publishing one of the items mentioned in paragraph (first) above. |

| Third: | If the violation were repeated, the Court may raise the fine, provided that it not exceed double the sum of the fine described in paragraphs (first and second) above. |

| Fourth: | The General Prosecutor and the affected person shall have the right to file suit, in accordance with law. |

Source: Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (2007: Law No.35)

In addition to the lack of legal definition of public and non-public figures or private and public spheres or spaces, the courts manipulate their judgments based on non-legal or non-occupational grounds. Where privacy is found to have been breached, the journalist responsible and the editor-in-general of the print media organization concerned are fined separately (Aivas 2013). Also, the core characteristics of private life or information privacy have not been precisely classified in relation to all types of mainstream and alternative media. In the 2007 Press Law, information privacy invasions and the other offenses related to publications have been defined as a joint offense for which the journalist and the Editor-in-General shall be levied the same fine. For instance, any offender shall be fined no less than one million Iraqi Dinar (≈ 662.46 GBP) and no more than five million IQD (≈ 3,283.37 GBP) for publication of each of “Libel, slander or defamation” and “Anything related to the secrets of the private lives of individuals, even if true, if it offends them” (see Table 3.3).
While the Editor-in-General in the legal framework represents the print media, one of the Editor-in-General or the journalist concerned, rather than both, should be charged. Additionally, the amount of the fine is a little higher for the nonpartisan media organizations, particularly in the case of repetition. Consequently, the 2007 press law should be democratically amended by balancing the individual's right to privacy against the public's right to know. The second theoretical framework related to the Iraqi Kurdish media regulation is Law No.06 of 2008, which is an Act to Prevent the Abuse of Communications Equipment that includes eight Articles. As Table 3.4 shows, the right to privacy has been clearly guaranteed in many aspects, including privacy leaks concerns and information privacy invasions within digital media. The 2008 Law in some cases has, to some extent, been used to regulate online media content and social networking sites, together with the protection of privacy in such alternative media networks as Facebook. This Law has been criticized for the complexity of concepts used and for generalizations of types of digital crime without distinguishing the identity of offenders. The individual's privacy could have been invaded by governmental bodies and officials, commercial companies, media professionals, media users or even ordinary citizens.

**Table 3-4:** The right to privacy in the Iraqi Kurdistan’ an Act to Prevent the Abuse of Communications Equipment Law No. 06 of 2008 (selection)

<table>
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<th>Article (1):</th>
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<td>Phone conversations, postal and electronic communications are private affairs which should be respected and not be breached.</td>
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<th>Article (2):</th>
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<td>The offender who commits any one of the following shall be jailed for a period no less than six months and no more than five years, the offender also shall be charged by paying a fine that is no less than 1 million IQD, and no more than 5 million IQD. Anyone who misuses the mobile phone, telecommunications equipment, the internet conversation or e-mail through the use of slander language, defamation, and distributing fake news to frighten people. Also, intrusion into private conversations, publishing images or video footages and SMS which contravene public ethics or take a photo without prior permission damaging the honor and dignity or pushing people into committing criminal affairs, or disseminating information related to the private life of families and individuals in any way unlawfully obtained, even if they were accurate and making them public are of an abusing nature and causing harm will face the same charges.</td>
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<th>Article (3):</th>
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<td>Each person who intentionally does any of the following shall face imprisonment for a period no less than three months and no more than one year, and also shall be charged by paying a fine that is no less than seven hundred and fifty thousand Iraqi Dinar, and no more than three million Iraqi Dinar, or one of these penalties. Anybody who uses a mobile phone or any type of telecommunication device, the internet or e-mail to abuse people; with the exception to those circumstances specified in the Second Article of the existing Law.</td>
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**Source:** Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (2008: Law No.06)
The newest or supplementary law is the *Right to Access Information (RTI), No.11 of 2013* that involves 22 Articles and five chapters, including definitions and goals, roles and responsibilities of the commission, methods of obtaining information, general provisions, and concluding provisions. This Law was estimated a relatively progressive piece of legislation by both the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD) in 2014. It gathered 98 points out of a potential 150 on the global rating of the Right To Information (www.RTI-Rating.org), which puts it in 28th place out of 95 countries.

In the beginning, the 2013 Law was given a considerable welcome by internal and international observers who commented that, in adopting the *Right to Access Information Law*, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq had joined other democracies in putting in place a system for guaranteeing transparency in government. In addition, local journalists also welcomed the adoption of the 2013 Law that allowed a significant level of protection for them, in being able to perform an extensive watchdog role and report on the KRG performance along with other public institutions without fear of reprisals or punishment. However, later events amongst Iraqi Kurdish political parties, as well as the battle against ISIS, restricted the fulfilling of this Law at all. While the 2013 Law is still very important for Kurdish political and media transitions to democracy, in a number of aspects there is much room for improvement. For instance, the procedures for processing information requests are very complicated and entail a long wait for the right response. The 2013 Law also fails to build a dedicated oversight body for information appeals, including an information commission rather than allocating this task to the current Human Rights Commission of the Kurdistan Region. There are no penalties for obstruction of protection or access for good faith disclosures pursuant to the law, and there is no way to consult with third parties (Joint report of the CLD and IFJ 2014). As Table 3.5 shows, Iraqi Kurdish citizens, including journalists, have been restricted by the 2013 Right to Access Information Law in their ability to ask and access certain types of information, particularly in points of 4, 5, and 6 of the second section of Article 14. Within these clauses, several aspects of the right to privacy have been guaranteed, however, including copyright or intellectual property rights, and personal identity data such as education, health, and bank account details.
The 2013 Law fails to separate the public and private information of public figures, celebrities, and ordinary people or citizens. Particularly, the main issue of this Law is that it is not applicable since it was issued by the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament due to administration routines, political conflicts, and corruption along with the lack of freedom of speech and media freedom in the following up of the professional rights of journalists. Since these are sub-national bodies, the Iraqi Kurdish ruling parties continue to dominate every aspect of life and do not allow citizens or journalists to access certain public and non-public information that may affect the private interests of political parties and their stakeholders. So far, for instance, nobody knows the real income from oil and natural resources in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Since the publication of the Right to Access Information Law of 2013, Iraqi Kurdish people have had no information on the cost of an oil barrel, let alone fluctuations in prices; meanwhile, the monthly salary of employees has been decreased or forfeited by the KRG. In his study of privacy, regulation and the public interest in the UK, Carrick (2012) found that media violations of privacy have been addressed by two main mechanisms: the courts and the regulatory framework. Similar to British society, these two mechanisms have been applied by Iraqi Kurdish society in the privacy cases of media intrusion into private life. However, the main difference in the case of Kurdistan is the lack of a democratic regulatory framework and media watchdog organizations, such as the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), for the Kurdish press and the Office of Communication (OFCOM) for Kurdish broadcasters.

While views differ around the best way forward, all parties agree on the need to strike the right balance between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression. The differences of opinion often lie with defining “the public interest”. When it comes to regulatory reform there is also a good deal of debate around whether there should be self-regulation, statutory regulation or independent regulation with a statutory underpinning (Carrick 2012:4).

Within such a legal framework, this study can conclude that the legal right to privacy has not been precisely defined in Iraqi Kurdistan legislation. As a result, the news organizations and media workers have faced many ambiguous challenges inside legal and ethical concepts. This ambiguity in the Kurdish legal framework has led to some local lawyers and journalists being unable to accurately classify private and public figures or private and public spaces or spheres. In some cases based on the public's right to know, the media and journalists have reported the private information of some persons who have been deemed by Iraqi Kurdish society as public figures, but the local courts later did not acknowledge the person concerned to be a public figure, and this led to charges and punishment for the reporters and their media organizations. While public figures globally have been considered to have zero privacy, the minority of dominant Iraqi Kurdish political leaders and their families has sketched a red line for the local media and journalist to invasion or even intrusion into their private lives. In the case of Kurdistan, civil liberties and notably the individual right to personal privacy of people in general and women in particular has not been socially respected and legally protected for several reasons. Thus media content regulation in this region needs much more work on the legal definition of privacy and its applicability to many areas of everyday life, notably in relation to media intrusion into people's private lives in a way that balances the individual's right to personal privacy and the public's right to know.
3.4. KURDISH MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC SPHERE

In the 1930s, social critical theory was developed in Germany to explain the neo-Marxist philosophy of the Frankfurt School as ‘a gadfly of other systems’ rather than promoting a specific philosophical agenda or a specific ideology. In the critical theory framework, ideology has been maintained as one of the major obstacles to human liberation (Elliott 2009; Jay 1996 and Geuss 1981). Many scholars have influenced modern critical theory, including György Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and Jürgen Habermas. For example, for Habermas, a second generation scholar of the Frankfurt School, one of the remaining Marxist philosophical concepts in much modern critical theory is a concern with social base and superstructure (William 1988). Unlike traditional theory oriented only to explaining or understanding society, the social critical theory seeks “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982: 188), and to critique and change society as a whole. In this theory, a normative dimension has been involved by criticizing society from the angle of any general theory of norms and values or by criticizing society in terms of its private espoused values (Zalta 2016). In this sense, the key concepts of social critical theory should be directed at every aspect of society in its historical specificity, and also should develop an understanding of society through combining all the significant social sciences, such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, geography, history, economics, and political science (Ibid.). In the 1960s, the social critical theory in Habermas's work had transcended its theoretical roots in German idealism, and advanced approaches to American pragmatism.

As a heritage of the Enlightenment along with making the discourse of law a major institution of the modern world, the creation of the social philosophy of Law has been influenced by the perceptions of Habermas in many countries, including Brazil. He further dissolved the components of social critical theory derived from Hegelian German Idealism, while his philosophy continued to be broadly Marxist in its epistemological approach. In addition, the core concepts of the public sphere and communicative action may be Habermas's two most influential ideas, the latter arriving partly as a reaction to the new challenges of post-structuralism to the modernity discourse. In the 1970s and 1980s, the social critical theory was redefined by Habermas as a communication theory: on the one hand, distorted communication; on
the other, communicative competence and communicative rationality. In other words, creating the processes of political consciousness, human communication and culture have been focused via social critical theory that includes the principles of universal pragmatism within which mutual understanding is produced.

In his famous study, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, a German Sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1962 Trans 1989) expounded on his theory of the “public sphere” and its progress since the period of the Renaissance in Western Europe. To some extent, it was carried out through merchants or wholesalers, who were a necessity in accessing truthful data and relaying information in the opposite direction of their distant bazaars. As Randall (2008) noticed, this led to the evolution of several notions of individual liberty or individualism instead of non-individual liberty or collectivism; democracy instead of autocracy and popular sovereignty. The public sphere was located amongst private individuals or ordinary citizens, and government authorities or public areas in the way that individuals were allowed to see their official documents, in addition to having critical discussions around common problems without obstruction. While a variety of definitions of the term “public sphere” have been suggested, this study has applied the definition first proposed by Habermas (1997: 360), who demarcated it as a “network for communicating information and points of view” where “the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinion”. Within this definition, the most extensive studies in the field of the public sphere have widely concentrated on the participation of individuals in making political decisions, and on the notion of the public interest, which comprise the institutional roles of global journalism cultures. Despite this, the public interest is one of the main justifications claimed by journalists in defense of media intrusion into people’s private lives. In this sense, a public domain sufficient to a democratic political entity relies on values of quantity and discourse of contribution (Calloun 1992). On the Public Sphere Theory (PST), the process of giving an arena for public debate builds on the appearance of an independent and market-based press. Habermas (1981) concluded that the public sphere can be used as a neutral zone for individuals with different backgrounds to freely participate and express their ideas and viewpoints on an equal basis. However, in establishing a major precondition to the democratic developments; it is increasingly difficult to ignore the
role of critical media professionally and independently as well. Supporting public conversation and giving access to a variety of beliefs, attitudes, entertainment, and information can promote the process of democratisation within the content of mass media communications. Therefore, the Habermasian concept of “the public sphere”, or the Arendtian term of “the public space”, in practice and theory is a multifaceted and disputed notion, due to the fact that it is “considered a discursive space in which citizens freely gather within a shared milieu to debate matters of significance to the public” (Carlisle 2013: 3; Arendt 1998 and Habermas 1991). Here, a suitable question has arisen that whether the new dominant powers in post-conflict countries offer an opportunity to the mass media communications in providing "the public sphere" or "the public space" for different social class or groups to frankly formulate and evaluate their understanding and perspectives?

According to the Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP), conceptual developments of the public sphere by historical roots may be differentiated into six classes: Ancient Greece; European Monarchies; Salons; Tribal gatherings; Church congregations, and Today's public sphere, which is strongly related to the mass media communications. A classic example of the public sphere was in the ancient Greek city-states, where the public sphere was practiced concerning public life connected to a particular meeting place known as the Agora, where ideas were debated by city-state citizens in contributing their opinions to the making of political decisions. Later, in the royal court of the European Monarchies, which included non-democratic countries, the King individually decided what was private and what was public.

Over the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Salon in France, the Coffeehouse in England, and Table societies in Germany became a privileged sitting room, where colleagues of the middle class or bourgeoisie and upper class or aristocrats encountered each other for a conversation about politics and artistic activities. Afterwards, with the progress of the first print media, most social groups became part of the public sphere in which the newspaper prepared public affairs, and their negotiations around such concerns were made accessible to individuals through developments in distribution. In stateless societies like precolonial Africa, the tribal gatherings had the same functions as the Agoras in ancient Greece, and Western salons (Splichal 1999).
In the case of Iraqi Kurdish culture, the Çayxane (tea-shop) is a well-known example of the public sphere, where people encounter each other, drink tea and talk about public affairs. For instance, Şe'b (Gel) in Hewlêr city center and Meçko in Suleymanî city center are two key Kurdish central tea-shops where individuals, including intellectuals, some politicians, artists, and so on still visit these public places in order to share their views and thoughts. Moreover, Mosques in Islamic societies have the same role of the Kurdish Çayxane, but the main difference is that the Çayxane is usually open to everybody, regardless of differences of religion or other aspects of identity. Comprehensively, during the period of political struggle, church congregations were expanded to include supporters of marginalized and oppressed groups and created another kind of public sphere. However, today’s public sphere is demarcated with the mass media communication as it allows people to exchange views and suggest the circumstances in which the medium can play a role (Bentivegna 2002). Since the development and distribution of new technologies of mass media communications in the 1990s, the concept of the public sphere has been a site characterized by ever-increasing access and rapid innovation. In this sense, new convergent media, including the Internet along with Web publishing services, as a form of the public sphere has had a broad influence on the increase in Web users. In the same way, the Net is widely used as a key source of information, chatting, learning, and voting, particularly in democratic societies; it is considered to offer extraordinary chances to debate and swap information with vast numbers of dissimilar individuals (CommGAP[no date]). As Ferree et al (2002) indicated that the exposure to minority opinions and political opponents are measured to be necessary to a properly functioning public sphere.

Nowadays, several factors are involved in the public sphere, for example, the Internet, civil society, private actors, public and public officials. In addition to the mass media communications which have become a convenient medium in the production of an institutional (infra) structure is facilitated the formulation of the common interest, both nationwide and universally (Splichal 2006). Otherwise, online privacy concerns have been globally sophisticated amongst individuals who have been surveillance threatened with the cyber-attack and its leakage of their private information.

In his latest study on the media in an emergent democracy, Syan (2015) has examined the development of online journalism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its role in political debates.
He concluded by focusing characteristics of the Internet that serve as an alternative tool for expression and creating a better medium for expanding speech freedom than mainstream media outlets, therefore, it is used as the key tool for Iraqi Kurdish individuals to have participation in many public debates. This status refers to the fact that, the political parties have historically owned and dominated the majority of Iraqi Kurdish media outlets, which has made it difficult for the opinions of ordinary citizens to be heard in these channels. However, in comparison with the traditional media, the Internet, particularly online journalism, is considered supportive to developing opportunities for a large number of individuals to participate and discuss quite freely and comfortably. While the Internet in Iraqi Kurdish society is not the ideal medium for generating a public sphere, due to access problems which may reduce equal opportunities for everyone. Even for too many people, the Internet is still preferred to traditional media because of its interactivity, affordability, users’ experience in publishing, and its anonymity. With regard to the current project, Syan's (2015) work is useful in rethinking the role of mass media communications in political transitions to democracy in Iraqi Kurdish society, but he has ignored the anonymity issue of Internet users, which led to making such leakages and invasions of individuals information privacy. While some media owners or authoritarian regimes have used the Web publishing services and convergent journalism practices to redefine public discourse by providing individuals as a prominent reaction in their governance than the get possible of mass media communications (Benkler 2006). Without a doubt, the factors identified by Habermas, which adulterate the public sphere and pull it into the “levelling-down” pit of the media, may be grouped into two main divisions; public relations and advertising.

As Habermas separated between newsprint production stages into three main points, which industrialized in European states chronologically (see Table 3.6), while these steps did not apply to the newsprint media’s expansion in the USA, which from the beginning was an advertising - and profit-driven initiative (Laughey 2007). For similar reasons and in the following paragraphs, the current study will be more necessary to enrich the research arguments by building criticisms of Habermas theory: To what extent Iraqi Kurdish media can be used as a public sphere to threaten people's private lives behind its ostensible goal of providing an independent medium for participation in the public debates.
In formulating the Liberal Press Theory (LPT), Odugbemi (2008) found that the essential constitutive elements of a functioning democratic public sphere can be listed under five prominent pillars (see Figure 3.5). First and foremost, civil liberties, or constitutional freedoms of guaranteed speech, press, assembly, and conscience. For example, granted the main principles of civil liberties entitled the key codes of the right to protect human rights in most states to the present day. These rights are firmly related to freedom of expression, which has been defined as: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Article 19). This universal definition of expression freedom has principally been adopted by the vast majority of national and international legislations, including the Kurdistan Regional Government within the latest Iraqi Constitution in 2005. However, the level of the existence of free expression is based on the tolerance level and democratic principles of the native government. As Sunstein (2007) confirmed, more than merely bypassing censorship, it has more to do with guaranteeing people's expression and exposure to competing viewpoints.

In addition to the technological design, administrative and legislative regulation of technology, along with the most traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights have obligatorily protected the expression of freedom, interactivity and mass participation as the most powerful normative conditions of the public sphere (Syan 2015 and Balkin 2004). The second pillar covers free, plural, and independent media system; frequently, the central foundation of the public sphere is that the media system is not under control of the government. The third pillar is access to public information, which consists of a culture of openness, transparency, and freedom of information enactments.
Fourth, the civil society allows all citizens of various civil organizations to practice the role of citizenship and responsibility in the public sphere. The fifth and final pillar of the essential constitutive elements of a functioning democratic public sphere, includes all sites of everyday discussion of public affairs, which means that one of the key features of public opinion development is daily debates everywhere, for instance in the coffee shop and the workplace.

**Figure 3-5: National democratic public sphere**

*Source: Odugbemi (2008:30)*

Within these pillars, it can be identified that the constitutive elements of the public sphere work together on the fundamental values of publicity and openness. In this sense, a freedom of communication and conversation of political worries’ difficulties, including a free influx of data and information has been built by an answerable and proper authority or the government. Thus, an individual's free speech, view, and assembly together with the laws of access to information and legally guaranteed civil rights have reconstructed by the democratic and open public sphere, because of:

An open and democratic public official should feel committed to the public’s right to know, not the government's right to secrecy. Media regulation should guarantee that the media can fulfil its democratic roles without political or economic pressures. Literacy and education promote a citizenry that is interested in public affairs and that is willing as well as able to participate in governance. Policies should target these main factors to promote a public sphere that enables good, democratic, and accountable government (CommGAP [no date]: 6).

Within that statement and according to Odugbemi (2008)'s five prominent pillars, it can be highlighted on the main aims of the current research study that focuses on
 intrusion into the people’s private lives and the role of Iraqi Kurdish media in political transitions to democracy. In addition to critically investigating the interrelationships between the right to know, the right to privacy, and the professional role orientations of Kurdish journalism cultures. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the essential constitutive elements of a functioning democratic public sphere can be identified, as such civil liberties as freedoms of speech, the media, assembly, and conscience has been constitutionally guaranteed. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) has been legally adopted in Iraqi Kurdish rule, but there is no guarantee of consistent protection in reality, specifically during times of political conflicts. In the most recent decade, several studies have shown that the dominant media in Iraqi Kurdish society conform to the definitions of a partisan media, whether formally or otherwise (Jameel 2016; Bali 2016; Syan 2015; Ismaily 2015 and Mawlood 2011). While Herdî (2015a) aforementioned confirmed, the Kurdish independent media is owned and supported by the private sector and is dependent on its revenue. He cites the example of the Hudatatî (citizen) political newspaper, which has been published since 2000 by the private printing house of Renc (strive), and has occasionally claimed the reader's financial support to continue. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament issued The Right to Access Information Law No. 11 of 2013, but it has yet to be applied at all due to its attendant legal complexities, political barriers, and other obstacles. Thus, a culture of openness, transparency, and freedom of information and access to public information still look forward to full development.

Occasionally, the ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq place restrictions on citizenship, particularly during political crises and conflicts. To take an example still resonating more recently, on 28th September 2016, Hêmin Binesllaweyî, a Kurdish Pêşmerge officer affiliated with the Change Movement, was arrested by KDP security in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital city of Erbil, beaten and had his head and eyebrows shaved for writing a Facebook post criticizing the KRG and asking the people of Erbil to demonstrate for their basic rights (see Figure 3.6). He also was evicted from Erbil and told him not to return, but men in Kurdistan and the diaspora have since been shaving their heads in the same style to show their support for Binesllaweyî, who was sketched by an Iraqi Kurdish journalist; Kawê Şêx Ebibulla. This case occurred in the context of prevalent political discontent in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, defined as a backsliding towards more authoritarian practices, such repressive acts reminding the Iraqi Kurdish community of Ba’athist practices and adding to the growing anger.
The next sections adapt the Habermasian concepts of the Public Sphere and Communicative Action, then apply them to the newly emerging model of the national democratic public sphere in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Primarily, the first virtue of the public sphere theory focuses on the indissoluble connection between practices of democratic politics and the institutions; also practices of mass public communication and the institutions. Another virtue of this theory is the powerful focus of concern on the difficulty of representation in the mediative sense of the word; that is, the problem posed is; how healthy or unhealthy is the current balance of political forces and the current political agenda as reflected in the many different media, and what is its influence on political activity, especially on voting models. As aforementioned, the core characteristics of political and media systems in Iraqi Kurdish society have been precisely identified in order to a better understanding these links amongst ownerships of privacy and media, media professionals, media audiences, and media content regulation.

As Garnham (1992) explained, the fundamental argument on the relationship between democratization and public communication is still dominated by the independent media model. This paradigm continues a fundamental idealist transposition of the paradigm of face-to-face communication to that of mediated communication, particularly how are the material resources needed for that communication made available, and to whom? This question has been defined as the third virtue of Habermas's theory, to escape from the shallow dichotomy of state control versus the free market, which dominates critical thinking on media policy and regulation.
On the contrary, Habermas separates the public sphere from both market and state, thus enabling discussion of the threats to democracy, and the public discourses upon which it depends, coming from both the progress of the modern interventionist welfare state and from the progress of an oligopolistic capitalist market (Ibid.). In academic circles, the public national democratic sphere has been vigorously challenged in recent years, and Habermasian concepts of the Communicative Action and the Public Sphere have also been subjected to considerable criticism. The most important of these criticisms is that his discussion is limited to news production from the traditional types of news media. As discussed in the following chapters, the cases of media intrusion into the people’s private lives have widely increased, for instance, the British Leveson inquiry was an examination of phone-hacking, an example of a contemporary scandal, a new global media problem that press regulation and professional ethics of journalism has encountered relating to the issues of information privacy invasions across the world.

Garnham (1992) found that Habermas’s rationalist model of public discourse leaves him powerless to theorize a pluralist public sphere, and it leads him to ignore the continuing need for compromise between bitterly divisive and irreconcilable political positions. Besides, this in its turn leads Habermas to lament the entry of political parties into the public sphere. In addition to inside both gender relations and relations of production, Habermas systematically suppressed the question of democratic accountability. In this case, he ignores both the playful and rhetorical features of communicative action, which leads to the sharp further distinction between entertainment, information and a neglect of the links. For similar reasons, “Habermas’s model of communicative action, developed as the norm for public discourse, neglects, when faced by distorted communication, all those other forms of communicative action not directed toward consensus” (Garnham 1992: 359-360).

### 3.5. THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND GENDERED CRITIQUES

Along with building on critiques of gender and the work of Habermas, the current research study has been enhanced by the work of American feminist scholar; Nancy Fraser. In her recent book on the fortunes of feminism, Fraser (2013) argues feminism issues from state-managed capitalism to neoliberal crisis. She also points to the weaknesses of the public sphere theory, notably in terms of its gendered distinction
between a masculinized public, the affairs of the society and state, the affairs of women and the family, as well as a feminized privacy. For her, Marx's 1843 definition of Critical Theory as “the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age” (Marx 1975: 209) has still not been updated. She believes that there is no philosophically interesting difference between an uncritical and a critical social theory that frames its conceptual framework and its research program with an eye to the activities and objects of those oppositional social tendencies with which it has a partisan if not uncritical identification. Accordingly, “if struggles contesting the subordination of women figured among the most significant of a given age, then a critical social theory for that time would aim, among other things, to shed light on the character and bases of such subordination” (Fraser 2013: 19). Rather than occluding relations of female subordination and male dominance, she suggests that critical social theory would use categories and explanatory models which would demystify as ideological the rival methods that rationalize or obfuscate those relations. For that reason, Fraser examined the critical social theory of Habermas as developed in The Theory of Communicative Action and related recent works, for instance, what is critical and what is not critical with respect to gender, and feminism as a new social movement in Habermas’s social theory. It is one of the serious deficiencies of Habermas’s work that, in his Communicative Action Theory, there is virtually nothing about gender and that many themes of concern to feminists would have emerged from his viewpoint had they been thematized. Besides, some social-theoretical framework components of Habermas’s theory have been examined in order to see how it serves the restricted, modern, nuclear family, male-headed and childrearing. From there she used Habermas’s delineation of the relations between the private and public spheres of life in traditional capitalist societies to rebuild its unthematized gender subtext. Eventually, she measures Habermas’s account of the crisis tendencies, dynamics, and conflict potentials specific to Western, modern, welfare-state capitalism, in order to see in what circumstances it counts struggles of contemporary feminism (Ibid.).

Fraser (2013) places Habermas’s social-theoretical categorical framework into two central distinctions: firstly, the distinction between the material and symbolic reproduction of societies. In this distinction, Habermas claims societies must materially reproduce themselves with other social systems, with a non-human and physical environment; they must strongly regulate the metabolic turn about groups of biological individuals.
However, societies must symbolically reproduce themselves; they must prepare and convey linguistically developed models and norms of interpretation constitutive of social identities to new members. By means of ‘social labor’, material reproduction is secured, but symbolic reproduction involves the connecting of group solidarity, the socialization of the young, the transmission and expansion of cultural traditions. In the first instance, the distinction between material and symbolic reproduction is a functional one and also, if a society is to persist and survive, it distinguishes two distinct functions that must be successfully performed. Habermas uses the distinction meanwhile to classify activities and actual social practices based on which one of the two functions they are taken to serve, whether primarily or exclusively. Within his theory, the practices and activities make up the sphere of paid work in capitalist societies which count as material reproduction activities as they are ‘social labor’ and assist the material reproduction function. In such societies and in the domestic sphere, the childrearing practices and activities are done without pay by women which count as symbolic reproduction activities that serve as socialization and symbolic reproduction functions in Habermas’s view. Fraser (2013) characterises this as women’s unpaid childrearing work, and she confirms that Habermas’s distinction between material and symbolic reproduction comprises two contrasting interpretations. Two functions have been taken by the first interpretation as two objectively different natural classes to which both actual organization of activities and the actual social practices in any given society may more or less correspond faithfully. Given that view in and of themselves, childrearing practices are simply oriented to symbolic reproduction but by their essential nature, the practices that produce objects and food are concerned with material reproduction.

Unlike, say, archaic societies, the organization of modern capitalist society would be a faithful mirror of the distinction between the two natural kinds because it institutionally divides these practices. At odds with another potential interpretation, Fraser (2013) has called this understanding of ‘natural kinds’ a ‘pragmatic contextual’ interpretation that would not count practices of childrearing as inherently leading to symbolic reproduction. However, it would allow for the likelihood that, under particular conditions and given particular purposes, they could be usefully thought of from that viewpoint. In addition to a sexist political culture, the dominant view accords this traditionally female occupation as historical, natural, and instinctual. For more illustration, this traditionally female occupation still exists in this form in the post-
conflict region of Kurdistan, where there is limited understandings of women’s activities. In Iraqi Kurdish society, females have been controlled by dominant males within different social systems. In this case, the lowest number of women have a skilled and/or high position in political, economic and social institutions, including mass media organizations due to their historically subordinated status. In addition to media intrusion into private life, female politicians and other prominent women become one of the main invasion targets of the right to personal privacy because of the predominantly sexist traditional criteria of Oriental and Islamic cultural hybrids (see Chapters IV and VI).

Conceptually, it can be seen that the ‘natural’ argument is poor and ideologically based because the practices of childrearing serve symbolic as opposed to material reproduction. Within social mores, they involve initiation and language-teaching, but also comprise protection, bathing, feeding, and protection from physical harm. In this sense, children’s interactions with other people have been regulated, but include their interactions with such forms as animals, weather, excrement, dirt, germs, and milk as a physical nature. This might be called a “dual-aspect” activity because, per se, symbolic reproduction activity is not childrearing but also it is equally material reproduction activity at the same time. In other words, not only children's biological survival is at stake but also the construction of their social identities. Accordingly, it can be noticed that this is societies' biological survival they belong to, still in modern capitalist paid work; the same is true of the activities institutionalized. For instance, the biological survival of society's members comes from the contributions of food and objects production, but also at the same time, such production reproduces social identities. In view of that, nourishment and shelter are not simply being produced, but their forms are culturally elaborated which have symbolically mediated social meanings. By norm-governed social practices, symbolically mediated, and culturally elaborated social relations, such production occurs. In addition, the social identities of persons directly involved and indirectly affected have been formed, maintained, and modified by serving contents and results as well of these practices. From the standpoint of reproduction, it cannot be distinguished from women's unpaid childrearing or other kinds of natural work. In short, the potentially ideological interpretation of the natural kinds division between the material reproduction of other work and symbolic reproduction of childrearing can be applied in capitalist societies to legitimize the
in institutional division of childrearing from waged work. This division has been considered a mainstay of modern forms of women's subordination by many feminists, including Fraser (2013), in combination with other assumptions by Habermas, to legitimate the confinement of women to a “separate sphere”.

It is worth noting the second distinction of Habermas's categorical framework between “system integrated” and “socially integrated” action contexts. While any particular action is defined by self-interested, utility-maximizing calculations typically considered in the idioms or in the “media” of power and money as Habermas stated, system-integrated action contexts are those in which the actions of various agents are associated with one another via the functional interlacing of unintended consequences. For instance, sometimes the right to privacy of individuals has been violated by news media organizations and media professionals for financial gain or access to power, particularly when the ownerships of media and privacy are dominated from the same source. By contrast, socially integrated action contexts are those in which various agents adjust their actions with one another through connecting to some kind of implied or expressed intersubjective agreement about ends, values, and norms, that agreement predicated on interpretation and linguistic speech. In this sense, the capitalist economic system has been taken to be the standard case of a system-integrated action context by Habermas, while the nuclear, restricted, modern family has been taken to be the equivalent of a socially integrated action context. Fraser (2013) has broken down this complex distinction into six analytically different conceptual components; strategy, normativity, consensuality, linguistics, intentionality, and functionality. Three of these are clearly operative in virtually every major context of social action, while each component of functionality, intentionality, and linguistics can be set aside. The consequences of actions may be functionally connected to directions unintended by agents in both the capitalist workplace and the nuclear, restricted, modern family. In addition, agents in both contexts coordinate their actions with one another intentionally and consciously. Eventually, agents in both contexts coordinate their actions with one another in and by language. Hence, it can be understood that Habermas’s distinction dramatically turns on the components of the strategy, normativity, and consensuality. Within two possible interpretations of Habermas’s position, Fraser (2013) argues that the first distinction takes the contrast between the two sorts of action contexts as an absolute difference.
In this sense, socially integrated contexts would include absolutely no strategic calculations in the media of power and money, while system-integrated contexts would include absolutely no reference to moral values and norms. At odds with a second possibility, this interpretation of the “absolute differences” takes the contrast rather as a difference in degree. In this view, socially integrated contexts would include some strategic calculations in the media of power and money, but less than in system-integrated contexts; in the same way, system-integrated contexts would include some reference to moral values and norms, but less than in socially integrated contexts. Given this, the absolute differences interpretation can be argued as a further extreme that is also potentially ideological, since contexts of human action are actions coordinated absolutely non-consensually and absolutely non-normatively. While the consensus is morally questionable, and the status and content of the norms is problematic, virtually every context of human action includes some form of both of them, therefore the system of the capitalist economy has a moral-cultural dimension. Likewise, no human action contexts are entirely empty of strategic calculation. In non-capitalist societies similar to Iraqi Kurdish culture, gift rituals, once viewed as real crucibles of solidarity, are now broadly known to have a calculative dimension and a significant strategic value, performed in the medium of power, if not in that of money. For that reason, it can be argued that the nuclear, restricted, modern family is not empty of strategic, self-interested, individual calculations in both media. These action contexts have a strategic and economic dimension, while they are not officially counted as economic. In this sense, the absolute differences in interpretation fail to distinguish the capitalist economy or the official economy from the nuclear, restricted, modern family. In fact, the distinction must be described as a difference of degree if both of these institutions are to be distinguished with respect to the form of action-integration which must turn on the interactions, proportions, and places of the three components inside all. If this is so, the absolute differences in distribution of the modern family as a socially integrated action context and of the official economy as a system-integrated action context is probably ideological, which could be applied to occlude the similarities and exaggerate the differences between the two institutions or it could be used to construct an ideological opposition, for example.

In the above context, the current study agrees with Fraser’s (2013) criticisms of Habermas, who would contend that families can be seen as economic systems because of the intrusion or invasion of alien forces of the “colonization” of the family through
the state and the official economy, but this is also a questionable proposition. Generally, it can be concluded that Habermas’s model fails to concentrate on several dimensions of male dominance in modern societies, but his framework presents a conceptual resource for understanding other features of modern male dominance. For instance, the category of socially integrated action-contexts into two additional subcategories has been subdivided to include “normatively secured” forms of socially integrated action in the first pole. Such action is adjusted on the basis of pre-reflectivity, a conventional, taken-for-granted consensus regarding aims and values, rooted in the pre-critical internalization of cultural tradition and socialization. Then, “communicatively achieved” forms of socially integrated action comprise the second pole. Here, such action is adjusted on the basis of reflectively achieved understandings, an explicit agreement reached by unconstrained debate below conditions of fairness, equality, and freedom.

Within the category of socially integrated action, this sub-distinction allows Habermas some significant resources for examining the understood as normatively secured rather than through communicatively achieved action contexts. Sometimes, contexts where actions are negotiated through shared values and consensus where such consensus is questionable, as it is pre-reflective or it is achieved by discussion vitiated via inequality or coercion. The recent research studies on models of communication between wives and husbands can be perceived to neatly fit the concept of a normatively secured action context. The distinction between communicatively achieved and normatively secured action contexts succeeds in overcoming the matters explained earlier which is empirically helpful and morally important. According to Fraser (2013), women do further “interaction work,” such as asking questions and providing verbal support, while men tend to dominate discussions, deciding which subjects to pursue. With regard to differences in women’s and men’s uses of the bodily and gestural dimensions of speech, it is detected that the differences confirm women’s subordination and men’s dominance; therefore to achieve something significant concerning intrafamilial dynamics, Habermas’s distinction is very helpful. For instance, these power differences have been reflected or reproduced in media productions and the daily activities of media professionals in gathering and presenting information privacy. However, the term “power” has been restricted to bureaucratic contexts, which is a grave mistake for examining the coordinated actions through normatively secured consensus in the male-headed nuclear family because different kinds of power, including bureaucratic-
patriarchal power and domestic-patriarchal power, have been distinguished by critical theorists. In modern societies, in order to make Habermas’s framework fully sufficient to all the empirical forms of male dominance, even that distinction does not suffice by itself since in the domestic sphere only one component of the normative-domestic-patriarchal power enforces women’s subordination. To take the others, a social-theoretical framework has been required for examining families as economic systems that include the contribution of women’s unpaid labor which interlocks in complicated forms with other economic systems, including paid work. For similar reasons, the major categorical divide between system and lifeworld institutions, as well as among other interactions between family and the official economy has been drawn by Habermas’s frame which is not well equipped for that task.

Within Habermas’s empirical framework and the question of its normative political implications, the notion of modernization as the uncoupling of lifeworld and system institutions leads to the legitimation of the modern institutional separation of paid work, childrearing, official economy, and family. With respect to system integration, there is an asymmetry between symbolic and material reproduction, as Habermas's model has claimed. At least, it defends one aspect of “the separation of public and private”, particularly that of childrearing from the rest of social labor, and also the separation of the official economic sphere from the domestic sphere. Therefore, it defends an institutional system which is broadly held to be one, if not the linchpin, of contemporary women’s subordination. While Habermas is a socialist, even he supports the hierarchical command, profit-orientation, and elimination of private ownership in paid work, thus this would not of itself alter the official economic/domestic separation. From these arguments, several premises of the reasoning can be reconstructed, including estimates of the material reproduction distinction versus the natural kinds interpretation of the symbolic. However, Fraser (2013) confirms a dual-aspect activity of childrearing as, in this respect, it is not categorically different from other work, and also there is no permission for the claim of an asymmetrical face-to-face system integration. In addition, there is no permission for thinking that the system-integrated organization of childrearing would be any more or less pathological than that of other work. Another reasoning allows the absolute differences interpretation of the system versus social integration distinction. In this sense, the nuclear, male-headed, modern family is a melange of strategically and
normatively secured consensualiy. In this respect, it is also not categorically separate from the paid workplace, when privatized childrearing is already, to a not unimportant extent, filtered through the media of power and money. In this view, there is no empirical evidence that children reared in commercial daycare centres turn out anymore “pathological” than those reared by full-time mothers in suburban homes. One more line of reasoning simply raises system complexity to the level of a major consideration with powerful veto-power over advanced social transformations proposed to overcome women’s subordination. At odds with Habermas’s professions, system complexity is simply one example of “progress” among others and is also at odds with any sensible standard of justice.

In thematizing the gendered subtext, an account of the inter-institutional relations among different spheres of private and public life in classical capitalism has been offered by Habermas's model which includes some genuine critical potential. However, to fully realize this potential Fraser (2013) requires the rebuilding of the unthematised gender subtext of Habermas's material or his sophisticated and powerful model. Within its major lacunae, Habermas fails to understand exactly how the capitalist workplace is associated with the male-headed, nuclear, restricted, modern, family. Likewise, he misses the entire meaning of the way the state is associated with the public sphere of political speech through neglecting to thematize the masculine subtext of the citizen role. Habermas loses significant cross-connections among the four components of his two public-private schemata. For instance, he loses the way the masculine citizen-soldier-protector role is associated with the public sphere and the state in relation not only to one another but also to the paid workplace and to the family, underpinning the hypotheses of woman’s need for man’s protection and man’s ability for protection run by all of these institutions. Also, he loses the way the masculine citizen-speaker role associated with the public sphere and the state is related not only to one another but also to the official economy and the family, underpinning the hypotheses of woman’s inability and man’s ability to speak and consent therein runs throughout. Additionally, he loses the way the masculine worker-breadwinner role associated with the official economy and the family relates not only to one another but also to the political public sphere and the state, underpinning the hypotheses of women's dependent status and of man's provider status running through each institution. Also, that the coin in which taxes and classical capitalist wages are paid is not gender-neutral. Furthermore, he loses
the way the feminine childrearing role is associated through all four institutions to one another through managing the development of the feminine and masculine gendered subjects required to fill each role in classical capitalism.

From the gender-blindness of Habermas’s model, all these connections can be considered and then it becomes clear that masculine and feminine gender identity runs like blue and pink threads via the domains of citizenship, state administration, and paid work, also via the area of sexual and familial relations, as well as being lived out in all aspects of life. Among all of them, gender identity is one, if not the paramount “medium of exchange”, an essential element of the social glue that connects them to one another. Within a gender-sensitive reading of these connections, there are some significant theoretical implications, including male dominance as essential rather than secondary to classical capitalism and that the gendered roles are achieved through the institutional structure of this social formation. At issue here, the patterns of male dominance are not quite understood as permanent patterns of pre-modern status inequality. In Habermas’s sense, they are intrinsically modern as they are premised on the division of the state and waged labor from the household and female childrearing.

In fact, the relevant concepts of wage, consumer, and worker are not strictly economic concepts, contrary to the usual androcentric understanding. They have an absolute gender subtext and hence are “gendereconomic”, in addition to the relevant notion of citizenship which is not strictly a political concept; it has an absolute gender subtext and is “gender-political”. Consequently, this analysis shows the flaw in those critical theories where gender is subsidiary to politics and political economy. This highlights the necessity for a critical theoretical categorical frame in which political economy, politics, and gender are internally combined. With regard to a feminist critique of the dynamics of welfare-state capitalism, Fraser (2013) views the problematical characteristics of Habermas’s social-theoretical framework which leads to the application of the study as a unity and reduces its capacity to explain the wishes and struggles of contemporary women. Given that, Habermas’s view has been shown in the form of six theses, including welfare-state capitalism arising as a result of and in answer to crises or instabilities inherent in classical capitalism. In addition, the realignment of “official” economy-state associations is accompanied by a change in the associations of those systems with the public and private spheres of the lifeworld, rendering these developments “ambivalent”.
What's more, the most ambivalent welfare measures are those to do with the likes of family law, education, care of the elderly, and healthcare. Therefore, welfare-state capitalism gives rise to an “inner colonization of the lifeworld”, and finally the colonization of the lifeworld sparks different sorts of social conflict specific to welfare-state capitalism (Fraser 2013: 40-42). Within these themes, it can be concluded that these categories suggested by Habermas lead to misrepresentation and gives rise to the field of the feminist challenge to welfare-state capitalism. In other words, the wishes and struggles of contemporary women are not sufficiently explained via a theory that describes the fundamental battle-line between lifeworld and system and institutions, thus a further fundamental battle-line between the patterns of male dominance linking “system” to “lifeworld” and us have been considered from a feminist perspective.

3.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

By evaluating the opportunities and challenges of emerging democracies along with their similarities and differences, this chapter has acknowledged and classified the Iraqi Kurdish government as a hybrid model of semi-dictatorship and emerging democracy within the wider Middle East. In this fragile case, the civil liberties that refer to constitutionally expressed freedoms guaranteed of speech, press, assembly, and conscience have been documented according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). However, since Iraqi Kurdish society as a post-conflict region has been dominated by the two respective tribes of the ruling parties, KDP and PUK. Such civil liberties of the right to privacy have not been entirely provided and protected due to their own media intrusions into the private lives of opposition activists, particularly during the political conflicts and general election campaigns. As a result, the Kurdistan political system serves the interests of the ruling parties or dominant tribes, in addition to the purportedly free, plural, and independent media systems which are controlled by the political parties and their politician elites rather than government bodies. Ironically and sadly, the intelligence agencies so far have been affiliated and monopolized by both KDP and PUK rather than the KRG bodies. These agencies have recently taken over many media organizations, such as the television satellite of the Kurdistan24 and the Ajanis (Agency) weekly newspaper along with their media partners in the Yellow and Green zones.
Those independent media channels that have not affiliated with political parties and their stakeholder elites in the KRG have had limited success, principally due to the hegemony of the political ruling class. While the Kurdish parliament produced a law enabling the right to access information in 2013, a culture of openness, transparency, and freedom of public information has not greatly increased. To practice the role of citizenship and responsibility in the public sphere, citizens and various civil organizations do not have equal opportunity in Iraqi Kurdish society. So far, different types of discrimination, including gendered, political, and religious have been observed, however, talking about public affairs, such as the performance of the government bodies and its public figures with daily debates being held in all parts of society have dramatically increased.

During the transitional periods towards democracy, the environment of Iraqi Kurdish media, in the form of civil liberties, freedom of expression and media freedom, has been frequently violated. However, the media system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can be characterized as favoring massive partisan media organizations rather than a smaller independent and professional media. An elite-oriented press with a smaller circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media also characterize the Kurdish media system. In this case, press freedom and the development of commercial media industries arrived late; also the newspapers have frequently been economically marginal and in need of subsidy. Political parallelism in Iraqi Kurdish society tends to be high, in this sense, the press is identified by a sharp focus on politics, external pluralism, and a tradition of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism persists more strongly than in other parts of the world. The Iraqi Kurdish government, political parties, and industrialists have been using the media as an instrument that consists of common political ties. In the Kurdish media model, public broadcasting is very limited and does not tend to follow the government or parliamentary models. Like other models, the professionalization of Kurdish journalism is weakly developed as journalistic practice and political activism are not fully differentiated, the main reason here is coming back to general limitations of the editorial autonomy. Despite that, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is being marked by conflict over the autonomy of journalists' power and authority within news media organizations. In this case, due to the hegemony of partisan media ownerships, the journalistic professionalism of Iraqi Kurdish media has been limited and this has led to the lack of independent or
professional journalists and news media organisations. For similar reasons, the Kurdish ruling parties within their governing bodies have significant roles as regulators, owners, and founders of media platforms, but their ability to regulate effectively is normally restricted. Since the Kurdish print media is partially controlled, and the broadcasting and converging media are largely ignored, a post-conflict region of Iraqi Kurdish society is distinguished through “savage deregulation” or by an unusually rapid and uncontrolled transition from state-controlled to commercial television and radio stations (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Using Habermas, Iraqi Kurdish media cannot become the effective public sphere for the critical role of communicative action. In addition to limited, or absent, independent and professional media organizations, mass media communications in Iraqi Kurdish society still needs much more freedom in order to be a genuinely equal platform for everyone to independently participate in public debate or the national democratic public sphere. For similar reasons, the KRG should promote a new model of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, and make extra provisions for freedom of expression in terms of encouraging opposition political parties, independent media, and an unrestricted environment for the professional work of journalists, in addition to producing new democratic media content regulations. Based on Fraser's (2013) gender-based criticisms and the work of Habermas, the current research study has been enhanced by selecting feminist issues from state-managed capitalism to neoliberal crisis. This is in addition to highlighting the failings of Habermasian concepts of the public sphere and communicative action, particularly in terms of its gendered distinction of a feminized privacy, and the affairs of women and the family, as well as a masculinized public, affairs of society, and state. From this perspective, given the masculine dominance and feminine subordination in Iraqi Kurdish society, the media environment has extensively been directed by masculine powers in most institutions. Notably, during the cases of invasion of personal privacy and media intrusion into private life, the professional role orientations of media professionals have been manipulated by media ownerships or privacy ownerships with different aims in mind, including political, economic and social benefits. From these pieces of evidence and according to the Gramscian concept of hegemony, this chapter has confirmed that the vast majority of Iraqi Kurdish media has been dominated by prominent political parties, political elites, and their stakeholders.
In this sense, mass media communications and media professionals have been subordinated as a churnalism and propaganda model to retain the common sense of the society. For that reason, media intrusion into private lives has become more common, notably during political crises and general election campaigns, because of the imbalance in media ownership versus privacy ownership or dominant partisanship versus subordinated professionalism in journalism practices. While the politicians may be most likely to protest that the KRG’s freedom of speech is among the most liberal in the world, they have still warned that such freedom should not be abused. As Yiu (2003) argues, the responsibility of mass media communications should be to teach their audiences positive social values, which is the underpinning of their professional role in strengthening democracy.
Literature Review III:

Cultural Differences of Professionalism and Privacy Amongst Journalism Practices

4.1. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

An extensive debate on media intrusion into private life has been provided in this chapter by focusing on global journalism cultures and cultural differences in the shifting boundaries of privacy understandings, particularly in comparison with non-Western and non-democratic countries. The scholarly literature used for this study will be reviewed, leading to an outline of the reasons underlying the choice of theoretical framework to explore the influences on professional role orientations and perceptions of working journalists in using various methods for collecting and revealing private information within information privacy invasions. This chapter aims to contribute a critical engagement with wider works of literature in order to critically examine the existing models, theories, and frameworks. Many theorists have rethought the issues around journalistic professionalism and information privacy in the information age. This has led to the reuse of the works of various sociologists, anthropologists, media, and cultural scholars to make sense of the key issues and questions that are discussed in this chapter (Hanitzsch et al. 2016 and 2007; Allmer 2015; Bauman and Lyon 2013; Fuchs 2012; Nissenbaum 2010; Solove 2009 and 2006; Tavani 2007 and 2000). The employed concepts and report on the experience of media workers affecting invasion cases of information privacy will be evaluated. Importantly, this research project prefers to separate its empirical findings and its literature review, as it is more elegant to start with a review of the debates on privacy boundaries and professionalism in journalism, before a later presentation of gained findings to link them to the literature review within this current research project.

To begin with, this study has agreed to use the concept of journalism culture as a given collection of notions and traditions via the unconscious and conscious performance of journalists in legitimating their function in society, and also making their performance meaningful for themselves and others (Hanitzsch 2007).
That targeted definition can be applied to identify the characteristics of journalism cultures in Western and non-Western, or in democratic and non-democratic societies, such as the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq. In addition to this space of research which is largely unexplored so far, whether by Kurdish native scholars or even non-native. To identify this gap, the current study builds on the work of Hanitzsch and co-workers (2016 and 2007), since it is relevant to a better understanding of the orientations of journalistic professionalism because of its gathering of shared values between different cultures. Based on their extensive works, the core components of journalism cultures can be deconstructed into the institutional roles, epistemologies, and ethical ideologies of the journalists. These constituents have been once more separated into seven principles of interventionism; power distance; market orientation; objectivism; empiricism; relativism, and idealism. While media tends to think of itself as reactive, at least in Western countries, this research project more specifically intends to measure the influencing of public opinion, the importance of setting the political agenda, and advocating for social change as the three core characteristics of journalistic interventionism in the course of answering the question of whether is there any relationship between the interventionist journalists and their intrusion or invasions methods into people’s private life (Hanitzsch et al., 2016, 2014, 2010 and 2007). As Esser (2004) observed, cultural diversity in journalism cannot be understood as harmonies of same values, but rather hybrids between the traditional internal components in relation to international components that combine dynamically with each other.

According to a classical definition provided by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such attacks or interference. Consequently, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his or her honor and reputation. This foundation led to the current research project in redefining the concept of privacy as a prominent universal right of individuals to be protected against intrusion into their private life and affairs, or those of their family, through information dissemination or through direct physical means. For that reason, one of the current research questions here is; what are the motivations that influence Iraqi Kurdish journalists' decision-making when they encounter privacy issues?
In the meantime, the methods of journalists' decision-making in drawing a distinction between private information of ordinary people, celebrities, and public or official figures in gathering information and reporting news will be examined. Therefore, ethical theories of the Kantian, Utilitarian, Transfer of Power, and the Priority Model will be applied to investigate the professional activities of journalists in relation to their collection and processing of private information and other actions that could constitute an invasion of privacy.

4.2. PROFESSIONALISM ORIENTATIONS IN JOURNALISM CULTURES

Over the past decade, using the profile characteristics of the global professional milieus of journalists' role perceptions have been compared with typologies of journalism cultures. In sociological literature on mass media communication and cultural studies, an important recurring theme is the examination of the professionalism concept that broadly defined by social researchers as relating to occupations with special power and prestige, then typically evaluating the characteristics of such occupations as journalism in more detail. Unlike general moral or ethical codes, a professional code suggests the accountabilities of individuals inside the special group to those outside it (Singer 2003 and MacIver 1966).

While questions of 'professionalism' have long been fundamental to discussions about mass media communication and its journalism practices, both within and outside academic fields, such debates may originally seem rather bewildering. If a classic study of media professionalism revealed that the question of whether journalism changes as a profession is not essential (Soloski 1997), questions of whether journalism 'counts' as a profession or should 'professionalise' have not declined (Hartley 2007; Green and Sykes 2004). In contrast, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) have explained that professionalism in journalism has been in a process of seemingly inevitable decline, and explored the underlying reasons. Counter to that, there is a demand for journalism to re-adopt these values because they have historically determined its public role. Given that, Aldridge and Evetts (2003) suggested that what people are now witnessing is an inevitable tendency to 'professionalization' in journalism practices because this is feasible to have long-term influences on the models and identities of preparation of forthcoming generations of practitioners.
As Larson (1977) observed, those who demand membership in a profession do so at least in part to justify imbalance of status and to limit access to that situation. This point is interesting and can be expanded by stated that the psychological needs of everyone in a particular group or special community of professionals affect someone else in making any type of relationship more social. Therefore, membership in a profession gives a suitable opportunity to easily access others and find his or her differences and similarities within such social groups. In this sense, the essential role of any particular professional work can be performed only by individuals who have special education, judgment or talents, and also it is imperative that all parties clearly understand the distinction between layperson and practitioner (Allison 1986). Hence, the body of knowledge and procedures that professionals apply in their work comes from a cognitive dimension of the necessary professionalism in the training required to learn these skills and concepts. Likewise, the service orientation of professionals and their distinguishing ethics are rooted in a normative dimension that permits the privilege of self-regulation which is granted them by society (Singer 2003). What is more, an evaluative dimension implicitly distinguishes the jobs from the other professions, emphasising the singular characteristics of professions' prestige and autonomy (Larson 1977). For Freidson (1973), an exclusive knowledge offers a power to its owners who, through control over the recruitment, training and performance of work that means producing, disseminating and using knowledge, gain and keep that power. Similarly, a process of excusing an inherent inequality of power between the professional and the layperson comes from the concept of professionalism (Singer 2003; Allison 1996 and Johnson 1982).

Within those arguments and in relation the current research question, if being professional in journalism means having power and also getting information, notably private information means having a power again, therefore the question remains: how do those people who consider themselves journalists regulate both the powers of accessing the private information of others, and also of professionality in journalism practices? What is the professional role of journalists within media intrusion into private life? These questions need to be further discussed in order to discover these power relationships that built the prominent debates in this research project.
To this end, *The Worlds of Journalism Study*, conducted by Thomas Hanitzsch and colleagues, concluded there are four professional milieus of journalism cultures, such as *Detached Watchdog, Opportunist Facilitator, Populist Disseminator, and the Critical Change Agent* (see Table 4.1). Within this targeted study, they conducted a comprehensive survey with news media workers between October 2007 and January 2011. They used telephone or face-to-face interviews with a quota sample of over 2100 working journalists from 413 news organizations amongst 21 Western and non-Western countries inside their various media and political systems. In each investigated country, 100 active journalists from 20 news organizations participated, from which the scholars found that the journalistic functions or the vital journalistic virtues worldwide can be characterized as detachment, non-involvement, providing political information, and monitoring the government (Hanitzsch et al., 2016; 2014; 2013, 2011, 2010 and 2007).

From these four cultures of journalism, it can be noticed further virtues similar to the reliability, impartiality, factual verity of information and adherence to universal ethical principles seen to be of great importance for Western journalists, even though any active promotion of particular values, ideas or social change found less support among the Western journalists (Hanitzsch 2010). A dominance of the watchdog journalism concept classifies Western journalism cultures, mainly in South-Western democracies. In the case of Spain, there is a harbouring of a high journalistic culture of the ‘populist disseminator’ (Hanitzsch 2011a). The tendencies of journalism cultures have been perceived entirely differently in developing countries. For instance, in South America and Eastern Europe, the American model of the ‘objective’ press has been established by the ‘US government and media initiatives’ particularly in the 1990s (Reese 2001). The US-style journalism has been assumed to be an inevitable and natural world model, whereas journalism culture in Eastern European countries has not seen a universal adoption of Western journalism principles (Hanitzsch 2011a). On the contrary, these countries have been involved in the founding of a less objective, more entertainment and audience-oriented journalistic culture (De Beer 2008).
### Table 4-1: Four professional models inside global journalism cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of Journalism Culture</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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| **Populist Disseminator**    | - Journalists in this group share the strongest orientation towards the audience, for that they are most likely to provide interesting information and news that attract a wide audience.  
| E.g., Spain, Romania, Israel  | - A secondary characteristic of this milieu is a stronger professional orientation towards an understanding of the journalist’s role as detached observer. The monitoring function of journalism is least appreciated in this group. |
| **Detached Watchdog**        | - A defining characteristic of this cluster is the relatively high regard the journalists pay to their role as detached observer. They also see themselves as watchdogs of the political and business elites; and they find it important to provide the audience with political information.  
| E.g., Germany, Austria, USA, Switzerland, Australia | - Journalists in this group also feel that in order to reach their audiences, even political news needs to be interesting in order to sell well. At the same time, they are clearly less interventionist than their colleagues in other milieus, and they are most opposed to the idea that journalists should support official policies. |
| **Critical Change Agent**    | - Journalists in this group hold critical attitudes towards the government and business elites, but they are mainly driven by an interventionist impetus. They particularly emphasize the importance of advocating social change, influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda.  
| E.g., Turkey, Egypt. In parts Bulgaria, Mexico and Indonesia | - The journalists in this cluster are most eager to motivate their audiences to participate in civic activity and political discussion. An opportunistic approach to journalism, on the other hand, is least supported by them. Furthermore, they are least oriented towards the audience. |
| **Opportunistic Facilitator**| - The main characteristic of journalists in this group is their relatively strong opportunistic view of journalism’s role in society, namely as constructive partners of the government in the process of economic development and political transformation.  
| E.g., Russia, Chile, China, Uganda | - They pay least regard to a detached observer role, the political information and mobilization functions, as well as a watchdog role. |

This table has been designed based on Hanitzsch (2011: 481)
Within former scholarly outcomes can be seen that journalism cultures have been constantly changing in Western and non-Western countries. For illustration, if emerging or post-conflict countries previously disregarded entertainment programmes and audience-oriented journalistic culture due to the lack of civil liberty and other political issues, now the entertainment productions have become a source of fascination in the media coverage of developing cultures. In the case of the media environment in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region, thirty years ago it was not easy to produce any entertainment programme. Now, the Iraqi Kurdish media channels are producing too many entertainment programmes, such as Şeqlam (street) on NRT2 and Evin Jn û Jiyan (Evin, women and life) on Net TV. This type of media production has been named as a progress stage of the Iraqi Kurdish media development, a resulting of its transitioning to an emerging democracy. In addition, the growth of the information privacy invasions within these entertainment programmes caused a rethinking of the professional role orientations of the Kurdish journalists and also their own motivations to be journalists (see Chapter VI).

4.2.1. Professional Hegemony Versus Partisan Hegemony

In post-conflict and developing societies, some phenomena have emerged as an outcome of the political and media transitions to democracy, including professional hegemony versus partisan hegemony or media ownership versus privacy ownership and vice versa. While journalism can be realized as a profession which has a particular tradition, technique, sense of fellowship, and it is seen as a profession which has resisted, absorbed, or negotiated the assaults of commercialization, there needs to be a further discussion here about what 'professionalism' means to journalists. From those various perspectives and debates investigating various meanings of the concept 'professionalism in journalism', it can be understood that whenever professionalism is suggested for journalists as a discourse rather than a packed collection of attributes or values and claims since professionalism in journalism is commonly ‘in decline’, such notions can be perceived as controversial. Meanwhile, directions to an obvious decline in professionalism and contemporary direction to the journalistic professionalization may not be as different as they originally seem. In other words, discourses of professionalism and classical traditions of occupational identity have ceased to exert any power.
In addition, it is preferable to suggest that the characteristics of various emergent kinds of professionalism, and the standards to which news media workers remain adherent to practice a range of power beyond the shaping of their personal autonomy, become issues because these merit more investigation (Nolan 2008). As Bardoel (1996) explained, professionalism for some journalists concerns questions of who serves as the gatekeepers to public information; while this meaning now appears more archaic, this idea is still operational for many news media workers. As opposed to other public communicators, those who have deep cultural knowledge in better news judgment in practicing the principles of journalism make a professional journalist. In this case, the journalism meets professional standards of quality which have been globally developed according to core key indicators: reporting is objective, fair, and well-sourced; journalists follow documented and acknowledged ethical standards; journalists cover important events and issues within or outside the society across the world, such as media events of general election campaigns and natural issues like Tsunami; pay levels for journalists and other media professionals are adequately high to discourage corruption of qualified personnel within the media career; entertainment programming does not cover news and information programming; technical equipment and its facilities for collecting, creating, and distributing news are efficient and modern; quality function programming and reporting exist, such as investigative, economics or business, political and local affairs (the Media Sustainability Index 2015). Otherwise, Singer (2003) found that the concept of professionalism in the digital age is the fundamental task that online journalism poses for journalists rather than money or even professional security. In this sense, an ideological construct involves the notion of professionalism itself which is observed as a process to an end state at which some jobs have arrived and toward which others are moving. In other words, different services come from the various demands of diverse professions that contain different values or ideologies.

In summarizing these debates, this current study can be taken as a contribution to the knowledge that while professionalism in journalism is not a myth, the meanings of professionalism to the majority of journalists can have varied criteria, such as the possession of an academic degree, or more experience, and abiding by ethical principles in journalism, such as truthfulness, accuracy, and respecting privacy rights. In this sense, the public communicators or news media workers who have been
dominated and affiliated or who are members of a particular political party, including those who are in the ruling class, cannot be professional journalists. They cannot balance or differentiate objectively between their personal or political affiliations and their professional obligations along with abiding by professional accountabilities, which have been identified in professional media ethics as one of the distinguishing features between journalists and non-journalists. Here, there needs to be an extra debate: what is the role of journalism in society; is it to challenge hegemony? While such questions have been discussed in the first chapter, it is necessary here to focus more on Cultural Hegemony Theory (CHT) in order to understand the occupational or professional hegemony of journalists in relation to media intrusion into private lives or information privacy invasions. Since the early 1970s, the Gramscian concept of hegemony has been extensively employed to think through the sharp changes in the political economy and understanding of global governance. As two pioneering scholars, Robert Cox and Stephen Gill have demonstrated, an understanding of the growing structural power of transnational and especially mobile finance capital accompanying the rise of ‘neo-liberal’ hegemony is crucial (Cox and Schechter 2002; Cox and Sinclair 1996; Cox 1993 and 1992; Gill 1993 and 1991).

Hegemony has often been used as a fundamental concept of critical theory by the New-Gramscianism investigators (Jameson and Larsen 1998), particularly by scholars interested in studying mass media, communication cultures, Global Political Economy (GPE), and International Relations (IR), which examine the interface of ideas, institutions and material capabilities as they shape the particular forms of the state formation (see Bieler and Morton 2003). In this sense, cultural theorists like Stuart Hall (1932-2014) and the University of Birmingham's Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have connected Gramsci's concept of hegemony with the research of media power. While media convergence has been happening for a long time and was catalysed in the 1980s by Reagan-Thatcher economic policies, this media convergence has had a crucial role in cultural convergence. Nowadays, the biggest media companies in the world control interests in the internet, its journalism practices, broadcast news networks and enterprises of entertainment, real estate and limitless other sectors. This is certainly true in the cases of American multinational media corporations (Jenkins 2001). This type of media company has extensively dominated cultures across the world, which have been regularly used to maintain the ideology of ruling class over subordinate class.
From the historical materialism perspective, Marx and Engels have been criticized due to a tendency to see altogether other dimensions of social development as basically mirroring ‘the economic’ (Hall 1986). As opposed to the Marxist perception of the central role of economic crisis in subverting capitalism, Gramsci concentrated on the role of the superstructure and developed a social and cultural approach. In addition to the fight against current structures together with economic relations, he also examined the norms, ideas, and ideologies and their role in super-structural institutions, such as mass media communications and the occupying ideological power of journalists to retain the status quo in society. Based on Gramscian thinking, a productive debate on the relations between cultural superstructure and economic base along with the dichotomy between structure and agency has been widely pursued by Thompson (1991); Hall (1983); Hobsbawm (1982), and Williams (1977). Within these studies, to examine the ways in which the British media established a ‘common sense’ discourse on ethnicity and race, Hall (1983) developed Gramsci’s hegemony concept from engagement with class relations to broader relations of domination. He also highlighted the importance of cultural struggles, negotiation, and articulation over meaning for understanding the ideological role of the news. In Marxist philosophy, including new-Gramscian theorists, the Gramscian concept of hegemony is well defined as:

... the domination of a culturally diverse society by ruling class, who manipulate the culture of the society - the beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values and norms - so that their ruling class worldview becomes the worldview that is imposed and accepted as the cultural norm; as the universally valid dominant ideology that justifies the social, political, and economic status quo as natural, inevitable, perpetual and beneficial for everyone, rather than as artificial social constructs that benefit only for the ruling class (Bullock and Trombley 1999: 387–88).

Within the above definition’s concept of hegemony and in addition to Hall’s (1983) study, the struggles, articulation, and negotiation influences of various journalism cultures over determining for understanding the ideological or professional role of journalists along with their intrusion or invasion into the private lives of various individuals will be examined in the current research project.
4.2.2. Professional Roles of Journalists

Among various journalism cultures, the professional roles of journalists have been characterized in three distinct categories (see Figure 4.1). Firstly, *role orientations* that embrace the professional roles of journalists about their values, attitudes, and beliefs regarding the journalism position in society. The cognitive faculties of journalists are bounded by these role orientations so that understandings are subjective or primarily perceptions. These orientations have been divided into two main types.

The first type, as a result of the occupational socialization of journalists and the internalization of normative expectations, the subjective orientations combine the professional values and beliefs individual journalists embrace. In this sense, there are several internal influences in news work, such as the profit expectations of the news organization, advertising considerations, and market and audience research on the news. The second type is normative orientations which have appeared external to the journalists. For instance, the professional organizations, including journalism unions, army, security and police organizations, advertisers, and media laws and regulation are significant external influences on news work. With regard to the current study, these internal and external influences on news media workers in relation to their types of invasion or intrusion into private life have been surveyed in order to better understand the relationships between these variables (see Chapter VI). For similar reasons, the subjective and normative orientations as journalists’ role, including the generalized and combined prospects that they believe are deemed necessary in society (Donsbach 2012; Hanitzsch and Maximilians 2013).
Secondly, *role enactment* refers to the translation process of role orientations into actions. As Tandoc et al. (2013) observed, the professional practice of journalists is being guided by role orientations, for example in the production of news. Reich and Hanitzsch (2013) believe that when external constraints impose limits on the editorial autonomy of journalists, they are not always and may be even seldom able to enact their occupational values. *Role performance* captures the third category of the journalists’ professional roles as they are being performed in practice.

Hanitzsch and Maximilians (2013) view the behavioral domain as the birthplace of role performances. Ontologically, this divides into two perspectives: *Perceived role performance* refers to subjective understandings of journalists in their practice roles, which are bounded to the self-awareness and self-image of individual journalists. By way of contrast, the actual role performed by the journalists comes from the *factual role performance*; this becomes evident to the outsider, and it can be traced using observation and analysis of content. “A role may be defined by participation in cooperative activities known as practices, which serve as the immediate context for the exercise of virtues” (Borden and Tew 2007: 301). While this definition refers to understanding the role of journalists concerning the performance of journalism by focusing on the activities or skills involved in producing news irrespective of intention or context, the main issue here is checking facts, snapping pictures, and telling stories that could all have been practiced by non-journalists (Ibid.). This view means that the journalism and its professionals are similar to other occupations in being required to have some educational skills, pieces of practical training, and a rich variety of experience in order to become a professional journalist in a particular subject, such as politics, culture, sports, and so on.

At the heart of their seminal study, Galtung and Ruge (1965) examined the essential question of how ‘events’ become ‘news’. Then, they widely produced twelve news values which still have been used by the journalists and editors when they make the news. These factors consist of frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, in addition to the reference to elite nations, the reference to persons, and the reference to something negative, such as political corruption or invasions of privacy. Likewise, several scholars, including Boyd (1994); Bell (1991); Galtung et al (1965), and more recently after examining
news stories in a wide variety of British newspapers and the top stories on Twitter and Facebook in 2015, Harcup and O’Neill (2016), continued to add the following news values: exclusivity, including the news organization as a result of interviews, surveys, and so on; bad news stories of death, defeat, and loss of jobs, for example; conflict stories such as insurrections, warfare, controversies, and fights; surprise stories with unusual elements of contrast and surprise; audio-visual stories which have arresting video, audio, and photographs, or that can be shown with infographics; shareability stories via different forms of social media accounts; entertainment soft stories about showbusiness, sex, sport, or presenting opportunities for a humorous manner, and witty headlines; unfolding drama stories of escapes, battles or court cases; follow-up stories concerning such subjects already in the news; power elite stories about various institutions and powerful individuals; relevance stories regarding societies or populations distinguished to be influential with, or historically or culturally familiar to, the public; magnitude stories perceived as adequately important in terms of the large numbers of people affected, or likely impact, or including a degree of extreme occurrence or unreasonable conduct; celebrity stories about people who are already famous; good news stories with expressly positive overtones, including wins, breakthroughs, recoveries, and cures; news stories which are set by the news organization’s own agenda, whether commercial, ideological, or as part of a specific campaign (Harcup and O'Neill 2016).

Based on an ancient anecdote of news values, if a dog bites a man it is not news, but if a man bites a dog it is news, there are several areas of life, and geographical and digital locations in which the journalists often expect to find news stories, including conflicts, disaster and tragedy, progress and development. This is in addition to other news values of prominence; proximity; timeliness; action; novelty; human interest; sex; humour; crime, money, religion, health, sport, weather, food and drink (Herbert 2000). Within these various news values, the current study can observe that if the news media workers will not abide by the professional journalism standards, they will not be considered a professional journalist since professional accountability towards others is one of the main differences between journalists and non-journalists. Accordingly, these discussions are useful to identify the features of news and its distances from the ideological agendas or political propaganda which have frequently used by unprofessional or partisan media in such post-conflict countries like Iraq and its
Kurdistan Region. In addition, these news values of will inform and impact the current research project of Kurdistan and its media transitions to democracy in succeeding chapters. To do so can enable focus on the motivations behind Kurdish news media workers in making a decision to gather and reveal private information or identify those values or excuses that have been cited by Kurdish media as justification for intrusion into private life. However, it can be noted that the ‘role perceptions’ have not been sufficiently clarified by the majority of studies, in particular when they have been concerned with three main questions: ‘What journalists should do?’ as the normative ideas, ‘what journalists want to do?’ as the subjective orientations, and ‘what journalists think they do in practice?’ as the perceived performance. These three aspects have often been confounded in scholarly literature, even sometimes to the extent that they are interchangeably applied (Hanitzsch and Maximilians 2013). As Figure 4.2 shows, Hanitzsch (2007) deconstructed the constituents and principal dimensions of global journalism cultures into three core components.

![Figure 4.2: The constituents and principal dimensions of journalism cultures](source: Hanitzsch 2007: 371)

In the current study, the principal reason to conduct this deconstruction is that it is practically unmanageable to classify all aspects of journalism cultures. For that reason, a deductive and etic approach has been used to classify the principal dimensions which display the biggest cultural overlap. Also, through highlighting similarities and differences at the same time, the existing procedure attempts to give an analytical framework to map different journalism culture toward a collection of universal measures of global differences. Additionally, the institutional roles, epistemologies, and ethical ideologies have been separated into seven principal dimensions of interventionism, power distance, market orientation, objectivism, empiricism, relativism, and the idealism role of journalists.
Each of the seven dimensions spans two ideal-typical extremes that rarely become manifest in the ‘real’ world of journalistic practice. Most of the time, the truth lies somewhere between the poles. Although the various dimensions of journalism culture do more or less surface in all nations and media organizations, the relative importance of these dimensions is likely to vary. Some journalists, for instance, follow the neutral-objective paradigm, whereas others prefer the advocacy approach. These relative differences in the extent to which journalists endorse these dimensions reveals a universe of diverse and coexisting worlds of journalism. (Hanitzsch 2007: 371)

Within these dimensions, Hanitzsch’s (2007) flexibility model has been applied in the current study for the sake of theoretically identifying the key dimensions of Kurdish journalism cultures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (see Chapter VI). For this reason, more discussion here is necessary about the professional role orientations of journalists within global journalism cultures in the following paragraphs:

4.2.2.1. Institutional roles of journalism cultures

The normative responsibilities and actual or functional contribution of journalism culture in society have been originated by the first domain of institutional roles. These have been described in early studies as professional role perceptions or conceptions, news or press functions, and media roles. The concepts of journalistic paradigms or news ideologies are more recent approaches. For that reason, the role perceptions, and professional values worldwide have been examined by Hanitzsch and Maximilians (2013), who adhere to the notion of role perceptions. Following their analysis, the concept of professional ‘role perceptions’ has been used consistently in this study with the intention of avoiding the needless complexity which comes with this notion. Using the phrase ‘role perceptions’ is well recognized in the academic literature, and somewhat in the realm of practitioners. Several studies have examined the concept of role perceptions as a “shared set of professional parameters or imperatives” (see Relly et al., 2015: 4; Pihl-Thingvad 2014; Pintak and Nazir 2013). This concept has been characterized by some scholars as the secularization of news media system models or the ‘limits of homogenization’ (Hallin and Mancini 2010). In recent decades, the cultures of professional hybrid have been reflected in the stress of globalization between the forces of heterogeneity and homogenization, including the dynamic nature of cultural differences and their developments (Waisbord 2013). In this context, the professional role perceptions of journalists have been changing based on an ongoing
process of convergent journalism practices and several various identities of culture, religion, region, ethnicity, political ideology and so on which have been studied by many scholars (see Relly et al 2015; Pintak 2014; Waisbord 2013; Rawnley and Rawnley 2012; Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008; Hanitzsch 2007; Duez 2005 and Gross 1996). Therefore, the conceptual vagueness arises from the notion that role perceptions can decrease in the field of role orientations if they apply to the professional values of journalists concerning the status of media in a particular society. These instances led to rare distinctions in role orientations between their subjective and normative features by scholars; concurrently ‘role perceptions’ can further denominate characteristics of ‘role performance’ being observed in journalists (Hanitzsch and Maximilians 2013).

In her classic critique of role conceptions, Cohen (1963) identifies the ‘neutral’ and ‘participant’ sets as the elementary notions of journalists’ role perceptions. Within this critique, journalists have held both concepts of the role that the press plays or should play in the process of making foreign policy. In this sense, the journalists in one set are only working as a neutral reporter to produce the information, to be used by others in the shaping of the policy. However, another set describes the active participation of journalists in making the process of the policy. The first collection of role perception links the journalist chiefly toward the public partner in the process, while the second point links him or her toward the formal policy-making level (Cohen 1963). In their review, Johnstone et al. (1972) firstly examined these conceptual distinctions in a study of 1313 full-time journalists. The results show that the 'neutral role' perceptions of journalists have considerably less support in the USA, while the 'participant roles' of journalists have been extensively promoted in the perceptions of respondents. However, the values of the participant and neutral roles tend to be paradoxical, with combined elements from each of the two perspectives being evident in the patterns of beliefs held by most journalists (Hanitzsch and Maximilians 2013). Next, Johnstone et al. (1976 and 1972) studied the ‘interpreter’ concept as the role of journalists in offering exploration of complex problems. Also, the ‘disseminator’ role, that provides to get information as quickly as possible to the public. Additionally, the ‘adversarial’ role has been added by Weaver and Wilhoit (1996 and 1986), which denotes a different minority opinion that it is the journalist's role to examine claims made by the State.
In their analysis of journalists’ role perceptions, the model dimensions of passive-active and neutral-advocate have been suggested by Donsbach and Patterson (2004). Their model comes from a survey of journalists in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Italy. Based on results, the extent to which journalists act independently of those who have interests in the story came from the dimension of passive-active. However, the extent to which the journalist takes a stand on a certain issue has been reflected by the dimension of neutral-advocate. In the early 1990s, a ‘populist mobilizer’ role emerged in public journalism. This role means that ordinary citizens are allowed to express their opinion about the affairs of the government, which is common in democratic societies in building public opinion (Weaver et al. 2007). For instance, in the era of the former Iraqi Ba'ath regime, Kurdish citizens were not authorized to express their views on government affairs or even on Kurdish issues. However, a ‘populist mobilizer’ role is a widely held view that a Western understanding of news making has been conceptualized by the institutional roles of journalism cultures. The main reference here is to Weaver and Wilhoit’s (1991) studies on the role perceptions of American journalists. Though, the normative beliefs of the professional model which have molded the questionnaire survey may additionally have developed the answers in this study (Hanitzsch 2007 and Josephi 2006). In recent periods, the professional role of journalists has been conceptualized as a vital area of journalism culture by Hanitzch’s (2013) observations of cultures of journalism that struggle across fields of competition, including being detached or being involved; being loyal or being an adversary, and approaching media audiences as consumers or citizens. In the same way, the following tensions in journalistic roles have been identified by Christians et al. (2009), who identified adopting a neutral role versus participant; acting as a gatekeeper for all voices versus being an advocate for a chosen cause, and concentrating on facts versus setting out to interpret and provide commentary. In this sense, the developing commercialization trend of the news media worldwide may an equal struggle manifested in different oppositions, such as entering the broad audience arena versus civic engagement (Tandoc et al. 2013). This view is partially correct with regard to the increase in commercialization of the news media across the world; however, the role of gatekeeper of media and journalists in the current decade has dramatically decreased, particularly after the emergence of such digital networks as WikiLeaks.
The interventionism role of journalists has been labeled an ‘involvement sequence’, which is stretched from ‘passive’ (low) to ‘intervention’ (high) (Himelboim and Limor 2005). In addition to his initial model of journalism cultures, Hanitzsch (2007) identified interventionism as one of the three dimensions of institutional roles. The extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote specific values came from the role of interventionism. The distinction tracks of this role separate into two kinds of journalist. The interventionist journalist is the first type, who is involved, assertive, motivated, and socially committed. The detached journalist is the second type, of uninvolved neutrality, fairness, impartiality and dedication to objectivity.

With regard to the current study, both types of interventionist and detached journalists have been surveyed to understand their role perceptions of shifting boundaries of privacy understandings in Kurdish culture, and also their journalistic methods in collecting and revealing private information or information privacy, in the post-conflict, and emerging democratic, region of Iraqi Kurdistan. Many scholars hold the view that the roles of ‘gatekeeper’ and ‘neutral disseminator’ are related to the ideal—typically passive poles of interventionism dimension (see Weaver and Wilhoit 1991; Janowitz 1975 and Cohen 1963). On this side of the continuum, journalism cultures stick to the values of impartiality, detachment, fairness, neutrality, and objectivity. Each of these principles are remarkably rooted in the history of Western journalism culture, of the United States of America predominantly (Ibid.). In this case, the newsroom is dominated by occupational cultures where journalists primarily subscribe to the ‘professionalism’ ideology, and to the information function in journalism. In this sense, journalists see themselves only as disinterested tellers of the news, and mostly contribute to vertical communication in societies. In most liberal democracies, the commercial logic of media businesses emerges with these values and professional views. These include impartiality and the neutrality of reporting being constructed into the conception of the institutional separation of the media from the state. In countries like Russia and China, media organizations have a tendency to be ideologically guaranteed by political groups (Hanitzsch et al. 2014; Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2010; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Lee 2001 and Golding 1977).

In large parts of South America, the alteration from a politically active journalism to the most passive pole of the continuum is still happening. Given that, journalists tend to adopt a further interventionist method to reporting.
In role models similar to the ‘participant’, ‘advocate’, and ‘missionary’, the intervention pole of the continuum becomes evident with journalists taking a more active and assertive role in their reporting (Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Köcher 1986; Janowitz 1975 and Cohen 1963). In other words, various journalism cultures worldwide are following an interventionist approach which may act on behalf of the socially destitute including sex offenders, or as a mouthpiece of a political party and other clusters whose interests are at stake. Changes in these patterns can be connected with democratization by identifying the system characteristics of political and media transitions due to this process, which is not stationary but constantly evolving amongst Western and non-Western cultures. For similar reasons, the second and third chapters of this study will analyze this linkage with democratizing Kurdistan and its media transitions in northern Iraq in more depth. Among other policy, economic, and social changes, including sexual abuse or sexual crimes, such as rape, paedophilia and invasions of private life, such psychological and physical harms have globally increased amongst various cultures and for that reason some of them have solved such issues based on social agreements rather than legal prosecution. Otherwise, other cultures have strict legislation to punish criminals and restrict their behavior: a well-known example in the UK being the *Sun* and ‘Sarah’s Law’. This British tabloid newspaper published a news story that exposed the identities of 157 paedophiles to concerned parents applying Sarah’s Law, so named after the murder of Sarah Payne, aged eight, which allows fathers and mothers or carers to know if an individual living in their neighborhood is a convicted child abuser. As a result, numerous children have received a greater chance to protect their life from potential harm, it also resulted in a doctor being forced out of his home by people who could not tell the difference between a paedophile and a paediatrician, among other things. According to the Home Office, one of the strictest systems in the world for managing known sex offenders is in Britain (Sun 2016).

The debates on professionalism continue. Also from different cultures of journalism can be determined that the power distance role of journalists has been considered as the position of journalists toward power loci in society. This dimension has some likeness to the ‘adversary sequence’, which was first used by Himelboim and Limor. Moreover, Hofstede (1980) originally coined the term power distance to identify one of the fundamental dimensions of cultural variance. The ‘adversary’ pole (high)
represented one extreme of the power distance dimension in journalism in openly challenging the powers that be (Hanitzsch 2005). In liberal democracies, understanding this function as ‘fourth estate’, or as a countervailing force of democracy, has roots in the long tradition of ‘adversarial journalism’. Its journalists position themselves as agents of social control and as ‘watchdogs’ or ‘watchmen’ (Gans 1979: 295 and Schramm 1964: 127). According to McQuail (2000) and Fuller (1996), society and its institutions are provided with an independent and radical critique by adversarial journalism. Furthermore, journalists are sceptical of or even unfriendly to assurances made by those who are in power due to the constant censorship and pressures being brought to bear on journalists. While an adversarial understanding of journalism in some Asian or oriental cultures may encounter a preference for harmony and consensus, in other cultures, tight press restrictions of journalists have been circumvented by openly challenging those in power (Hanitzsch 2007). By way of illustration, Ma (2000) observes that the media workers in China express their criticisms between the lines of censored media texts through the conduct of ‘double coding’. An audience reading subversively can skillfully decode these messages. This was certainly true in the case of Suharto-governed Indonesia, where journalists adopted a way of “saying serious things nonseriously” (Nasution 1996: 53). Another goal of the power distance dimension is the pole of being ‘loyal’ (low) to those in power, referring to forms of journalism which serve as an ideological machine of the state. This form can be directly loyal through practicing “agitator journalism” (Wu et al., 1996: 544), and taking on a “propagandist role” (Pasti 2005: 99). Achieving this goal comes from journalists serving as the mouthpiece of the government or the party, being defensive of authorities, and routinely engaging in self-censorship. These journalists understand themselves as “guiding public opinion” and “bringing the influence of the public opinion to bear on the government.” In effect, they remain extremely paternalistic on behalf of “the people” (Lee 2001: 249).

Agitator journalism never challenges the legitimacy of the powers that be. It tends to offer support to well-known authorities and norms though not necessarily in a logical and straightforward manner. This is illustrated in the cases of “protocol news” in Uganda (Mwesige 2004) and the tradition of the Mexican “oficialista” (Hallin 2000: 99). These journalists, as noted by Hanitzsch (2007), pay disproportionately high attention to the authorities and scarcely question the official version of a story.
Journalists accept the information provided by government sources as trustworthy, credible, and authoritative. Frequently, these journalists become the channels of public relations to transfer information from the government to the public. In Gramscian theory, a well-known example is the use of the media by a dominant group of a society, including the political parties and their politician elites, to subordinate other social groups such as the media workers by imposing their occupational ideology on society as common sense. Partisan media (official or unofficial, known as shadow media) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq are practicing the same role. However, journalists in Western democracies may or may not do the same thing to achieve other aims including confirming the accuracy of their news stories rather than relying on government information as the most trustworthy source. Within professional journalism cultures, the third dimension of institutional roles is the market orientation, which dictates the main methods of addressing the audience principally in their role as citizens or as consumers (Hanitzsch 2013). In their survey of journalists in Switzerland, Marr et al. (2001) suggested a division of market-oriented journalism versus a role model that is provided by public needs. Journalism is understood as a communicator made an activity that is necessary to the functioning of democratic cultures within the nature of a knowledgeable citizenry and the promotion of political participation (Hanitzsch 2007). Market orientation is lower in journalism cultures where journalists primarily give priority to the public interest in producing the news. They maintain political information and mobilization as a means to generate an informed citizenry. As Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) argued, providing the information that is necessary for citizens to become autonomous and self-governing in making decisions is one of the primary purposes of journalism in these cultures. However, market orientation is higher in cultures of journalism where aims are subordinated to the logic of the market. In these cultures, emphasis is given to what the audiences want to know at the expense of what they should be aware of. According to Campbell (2004), audiences, in their role as consumers and clients, become the centre of attention regarding emotional experiences, attitudes, aspirations, and personal fears. Conversely, in their role as citizens concerned with the political and social matters of the day, audiences are not addressed. A rating mentality drives market-oriented journalism. This approach is predominant in commercial media, where the viewpoint of the individual is increasingly privileged (Hanitzsch 2007: 375, Hallin and Mancini 2004; and Bourdieu 1998).
In different cultures of different media organizations, providing forms of guidance, advice, help, and information concerning management of self and ordinary life trace back to the logic of a journalistic orientation-marketplace. This kind of service journalism offers items of “news-you-can-use” (Underwood 2001: 102; Eide and Knight 1999), which is adapted easily to more explicitly entertainment-oriented popular journalism. These two aspects are indicated by the results from factor analysis in empirical studies conducted in Germany and Indonesia, and have established a standard dimension. This tendency towards a combination of information for guidance, advice, relaxation and entertainment is exemplified by the increase in lifestyle journalism and infotainment news (Hanitzsch 2007 and 2005; Scholl and Weischenberg 1998). Meanwhile, the concept of social responsibility carries markedly different connotations in Eastern and Western journalism cultures. Eastern journalism cultures tend to incorporate some of the fundamental principles of social responsibility theory with the market orientation considered as the negative pole of this dimension. The responsibility of the media in Asia frequently relates to the prioritization of the protection of social harmony and respect for leadership, confirmed by the reluctance of Asian media to include coverage that could disrupt social order. According to Rosen (2000), citizens’ participation in the political debate and civic activity refer to help the idea of civic or public journalism. This notion comes from the idea of journalism acting in the public interest (Hanitzsch 2007; Gunaratne 2006 and Xiaoge 2005).

4.2.2.2. Epistemology orientations of journalism cultures

While ‘epistemology’ is a branch of metaphysics that has been discussed for a lot longer time than now, but this term was used to refer to the justification of belief and the study of knowledge (Dancy 1985). Epistemology understanding in journalism education refers to the validity of journalism that is closely fixed with claims to truth and knowledge (Ekströöm 2002), as well as the truth is the first obligation of journalism (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001). This viewpoint is close to describe epistemology as the criterion of validity, the inquiry into the character of knowledge, and the nature of acceptable evidence. These parameters allow one to distinguish truth from the falsity and the actual from the probable (Anderson and Baym 2004). Likewise, Hearns-Branaman (2016) links a gap between debates of human
understanding, truth, and epistemology in philosophical circles as well as discussions of bias, objectivity, and truth in journalism. He examines a primary conflict within the news media which is the role of journalists in relation to the truth. In the production and reception of news media, a powerful motivating factor is a truth, also the leading organization's legitimacy of news media lies in their capacity to write ‘factual’ content for audiences. That ability often attracts audiences that an outlet of the news media can later exchange to advertisers, this can be seen in non-commercial public service news media along with their measures of the application directly discuss the consequence of writing factual content. In doing news work, the philosophical underpinnings of journalism are instrumental that concerned with the epistemology constituent of journalism culture. Accordingly, objectivism and empiricism are classified as the two fundamental orientations of the journalism epistemology.

On the one hand, Hanitzsch (2007) observed the relationship between the objective role of journalists and the question of how truth can be attained. This is concerned with an absolute or a philosophical sense of objectivity rather than with a practical sense of objectivity as a method. There is a significant divide between the correspondence pole (high) and the subjectivism pole (low): The first pole assumes that there is a correlation between ‘what exists’ and ‘what is said’. In this sense, journalism cultures involve a totalitarian understanding of ‘truth’ because they support the principles of epistemological foundationalism. That includes knowledge as the correspondence between mental impression and the correct form of the existent actual. Moreover, perceptual realism takes place, in which the perceived objects are observed as independent from the reality of any perceiver. As a result, the reality is described as precisely and accurately as possible; advocates of the accuracy journalism philosophy even propose that means of scientific inquiry should pursue truth. In any case, a definition of objectivity is the acceptance of the opinion that one can and should separate facts from values. In this sense, journalists require the existence of ultimate truth and an objective “out there” that ought to be “mirrored” and not be produced, invented, or changed in any form. However, the second pole follows the opinion that the news is merely a representation of the world, and whole representations necessarily discriminate and need interpretation (Hanitzsch 2007).
In addition to the extreme subjectivism involves the constructivist idea, which is not absolute truth. In this sense, subjectivist journalists inescapably formulate their realities and do not believe that there is such a thing as an objective reality. Further, it is difficult to separate the context and human subjectivity from the truth and its pursuit, making it impossible for the journalists to produce value-free accounts of events. Eastern philosophy is a familiar example of an epistemological stance that considers the objective reality and its phenomenal representation as inextricably bound concerning substance and form. This explains why many Asian journalists are reluctant to fulfill any Western-style objective journalism. Though journalists with a subjectivist understanding must still pursue the truth, and ultimately the truth emerges from a mixture of a potentially infinite number of subjective accounts or competition between them. This view implies that there is competition in the marketplace of ideas along with competition between alternative accounts and mainstream news (Ibid.). All targeted debates are helpful to the current study in examining the professional role of objectivism in media coverages of the iraqi Kurdish journalists, particularly when they cover private information; in examining their ability to abide by professional standards of objectivity rather than personal or political agendas for example.

For Hanitzsch (2007), in the empirical dimension of the epistemology constituent, the journalist ultimately justifies a truth claim in order to appear valid to the audience, and journalists consistently produce truth claims that require justification. In the epistemology of journalism, journalists can justify truth claims using two ideal-typical: empirically (high) or analytically (low), in addition to the cultures of journalism which prioritize an empirical justification of truth strongly emphasize observation, measurement, evidence, and experience. For that reason, the view is central to these cultures that all knowledge is derived from experience, as articulated in classical foundationalism. As Merill and Odell (1983) illustrated that the journalists who score highly on the dimension of empiricism make knowledge of facts a priority over a knowledge of analysis. They consider that the truth necessarily needs to be confirmed by facts. In this sense, precision journalism is compatible with the epistemological position that values the methodological and procedural aspects of proper reporting highly, such as investigation, checking the facts and so on. Here, journalists merely recording events and letting ‘the facts speak for themselves’ is one of the essential tips of this pole of the empirical dimension. The analytical justification of truth claims
emphasize analysis as the negative end of the empiricism continuum and accentuate reason, ideas, values, opinion, and journalism cultures. In this sense, journalists prioritize analytic knowledge, with truth being independent of the facts. In commentary and opinion journalism, analytical reporting is manifest and does not need its practitioners to be neutral.

Accuracy, fairness, and balance as the conventional standards are not necessary for the credibility of commentary journalists and columnists, but simply their ability to convince the audience. In practice, however, empirical and analytical journalism, as the two extremes, are rarely encountered. In reality, as in the instance of critical reporting, the majority of news coverage occupies a middle ground. The distinction between the objectivism and empiricism dimensions of the epistemological orientations may seem puzzling at times. The correspondence pole of the objectivism is strongly related to high empiricism, and the subjectivism pole somewhat associates with the analytical end, but both dimensions are not a failure of a single factor. Objectivism refers to the perception of reality and empiricism, and is concerned with the importance of facts versus analysis. While it appears counterintuitive at first glance, journalists who have a high score on the objectivity dimension can be involved in commentary journalism. In this case, there are values that can be objectified in the feeling that they are universally true, such as human dignity along with the ultimate desirability of peace, and that these can also be consequently negotiated as “facts” (Hanitzsch 2007).

In short, the distinction between the objectivism and empiricism dimensions in gathering information and covering news is relevant to the current research questions and information privacy invasions in that any particular journalism culture’s epistemological orientations will consist of both dimensions on different levels. For instance, the media interventionists are most likely to condone privacy invasions of celebrities and the public figures due to news value or particular aims, while many other media professionals avoid private information or coverage of any news related to others’ private life because they believe that any person has a full right to privacy in any circumstance or in any position. Therefore, the ownerships of media and privacy have dominated the facts manipulation of objectivism and empiricism dimensions in gathering and revealing private information.
4.2.2.3. Ethical ideologies of journalism cultures

In recent decades, the latest developments in the domain of journalism culture practices have led to a renewed interest in the standards of professional journalism ethics. Morrison and Svennevig (2007) viewed the principle of ethics as an important part of moral philosophy that includes recommending, systematizing and defending the connotations of right and wrong behavior. In this scenario, ethics standards are explained as seeking to understand morality as the perceptions of individuals as beneficiaries of the setting of values (Walker 2000).

As Rokeach (1973) explained, a value can be defined as an enduring belief that is a particular mode of conduct or end-state of existence that is socially or personally favored over a converse or opposite mode of conduct or end-state of existence. “Ethics begins when elements of a moral system conflict,” to borrow Patterson and Wilkins’s formulation (2008: 4). However, the main issue with these definitions is the lack of explanation of the distinction between ethics and moral differences. In this study, ethics standards are mainly associated with professional practice in journalism. Broadly, journalism ethics is defined as the branch of media ethics concerned with the measurement, causes, and consequences of professional dilemmas (Ibid.). In his major study, Hanitzsch (2007) designated the ethical ideologies of journalists as the third constituent of journalism cultures. Meanwhile, the ethical ideologies and moral values distinguishing the general theory of ethics associated with evaluations of a certain practice.

Moral values are specific to the cultural context in which they are embedded; they should therefore be treated as contextual dimensions of journalism culture. Some of these factors are believed to be the prototype values of a “universal” code of ethics in journalism, though most of these principles have evolved in a Western cultural context. (Hanitzsch 2007: 377)

Within moral philosophy about virtue ethics, deontology or consequentialism, it can be seen that many non-Western cultures give priority to social harmony and unity concepts that may render unproductive some of the ethical values in other particular cultural milieus. It has commonly been assumed that in shaping ethical decisions of journalists the national context of making news may be supremely significant. The key codes of journalism ethics can be listed as freedom, independence, self-esteem, respect for privacy and honor, avoiding harm, responsibility, objectivity, and credibility, in
addition to fairness, honesty, justice, truth, transparency, straightforward, completeness, and the protection of information sources (Hanitzsch 2007; Plaisance and Skewes 2003 and Herrscher 2002). Several scholars desire to understand how journalists respond to their ethical dilemmas, instead of concentrating on the distinctive content of journalism ethical values. In examining this question, they discuss four mainstream approaches in ethics of the journalism cultures, as distinguished by Keeble (2005). In this context, the journalists’ obligation to agree upon an ethics code and editorial guidelines have been stressed by the ‘standard professional approach’. This standard perspective, however, from a range of standpoints has been criticized for its ‘liberal professional approach’. Besides, ethical issues have little relevance to journalists who follow the ‘cynical approach’, whereas ad hoc responses to ethical dilemmas have been promoted by the ‘ethical relativists’ (Hanitzsch 2007). A taxonomy of the ethical ideologies has been distributed by Forsyth (1980) from four distinct perspectives: situationists, absolutists, subjectivists, and exceptionists. This area of discussion inspired Plaisance (2005) to classify ethical ideologies along two further general dimensions in journalism. Relativism is the first dimension that focuses on the extent to which individuals base their philosophies of personal morals on the rules of universal ethics. Although some reject the possibility of relying on universal moral rules (high), others trust in and make use of moral absolutes (low). Idealism is the second dimension that denotes the consequences in the reactions to ethical dilemmas. “Ideal-typically, there are individuals who assume that desirable outcomes should always be obtained with the ‘right’ action (high, means oriented), whereas less idealistic individuals are more outcome-oriented, for they admit that harm will sometimes be necessary to produce good (low)” (Hanitzsch 2007: 377).

Following the classifications of Forsyth (1980) and Plaisance (2005), four ethical ideologies have been outlined more precisely (see Figure 4.3). First of all, as they tend to reject moral rules and to advocate individualistic analysis of each act in each situation, the situationists are idealistic and also relativistic. In this sense, situationist journalists consider that ethical issues cannot be judged in the theoretical and conceptual realms and that judgment must be learned in the midst of concrete situations. Secondly, in assuming that the best possible outcome can always be achieved by following universal moral rules, the absolutists are described as idealistic. Reporting critical methods have always been rejected by absolutist journalists because these methods run counter to agreed-upon ethical principles.
Thirdly, based on their personal values and perspectives rather than universal ethical principles, the subjectivists, similar to the situationists, are described as relativistic. Conversely, the situationists feel that negative means are occasionally crucial to producing desired outcomes. This is certainly true in the case of media intrusion into people's private lives, which journalists sometimes justify as acting in the public interest. Because of difficulty in definition, Morrison and Svennevig (2007) have suggested the concept of ‘social importance’ rather than ‘the public interest’.

Fourthly, exceptionists are utilitarian, and they allow moral absolutes to guide their judgments but remain pragmatically open to exceptions in so far as this will help to prevent negative consequences. In this sense, it can be noted that Forsyth (1980) understood ideology to comprise different groups of values and attitudes. Thus, absolutism is identified as a mirror of the ‘deontologist’ and ‘standard professional approach’ in journalism, while the ‘cynical approach’ comes close to subjectivism. As specified that:

Applied to the justification of unconventional and potentially harmful practices of reporting (e.g., badgering informants, paying for information), situationist journalists would feel that these judgments are highly contingent on the actual details of a given situation, whereas subjectivists would tend to justify these methods provided they yield the best possible outcome. Absolutist journalists would always reject critical methods of reporting as long as these methods run counter to agreed-upon ethical principles. Exceptionist journalists, on the other hand, would agree that universal ethical principles in journalism are necessary, but exceptionists are also utilitarian for they feel that unconventional practices of reporting may be allowable in very exceptional cases (Hanitzsch 2007: 379).
Within these definitions and explications, most principles of professional journalism ethics have applied to convergent journalism practices in online news productions. Therefore, the differences in the investigation of journalism ethics in traditional and new digital media are not considerable, but abiding by professional standards in print media is easier and clearer than in web journalism and alternative media practices. Moreover, the issue of privacy information invasions has become a controversial subject within the field of media content regulation both legally and ethically. In this context, the changing nature of technology is claimed to impact directly on the practices of journalism and access to the profession (Fenton 2011). Therefore in the following pages, a further debate will be necessary to explain the professional accountability of journalists towards others.

### 4.2.3. Professional Accountability of Journalists

In media ethics, one of the distinguishing features between journalists and non-journalists is professional accountability. In analyzing professional perceptions of journalists and the public accountability of the media, Murthy (2007) used the concept of accountability to define the functioning of a media channel to the higher authority or a collection of persons in the event that its behavior is deemed questionable. The media is regularly accused of infringing professional norms, and so its actions call for specific explanations. According to Buttny (1993), the metaphor of ‘keeping an account of one’s conduct’ introduced the term ‘accountability’ that means an account has to be produced that is accessible to another person or a higher authority. In the era of market-driven journalism, the media revel in sensationalism to maximize advantage and commercialism is supposed to be the basis for such performance (Murthy 2007). For Erlbaum (2004), accountability means responsibility to report the whole story from all sides since stories from journalists are what the news media sell, and has a direct impact on the revenue of the corporation. In this sense, the editors play a funnel role in making a final decision in adding or erasing the information gained. They use their authority to control what stays in the media and what is left out of broadcasting or publishing. Consequently, the professional values of journalists take over their individual purposes in which their actions are directed by the higher authorities, particularly their editors and sub-editors. Given that, the professional accountability of journalists to their particular media outlets is the root basis of the issue of privacy invasion.
Meanwhile, media coverage and journalism practices have been assumed by society to be accountable professionally and legally to their constituents (Gerard 2012). As Pritchard (2000) explained, the individuals, groups, and organizations are considered the constituents. Their goodwill is valuable and very significant for any news organization. In this sense, the news sources, advertisers, audience members, peers in their organization and regulatory authorities have been named as the media constituents. Therefore, the professional accountability of journalists can be defined as a process in which the journalists and their news organizations shall provide, or be forced to provide, an account to their constituents. Likewise, the interaction between the claims of an autonomous agent and the set values of another is manifested as professional accountability (Murthy 2007). Within that definition, and based on the works of Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987) as well as Murthy (2007), this study splits the professional accountability of journalists regarding the invasion of information privacy into four levels of responsibility; to the employers; to the subject; to the sources, and to the public.

In analyzing the professional accountability of journalists toward their employers, the journalists are obliged in offering an account to their employers due to the profession of journalism being defined as a public service. The owners of media, on the other hand, are looking for profit in their profession rather than public service for the society's welfare (Hamlin 1992). The necessary compromises involved in seeking to make a profit as well as fulfill their public service obligations lead to the media owners being satisfied with the inclusion of some public issues. They have highlighted specific questions “to bring them to the public view while suppressing certain other issues by placing them in the inside pages to keep them from public view” (Murthy 2007: 144). A well-known instance here comes from an editor of the Observer newspaper in the United Kingdom who was "failing to publish a legitimate news story that is potentially detrimental to the interests of an important advertiser because the advertiser declares that he will discontinue the advertising if the story appears" (Ibid.).

In analyzing the professional accountability of journalists toward their subjects, the reporters may get sensational stories when public figures are the subjects required in the argument. In this case, several people become interested in controversies and scandals such as elected representatives, civic officials, institutional leaders, and entertainment stars. Information privacy of these people has been revealed by media
In answering the question of whether these people can take legal recourse against the news media when the news media misrepresent them, it was confirmed that the news media are awaited to be answerable to the subject. A misjudgment on the part of the media equivalent to neglect and an error of this kind and its resulting harm may be reasonable, but without a valid reason, this does not exclude an obligation to take responsibility (Murthy 2007).

In examining the professional accountability of journalists toward their sources, the journalists are answerable to their information sources in the process of news gathering from various sources. As the source places trust and faith in the reporter not to reveal the identity of the source, such a revelation could harm them and, consequently, their privacy will be invaded. In this sense, there is a reciprocal relationship between the journalists and their news sources; the sources want journalists for media coverage, and the journalists require sources for information. For this relationship to remain mutually beneficial, it is important to maintain regular communications between the sources and providers of information, notably when the journalists have an intention of using their sources of information for a long time (Gerard 2012 and Murthy 2007).

According to Christians, Rotzoll and Fackler (1991), while providing information to the public is the primary goal of journalists, the information is given by the sources, who should follow the interests of the public or society, which is more valuable than the means adopted to achieve that information. In this judgment, the news sources may reveal any information relating to a government policy decision that required the journalists to keep the confidence of the sources. On occasion, the journalists are obliged, ‘off the record’, by the sources to prevent the information from being revealed despite the fact that, in disclosing such information as that related to a crime, national security, or financial loss to the organization, the journalists can exercise their discretion. However, in revealing the truth of a news story in the process of securing the gathering information, the journalists are deceiving their sources. That method of information gathering is unethical. In such behavior, the right to privacy of information sources is invaded due to being unaware of the identity of journalists; also, the sources are likely to have disclosed the information in confidence (Gerard 2012 and Murthy 2007).

In terms of examining the professional accountability of journalists towards the public, mass media and society are interdependent because society depends on media for
information in democracy cultures. Mass media reflects society in its news content and, consequently, society and mass media share a symbiotic relation (Murthy 2007). The system of media is considered to be an influential part of the social fabric of modern society. Moreover, the media system is observed to have relationships with other social systems, organizations, groups, and individuals (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1989). As examined before, these relationships may be dynamic and changing or static and orderly; moreover, they may be conflict-ridden, or cooperative. Additionally, they may range from being powerful and direct to being weak or indirect. “Whatever the particulars of the relationship, it is the relationship that carries the burden of explanation. This relationship makes mass media being accountable to the public” (Murthy 2007: 147). In this context, the journalists in the process of news dissemination build respectability and credibility amongst audiences; consequently, they will seek to place their work with the more professional productions. In particular, the newspapers need constant support from the readers for the account that is given to them, as well as the journalists reporting events being held accountable to the readers. As confirmed, the onus of responsibility in the case of print media is much more than in digital media due to the construction of social reality, and the two dimensions of objectivity in reporting an event that must be considered in the case of the former. In the first dimension, the art of professionalism requires journalists to learn the principles of journalism such as; truthfulness, factuality, and accuracy that play a fundamental role in the construction of the social reality of an event. The journalists and their news media in the absence of good communication skills have been accountable for the consequences of misrepresenting social reality. Moreover, in reporting accidents or communal riots, the reporter through using passionate language may inflame passions and disturb the peace and arouse public unrest. In the second dimension, during the construction of social reality, the objective view of an event is equally important. Given that, a value-neutral projection of reality has been defined as objectivity. For Boyer (1981), objectivity in journalism involves six core characteristics. The first is related to ensuring balance and even-handedness in displaying various sides of an issue. The second characteristic concerns realism and accuracy in reporting. Thirdly, showing all relevant central points is important. Moreover, separating facts from opinion, but negotiating opinion where relevant. To reduce the influence of writers’ own attitudes, opinions or involvement is considered the fifth core characteristic.
Finally, avoiding fraudulent purpose or rancor, and slant. As a result, in answering another research question of whom journalists should be accountable to, Ryan (2001) concluded that the objective journalists are liable to their audiences, to the highest standards of objective professional journalism ethics, and eventually to employers. From this perspective, the journalists should never expect that the employers, not themselves, have the final accountability for their action. However, Erlbaum (2004) believed that journalists are responsible for their sources even above and beyond their readers, editors, government, society, laws of the professional association, and country. This accountability builds on the personal and professional values of journalists. While professional values may lead the reporters in their responsibility, they are also bound with personal values that can differ from their professional values (Gerard 2012 and Murthy 2007). Within these targeted debates and with regard to the current study, the professional accountability of Kurdish journalists has been surveyed and described in the sixth chapter.

4.3. PRIVACY UNDERSTANDINGS

There have been few empirical investigations concerning the media violations into information privacy, although Hanitzsch et al. (2016 and 2007) have examined professionalism directions among global journalism cultures. Within these studies, the professional role orientations of journalists were affected by the perceptions of cultural and social values. In countries with restricted political freedom, journalists were more willing to intervene in society when they worked for a public media organization. Meanwhile, the value of power, achievement, and tradition were powerful motivators for journalists, who were more likely to embrace an interventionist role in journalism practices. This type of study is able to develop and to provide a framework for the current research project.

Conceptually, privacy is a term frequently used in scholarly literature, but to date, there is no consensus about the concept, which has been discussed as an animated idea since the time of the ancient Greek and Chinese civilizations. More than two thousand years ago, there may not have been privacy as a civil liberty, as people think of them today, but some of the controversial ideas that support the whole ideology were being discussed.
As Aristotle (384–322 BC) reported, the worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal (Jacoby et al. 1999 and During 1969). For instance, this understanding of privacy is not being equally expected by individuals, who do not have an equal right to privacy due to their differences in identities and accountabilities, including personal and professional backgrounds. Plato (c.429–347 B.C.E.) believed that the bad people will find a way around the laws, while good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly (Richard 2015). These can continue to be debated in the current research project, in different ways; to what extent do the news organizations and their media workers need any media policy and regulation to create a balance between the public's right to know and the different pieces of collected information, notably during media intrusion into the public's private lives in various circumstances? However, the nature of privacy remains blurred in everyday language because a conclusive and consistent definition of privacy is uncertain and controversial (Kemp and Moore 2007; Tavani 2007 and Michael 1994). As Xu et al. (2011) argue, the relationships, concepts, and definitions of privacy have been underdeveloped, and are inconsistent, disconnected, and not empirically validated. Furthermore, privacy is a temporal notion (Palen and Dourish 2003), context-specific (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005; Nissenbaum 2004), and discipline-dependent (Xu et al., 2008). Therefore, the philosophy of privacy has been explained through the use of various concepts, each has widened the understanding of privacy, with one or more connected notions of autonomy, solitude, secrecy, and liberty (Tavani 2000). Terminologically, “the Greek term for a purely private person – idiotes – reflects their ambivalence about the private: not to be part of public life was also to be an ignorant, awkward person, an idiot. The Latin privatus, to be withdrawn from public life, is linked to privare, to bereave and deprive” (Sanders 2003: 78). Within this definition, privacy consists of several spaces nearby, in which people create boundaries and then they strive to control access. Words, opinions, names, activities, material goods and objects have demarcated these limits. According to this definition, privacy allows people to make sure their everyday life is not presented for public observation (Ibid.). Though there is a common understanding of what is privacy, without identifying the details it is just a contested concept with many definitions. Thus, this study can eventually answer the question of whether ordinary people, celebrities and public figures in post-conflict regions of the Kurdistan are victims of privacy intrusion? Also, the concept of privacy is very temporal, contested and related to context, how can this be?
4.3.1. Key Concepts of Privacy

As discussed before, it is not easy to provide irrevocable key concepts and models of privacy, since there are several reasons why the phenomena of privacy have been so difficult to theorize around, why it always seems to be in crisis and why people continue to demand it. In his major study, Solove (2009) discussed these questions and argued that the concept of privacy is “in disarray” because of the intricate boundaries of meanings this term generates. The difficulties in accessing a satisfying formulation of privacy understanding have long been lamented by Western legal theorists, jurists, and philosophers. Solove’s legal background often leads to definitions of privacy in a legal context, but his views are valuable for media decision-makers, journalists and anyone who is interested in where to demarcate the line between public and private lives because privacy knowledge is not just a legal concept, but is relevant in other fields, including mass media telecommunications and journalism practices. For similar reasons, the current study began by dividing the broad range of academic and legal literature on privacy into six core concepts:

4.3.1.1. Privacy as the ‘right to be left alone’

As aforementioned, 'the right to be left alone' comes from the legal formulation of Samuel Dennis Warren and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, two prominent lawyers in the Supreme Court of the United States of America (USA), who cited this basic definition from Cooley (1888), then developed and produced their significant article which was well-known as 'the right to privacy'. They wrote the earnest theoretical framework for investigating the general jurisprudence, then described privacy as the right to one’s personality and as a general right to the immunity of the person. In their famous article, Warren and Brandeis (1890) emphasized privacy as a tort or a legal right with a course of action, in addition to privacy rooted in predominantly philosophical and legal argumentation. Since then, even though times have changed, the explanations or legal discussions that come from Warren and Brandeis are still relevant to the current research project since the right to an individual’s privacy has been respected and protected in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the International Federation of Journalists (1954 and amended in 1986) that draw the professional code of conduct for all news media workers involved in collecting, confirming, publishing or broadcasting, and also commenting on information and news
stories. In this sense, the initial concept of privacy was the people’s right to isolation or privacy that should be respected and protected, in contrast with intrusion by information dissemination or by direct physical means into their private life, affairs, or those of his family. This means that everyone has a right to protect his or her privacy; by the same token, Tavani (2000) labeled these subsets as ‘non-intrusion’ theory that means personal privacy embraces ‘being free from intrusion’ or ‘being left alone’. The problem with these justifications is that the authors did not make a clear distinction of privacy as a personal right between the content or condition of privacy and its rights in various positions and places, or between the individuals’ right to privacy and the public’s right to know public information and common kinds of civil liberties, including the freedom of expression and media freedom. There are many scholars who have made some kinds of distinction and work on privacy issues in the information age who have conceptualized in various ways (Anh et al., 2014; Mosco 2014; Lovink and Rasch 2013; Nissenbaum 2010 and 2004; Lyon 2010, 2007 and 2003; Boyd 2008; Morrison et al., 2011 and 2007; Froomkin 2000 and Langford 2000). While no-one ever does anything with complete liberty, Westin (1968) viewed privacy as the wish of individuals to select freely in whatever situations, and to whatever extent they want to disclose themselves. Furthermore, privacy involves people’s approaches and their conduct to others, because privacy is not only a legitimate right but also a human status quo or position in which individuals control the time and communications conditions around themselves (Meyers 2010). Critically, the fundamental study of Warren and Brandeis (1890) was not quite sufficient to precisely define privacy concepts since their research aim was to discover the circumstances of the individual’s civil right to privacy in American general legislations, instead of providing a comprehensive and unambiguous understanding of privacy.

While the American Laws have primarily identified personal privacy as a legal right, that may be chosen as the principal reference to law and regulation of privacy rights elsewhere. Given this understanding of privacy, it can be comprehended that any kind of harmful or offensive conduct directed toward another person could be identified as an invasion of personal privacy if privacy is solely defined as ‘being left alone’, in this case, a punch in the nose and a peep in the bedroom would be a privacy invasion (Solove 2009 and Allen 1988). Within these theories, privacy violations cannot be reduced to this level since the concept of privacy as the right to be left alone is being
consistently raised through cultural or social channels that see privacy as a supplemental right. Particularly, some cultures of journalism are more subjective and journalists cannot differentiate between their personal and professional conduct in gathering and revealing information about someone’s private life. In addition to the legal circumstances including constitutional guarantees of privacy, the perspectives of Warren and Brandeis (1890) were a good start to standardize this concept within the framework of law in the USA, which also has since been published in the different privacy legislation in other countries, such as France, Spain, Canada, and Germany (Sanders 2003). Here, it can be noticed that the privacy laws and regulations in Western and democratic governments have been recognized as the different understandings of the legal boundaries of privacy protection, in comparison with non-Western and post-conflict countries like the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the Islamic Sharia Laws are considered as one of the fundamental references of laws rather than relying on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this common sense view, Emerson (1995) saw the concept of privacy as a legal right that tries to demarcate a line between the collective and the individual, between society and self. This means that privacy aims to assure the individual a zone in which to be an individual, not a shareholder of the public; also in that zone, individuals can think their own thoughts, have their own secrets, live their own life, reveal only what they want to the outdoor realm. According to Emerson’s conclusion, a privacy right creates a zone separated out from the shared life, not controlled from side to side by the rules of collective living. However, Hannah Arendt (1958), cited in Plaisance (2009), in both cultures of ancient Greek and Roman, the private world was where people achieved their material needs while the people entered the public sphere to work but not their rational, creative, and additional higher-level actions.

Those views distinguished privacy values between one's private life and one's public life, therefore any interest of privacy as an independent right to be left alone is based on a rather poor understanding of why individuals, as a social being in the first place, need privacy (Solove 2009). In this context, the right to be left alone has been demanded by individuals in private life or in public life, the ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures have obtained the different degree of isolation rights based on their different accountability versus others. For instance, officials and politicians as the public figures have had their isolation rights frequently invaded by news organizations and their
media workers. This is because such private pieces of information are newsworthy in terms of the public's right to know, and because revealing this private information has been excused as a social importance or in the public interest or sometimes for the sake of private interests, including political agendas or financial motivations. As result of this, the convergence of information and communication technologies in the era of digital media are becoming more sensitive than before, thus the necessity of privacy protection is crucial because of the increasing needs of people. For example, online privacy leaks nowadays have become more common globally, when the Internet services have become a significant component of the personal and professional daily lives of individuals. In addition to the drawbacks of technology, most countries in the world have endeavored to protect the statutory rights of privacy (Keeble 2001). Nevertheless, these debates can be criticized for ignoring anti-terror laws in recent decades that cover several types of intrusion into private life and also information privacy invasions, notably after four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group of al-Qaeda in the USA on 11 September 2001. Consequently, it is misguided to say that every country has the same penalty for journalists who have infringed the right to privacy through convergent journalism practices by using Internet services. Therefore, the distinction of punishments refers to various legal limitations, cultural differences, and other considerations. As Table 2.1 displays, journalism has been divided into four global professional cultures with certain differences and similarities between each other, which also determine the definition of a particular culture of journalism. Any journalism culture will offer some professional activities for news media workers in using a given method of collection and revealing information privacy from people’s private life.

In contrast to the individual’s right to privacy or private life, there is the public’s right to know public events and information in everyday lives. Nevertheless, the main problem here goes back to not accepting the difference between claiming that a right exists and making a claim to that right, thus the failure to separate between different types of human rights promotes substantial misperceptions about the public’s right to know (O'Brien 1981). This ambiguity is occasionally used by journalists as an excuse for being permitted access to information that they might not otherwise get (Lesley 2000). In this case, journalists have seen themselves as those characters who identify what is bad and what is good for the public to know, or what benefits their career and news
organisation. Whereas, the public does not have precise knowledge regarding their rights on private information that should or should not be disclosed; particularly the public in collective and post-conflict societies increasingly waive their rights to privacy for several reasons, such as a lack of awareness about the individual’s religious, political and cultural or social background. In view of that, knowing well the professional role orientations of journalists along with their accountabilities and civil rights are more important to both media workers and media audiences. Within these observations, it can be said that journalists are not always so excellent in their daily works, but the fundamental commitment of professional journalists is related to challenging hard issues that affect the people, to study them, to consider them and to go into them, then they have to report the information wholly back to the individuals (Kieran 2002). In addition to their professional reporting, journalists have been required to strike a balance between individual privacy versus the demands of the public, for instance, if information is required that would violate personal privacy, “journalists have to juggle between these two obligations, taking into account the harm it would cause if the information is published” (Gerard 2012: 22). As Wilkins (2011) agreed, journalists are moral actors who must action responsibility due to their accountability towards the employers; the subject, the sources, and also towards the public (see Section 2.3). From these debates, this section can be concluded by stating that the classical concept of privacy as ‘the right to be left alone’ is still working and has been relied upon by this study because of some types of media intrusion into private lives has presently covered the isolation conditions of celebrities and public figures.

4.3.1.2. Privacy as a ‘limited access to the self’

Limited access to the self, or the capacity to shield yourself from annoying intrusion by others, is another definition of privacy. O’Brien (1982) critiques those thinkers who believe that the concept of ‘limited access’ is an existence situation, a choice, and a procedure for single control over who has ‘access to the self’. For O’Brien, not all models of privacy are chosen; in this sense, a number of privacies are obligatory, unintentional, or even automatic. This means that the meaning of privacy changes across different personalities and their circumstances or positions since privacy could be principally understood to mean an existential situation of limited access to an individual’s life engagements and experiences; in particular, this understanding of
privacy is closely linked to the cultural differences of privacy which will be discussed more in the following sections. Within these debates, the idea of ‘limited access to the self’ may be seen that as an inaccurate concept of privacy, because the notion of ‘limited access’ has some similarities to the concept of ‘the right to be left alone’. By the same token, it is comprehensive and is not quite clear how to consider the scenario of access when it is essential to make an infringement of privacy. There is a bigger issue here about invading privacy through the State and whether they set a certain standard.

In section 2.5, the current study will address the issue of information, data or data protection, the connection between gathering and distributing of information using convergent technologies, the public’s anticipation of privacy, as well as the legal and political issues surrounding them. Furthermore, the notion of 'solitude' is different to 'the limited-access', and a form of seclusion is solitude, of retreating from other people, of being alone. These ideas mean that solitude is an element of both concepts. The notions of 'the right to be left alone', and 'the limited access to the self' are spread distantly, and also more general than solitude, embracing freedom from the intrusion of government, the media, and from others (Solove 2009 and O'Brien 1982). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the weakness of 'limited access' have been resolved by defining privacy as a neutral concept that is coherent and distinct, owing to the balance between people’s benefits in privacy connected with people’s worry about their ease of access to others. It includes to what extent individuals are known to others, the degree to which others have physical access to unknown individuals and the extent to which particular individuals are the subject of attention by others (Gavison 1980). This view is more relevant to the current research project because the positions and accountabilities of different personalities towards others are distinguished. In this case, the news organizations and their media workers consider ordinary citizens and the MPs who have a different degree of the right to privacy, since they have different levels of their newsworthiness in relation to the public, and different levels of responsibility towards voters. In her major study, Gavison (1980) determines privacy as a model of 'the limited access to the self' which is valuable in supporting freedom and autonomy. While privacy has been discussed for a long time, she identifies the values of solitude, anonymity, and secrecy as three autonomous and various components that build a concept of privacy to mean 'the limited access to the self'.
Gavison’s definition covers the invasion of an individual’s privacy that contains nuisance, harassment, and the government’s interference in decisions about one’s body, family life, health, sexual conduct, and computerization or digitization of information along with its collection and storage. Furthermore, she avoids the generalization and ambiguity of larger ‘limited-access’ perceptions, and her struggles to clarify what ‘access’ involves winds up being quite narrow (Solove 2009 and Gavison 1980). Accordingly, the concept of privacy as ‘the limited access to the self’ has been surveyed amongst news media workers in the current study to test their understanding of privacy in the case of the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq (see Chapter VI).

4.3.1.3. Privacy as a ‘secrecy’

Another concept of privacy is ‘secrecy’ or the concealment of nominated problems from others. Within this concept, central to the collective discipline of privacy, is the notion of secrecy that plays a significant role in the maintenance of people’s private boundaries. In other words, privacy as a concept of secrecy does not mean being secret but also includes respecting privacy and therefore you are not always requiring secrecy. What is more, the philosophers, legal representatives, psychologists, sociologists, political and media scholars along with governments and corporations have seriously considered how to deal with the secrecy concept of privacy, but economists have debated less the broader denotations of privacy. For similar reasons, Posner (1981) thought that the concept of privacy is used in at least three simple perceptions: firstly, privacy is used to conceal information like secrecy; secondly, it is used as peace and quiet, particularly when somebody complains that phone solicitations are being called an invasion of his or her privacy; and thirdly, privacy is used as an alternative value for autonomy and freedom. This understanding is employed by the American Supreme Court, in subsuming the right to privacy beyond the right to have an abortion, for example. Posner’s thinking is more relevant to the current study due to his classifications which are helpful to understand the different types of intrusion into private life and common claims of privacy invasion. However, one question that needs to be asked here is whether all secret personal information is private, or all private personal information is secret.
To answer that question, DeCew (1997) confirms that the concept of privacy is not synonymous with secrecy, in this sense, because of secret information is similar to maps and military plans which are secret but frequently not private. Also privacy issues, such as one’s debts, are not consistently hidden since there are international banking laws surrounding privacy. Despite this, there are several reasons why privacy appears as a secret. Sociologically, privacy is a realm which can be effected without accountability or disclosure to others. Psychologically, privacy as a secrecy concept neglects the control component, since privacy may not be the opposite of publicity; its role might be to provide control to the individual over aspects of her or his life.

Given those perspectives, privacy in this study is an umbrella term for covering several types of secrecy but not all secrecy can be regarded as a kind of privacy, in other words, the concept of privacy can be defined as a subclass of the concept of ‘limited access to the self’ that is merely one element of secrecy. Complete secrecy is not often required by individuals, rather they wish to share secret information with a choice set of reliable persons or occasionally no one. As a result, while many scholars would acknowledge the disclosure of certain secret, personal information to be an invasion of privacy, they would also generally acknowledge that invasions of privacy do not mean the loss of secrecy (Solove 2009). Briefly, privacy has boundless meaning rather than just secrecy; also, covering and revealing secret information in some circumstances does not make a criminal case, particularly for news organizations and their media workers, because of the social importance or for the sake of public interest. Publishing the WikiLeaks files and the Panama Papers investigation are well-known examples from recent years (see wikileaks.org and panamapapers.icij.org).

### 4.3.1.4. Privacy as a ‘personhood’

Personhood or the safeguarding of one’s individuality, personality, and dignity is another understanding of privacy. The connotation of personhood is commonly used in attempts to define the human right to privacy, which is still a concept difficult to define precisely. This understanding is clarified in the United States Supreme Court (USSC), which describes privacy in this context as the intention to create a particularly significant decision about family relationships, marriage, child-rearing, contraception, and procreation.
In his analysis of privacy understandings, Solove (2009) identifies several characteristics of the Court’s privacy cases and personhood concepts that are not exclusively around privacy, but also about autonomy and liberty. Accordingly, the concept of privacy as personhood is not different and autonomous from previous theories argued; also personhood is created around a normative goal of privacy, particularly the defence of the self’s integrity.

The concept of privacy as a procedure of keeping personhood refers to the legal discussions of Warren and Brandeis (1898), who viewed personhood as those characteristics of an individual which are fundamental attributes of personhood that are public in his or her selfhood. In other words, privacy can be seen as a negative and a positive right, which is not simply a freedom from the State or authority, but also a responsibility of the government to preserve some matters through the rights to property, criminal law, tort law, as well as other legal means. For instance, without protection against trespass, assault, rape, and personal information, individuals would have little privacy and security, or limited space to engage in self-definition. In this sense, to protect the ability of individuals to engage in self-definition, the government should certainly intervene, though it is true that the government cannot be impartial or neutral when shifts occur in self-definition. Following the above observations, personhood can be understood as a right to decision privacy; people are not constantly independent from internal and external influences to make personal decisions such as marriage, divorce, choosing a career and so on, as is widely witnessed in several collective societies. For instance, female genital mutilation (FGM) is still common in some rural and non-urban areas of the Kurdistan Region for cultural and religious reasons, whether or not Kurdish women choose to accept their fate or resist. On 7 December 2016, the KRG’s High Council of Women Affairs (HCOWA) along with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported their shared survey results regarding FGM. Their findings showed that 6000 Kurdish females were surveyed during 2015 and 2016 and that 84.3% in the capital province of Hewlêr (Erbil) and 72.1 in Slêmanî province had been genitally mutilated (NRT 2016).
4.3.1.5. Privacy as an ‘intimacy’

Within media intrusion into private life, the notion of intimacy plays a significant role in the maintenance of privacy whereby the meaning of intimacy refers to control over, or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life (Solove 2009). In other words, privacy is a fundamental basis of human relationships, and also for the self-creation of an individual. In this sense, intimacy can be seen as an ideal form of privacy which is valuable for its close links between the ability of individuals to control who has access to them and to information about them, and the ability of individuals to build and preserve dissimilar types of social relationships with dissimilar people (Rachels 1975). Furthermore, intimacy for Fried (1970) means the involvement of information about emotions or beliefs and actions which an individual will choose not to share with all, and have the right not to share with anybody else. In this context, privacy generates the moral principle underpinning individuals’ love and friendship; however, this kind of privacy is a less accurate method of approaching values, such as freedom of speech, religion, and association. From this understanding, it can be seen that the privacy as an intimacy is somewhat related to the concept of secrecy or concealment, that privacy contents cannot be taken if individuals entirely focus on the three zones of information, access, or intimate decisions. Thus, it can be suggested that these dissimilar zones have the shared denominator of intimacy; the content of privacy involves each zone of intimate information, access to information, and personal decisions (Solove 2009). Otherwise, Tavani (2000) adds seclusion as one of the major theories of privacy, which is defined by Westin (1967) as the temporary and voluntary physical withdrawal of an individual from the common society (Tavani 2000). Critically, a serious strength of this argument is that the seclusion theory distinguishes the idea of liberty from privacy, but the central weakness is that it tends to blur solitude with privacy by quietly assuming that the solitary individual has privacy (Langford 2000).

From the different meanings of privacy, the concept of intimacy seeks to describe the characteristics of individuals’ private life; that they should be able to limit access to their information and to control or protect their secrets. While somebody can be private from those they are intimate with, so far theories of privacy as intimacy completely focus on interpersonal relations. Though privacy facilitates trust, love, and intimacy, they are not the only purposes of privacy, a well-known example of intimacy being information about the finances of an individual, which is private but not intimate.
Consequently, if the scope of ‘intimacy’ has not been adequately defined, this concept is also narrow since it ignores numerous problems which do not contain the features of intimate relationships (Solove 2009). In short, from this debate can be understood that the notion of intimacy is one of the significant elements of privacy that has largely been invaded by news organizations and their media works. Therefore, based on their perceptions on this notion, some Kurdish journalists have chosen the term ‘intimacy’ as another meaning of privacy (see Chapter VI).

4.3.1.6. Privacy as a ‘control over personal information’

One more important meaning of privacy is the control over personal information or the capacity to exercise control over information about oneself. For Jourard (1966), privacy is a result of an individual’s desire to prevent others from gaining particular information as to his or her previous and current achievements, practices, and his or her future purposes. By the same token, Siegel (2008) lists two types of privacy, which are decisional and informational privacy, also why these have become so dominant in connection with mental health and State power. In this sense, decisional privacy concerns people’s freedom to make crucial decisions about their intimate relationships and their lives without intrusion by means of the State, as well as informational privacy, which concerns people’s control over others’ access to and usage of information about people. As argued, each type of privacy is substantial to mental well-being since they supply the status under which individuality and intimacy can flourish; this idea is of particular relevance to the issues related to decisional privacy regarding homosexual intimacy. These were newly spotlighted as a legal case in the USSC regarding the constitutionality of laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy (Ibid.). Posner (1981) brought attention to another meaning of privacy, and he explained that the former debates are made against the notion of privacy that contains a form of fraud referring to the concealment of personal information, therefore a form of social insurance has been provided by such concealment. The results of social misconduct, ill health, and other factors that might minimize wealth, if concealed, may prohibit the entire wealth consequences of her/his history or condition from being visited on the person. However, concealment of adverse personal characteristics can have repercussions that are not confined to the individual. For instance, “suppose that a teacher is allowed to conceal a history of sexual assaults on schoolchildren. The costs of concealment-as-
insurance in this instance will not be spread throughout a large group but will instead be concentrated on the schoolchildren who become victims of this teacher in the future as a result of their (and the school board's) ignorance of his propensities” (Posner 1981: 406). For that reason, this all is relevant to the current study because understanding the role of information privacy within media intrusion into people’s private lives is crucial to examining the professional role orientations of Kurdish journalism cultures. In scholarly literature, the relationship between privacy and the notion of control over personal information has been widely investigated by Westin (1967), Murphy (1996), Rosen (2000), and above all Solove (2009), who argued that this concept is one of the most important theories of privacy. Tavani (2000) provided an explanatory theory for each type of privacy, and he considered the primary virtue of control concept that splits solitude and liberty from privacy. The theory of control over personal information has precisely identified the stage of choice, hence a person who has privacy enjoys being ambidextrous in granting and denying access to private information. This idea means that everyone has a choice to allow, accept and refuse others to access his or her information, but this meaning of privacy has been described as a very general, narrow and unclear sense of ‘control’ due to concentrating on all types of information through which persons need to keep control. However, privacy is a question of what society deems convenient to protect rather than solely being an individual issue of individual privilege (Solove 2009). For example, it is mostly deemed appropriate to protect privacy in Kurdish culture by social agreements amongst individuals rather than through legal prosecutions. In recent decades, too many cases of social conflicts and personal privacy have been resolved outside Kurdish courtrooms for many social and political reasons, including a non-independent judicial system and low awareness of civil rights among the general populace. Within this debate, it can be seen that the control theory of privacy has been vigorously challenged in recent decades; at least, the conceptual and the practical in nature are two main weaknesses of this theory.

On the practical level, one is never able to have complete control over every piece of information about oneself. And a theoretical or conceptual difficulty arises for control theorists who seem to suggest that one could conceivably reveal every bit of personal information about oneself and yet also be said to retain personal privacy ... Another weakness of the control theory is that in focusing almost exclusively on the aspect of control or choice, it tends to confuse privacy with autonomy. (Tavani 2000: 67)
Within the above shortcomings, it can be identified that ‘the control over information’ as a subset of the concept of ‘limited access to the self’, also focuses exclusively on the choice of individuals, and deletes decisional freedom from the privacy realm (Solove 2009). In this case, detailed examination of privacy concepts has been more extensively studied and there is a possibility here that the new open-minded perspective of privacy comes from Thomas Hobbes's opinion that the ‘private world’ works to keep the security of an individual. This understanding also refers to John Locke’s view that privacy serves to make absolute sovereignty through keeping whatever an individual “hath mixed his labour with” (Plaisance 2009: 171). Each of solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and also reserve have been defined as four particular conditions of privacy that are the claim of institutions or groups, and individuals to locate for themselves to what extent, how, and when information regarding them is relocated to others. In understanding ‘control over personal information’ as a formula of ownership of information, Westin (1967) views personal information as the right of decision over one’s private life that should be known as a right to property. However, it can be considered that the understanding of control as ownership comes from the difficulty in grappling with the uniquely joined nature of extremely private information owing to a claim of ownership which is not the same as a claim of privacy (Solove 2009). In this sense, media ownership and privacy ownership can be seen as belonging to those people who have the power of control over personal information, such as politicians and journalists.

For that reason, Murphy’s (1996) definition of personal information’s scope as made up of any data concerning any person which is identifiable to that person has been debunked by Solove (2009). For the latter, a large quantity of identifiable information is not considered private information; also an example of a particular profession, or a famous public figure recognizable to others, is not private. In other words, some personal information is more readily identifiable and not necessarily private or secret because information cannot be easily shifted, once known by others, and also cannot be excised from their brains. Information unlike physical objects can be possessed collectively within the brains of millions; that is why the law of intellectual-property protects private tangible expressions of conceptions rather than the implicit conceptions themselves.
As Solove (2009) argues, privacy can be invaded by nuisances, including smells, noises, and other noxious disarray of one’s peace of mind rather than only by the loss of control over information. From the key conceptions of privacy, it can be seen that these concepts partially focus on privacy meanings while some of them concentrate on aims of privacy. For more illustration, the concept of ‘control over personal information’ can be seen as a subclass of the concept of ‘limited access to the self’, which has a significant likeness to ‘the right to be let alone’. This means that the understanding of privacy is not easy due to various dimensions that generate various meaning of privacy; in addition to these notions of privacy, it can be seen that privacy has been altered across conditions, identities, cultural differences and so on. This is another key theme of this study because privacy can be understood as the ability of an individual or group to separate themselves, or information close to themselves, to express selectively themselves. As Poe (2008) points out, there are several difficulties with the existing definition of the nature and purpose of privacy. The first reason is privacy is a value, which is socially constructed, and the defining of the nature and purpose of privacy is a work in progress. Furthermore, privacy supports not one but many purposes; also, privacy is a perspective that orders life, it is both a value and a process that produces data, and furthermore privacy is not a rational concept. In this context, the content and boundaries of what is deemed private differ among individuals and cultures, but share common themes. For instance, when something is private to an individual, it normally means that it is naturally sensitive or personal to them, therefore the realm of privacy somewhat overlaps confidentiality or security. In this sense, Tavani (2000) views the concepts of privacy which will allow discrimination between a right to privacy and a loss of privacy, between a violation of privacy and the condition of privacy. All this is relevant to the current study, notably when news organizations and their media workers, who have been required to balance between the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s right to know, decide whether to conceal or reveal private information.

Given that, Tavani (2007) has theorised privacy and organized into four categories: non-intrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control. Each of these four categories includes one or more valuable insights on privacy concepts, though each of them falls short of producing an adequate account of privacy. He examined and suggested a theory of privacy that combines elements of the classic theories into one unified theory, of
Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC). While this theory is not directly relevant to journalism research, it helps scholars of information, communication, and technology in setting an online privacy policy and it will be applied by using the example of the technology of data-mining on the internet. It is adequately inclusive in the scope for addressing an extensive choice of privacy concerns, which have arisen in fitting together with information and computer technologies. Taking the above perceptions into account and based on definitions provided by previous scholars, including Solove (2009 and 2006) and Tavani (2007 and 2000), the boundaries of privacy understanding will be further explored in the following sections. For instance, the concept of privacy has been defined as a “limited access to the self” that classifies the desire of individuals to hide information from others. This understanding of privacy has been reinforced by Ernest Van Den Haag, who emphasizes that privacy means limited access to an individual, or by another legitimate individual to the domain of somebody else’s personal realm. Further, privacy rights allow the individual to prevent another from observing, using and attacking a personal world (Solove 2009). Unlike the control concept, Langford (2000) sees the limitation concept of privacy as one that properly recognizes the rank of privacy zones or setting up contexts, and another strong point of this theory is that it avoids confusing privacy with the concepts of solitude, liberty, and autonomy.

4.3.2. Key Models of Privacy

Privacy taxonomies of Solove (2009 and 2006) have been adopted in the current research project because they offer a valuable mechanism towards a better understanding of the activities of Kurdish journalists which cause issues of privacy to arise, in addition to insights into how they make their decisions when revealing information privacy. Amongst classifications of privacy, several scholars (such as Gerard 2012; Abu and Siti 2002; Belsey and Chadwick 1992) have itemised four broad categories of direct and indirect privacy, thus Gerard (2012) summarized as follows:

1. **Bodily or Physical Privacy** is the first type that provides a space in which the body can exist, function and move, free from physical intrusions such as body contact and touching, or the proximity of other people, and free from the observational intrusions of eyes and cameras or other sensors.
II. The second type is Mental or Communicational Privacy that allows a person to be alone with their thoughts and feelings, wishes and desires, to keep written or electronic records of them and to communicate them to other people of their choice, free from eavesdropping, intrusion and other forms of psychological invasion.

III. Informational Privacy, which is the third kind and also relevant to the current study. This affords protection for personal information that is legitimately held in the files of public and private organizations and prevents the disclosure of such information to third parties. ‘Legitimately’ in this context means not only in accordance with the law but also with the subject’s knowledge and consent. Such information contains details of bank accounts, tax returns, credit status, social security records, education records, employment records and medical records.

IV. The fourth form is Territorial Privacy which relates to the setting of limits on intrusion into domestic and other environments, including public space or the workplace.

On the other hand, three elementary sorts of privacy have been condensed, including Accessibility Privacy: freedom from unjustified interference expressed as a legal right to be free from others’ intrusion, or the right to be left alone. Also, it needs to be Decisional Privacy, defined as a freedom from others’ intrusion into individual ideas, decisions, and election choices, in areas such as freedom of euthanasia, abortion, and contraception. Additionally, Information Privacy relates to persons having the freedom to control information about themselves that they believe to be private (Tavani 2007).

In the developing history of privacy violations, four different types of harmful activities under the privacy blanket have been distinguished by William Prosser. He was a well-known tort scholar, who taxonomized the harmful effects of privacy into four harmful activities: The first type is Unwarranted Intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion/solitude, or into his private affairs, or information gatherings from the home, such as photographs and tape recording. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness is another type that appears in cases of commercial advertising and property rights. The third type is Public Disclosure of embarrassing private facts regarding the plaintiff, including personal matters and newsworthiness. Publicity is a final harmful activity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye, such as slander or libel involving fabrication and photographs out of context (Prosser 1960:338; see also Christians et al. 1995; Abu and Siti 2002). Etzioni (1999) further proposed that the primary stage of addressing any issue of privacy is identifying the activities that can be a reason for the violation of privacy. Within four harmful activities, Solove (2006) provided ‘a taxonomy of privacy’ which attempted to order the various harms that may arise from breaches in privacy (see Figure 4.4). In his taxonomy, privacy has been split into four classes that subsequently divide into more categories. These are, firstly, an information collection that divides into surveillance and interrogation; secondly, information processing, including aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion; thirdly, dissemination of information that splits into breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, blackmail, appropriation, and distortion; fourthly, information privacy invasions that consist of intrusion and decisional interference (Jamal 2013). With regard to current study, all these models of privacy will be helpful to a better understanding of media intrusion into people's private lives and how information privacy invasions have been performed in Kurdish journalism cultures. To this point, most studies have been descriptive of the nature of the limitation on how far the journalists and their media could be permitted to invade individual privacy rights. While there is a limited degree of elasticity in the law concerning privacy rights, likewise, separating public from private life is open to multiple potential ambiguities. In other words, the research to date has focused on black and white areas of privacy rather than on the gray areas.

![Figure 4.4: Solove’s model of taxonomy for privacy activities](image)

**Source:** Solove (2009:104)
As Ess (2009) asserted, watching an athletic event in a stadium and walking in the park are two key examples of public spaces where people often may not expect privacy. Also, there are gray areas which appear to occupy a space between the obviously private and the obviously public. Additionally, he stated that sitting at an outside table at a Café appears somewhat public, and therefore a public figure should not be surprised if somebody overhears his conversation, or maybe even takes a picture of the Café that accidentally involves him, but what is the reaction if the individuals are seated in a room booked for them at a restaurant or in a private party?

Within that question, it can be agreed that the journalist's reporting on privacy issues is similar to walking across minefields due to the difficulty of identifying and distinguishing the gray areas from the black and white. Thus, journalists must be very careful to evaluate the news values of private life information amongst ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures. As Gerard (2012) observes, public figures have the right to a degree of privacy, though conversely when somebody leads a public life, they must expect the media to scrutinize them closely. In this case, while celebrity news has risen in prominence, the media and journalists are normally in search of individuals who hold elected political office, and one would surely argue that full detailed information regarding those individuals is required for the sake of judging their worth as servants of the public. Accordingly, this study goes into more detail on the most relevant ethical theories elsewhere (see Section 4.4.3).

### 4.3.3. Key Debates of Privacy

The debates on privacy have a long history in various fields, including mass media communications, journalism theory and practice. In this context, a considerable amount of literature has been published on the key debates around privacy boundaries across cultures and domains for different goals (Jamal 2013 and Al-Amri 2012). As Figure 4.5 shows, the philosophical importance of privacy relates to human dignity, individual autonomy, and self-determination. From psychological perspectives, privacy is crucial due to the individual’s need for a private space that allows them to judge possible threats, decide how they are going to act, and select the information they choose to give about themselves.
Sociologically, individuals desire to be free to behave as they wish, free to associate with others as they want, and also to be free from the threat of being observed. In addition, from the economic perspective of privacy, individuals wish to be free from to innovate, as well as to be free from the risk of a lack of private space while they work on their innovations, including potential invasions of property rights or copyrights, notably in those cultures where plagiarism is common place and accepted as normal. Politically, voters have the necessity to be free to think, argue and act as well as to be free from the threat of being observed (Al-Amri 2012).

**Figure 4-5: Importance of privacy within different perspectives**

This model has been developed by the current study based on the work of Al-Amri (2012)

Within these perceptions of privacy and its importance, it can be seen that in gathering and revealing personal information to audiences, the media and news workers have faced several challenges, including ethical and legal or professional accountabilities. For instance, news media workers consider information privacy in terms of its newsworthiness, its social importance, and the public's right to know. Journalists believe that covering the private information of celebrities and public figures are more important than ordinary people due to differences of the news values. Thus, making a professional decision in gathering and revealing private information is quite complicated for news media workers, particularly in developing and post-conflict countries where journalistic professionalism and the implementation of laws are limited.
In the current study, each activity of presenting and preserving private information has been identified as a professional duty and a legal obligation of journalists, thus the news media workers should make a precise balance or apply ethical theories, including a *Priority Model* of information privacy between their journalistic rights to cover events, balanced against an individual's right to privacy versus the public's right to know (see Section 2.4). To protect their personal information confidentiality, every single person has universal human rights, but understandings of definitions of privacy differ in each and every situation where private information is disclosed in the media. There is little consensus, with each person solely distinguishing what constitutes the nature of privacy as related to themselves (Gerard 2012). Therefore, this research seeks to outline the key debates of privacy as follows:

### 4.3.3.1 Cultural differences of privacy

To understand better the significance of privacy among different cultures, one should refer to the structure of culture and its connotations. According to Livingstone and Brake (2009), the structure of cultures gives people different possibilities for the construction of a wide circle of relationships, the offering of the self, learning, and the management of intimacy and privacy. From this perspective, it can be seen that a particular culture gives individuals several characteristics that are different from the features of other cultures. The cultural differences amongst Western and non-Western societies have been contributing to different attitudes on the shifting boundaries of privacy understandings. Plaisance (2009) suggests that the core cultural features regarding privacy are divided into four main areas. First and foremost, individuals tend to rely on an idea of social distance as part of their social interaction. The majority of individuals are sociable and need others to create any type of social relationship, including friendship and marriage. While a minority of people desire to be isolated, others believe that one is never fully alone, which most likely stems from a primal fear of isolation. Furthermore, individuals will tend to invade others' privacy for a perceived social benefit or to prevent antisocial conduct. Lastly, as a society becomes more complex, the opportunities for physical and psychological invasions of privacy tend to increase.
In modern Western cultures, privacy is measured as one of the prominent rights of individuals, which is necessary to be respected and protected within modern liberal democracies (Ess 2009). The concept of universal individual privacy has been examined by Zemskaya (2005) as a contemporary construct which is originally connected with Western culture, particularly North American and British. As understood in the West, privacy in some cultures like Kurdistan Region of Iraq has remained virtually unknown until more recently. Furthermore, the concept of privacy sets Anglo-American culture apart even from Western European cultures, including Italian or French. However, most cultures nowadays recognise the rights of individuals to keep some elements of their personal information from broader society, such as closing the door to one's home. By way of illustration, Plaisance (2009) observed that the understanding of privacy in Western culture was built on the Enlightenment philosophy, which placed emphasis on individual centrality. Therefore, it has led Western people to form a common sense of privacy as a right to be left alone that is a truth of life and a global fact. While this view does not help Western individuals and their societies too much, this idea has been contested by enlightenment theorists: words like ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ are publicly held ideals until they are challenged by users with cultural differences in understandings of privacy. Hence, an inquiry into privacy is valuable in encouraging people to look at their cultural traditions and develop their perceptions of notions of privacy. More interestingly, studying privacy can be helpful to open the eyes of individuals to exactly how differently people’s modern claims to privacy would appear in other historical periods (Ibid.). On this basis, studying privacy and then using it as a yardstick against how your own culture should be measured is quite useful as there is a lack of accuracy in understanding privacy amongst various cultures and even amongst various individuals from time to time. As McLaren (1998) asserted, everyone should have the right to improve him or herself based on private choices, whether or not that suits the community.

In non-Western cultures, including many Asian nations, privacy is not considered as an individual right, but a collective one, for example, family privacy, or a group of individuals versus the wider society. This understanding of privacy is changing rapidly nowadays, with individual interpretations of privacy being prevalent. In some cultures like Singapore, information technology is widely used by the government to track their citizens’ activities (Ess 2009).
In June 2015, the organization of Privacy International (PI) reported that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had still not been signed or ratified by Singapore. This was contrary to Article 17: “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation” (ICCPR 1966). So far, it is broadly confirmed that the Republic of Singapore has a well-established, centrally controlled system of technological surveillance designed for maximum national security (PI 2015). From this, it can be seen that individual privacy in Western industrialised countries is far more highly valued than is the case in Eastern developing states. For some societies like the State of Israel, which has been considered a flawed democracy, to reach full democratic status there is still work to be done, thus for Israel, its national security is much more important than individual privacy. Nevertheless, Tavani (2000) confirmed that privacy appears to be globally valued, though, in any given culture or nation, privacy has a particular value and is defined through different cultural circumstances and influences. In other words, it is increasingly difficult to unify the understanding of privacy amongst whole cultures and countries. Within this cultural diversity, and based on the interviewee insights in this study, it can be concluded that the privacy of family or group is much more important than the privacy of individuals in such cultures as the Kurdistan Region. These circumstances occur for various reasons, including the slight growth of individualism principles and the ignoring of civil liberties for the sake of gaining political rights. Therefore, a political question is one of the main reasons to limited development of privacy concepts in a post-conflict region of Kurdistan within Middle Eastern cultures.

4.3.3.2 Middle Eastern theorists on privacy

In order to find out the similarities and differences to Western concepts of privacy, as well as to compare and contrast them amongst Eastern and non-Eastern cultures, the current study needs to review the literature of the Middle Eastern theorists on privacy understandings. Othman et al., (2015) selected and analysed the content of nineteen publications from 1986 to 2013 with regard to the meaning of privacy, modesty, and hospitality in Islam and the design of Muslim homes. From this view, it appears that the guidelines which have straight applications in the domestic sphere have been involved in traditions and traditional Islamic teachings. These guidelines come from
three central principles of hospitality, modesty, and also privacy, which have an important influence on the design of Muslim homes, the design of space, and domestic actions inside each home. For observing each principle in each home the guidelines are generally shared, although the cultural factors which operate inside their country of residence have influenced Muslims living in different countries. These cultural factors also operate within Muslim homes in different ways in terms of use of space and influence on architectural styles. According to Omer (2010), a home is deemed to be a “microcosm of Islamic culture and civilization” which is a “matchless delight”. Within this Islamic religious conviction, Heathcote (2012), Altman and Chemers (1984) have described a home as the expression of symbolic social communication because it defines interpersonal creative expression and style, and also represents the social class and social network of its owner. The importance of such macro-level factors as religion, culture, climate and socioeconomic factors has shaped individual perceptions of home. In other words, a macro-level factor, which needs noteworthy attention is the impact of other cultural traditions on home design, home perception, space using, and domestic behaviour. For similar reasons, Sixsmith(1986) proposes three principal structures of a home, which are: The physical home, including architectural style, physical space, and structure; the social home, or a place to build relationships, entertain, and share; the personal home, which is an expansion of oneself. Within these structures, many architectural components are functional, including bedrooms, windows, and doors. These spatial elements exert substantial influence on human domestic interactions and behaviour inside the home environment (Heathcote 2012). Within these debates, it can be summarized that privacy involves a private and safe place for sanctuary, both personal and familial; also modesty means a home with space for religious rituals and activities, primarily defined through humility in design within a sustainable and economical design. In addition, the perceived desirability of a dwelling with opportunities to extend hospitality to neighbors and enhance social relationships has shaped the meanings of hospitality (Othman et al., 2015 and 2014; Mortada 2011 and Omer 2010).

With regard to the current study, home as a private space for various individuals has been occasionally considered by the media and journalists to cover private information and private pictures, notably for celebrities and public figures, thus a private space or home that may have faced invasion of privacy is considered as part of information
privacy by this research project. Rather than the effects of Christian beliefs and the universal declaration of human rights (1948), in most Middle Eastern societies the Islamic religion and its Sharia Laws have influenced or dominated decisions and behaviour of individuals, including news media workers’ professional activities. In paying more particular attention to the Islamic role, and to cultural anticipations in building norms about privacy, Abokhodair and Vieweg (2016) examined how privacy is exercised and understood in technology-mediated conditions amongst technology users in the Middle East, researching understandings of privacy derived from the attitudes of Arab Gulf citizens. Historically, privacy has been understood as a concept of the self as an individual, apart from a group (Altman 1976). While this idea is true in numerous formerly studied user groups, it can be understood that the fundamental notion of the group and the self in Middle Eastern countries, including the Arab Gulf, is conceptualized such that supporting one’s individuality is viewed in a negative light. In this sense, membership of a tribe and family are of the highest social value, and also there is no individual divide from a family, and this means that individualism is less applicable in Islamic cultures. In her study on Facebook use in rural Africa, Bidwell (2010) extended the perception of self elsewhere, explaining that in the daily performances, philosophy, and linguistics of precolonial African society, personhood was developed by others (both dead and living) and identity was seen as fixed and uniform to a social position. Furthermore, Abokhodair and Vieweg (2016) view the notion of formulating the self by others as a method which has similarly applied to the culture of Arab Gulf.

In most Middle Eastern countries, including the League of Arab States (LAS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and even the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), understandings and practices on privacy ethics are primarily tied to norms and anticipations. These have been produced in the central religious text of Islam (the Quran), and the daily instance (Sunnah) of Muhammad, Islam’s prophet, therefore these have become the principal sources of the Sharia Laws. The justifications for both the judicial system and the prevailing societal norms, including anticipations of behaviour and practices amongst Muslims, have formulated the Islamic Sharia Laws. In this context, the Islamic visions of privacy come back to the religious concept of “Hurma” which is closest to the idea of privacy in the English vocabulary (Guindi 1999). According to context, the word “Hurma” involves two meanings:
First, a woman; a sacred time like the holy month in the Islamic religion, and also a sacred space such as home or mosque. Second, anything that is illegal to take or watch outdoors without prior permissions. Both meanings are deemed pure and should remain secure, and any interference with their sanctity is deemed sinful. This aims to protect the sanctity (or hurma) of the body and the house. The Quran is directly notified in the connection of instructing individuals to knock on a door three times, and then getting prior permission before entering another’s space or home. This rule is also in place to avoid walking in on another while in a state of undress, or while with one’s family or spouse; entering without prior permission risks exposing one’s “awrah”, which literally in Islam means the intimate parts of one’s body.

In the Islamic culture, everybody has been commanded to hide some body parts; what is covered and when depends on the particular state and the level of conservativeness. Awrah for women can be extended behind the hair to cover the arms, the legs, and in some cases the face, therefore Hurma and Awrah can be applied together to show the unlawfulness of seeking or obtaining access to sacred body parts by others. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the right to privacy is stated thus: “Dwellings are inviolate. Access is prohibited without their owners' permission. No search may be made except in cases specified by the Law.” (Article 37 in Basic Law of Government 1991). In such cultures as Iraq and its Kurdistan Region, the rule associated with privacy is mafi jiyanî taybet or haq al-khososyah. This covers the civil right to protect some features of individuals and their private life, along with maintaining confidentiality, to defend the reputation of individuals and aspects of their life from other people's interference. Within this rule, the right to privacy (Haq al-khososyah) has been enforced through protecting the Hurma and/or Awrah of any given individual (see Figure 4.6). Privacy has been considered in the Quran in relation to a law encouraging the respect of others’ private life to avoid bad behaviour, and this can extend to an invasion of others’ privacy (Abokhodair and Vieweg 2016). Within Islamic Sharia Laws, the importance of privacy is generated from the imperative to preserve the sanctity of one’s body and one’s home, as well as upholding the good name and honour of one’s extended family. While predominant notions of privacy consider individuals and their relationships to a group, Islamic understandings of privacy are tied up with the significance of modesty. As Sobh and Belk (2011) explained, the concept of privacy in Islamic societies is broadly related to the demand for modest self-presentation of Muslims in public,
especially women. In addition, the underlying definition of privacy in such cultures is respect and not seclusion. In both behaviour and dress, offering oneself as modest is of the highest importance in being considered a respectable member of Islamic society; therefore privacy plays an essential role in how respect and modesty are maintained. However, the Islamic understandings of privacy functions have been constantly criticised by secularists who believe that individuals should be free from any religious and ideological stipulations as to what they wear and how they think about their behaviour, actions, and civil and political rights. A Kurdish philosophy researcher, Newzad Cemal, sees the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a green environment for mixing the Islamic Sharia Laws with Kurdish traditions in terms of dress, behaviour, and so on.

![Figure 4-6: Aspects of privacy within the understanding of Islamic religion](image)

**Source:** Abokhodair and Vieweg (2016: 673)

In his in-depth interview for the current study, he stated that the Islamic religious clerics, including the Mela ú Şêx, have considered themselves as thinkers, educators, and decision makers for all Muslims. They have manipulated and brainwashed the individuals to what is allowable and unallowable, then dominated thinking and behaviour as to what they must do in their daily lives. Sometimes, the private lives of secularist authors, artists or celebrities, and other public figures, as a consequence of non-Islamic behaviour and viewpoints, have been orally violated by the Mela through the Gutari Nweji Heyini - Friday prayer discourse - (interview with Newzad Cemal 2015). For instance, since their particular literary outpourings, prominent Kurdish poets Şêrko Bêkes and Qubadî Celîzade have been attacked several times. Finally, it can be concluded that the Islamic Sharia Laws are being used as the central principle of legislation in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region.
While Western laws principally rely on the universal declaration of human rights (1948), which is unfavorable or unconducive to the Sharia requirements, thus this can be identified as one of the main differences between Western and non-Western cultures in understanding the shifting of privacy boundaries.

**4.3.3.3 Information privacy in the information age**

In the information age, privacy and professionalism differences have been increasingly debated in convergent media by both privacy owners and media owners and brands to provide a better plan for the data-for-service exchange. The core components of media convergence can be described as a chain of changes, which include demands of power and economics, since “convergence will become the site where issues of power and control will continue to be contested between those who originate media content and those who engage with it” (Bainbridge et al., 2011: 380). As Joseph (2015) observes, the wave of alarm about cyber-security has provoked global public interest in how personal data is stored, and forced media owners and brands to participate in the inquiry into their data-for-services exchange policies. When businesses, including marketers, are frequently reliant on internet data, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the cyber-attacks leading to the data thefts of online users that are becoming commonplace. In 2010, Helen Nissenbaum described privacy as one of the most urgent issues associated with digital media and information technology. She asserted that information ought to be distributed and protected based on norms governing different social contexts, whether health care, workplace, schools, or amongst friends and family, and that the concerns of privacy should not be restricted only to the concern of control over the personal information. Nissenbaum (2010) has suggested that the basic differences between private and public spheres informing common current privacy policies obscure more than they explain. Personal privacy rights have been compromised by internet privacy concerns relating to the storage, repurposing and preparation to third-parties, and the presentation of information about oneself through the internet, in particular relating to social networking services. The astronomical quantity of information processed by these sites every day invokes issues of privacy and the security of social networks. Internet users have been invited to join open platform applications and share photos, messages, and other applications which frequently operate as a green light for others to access the private information of a user.
Information privacy involves the personal data of family, health issues, financial or banking concerns, marital status, social life, personality traits, employment history, and career development (Gerard 2012). The scale on which such information is shared has led a private investigator specializing in cases of internet privacy, Rambam (2006), to say that privacy is dead and it no longer exists. While Pogue (2011) proposed that the appeal of internet services is the deliberate dissemination of personal information, Schneier (2006) considers privacy as a protector of people from abuse by those in power, even if individuals are doing nothing wrong during the period of surveillance. However, Privacy International (2012) believe that political surveillance no longer requires targeting huge amounts of resources due to the new developments in technology convergence, along with the progress in internet usage and contemporary databases. Accordingly, online privacy concerns have been categorized into several discrete potential dangers, such as online victimization, surveillance, sexual predators, preteens and early teenagers, identity theft, unintentional notoriety, stalking, employment, law enforcement prowling the networks, mob rule, location updates, and also invasion of agreements of privacy (Paliszkiewicz and Mądra-Sawicka 2016; Andrews 2012; Zhan and Fang 2011; Smith 2010).

On the other hand, the political economy of privacy and surveillance on Facebook has been examined by Fuchs (2012), who has developed the concepts of socialist internet privacy, and socialist privacy, whereupon the commodification of users and their data has relied on the capital accumulation on Facebook. He identifies the surveillance on Facebook as an economic surveillance, which is an extensive process of gathering, storage, evaluation, and commodification of user-generated data, user behavior, and personal data for economic goals since the big advertising-based capital accumulation machines are Facebook and other platforms of web 2.0, which through surveillance fulfil their economic purposes. For that reason, the Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has been criticized and asked; if he truly does not care about profit, why then is Facebook not a non-commercial platform, and why does it use targeted advertising? Fuchs (2012) has answered that numerous are the obstacles entailed in targeted advertising that aims to control and manipulate human needs. This can indicate a lack of democracy because users are commonly not invited if they do not consent to use internet advertising. In this context, market concentration can be increased by targeted advertising, and for most internet users the kinds of information
gathered regarding them that is accepted for the purposes of advertising is ambiguous or opaque; also when uploading data they are not paid for the value creation. In economic terms, the primary meaning of ‘sharing’ on Facebook is the information Facebook “shares” with advertising clients; the unique euphemism for selling and commodifying data is “sharing”. Therefore, when Zuckerberg states that Facebook is about the “concept that the world will be better if you share more” (Wired, August 2010), the real question raised here is a better world for whom, because of Facebook trades and commodifies the data of users and their behavior. This also makes the world still more commercialized, one big shopping centre without exit, and not for the benefit of internet users; but for companies interested in advertising, Facebook makes the world a better place. For similar reasons, the surveillance analysis which meets the liquid modern world has been insightfully dissected by Bauman and Lyon (2013), who have asked: are there still spaces of freedom and hope, or how do we understand our responsibility for the human beings before us that usually lost in categorization and data debates? In their study, Bauman and Lyon (2013) have examined the questions of morality, technology, and power in terms of what it means to watch and be watched today. Those who are monitored regularly collaborate voluntarily with the monitors because the smallest daily life details of individuals are traced and tracked more closely than ever. In public places, CCTV or video cameras are a familiar and accepted sight, and also in the wake of 11 September 2001 such devices as body scanners and biometric checks have proliferated and are now commonly involved in air travel. Every day, credit card issuers and Google engines scan the details of individual preferences, concerns, habits, quietly promoting customized marketing strategies along with their activities, meeting with frequently enthusiastic cooperation. As Bauman and Lyon (2013) explained, being mobile and flexible is the path of daily life in today's liquid modern world, and in social media networks crossing national borders is an increasingly universal and commonplace activity.

Today's travelers, consumers, workers, and citizens are constantly on the move but usually require confidence and permanent relationships in their offline lives. In this liquid modern world, where places may not be fixed and time is unlimited, the perpetual motion of individuals does not go unnoticed, while seeping into regions where it previously had only marginal sway, responding to and representing the smooth nature of modern life.
Within these debates on information privacy concerns in the information age, it can be said that there has been a growing interest in studying professional role orientations among global journalism cultures, which have become an essential element of any political or media system (Hanitzsch et al. 2016), while linkages between information privacy invasions and journalistic professionalism have been less frequently debated. Many scholars in the field of journalism point out that journalists should make a clear distinction between the public and private spheres, that the zero and full degree of privacy rights amongst individuals and their positions can differ. For instance, ordinary people, including children and crime victims, have a full right to privacy, while celebrities and public figures have a zero degree of privacy rights. Furthermore, such zones as home and bedroom have been morally and legally recognized as private and not appropriate for media coverage, while a city centre or public garden is largely considered a legitimately available space for journalists and photographers to take a photo and cover newsworthy information (Morrison and Svennevig 2007; Conboy 2004).

4.4. MEDIA INTRUSION INTO PRIVATE LIFE

While historically, Warren and Brandeis (1890) confirmed that the expanding new technology and yellow journalism were the leading causes of intrusion into private life, an invasion of privacy frequently causes emotional and spiritual harm, rather than physical harm; therefore sensation, emotions, and thoughts require statutory recognition. In today’s digital age, the invasions of information privacy, namely in relation to the private life of celebrities, public figures, and even ordinary people, has increased to unprecedented levels. According to Meyers (2010), media intrusion into private life may be classified depending on issues of private information and images into three main groups: (a) celebrities, including sports and entertainment stars; (b) public officials and candidates for public office, such as members of parliament, whether prospective or currently serving; (c) private or ordinary citizens, with no interest in public attention. Many ordinary people aspire to be famous, while a private figure or ordinary people means a person who does not attract wide attention by the nature of their work, including somebody who does not work in the national or international public sphere (Lesley 2000). Furthermore, Jones (2005) viewed public figures as people with fewer privacy rights than ordinary people. In other words, the private lives of accountable individuals in public positions are the main subject of
privacy invasion due to their prominence. In these cases, public figures including judges, police officials and school educators have fewer rights to privacy because their position has an influence on the public sphere. This view is open to criticism when someone comes to public attention through no fault of their own, such as a murder suspect before trial. For instance, Christopher Jefferies was an English teacher at a co-educational independent boarding school for 34 years before taking early retirement at 56 in 2001. He was wrongly arrested when Joanna Yeates, who rented a flat from him, was found dead on Christmas Day 2010. Unwittingly finding himself at the center of a media frenzy, Jefferies later won libel damages from eight British newspapers. In evidence to Lord Justice Leveson’s inquiry into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press in 2011, Jefferies said that the British tabloid press portrayed him as a “sexually perverted voyeur who used teaching as a means of feeding my perversions” (Johnston 2014). From this instance, it can be seen that in the determining of who is a public figure and who is not, the news media organizations and journalists should be more measured in deciding whether to publish and broadcast a news story. As Thiriux and Krasemann (2009) stated that in gathering daily news, because of their photos and inquiries into the personal affairs of individuals, media workers, including photographers and reporters are often castigated by politicians, entertainers, sports figures, and other famous figures. However, media intrusion into private life has been justified by journalists as being in the public interest: “the idea of privacy might be subject to change over time, but the concept of the public interest seems effectively to be a constant” (Morrison and Savennevig 2002: 2).

Similar to the notion of privacy, the public interest has been surveyed and then defined as a sophisticated concept which has multiple meanings; privacy can be seen as an essential right to protect the private life of the individual within public and private space. These spaces separate into three main types; the home is an example of ‘closed spaces’; the secluded beach or the office are referred to as ‘restricted public spaces’. While shopping precincts, town centers, and open public beaches are three samples of ‘public open spaces’. Subsequently, the journalists have been required to make a clear distinction between the privacy rights of public figures and ordinary people, particularly in terms of location (Gerard 2012; Morrison and Svennevig 2007; Conboy 2004; Belsey 1992 and Sissela 1988). For that reason, it is necessary to clearly classify the types of personalities in any media content regulation or privacy-related law
because such people as celebrities and parliamentarians have chosen a public life and thus must put up with a degree of media intrusion into their private life. A well-known example in Britain concerned Princess Diana and her gym photos, which had been taken by gym owner Bryce Taylor, who was first printed in the *Sunday Mirror* and later again in the *Daily Mirror*. However, a High Court injunction by Princess Diana against Taylor and *Mirror Group Newspapers* (MGN) banned further publication of the pictures (BBC 1993). From this case, it can be understood that the celebrities and public figures are the main targets for privacy invasion by media and journalists, notably for churnalists and paparazzi.

4.4.1. The roles of political change on privacy

The debate on media intrusion into private life continues, while privacy invasion cases by now have a long history. On 10 December 2016, *The Guardian* reported that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation covered up information on Russia attempting to shift the 2016 presidential election in Donald Trump’s favour after reports on spy agencies’ investigations of hacking information held by political parties in America (Smith 2017). While invading governments and corporations is more difficult, the ability to invade the information privacy of individuals has been dramatically increased by journalists, corporations, and governments around the world. Moreover, different approaches have been used to get the credit files, chemical drug tests, widely distributed medical records, and ever more sensitive listening devices (Hodges 1994). These activities have generated controversy, but also the observation that making money is more important than performing a good professional job, and profitability is the only really important metric nowadays. As a result, this is vanishingly unlikely to change even if it becomes more profitable to tell lies than the truth. In *Flat Earth News*, Davies (2011) found that 60% of British newspapers’ content was based mainly on press releases or wire copy. This means that the vast majority of journalists are ‘churnalists’, who conform to a model of journalism which relies on press releases, stories provided through news agencies, and other forms of pre-packaged material rather than news reported as a result of an independent investigation by the newspapers and other news media concerned. Of the remainder, Davies found that 12% were original stories and only 12% of news stories displayed evidence that the main statement had been confirmed.
In 2008, Waseem Zakir a BBC journalist, coined the term "churnalism" in reference to recent developments where the aim is to reduce cost by reducing original news-gathering and source-checking, of which there was a particularly steep fall from late 2015 due to revenue lost with the decline in advertising and the rise of internet news sites. In today's journalism practices, churnalism and the propaganda model have been widely replicated across the world, which has also affected the increase in information privacy invasions, particularly during periods of war and political crisis. Given that, one of the legal and ethical challenges facing professional journalists is to balance the extent of the issue of privacy against taking into account the public's right to know (Gerard 2012).

Privacy as a political right has been widely debated by Privacy International, which was the first organization committed to campaigning for the right to privacy around the world. Political history offers a multitude of core cases of information privacy, including the Panama Papers, the Wikileaks Files, Watergate, blacklists, and secret files held by governments in wartime. The debate of academics and privacy advocates constantly involves a recitation of the place of privacy in all the universal declarations, conventions, and treaties of human rights, while the public often remains unconvinced of its importance. In environments where democracy is fragile, privacy is also seen as a mere convenience, and governments actively seek the powers to do everything they can to defend the homeland or the nation at the expense of individual privacy. Given those reasons, privacy is regarded as an issue of import, though it is hardly on the same level of attention as other political rights. In countries which have traditions of open government, it can be seen that a key defence of a healthy democratic system is privacy. Put in this light, the British Leveson Inquiry on the News International phone-hacking scandal in 2011, and the Clinton-Lewinsky American political sex scandal of 1998, are two obvious examples in recent decades. However, in countries without traditions of a healthy system of democracy or open government, privacy is not considered of any value and certainly not when involving homeland security. As there is a dominant sense that the ability of politicians to act and organize is integral to the political system, safeguards are traditionally in place to preserve their privacy (PI 2012). In actuality, the surveillance of individuals' political preferences, and also of political movements threatens political integrity, therefore privacy is not an opportunity or right that only applies to parliamentarians.
Ironically, in such post-conflict regions as the Kurdistan, the private life of parliamentarians has been violated by an intelligence agency of ruling political parties rather than by the national intelligence agency, notably during the political crises (see Section 6.5). In recent decades, the law of anti-terrorism has been broadly used to spy on human right groups that allow random and discriminating measures against media or political activity and against anyone critical of the ruling authorities. This has been achieved via formulating legal definitions of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ that are so vague, and also they can be used this to restrict civil and political liberties (Glenewinkel 2006). The 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law in the Kurdistan Region being a well-known example. In this case, it can be clearly seen that the global technology and safeguards of democratic standards do not necessarily mix well together. In some cases, the new technology is currently in place to allow intelligence agencies of ruling political parties or their governments to ‘lawfully’ intercept the voice communications of any perceived enemy of their interests (PI 2012).

Along with privacy developments nowadays, the level of democratic developments can also be tested as the Privacy International (2012) reported that the stakes have significantly grown in the wake of modern and technologically advanced political surveillance. Since it first develops the surveillance within society's infrastructure and then democratises it in ways designed to mollify people worried about applying political surveillance to the entire population, government authorities may be able to access vast amounts of personal information on individuals which would have been inaccessible hitherto. As a result, political surveillance no longer needs to be targeted or requires vast amounts of resources due to the advances in the use of the internet, and modern databases with changes in technological convergences. For instance, telecommunications companies in Europe are now forced to maintain records of the calls, emails, locations, and other data of customers for up to two years. While according to the Iranian Press TV, the new laws of ‘cybercrime’, announced by Iranian Government in July 2009 to ostensibly protect individual privacy, asked internet services providers to store all the data received or sent via their customers in a similar vein. Certainly, through gaining access to telephone and email logs, the identities of journalists’ sources have been constantly determined by using such tactics. Based on the annual reports of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the 2015 list of the ten countries with the highest censorship comprises Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, Vietnam, Iran, China, Myanmar, and Cuba. Most of them have been described as repressive regimes which threaten jail terms and restrict the internet to silence the press. In addition to the 2009 list of 10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger, a research methodology of eight questions was adopted, including three focussing on surveillance (CPJ 2015 and 2009). From these annual reports, it can be seen that those countries have decided to implement censorship technologies on the internet so that they can keep track of everything their citizenry is doing. Since there are huge databases, convergent companies of telecommunications, and providers of internet services who have easily accumulated personal information about fetishes, hobbies, hates, loves, and political interests of individuals, including journalists, covert surveillance and informants are no longer demanded in this day and age. As a political right, individuals have demanded the rebuilding of privacy safeguards, notably in developing countries, but they are regularly neglected. For classifying conspiracies, hidden interests, illegal activities, and also policy contradictions, some surveillance of political actors can be useful. When these methods are politically used without any oversight, however, various problems have emerged, therefore the media and the police have been required to regulate these activities by strict controls.

In any political system, privacy plays significant roles, particularly in how political surveillance is destructive to a democracy practice. Privacy International (2012) was concerned that if individuals remain to deploy political surveillance without thinking about the consequences, two outcomes can be foreseen. First and foremost, as people’s political interests are more easily identified, they may face social exclusion, and then discrimination may arise as individuals are known as members of political societies from their donations, social networking profiles, their CVs and links to their home addresses. Political stagnation is the second outcome, which simply means no one would regularly run for office, as our private lives as adults, teenagers, children, and even toddlers would constantly haunt our personal political aspirations, and by surveillance of their critics and opponents, those in power will maintain their position. As a result of this, to prevent abuse, long-established constitutional and human rights within political systems, including freedom of speech and privacy as a civil and political right must be safeguarded. Besides, if individuals will not allow surveillance to inhibit expression, development, and political autonomy, then they must update and enhance these constitutional and human rights to counter new political surveillance systems (PI 2012).
4.4.2. Privacy and an alternative concept of the public interest

In the current study on professional role orientations of journalists and information privacy invasions, the concept of “social importance” has been used instead of “the public interest”, for several reasons as explained in the following. Morrison and Svennevig (2007) examined the relationship between the public interest and the right to privacy along with a focus on news values, practices of journalism, and the extensive development of social surveillance. Each one of the scholars has conducted a series of focus groups, a British national sample survey, and a set of in-depth interviews with media regulators and media interest groups in the United Kingdom. They asked people in their words to describe what they understood by the term “the public interest”. Then, Morrison and Svennevig identified nine core characteristics of the public interest definitions derived from the survey:

34% of the respondents defined the public interest as the public rights, such as information that the public has the right to know, and government officials should be accountable for their mistakes. 28% of the participants understood the public interest as the public effects which mean issues that affect ordinary people directly, and where the issue has a direct impact on people’s lives. Public interest has been defined as the national interest by 3% of the respondents, who explained that if a famous singer is wearing pink knickers that is not important to the country, but if she is a spy, that is in the public interest and those of national security. 15% of the participants understood the public interest to mean the interests of the public, including things that the public would be interested in hearing about celebrities’ and politicians’ private lives or what people want to see or read. Public interest has been defined by 7% of the respondents as the personal interests, such as something that is going to interest or benefit individuals but be of doubtful interest or benefit to others. 2% of the participants saw the public interest as a local or community interest; people nowadays often do not know their neighbor, therefore they need to know what is going on in their neighborhood to protect themselves, or simply what is happening in their local area. Also, 16% of the respondents defined the public interest as the unwarranted intrusion, such as gossip; they actively want to hear about or delve into people’s private lives. However, 12% of the participants understood the public interest as a media excuse, for instance, anything that people are interested in, particularly in other people’s lives is just a way of broadcasting what media want.
Then, the concept of public interest was defined by 5% of the respondents as warranted intrusion, where an individual might know the full character of the person involved, or where the nature of the information transcends or supersedes the individual’s right to privacy. From these results, it can be summarized that the public interest is not easy to define; an initial objective of Morrison and Svennevig (2007)’s study was to identify the cornerstone for a more sophisticated analysis of the underlying issues involved in judging individuals’ rights to be preserved from media intrusion. As a result of their primary outcome, the term ‘social importance’ as a new concept instead of the ‘public interest’ may be more apposite, since the notion of social importance is truly scalable regarding intensity, in its possible applications, and operationalizable. That is why the current study believes that using the concept 'social importance' is much better than ‘the public interest’ in describing the process when the media and journalists are making any decision about gathering and revealing private information. While Morrison and Svennevig's (2007) study is still very relevant to the current study, it may have been more useful if the authors had addressed the question of whether British mainstream media and journalists affect the privacy rights of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures in such developed democracies or Western cultures.

4.4.3. Invasion of privacy in the ethical theories

One of the more interesting areas of debate in the current research project concerns the effects of media on those people whose privacy rights are breached, and also how ethical theories apply to invasions of privacy during media intrusion into private life. In this sense, the main purpose of undertaking media theory “is to break free from our everyday experiences, and to think about them at a critical distance, through the different perspectives that we will encounter” (Laughey 2007: 4). This view raises questions about the professional ethics and practical logics of the journalists which are applied in understanding the theoretical structure of privacy when they practice the gathering and reporting of private information. Many, vastly different, philosophers and theorists have examined ethical behaviour within moral logic, such as Plato, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gautama Buddha, Confucius, and Ibn Rushd or Averroes (Lapsley 2006).
Determining the traditional questions of what is wrong or right, bad or good, and what should be done to achieve or produce goodness have been studied since the ancient Greeks. The moral reasoning was defined by Aristotle as practical reasoning, as it bears upon matters of practice, and also is applied to assess human behaviour or action. In his words: “Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.” (Gerard 2012: 33 and Tredennick 2004). As aforementioned, the principle of ethics is an important part of moral philosophy that involves recommending, systematizing and defending the connotation of right and wrong behaviours based on the culture (see Section 2.2.2.3). In other words, the reasoning decides what is right or wrong, and this decision refers to the rules and principles of a golden moral judgment that consists of: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (cited in Gerard 2012: 33-35). In moral thinking, rules and principles are slightly different: “Don’t lie” and “Don’t steal” are considerably narrower than the principle of “Do unto others” (Ibid.). Moreover, the morality range of people can be examined through three main points: “(1) what are their beliefs, (2) what they in practice praise or condemn or what kinds of acts they encourage or try to prevent, and (3) what reasons they offer to defend themselves of criticize others” (Gerard 2012 cited in Fox and Marco 2001:13). Given that test, it can be noted that people in their beliefs and actions are not always rational, furthermore, moral activities are reliant on how people conceive of them or on their perspectives. Also, “most people are honestly confused when it comes to issues of their beliefs as these issues are often seen as complex and it is easy to wander from one point to the next” (Gerard 2012: 35). For that reason, in conducting ethical analysis on media intrusion into private lives including information privacy invasions, Gauthier (2002) suggested three models explore questions of media morality. These models consist of the Kantian philosophy in respecting the persons, Utilitarian philosophy for comparison of the benefits and harms, along with the analysis of the transfer of power. In addition to the Priority Model of information privacy which has been suggested by the current study, these four models have been applied to news reporting that invades information privacy of ordinary people, celebrities and public figures in Kurdish media coverage.

In Kantian theories, the principle of respect for persons plays a significant role in analyzing the invasion of privacy: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (Kant 1785 and 1959: 47).
In comparison with objects, persons are moral agents, rational beings, and able to make choices according to reason. In Kant's analysis, persons have intrinsic value, unconditional worth; therefore, they must always be treated with respect and dignity as ends in themselves. As Gauthier (2002) suggested, individuals must avoid dealing with others in ways that force their own aims and objectives on others; alternatively when projects and actions of individuals include others, these choices must be respected. In this light, invading privacy of a person patronizes that person as a mere means via interfering with the choice to retain particular private information. In the case of invading information privacy, news media and journalists must answer the question of whether they are treating persons as a rational agent respectfully and with dignity, or as a thing or object to access particular goals such as informing the public and increasing circulation, profit or ratings, or winning notoriety for organizations and reporters. As Gauthier (2002) emphasized, one of the social functions of the news media is to inform the public and yet the principle of respect for persons has been violated as a price worth paying for providing that information to the public. That means persons have been treated as objects or things rather than as rational agents whose choices should be respected. Given that, in order to make reasonable decisions themselves, the public needs relevant and accurate information. Accordingly, judiciously applied privacy invasion may be needful for the sake of allowing others access to information necessary for making this possible.

In the *Utilitarian* model, a similar comparison or weighing of competing claims, of benefits and harms, is involved in analyzing invasions of privacy by news media and journalists. Within this model, identifying whether a journalist’s action is morally wrong or right, for all concerned an action's potential benefits and harms must be determined and compared fairly. This means that the action of journalists is morally right if the anticipated benefits outweigh the potential harms, moreover the journalists’ action is morally wrong if the potential harms outweigh the expected benefits. Here, the main risk may have emerged from the desire to concentrate on the number of benefits and harms or the number of people who will be benefited or harmed. In the *Utilitarian* analysis, either hypothesis will be a proper application. In assessing a certain case of privacy invasion, the *Utilitarian* model requires reporters and editors to compare their actions against a list relating to imagination or empathy to classify the potential harms and benefits of revealing information privacy.
This may be a helpful exercise for editors and reporters who value their own and the public’s right to know over any considerations of personal privacy of individuals. As practiced, the loss of the support of family, colleagues, friends, as well as loss of reputation, career, and emotional damage are classified as possible harms for the subject whose privacy is violated. While violation of privacy in individual cases may be morally acceptable, others involved in these actions may be harmed by their close relationship with the person in question. For the news organization, editor and reporter it may be possible that harms come in the form of loss of the trust of their audience, future sources, reputation or the respect of their peers and counterparts in the news industry, and also legal consequences may ensue. Also, an argument could be produced that media invasions of privacy degrade the public discourse in a way which is harmful to the whole society (Gauthier 2002). Otherwise, it may be seen that commercial profits and increased market share are the potential benefits for the news organization, and an earning in reputation, promotions, and prizes for the reporters involved. For the public, receiving substantial information to enable choice, including how to vote, whom to trust and support, how to spend one’s time and money, or to motivate necessary social change are the expected benefits. Within this evaluation, comparing the anticipated benefits and harms are problematic. Even for an independent observer whose own interests are not at stake, the weighing of competing interests and claims is complicated. Eventually, this type of comparison will be founded on the personal values of the individual reporters or editors, even though there are inevitably separate values among news people, as in wider society. As Gauthier (2002) argued, differences may arise from even the shared values of individuals, thus it follows that there will be differences in perceptions of morality over individual cases of privacy invasion via the media. For the promotion of the public good, the benefits to society may justify privacy invasion by the news media and journalists. Based on the Utilitarian model, privacy, rather than an absolute value, is a prima facie in consequence of competing values which may override privacy. This may apply, for example, in particular instances of supporting and protecting the democratic process, promoting public health and safety, and preventing deception or fraud.

Another ethical model that has been used to analyze the invasions of privacy by media and journalists is the Transfer of Power that “builds on the conception of personal privacy as our control over who has access to us and to information about us” (Gauthier 2002: 26).
As Boling (1996) found, privacy is viewed from certain perspectives, a form of power, therefore the theft of that power can be understood as the invasion of privacy. In this sense, the individual has been provided with a measure of power against the rest of the world, other members of the community and the government. This “provides a way to protect ourselves from others and especially from more powerful institutions, groups, and individuals and, when respected, it gives us an entitlement to that protection … Privacy, understood in this way, serves as a valuable counterweight to the power of others” (Ibid.). Thus, the significant value of privacy is that it allows individuals to be social beings and ultimately moral persons (Plaisance 2009). When privacy of individuals is violated, they lose the protection that privacy offers and allows others access to power over them; for example, during an invasion of privacy, the news organization, editors, and reporters are using investigative activities for obtaining power from the subject of the information. In this case, the news media organizations and journalists have the power to reveal private information or not, to destroy reputations, relationships, and lives or not. Reporting once-private information also provides a type of power for the public over the target of such reports; the public access the power to debate, judge, punish, or support the individuals and their relationships, actions, and words. In these circumstances, “the protection against the world that privacy, conceived as power, has given the individual is reduced or may be lost altogether.” (Gauthier 2002: 26.).

On this model, cases of privacy invasion can be understood as the theft of power from the target of the news report and an illegal transfer of this power to the public. In justifying invasions of the privacy of political officials and candidates for public office, the most useful model is the Transfer of Power, since the power of the citizens, themselves, to control how and by whom they are governed is one of the defining characteristics of a democratic society. For that reason, the primary step for the exercise of this power is to access information on those who are serving or seeking to serve in positions of government. Accordingly, with this information, the transfer of the power passes to those who must decide whom to vote for and whom to defend on a basis of moral justification. This will be based on the quality of the singular private information and the part it plays in the democratic process “as compared with the loss of control over that information for the person whose privacy has been violated” (Gauthier 2002: 27).
Behind these three ethical models, the current study has suggested a *Priority Model* that can be further applicable to examine competing claims when overcoming the barriers between the journalists, their news organizations and the public when they make a decision on revealing information privacy within journalism daily practices. In this model, there are many types of barriers, including internal and external strategies. Through employing the following matrix, the news organizations and their media workers can classify their barriers, whether real and perceived, then formulate an action plan. In other words, to help provide a clear focus in the writing of objectives, the acronym SMARTer can be used. This acronym consists of seven concepts, such as *Specific*: having unquestionable and specific goals; *Measured*: the journalists need to ask if items of information can be measured; *Achievable*: are the goals journalists set attainable and achievable?; *Realistic*: that the journalists can ask to what extent, or how the information or private information is realistic; *Timed*: which is it time-bound? or is there a set date by which the journalists will have achieved this goal?; *Engaging*: does this goal (such as covering and revealing information privacy) engage and excite you as a journalist or as a news organization?; *Rewarding*: do the journalists know what their reward will be if they achieve their goals? (see Vitae 2014: 11). As Figure 4.7 shows, there are various barriers to overcome in front of journalists and their news organizations to examine items of information privacy when revealed with different types of media coverage. These barriers can be divided once more into four main groups, as follows:

1. **ACT: barriers that are within journalists’ control and are important.**

   A common internal barrier for many people, including journalists, is procrastination, for example. The fact that it is internal suggests, however, that it is something people have control over, so can be placed in the 'ACT' box. Then brainstorm specific things you as a journalist can do to overcome it, for instance, setting SMARTer objectives and breaking them down into manageable chunks; arranging for a friend or relative to support you in sticking to your objectives etc.

2. **REFRAME: barriers that journalists cannot control and which are important.**

   The uninviting state of the job market is an example of an external barrier to gaining employment which falls into the 'REFRAME' box. Think about how you could view this barrier in a more positive and manageable light, instead of seeing it as a limiting factor. You could view it as a signal for the actions you need to take, for instance,
creating learning opportunities; developing new skills; making use of networking opportunities, and so on.

III. **CHOOSE: barriers that journalists can control are not important.**

Barriers which you as a journalist can control but which you might not perceive as particularly important belong in the 'CHOOSE' box: you can choose to take action on these if you want.

IV. **IGNORE: barriers that journalists cannot control and are not important.**

Barriers which are not particularly important and over which you as a journalist have little control should go in the 'IGNORE' box (see Vitae 2014: 48-49).

![Priority model of journalists' overcoming barriers to examine pieces of information privacy when revealing within journalism practices](image)

On the *Priority Model*, the news organizations and their media workers can learn how to evaluate their professional or even personal decisions regarding any process of private information which are not easy to reveal in their journalism practices within media daily coverage. It is increasingly difficult to ignore the ethical and legal standards in producing a professional media production, as journalism is a responsibility with high ethical dimensions which are more important to the profession and the wider society than the pursuit of sensationalism and market profits. As a final point, these ethical theories will be used to analysis the main invasion cases of information privacy in the Kurdish media coverages in different periods (see Chapter VI).
4.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has been concluded by critically debating the core concepts of professionalism and privacy, as they apply to journalism practices, which have not been intensively studied. This gap leads the current research project to focus on professional role orientations of journalists and the shifting boundaries of privacy understandings. While the right to be left alone has often been understood as a core concept of privacy, this study consistently has defined privacy as one of the universal human rights and a common component of professional ethics in journalism practices. In this context, privacy is a person’s personal information which he or she does not wish to reveal or be trespassed without prior permission or legal prosecutions. For similar reasons, invasion of information privacy has been raised as a global media matter ethically and legally. Meanwhile, journalists have been defended as abiding by their ethical principles, though they have also been criticized extensively for ignoring professional accountability to news report sources, readers, and employers as they consciously and unconsciously choose the pieces of private information to reveal. In particular, the journalists for whom there is a minimal level of awareness of privacy issues, going undercover, using long-lens cameras, eavesdropping, and publishing personal information without the source's permission are the main types of privacy invasion. In addition, the journalists who have made a distinction between ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures in disclosing their private information provide the justification that their actions may be for the purpose of saving lives, in the public interest and their belief that journalists are primarily accountable to themselves (see Gerard 2012 and Wilson, et al. 2011).

Within daily news reporting, journalists have been facing the dilemma of balancing political and civil liberties with the public's right to know, and the individual's right to information privacy, between freedom of speech and legally regulated speech on private life, and also between public and non-public figures. Such balance of justifications is more necessary to make a professional decision; to what extent does the disclosure of information privacy is necessary and for what reasons, while everyone personally and universally has a right to privacy or protection of private life, and also they have the same right to know information. This study confirms that a certain set of ideas and traditions, through the sentient and non-sentient performance of journalists, creates a particular culture of journalism that, in legitimating their function in society,
makes their performance meaningful for themselves and others. In other words, professional role orientations of journalists have been characterised by four core cultures of journalism, including Populist Disseminator, Detached Watchdog, Critical Change Agent, and Opportunist Facilitator. While these four cultures have been practiced amongst Western and non-Western media workers alike, any culture of journalism has many differences and similarities in the performance of journalists in professionally dealing with private information and also information privacy invasions based on the adopted political and media regulations of the country. In this case, professionalism produces a process of excusing an inherent inequality of power between the professional and the layperson. For that reason, via control over the recruitment, training, and performance of work an exclusive knowledge offers a power to its owners that means producing, disseminating and using knowledge will gain and keep that power. If being professional means having power because of gaining knowledge in a particular profession like journalism, this also can be true for those who have control over others’ information; notably accessing the private information of others means exercising power, and therefore journalists can consider themselves to have two powers; journalistic professionalism and information privacy. Accessing this power and gaining a reputation in society are core motivations for a great many people to become journalists, and also those who desire membership in a profession do so at least in part to justify imbalance of status and to limit access to that situation.

As a result of this, membership in a profession gives a suitable opportunity to easily access others and find his or her differences and similarities within such social groups. The essential roles of any particular professional work can be performed only by individuals who have the necessary training, judgment or talents, and also it is imperative that all parties clearly understand the distinction between the layperson and the practitioner who abides by the professional ethics in journalism. For some journalists, gathering and revealing information privacy are essential elements of the public's right to know which is in the public interest; this type of journalists will consciously use different methods of information gathering and will occasionally apply even unacceptable methods if the information is deemed newsworthy. Critically, while the public interest is seen as a controversial concept and too comprehensive, journalists have considered themselves as those who make a decision as to which private information is in the public interest and which is not.
Other journalists strongly believe that the private life of others is one of the taboos because everyone has a full right to privacy which should be respected and protected in any circumstance, even those who are in official positions or well-known public figures. These justifications have been criticized on the grounds that the accountability of parliamentarians and other powerful figures are not the same as the accountability of ordinary people. Between these two types of journalists, based on the social importance of the individual’s private information, some journalists make a decision to reveal some pieces of information very carefully. While other types of journalists like churnalists and paparazzi will film and reveal the sensitive and private information of celebrities and politician without abiding by any ethical principle.

Theoretically, these controversial debates will be useful in understanding the big picture of privacy invasion and journalistic professionalism in the post-conflict region of Iraqi Kurdistan during the transitional period, both politically and in terms of media infrastructure, from dictatorship to democracy. In this chapter, the Gramscian concept of hegemony has been used to read and understand the relationship between the differently positioned journalists who use their professional hegemony to invade the information privacy of various individuals and also the link between hegemonic struggles, political change, and cases of information privacy invasion. In this view, respecting the right to privacy has been changed by changing the cultural differences in journalism practices within politic and media systems. In Western and liberal democratic cultures, privacy has been defined as a universal human right, while it still does not make sense for many non-Western and undemocratic societies. The right to privacy has not been completely respected and protected by most Middle Eastern countries, while their political and media systems have been regulated by Islamic Sharia Law which has dominated most decisions and modes of individual behaviour, including the professional activities of media professionals. In the Islamic religion, the right to privacy (Haq al-khososyah) has been enforced through protecting the sanctity (or Hurma) and/or one’s (Awrah) of any given individual, which literally in Islam means the intimate parts of one’s body. These guidelines come from three central principles of hospitality, modesty, and privacy, which have an important influence on the design of Muslim homes, the design of space, and domestic actions inside each home. Since journalistic professionalism and privacy concepts have been inadequately debated and theorized in this post-conflict region, power relations have determined
journalistic practices in relation to privacy by dominant partisan power versus subordinated professionalism between ownerships of media and privacy. In this sense, the media organizations and media professionals have been dominated by the ruling classes or prominent political parties, and have in turn accessed and controlled information privacy held by the subordinated class. Occasionally, media communicators, including journalists, have been directed and used to silence opposition activities through gathering and revealing information about people's private lives in order to retain the status quo as acceptable and normal common sense.
After providing an extensive theoretical framework, this chapter will define quantitative and qualitative approaches to the presentation of research data as well as explaining the motivations for the methods adopted in examining the links between journalists’ professional role orientations and their understanding of information privacy invasions. A case study, an in-depth interview, and a questionnaire survey have been chosen to answer the significant research questions and hypothesis. The selected methods have been evaluated on the experience of fieldwork in the current case study of the Kurdistan Region. According to a random scheme, the selection of media organisations formulated media groups along two dimensions. Firstly, the group of media outlets and their distinct sublevels; secondly, the distinction between ownership of media outlets. Based on the political, economic and societal environment of the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish media outlets, and their properties have been divided into three main types:

1) **State or Governmental Media** representatives of the ruling parties of the Kurdistan Regional Government, such as Radio Newroz. This radio station and other governmental media have been closed down due to the financial crisis in 2016.

2) **Partisan Media** has an ideological agenda from the ruling and opposition parties. This type has divided into Official Media of a particular political party, such as the Xelbat (struggle), a daily KDP newspaper. This is in addition to non-Official Media indirectly affiliated with the ideological agenda of the political parties, such as the Rûdaw (event) Media Network, which is well-known as a Shadow Media (Mîdiyayi Siêber) of the KDP.

3) **Private Media** refers to non-governmental and non-partisan media, divided into two main types. The first one is known as Independent Media, which is financially supported by the private sector. Here, the editorial staff have more freedom to make decisions without political interference from the owners, the Haûlatî (citizen) daily newspaper for example, which has closed down due to the financial crisis.
Within the private media, the second type can be named the *Tycoon Media*, which is financially supported by different stakeholders and their business partners, including the Nalia Media Corporation (NMC).

Due to most research in media and communication studies requiring a correct sampling size for survey questionnaires, the current researcher chose a non-probability sampling for the research project without identifying whether the sample chosen was representative of the entire targeted population or not. There is a lack of official data on Kurdish journalists' numbers as a population, which causes problems in ascertaining a representative sampling size and type. Therefore, a simple random sampling was carried out on two levels: The first level entailed choosing most news organizations that broadcast and print in three major provinces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Sêmanî, Hewlêr (Erbil), and Dhok. The second level was to select Kurdish journalists in these news organizations from different levels of the editorial hierarchy, such as senior manager, junior manager, and non-management staff. Between 1st August and 19th September 2015, around 160 questionnaire forms were distributed amongst Kurdish journalists in the central headquarters across 29 news organizations. Of these, 142 valid responses from participants, including two freelancers, of the diverse age range, gender, professional experience, educational background, and politics, were received. It is not always easy to identify professional journalists in the Kurdistan Region because of transitions from dictatorship to democratic systems of politics and media. Several individuals consider themselves journalists while they are really working as other types of communication professionals in the media environment. Still, the media environment and its news workers have been used as a propaganda tool of the competing Kurdish political ideologies. This situation has been represented by the responses to the survey questionnaires. In addition to the participants regularly working for the various newspapers, radio, television, and Web journalism networks including news sites and news agencies are also represented. The current study has used the term “Web journalism” to mean “networked digital media” (Meikle and Young 2012: 3), using “multiple media platforms” (Jenkins 2008: 3) or “multimedia journalism” (Deuze 2004: 140) in “convergent journalism practices” (Grant and Wilkinson 2009: 8). In the present questionnaire, all participants are asked the same questions about journalism culture dimensions, and shifting boundaries of privacy understanding.
Based on their editorial policies and political backgrounds, the journalists, including communication professionals and news media workers, along with their news media organizations, have affiliated with various media owners, such as governmental, partisan (official and unofficial), private media, which means those media outlets have been described in Kurdish literature as non-governmental and non-partisan media. Within these classifications, the selected news organizations were divided into five different media outlets: daily newspapers; general interest weeklies, which can be weekly newspapers or magazines embracing a broad range of topics; television, radio stations, and Web journalism networks. In comparison with the work of Relly et al. (2015) who used the hierarchy-of-influences model to look at determinants, the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists in Iraq were principally supportive of the current research project, in particular with regard to retesting professional role perceptions about information privacy invasions. In addition to methodology materials including the formulation of a questionnaire survey, the research approaches used by Relly et al. (2015) led to valuable and clear directions for the current study. Given that, the introductory section begins by laying out the theoretical paradigm of designing the research and methodology materials in media studies. Subsequently, the integrity and ethical requirements will be explained.

5.2. RESEARCH THEORETICAL PARADIGM

Bryman (2008) observed that the primary challenges for researchers are to determine the association between types of research that might be applied to their study and the objectives of their data collection, whether it is to examine an existing theory or to generate a new one. Induction and deduction are two basic kinds of research theories (see Figure 5.1). According to Trochim (2006), if the researcher is interested in building a new theory, an induction or "bottom-up" method would be used owing to its logic of working from particular observations to wider theories and generalizations. Within induction theory, the researcher recognizes a phenomenon, produces tentative hypotheses, achieves data collection and analysis regarding these phenomena, displays their results or patterns, and lastly makes observations obtained by building the research theory. In contrast, if the researcher is interested in testing an existing theory, a deduction or 'top-down' approach would be used due to its logic of moving parts.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: Data Collection Methods

from the broader observations to the more particular theory. To do so, the researcher endeavors to shape several hypotheses about this theory. In addition to showing the data collection and providing the results of their observation, in the end, they make a decision whether to reject or confirm these research theories (Bryman 2008 and Trochim 2006). Consequently, a theoretical deductive paradigm, which is more prevalent in social and media studies (Al-Amri 2012 and Ponterotto 2005), is a proper model to examine the current research project.

In this study, a research paradigm begins by building a deduction theory, through evaluating the literature review of the shifting boundaries of privacy concepts and how they affect the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists. Later, several hypotheses are developed and tested with the intention of rejecting or confirming each of the relations inside the standard research paradigm (Bryman 2008). Deductive theory in this study builds on hypotheses regarding relations between variables of the global dimensions of journalism cultures and the shifting boundaries of privacy understanding, with the aim of illustrating the current situation. For theoretical and practical implications, it can be said that the existing literature on the shifting boundaries of privacy and dimensions of journalism culture is theoretically and empirically underdeveloped. In addition, the nature of the journalists' professional ideology and the consequences of their professional role orientations for our understanding of information privacy invasions is becoming increasingly politicised. The growing field of media studies has identified the concepts of professionalism and
privacy in journalism practices, which are characterised by processes of political de-Westernisation and the politicisation of professional identities that have significant consequences for our understanding of media violations content. Subsequently, another suggestion will be explored by integrating insights from contemporary privacy studies with their roots in cultural, political and media studies along with existing theories. Therefore, it is possible to elaborate upon an appropriate theory of privacy. In this sense, the research problems can be seen as similar to a group of hypotheses or theories, “in contrast to scientific hypotheses, which are pitted against direct observational evidence, the research questions of content analysis must be answered through inferences drawn from texts” (Krippendorff 2004: 31). Thus, the questions offer a clear statement of what it is the scholar wants to know about (Bryman 2012), and so, the current study seeks to answer the following research hypotheses or theories:

I. Is there a relationship between the professional experience of Kurdish journalists and their understanding of privacy concepts?

II. To what extent does a relationship exist between the institutional roles and ethical ideologies of Kurdish journalism cultures and the common forms of privacy invasion?

III. Is there a relationship between the professional activities in Kurdish journalism (information gathering and investigation, news production, presenting news or design, editorial coordination or management) and their personal factors to become a journalist?

IV. What are the motivations that influence Kurdish journalists’ decision-making when they encounter privacy issues?

V. Has professional experience and editorial autonomy caused Kurdish journalists to embrace an interventionist role?

When testing these hypotheses, evidence will be sought to show whether these relationships actually exist. Thus, these hypotheses will help to determine an accurate representation of reality (Oates 2005). In respect to the purpose of research data collection, some scholars refer to the necessity of a focus on the philosophical paradigm about the nature of research reality and forms of knowledge.
Amongst these scholars, Guba and Lincoln (1992) noted that the logical model is a chain of beliefs, which produces a picture of the world nature, the entities inside it and their potential associations with the world. In this sense, the resulting investigation of the research design has required ontological and epistemological questions and the methodological questions. Each of these questions creates possibilities for the researcher to make the chosen topic clearer and easier to investigate. As Al-Amri (2012) examined the ontological considerations that help social researchers to respond to an essential issue concerning whether they should study social phenomena taking into account a social actor’s role. On the other hand, For Stahl (2007), the epistemological question related to “the principle of knowledge” entails considerations of what is acceptable as knowledge in a particular discipline. The nature of researchers’ relationship with the objective of data collection has been identified, in addition to the interpretive and positivist positions linking the epistemological question. Interpretive researchers have been recommended to think about the differences between the objects of the natural sciences and people, in any method employed within natural science to examine the reality of social behaviors. For instance, the linkage between media researchers and their objects of data collection on privacy ethics or professional behavior as part of the social sciences is quite different to the same objects of other researchers in such disciplines as medical science or criminology. In this case, social researchers including media scholars are more likely to raise epistemological questions, and they also are more likely to take positivist and interpretive positions. However, positivist researchers believe that knowledge is achieved purely from empirical facts collection; in addition, the methods of natural science have also been adopted in studying social sciences (Al-Amri 2012; Denscombe 2010 and Bryman 2008).

In this research project, via studying the empirical facts group of privacy concepts and global journalism cultures, a purely knowledge-based set of results can be realized, and that is the significance of interpretive and positivist positions. For that reason, this study has focused on the professional role orientations of the Kurdish journalists in relation to their perceptions on information privacy invasions. It aims to understand what are viewed by Kurdish journalists as acceptable and justifiable methods to gather private information in order to explain how and why journalists justify it. Furthermore, to what extent has the intrusion into private life within the boundaries of invasion of privacy been covered in the professional training of journalists.
This is followed by obtaining and analyzing empirical data regarding the internal and external influences of news workers. To specify, several statements to do with journalists’ perception of privacy variables and ranking the satisfaction levels of journalists have been detailed. Afterward, some statistical associations amongst the variables of journalism culture dimensions and the shifting boundaries of privacy understanding have been focused upon, along with “the way of obtaining the knowledge” as the methodological question (Stahl 2007: 118). As a result, the ontological and epistemological positions of the researchers have been required to develop an understanding of how they are working to discover the answers to that which they are seeking to investigate. According to Al-Amri (2012), the positivist position in considerations of epistemological study is connected to numerous methods of structured interviews, questionnaire surveys and experiments in which all research data collected is quantifiable and countable. Consequently, the positivist paradigm can be chosen as a fitting model for this study, due to the struggles of the positivist researcher to test a theory for increasing the predictive perception of phenomena. Nonetheless, the considerations of critical study particularly corresponded with other methods, of a case study, and of unstructured and semi-structured interviews. These, in addition to the observations available from the quantitative research data collected, offer rich perspectives for researchers into the investigation area (Al-Amri 2012; Denscombe 2010; Howley 2007 and Oates 2005).

5.2.1. Methodology In Media Studies

To date, various techniques have been applied in media studies to gauge qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and a large number of scholars have measured these approaches in studying different fields (Syan 2015; Jamal 2013 and Al-Amri 2012). For instance, the classification and measurement requirements of quantitative research, in which the procedures of study are more organized, inflexible, predetermined and stable in their usage to confirm truthfulness in classification and measurement (Kumar 2011). By applying different quantitative and qualitative techniques, several similarities and differences can be determined. Quantitative and qualitative techniques are similarly interested in reduction of data and they are both concerned with replies to research questions. Both types of research methodology treat frequency of response as a springboard for analysis.
Both quantitative and qualitative research seek to ensure that deliberate distortion does not occur. Furthermore, each research type argues for the significance of transparency, in addressing the question of possible error. Finally, research methods should be appropriate to the research questions (Bryman 2012). Otherwise, there are several differences between each type of research procedures, as explained in the table below.

| Table 5-1: Some common contrasts between quantitative and qualitative research |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Numbers                         | Words           |
| Point of views of researcher     | Point of view of participations |
| Researcher distant               | Researcher close |
| Theory testing                   | Theory emergent |
| Static                           | Process         |
| Structured                       | Unstructured    |
| Generalization                   | Contextual understanding |
| Hard, reliable data              | Rich, deep data |
| Macro                            | Micro           |
| Behaviour                        | Meaning         |
| Artificial settings              | Natural settings |

Source: Bryman (2012: 408)

Within the above table, there are many differences and similarities between quantitative and qualitative research approaches, as a result of this, researchers have been required to define a particular research design to clarify their methodological approaches to data gathering. Bryman (2012 and 2008) determined the structure of data collection and analysis as the research design that builds on the relationship between variables of the study. It aims to explain social behaviors and their application in a social context, which allows the researcher to theorize their results to encompass a larger number of individuals. A data collection procedure indicates the application of a particular tool described as a research methodology. For instance, observations, interviews, and survey questionnaires are all forms of data collection from the participants or topic of the research (Bryman 2008).

In this section, the structure of qualitative and quantitative strategies of data collection and data analysis has been designed to arrive at the most effective methods for the aim, objectives, questions, and the hypothesis of the current research project.
5.2.2. Qualitative Methods in Research Data Collection

In this study, the qualitative research method has been described as “an approach to empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their content of the communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification” (Mayring 2000: 2). This definition means that the qualitative research strategy is answering the question of why a phenomenon is occurring and is frequently based on words instead of numbers in each stage of data collection and data analysis. It represents the inductive theory of the association between the theory of the study and the aims and objectives of data collection. Accordingly, interpretivism is the philosophical paradigm (Bryman 2012 and Al-Amri 2012). These features lead to several possible procedures for qualitative data collection, for example, participant-observation or ethnography; focus groups; qualitative interviewing, and language-based approaches to the collection of qualitative data, such as conversation analysis and discourse analysis along with the qualitative content analysis of documents and texts. However, “qualitative research does not lend itself to the delineation of a clear set of linear steps. It tends to be a more open-ended research strategy than is typically the case with quantitative research” (Bryman 2012: 412). Therefore, the current research project has chosen a case study, in-depth interviews and a questionnaire survey to answer the research questions and its aims.

Within those procedures, a variety of devices are used, each of them having benefits and drawbacks. One of the main advantages is that the researcher has an excellent opportunity for understanding in depth the phenomenon under investigation, in particular, arguably if the key issue of study is new or does not have a prior body of research. Afterward, the flexibility of these methods can allow the researcher to explore areas that would be denied them by the constraints of quantitative research. Conversely, the limited size of a sample is one of the main disadvantages of qualitative methods, which is frequently the initial phase for further study rather than the last step of an investigation. For Wimmer and Dominick (2011), qualitative research in some ways is too subjective and has tendencies towards generalization, lacking transparency, and also it is hard to replicate. While “in qualitative research, a theory is supposed to be an outcome of an investigation rather than something that precedes it” (Bryman 2012: 380-406).
In this study, intrusion into private life within invasion of privacy rights has become a controversial matter for individual civil liberties, especially in the age of new digital media. This issue is an increasingly important area in the application of media laws, regulations and professional ethics in convergent journalism practices. To examine this problem in the case study of the Kurdistan Region, both quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches have been used. The case study adopts the qualitative research strategy that consists of several methods of in-depth semi-structured interviews and participant-observation (Gable 1994). Furthermore, this study uses in-depth semi-structured interviews with a diverse range of respondents, divided into several groups of academics or experts, managers, owners, politicians, activists, and victims of privacy invasion. These extensive interviews are related to the current role of Kurdish media and political systems along with understanding the shifting boundaries of privacy and its invasion in the context of culture, politics, and legislation.

5.2.2.1. A case study

It was considered that the quantitative measures would usefully supplement and extend the qualitative analysis. Diverse scholars within media and communication research have analyzed case studies in a variety of ways (Syan 2015; Mawlood 2011 and Yin 2009). The importance of this case study lies in its delineation of emergent ethical and legal problems in newly democracies and post-conflict societies, surrounding the issue of media intrusion into the private life of celebrities, public figures and ordinary people who have no official accountabilities. According to Denscombe (2003), the case study emphasizes, in a few cases or merely one instance, a particular phenomenon to (or “intending to”) offer an in-depth account of relationships, events, experiences or procedures happening in a particular case. Moreover, there are several approaches to conducting the current case study: to focus on theories of privacy; the essential features of Kurdish journalism cultures, and the current role of media policy and regulation in the Kurdistan Region. For that reason, the British Leveson inquiry has been chosen as a means of application to reading and understanding the culture, practices, and ethics of Kurdish media productions. Based on the research questions and hypothesis, the current researcher interviewed some of those acting as decision-makers in the political and media arenas or working in areas of media expertise directly affected by the socio-political and legislative context of this research.
In other words, the perceptions of these knowledgeable interviewees can make significant contributions (Yin 2009). Besides, this study has used multiple primary and secondary sources of data collection to enhance the reliability of the evidence in the case study. Four varieties of data sources have been identified: interviews; field-notes; audio-tapes of naturally occurring conversation, and visual images (Silverman 2013). As Yin (2009) found, there are six primary classes of evidence that can be classified into interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, physical artefacts, archival records, and documentation. Accordingly, it was decided that the best method to adopt for current research data collection was to focus on the Leveson inquiry regarding the phone hacking scandal in Britain. It would be used to read and understand issues related to the invasion of privacy raised by the relationship between media regulations and journalist practices in developed and developing democracies. This instance might be used to provide a counterpoint or a base when analyzing the important cases of privacy invasion in the Kurdistan Region. As a result, the case study is valuable in offering testimony and evidence from a multiplicity of viewpoints to produce or test certain theories (Bloor and Wood 2006). Indeed, one of the main advantages of using diverse data sources is afforded by the comparison between the similarities and differences of the Leveson inquiry into privacy invasion in the United Kingdom, and those that have taken place in the Kurdistan Region. In addition to the researcher’s background as a Kurdish native speaker and media practitioner, in the context being studied this will enhance his ability to obtain accurate information and access to individuals that would mostly be inaccessible to the researcher from outside this situation (Mawlood 2011: 133). Later, the legislations of the Kurdistan Region have been compared with special laws of privacy in diverse countries. What is more, the contrast between the protection of the right to privacy in Western and non-Western journalism cultures respectively will be presented in a series of direct comparisons. In this context, the regular reports of Privacy International, which is committed to fighting for the right to privacy across the world, will be helpful.

5.2.2.2. In-depth Interviews

The conducting of interviews is a major area of interest for qualitative researchers, who begin reading texts with the objective of identifying a research problem, "not for what an author may lead them to think or what they say on the abstract" (Krippendorff 2004: 32).
Bryman (2012) classified interviewing into twelve broad types, namely: the structured interview; standardized interview; semi-structured interview; unstructured interview; intensive interview; qualitative interview; in-depth interview; focused interview; focus group; group interview; oral history interview, and life history interview. Accordingly, the in-depth interview, that consists of two basic kinds of qualitative questioning (the unstructured and the semi-structured interview) has been used in the current research project (Bryman 2012). In the same way, other scholars describe six key types of qualitative research interviews, comprising collaborative, intensive, ethnographic, unstructured, semi-structured and in-depth interviews (Lindlof and Taylor 2002).

From these interview types, the current research project has formulated the conduct of the most accessible and flexible qualitative approach, in this context, of the semi-structured in-depth interview, which has some attractive features. One of the main benefits is that the researchers are enabled to record the conversations, which can be transformed into transcripts, and then analyzed in detail, which leads to the accessing of data that scholars cannot obtain just by monitoring. To illustrate this point, these qualitative data collection methods were ideal for investigating privacy concepts in Kurdish journalism practices. In this case, the interviewers and their interviewee have an excellent opportunity to better understand a particular topic through the practice of open-end questions and responses. Through such methods, “the transcription of interviews, and the analysis of transcripts is all very time-consuming, but they can be more readily accommodated into researcher's personal lives” (Bryman 2012: 469).

The personal and professional backgrounds of the current researcher have progressed due to getting more interviewing experiences and participating in an academic area. However, the journalistic background of the current researcher was helpful to clearly and simply producing the research questions, finding interviewees, getting their prior permission, and also conducting the semi-structured in-depth interviews with each of them. In this study, in-depth interviews were not just conducted with news media workers and communication professionals who share their professional relations and purposes with the ruling and opposition political parties. In addition to an extensive range of journalists, commentators, and academics have been interviewed. They total 15 people who have varied backgrounds of gender, age, education, political, profession, experiences (see Appendix II).
In addition to places of the interview such as work office or homes, silent or noise-free public spaces like libraries and cafes were also conducive to the audio recording. In the beginning, in-depth questions for the interviewee groups were designed (see Table 5.2). Later, after discussing my current research topic and its objectives along with getting interviewing permission, the participants were talking regarding the current situation in the broad contexts of privacy concepts, and professionalism in Kurdish media developments within the latest cultural, political and economic crisis in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The formulation of the semi-structured, in-depth interview was finally decided after doing pilot interviews in Slêmanî, the second largest city in the Kurdistan Region. To discover the main research questions, the researcher was interviewed face-to-face using a digital recorder due to having gathered useful data from selected groups of the interviewee as the primary sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-2: Interviewee groups of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Names of interviewee groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists and commentators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, experts, and activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of privacy invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other cases, those people who were not reached directly or did not desire to respond to questions face-to-face were interviewed by email, because “you may get a better response if you presume that people will agree to be interviewed rather than refusing” (Bryman 2012: 217). Email interviews are less favorably considered due to the fact that the interviewee may or may not respond themselves or use secondary sources to answer the research questions, but sometimes researchers have to carry out an email interview against their will based on the interviewee’s preferences. This is true in the cases of media violations and other sensitive topics, such as victims of rape and targets of information privacy invasions. As a result, the questions comprising the in-depth interviews were categorized into four primary units (see Appendix I).

I. **Interviewee background**: This provides the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, which was an encouraging stage for the researcher in asking difficult and sensitive questions step by step. Meanwhile, it was helpful in building a friendly relationship with the interviewee in order to facilitate better
discussion of the detailed reasons underlying the issues concerned. In this case, prior knowledge of interviewees’ political affiliations helped the researcher to find the similarities and differences amongst their diverse perceptions.

II. **Shifting boundaries of privacy**: These involve different perceptions on the privacy concepts and commonly occurring kinds of information privacy invasion in the Kurdish culture. This unit was focused on privacy understanding in Kurdish journalism practices, in which the gathering of private information, the decisions made by news workers in reporting such information, and to what extent this is justifiable, were all discussed. This stage could be useful for comparing the differences and similarities in the perception of basic themes by interviewee group, in terms of differing positions of responsibility and professional experience.

III. **Media content regulation**: This includes the legal mechanisms for privacy victims to protect their private life within the current media content regulations and legislation of the Kurdistan Region. This unit considered prominent cases of privacy invasion in Kurdish journalism practice, and the motivations prompting journalists to uncover private information, in particular during the general election campaigns and political crisis. It could be helpful to discover the relationship between common types of privacy invasion and the major types of partisan media. The aim was to examine whether, and how, victims of privacy use legal procedures to protect their private life. Finally, after qualitative data collection from the 15 semi-structured in-depth interviews, the data collected was transcribed and translated from Kurdish into the English language. Subsequently, the data has been analyzed based on the central research questions and hypothesis.

IV. **Kurdish media developments**: This area covers the depth of understanding of issues related to professionalism in Kurdish journalism cultures by interviewing people who were practicing in or managing different types of printing, broadcasting, and convergence media networks. In addition, they were politically and financially distributed amongst three governmental, partisan, and private media ownerships. In this sense, the main goal was finding differences and
similarities in viewpoint between interviewee groups in each type of media outlet. This stage was helpful in learning which type of Kurdish media has hegemonic ideological power in the wider society.

5.2.3. Quantitative Methods in Research Data Collection

According to Al-Amri (2012), the quantitative research method is useful for testing a research theory and understanding a particular phenomenon. It represents a deductive theory of the association between theory and research in which positivism is the philosophical paradigm. In this context, the quantitative research strategy works on answering the fundamental question of what is happening in the quantification of research data collection and analysis (Al-Amri 2012 and Bryman 2008). The quantitative method builds on numbers, charts or graphs, tables or statistics and attempts to “measure” some phenomenon and create “hard data” from the research results. While the quantitative methods are often used for product analysis, it is also frequently applied “to measure how many people feel, think or act in a particular way” (Rayner et al. 2002: 273). In this sense, the terms “populations”, “variables”, and “results” have been employed by data analysts as substitutions in the vocabulary (Bogdan and Biklen 2007). For instance, the structured interview and questionnaire survey have been described as fundamental quantitative data collection and analysis approaches (Gable 1994). As such, this study has used a questionnaire survey with Kurdish news media workers who are living and working in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

5.2.3.1. A survey questionnaire

As a quantitative and statistical methodology, a survey questionnaire examines the content of a message from similar questions that have been asked by a particular researcher to collect the answers from a sample of research participants. For that reason, the researcher has been required to develop a chain of questions based on the targeted literature review, then designed a survey questionnaire best fitted to gather the data. In other words, research results are illustrated through the questions asked of a high number of participants concerning their feelings, behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions (Oates 2005; Fink and Kosecoff 1985).
Accordingly, Denscombe (2010) classified a research survey into four main methods of data collection analysis: documents; observation; structured interviews, and questionnaires. In addition, determining and producing of public relations from a research sample of participants have been defined as one of the primary objectives of each quantitative research survey. As Denscombe (2010) examined that the survey questionnaires are used to provide a generalized understanding of the phenomena studied, therefore the current research adopts a questionnaire form of the survey to discover new variables of socio-demographic backgrounds, perceptions, motivations and attitudes of Kurdish journalists in understanding privacy boundaries (see Appendix IV). This is in addition to investigating the interventionist role of journalists in the private lives of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures. In these ways, conducting a quantitative research method of survey is a useful means of obtaining standardized data collected from several respondents. This approach, in the words of Wimmer and Dominick (2006), allows the researchers to receive an amount of data from a variety of individuals. Vaus (2002) asserted that survey questionnaires are well adapted to producing particular types of genuine and accurate information. For these reasons, the current research project has used the survey questionnaire as a quantitative method in gathering the data on privacy concepts and professional role orientations amongst Kurdish journalism cultures.

**A. Sampling Chosen of Survey Questionnaire**

The three major systematic processes of the media (population) and amounts of sampling were demarcated by Berelson (1952) as a selection of media or titles; the sampling of issues or dates, and the sampling of relevant content. In this context, there are several forms of probability in sampling size, as an instrument to minimize the risk of bias in the sample selection. For instance, the simple random sample, systematic sample, stratified random sampling, and multi-stage cluster sampling are all possible examples. In this case, the researcher has attempted to select the sample in which the participants may be representative of the entire targeted population. Also, there is a significant number of non-probability sampling techniques, such as convenience sampling, snowball sampling, or sampling size by quota.
For immediate purposes, the researcher chose a non-probability sampling for the current research project without identifying whether the sample chosen was representative of the entire targeted population or not (Bryman 2012). Table 5.3 displays the process of the population size and amounts of sampling in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of News-organization</th>
<th>Provinces of news worker</th>
<th>Types of media ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State or Government media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily newspaper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General interest weekly (magazine/newspaper)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>3(9)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web journalism networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slémanî</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlêr (Erbil)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 (142) including 2 Freelance rs</td>
<td>4(10)</td>
<td>18(86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in parentheses represent the total subsample of working journalists in the respective media category.
B. Designing a Survey Questionnaire

As Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) observed, the survey questionnaire form should be designed by reviewing previous studies and restructuring different units of new targeted study within a particular format of data collection. Questions on the survey questionnaires were frequently improved following the guidelines for survey research produced by Wimmer and Dominick (2006). According to Lewis (2004), any academic research contributes a similar modification of questions by directly discussing the concern with methods and norms. As aforementioned, the current study built on the works of Hanitzsch and coworkers (2016 and 2011); Al-Amri (2012); Gerard (2012) and Morrison et al. (2011 and 2007). As a result of this, the final version of the current research survey has been redesigned by embracing four key units as follows:

I. **Personal background of the participants:** In the first unit of the present questionnaire survey results, the socio-demographic characteristics of gender, age, academic level, employment terms, and the monthly salary of the Kurdish journalists in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have been specified.

II. **Shifting boundaries of privacy:** In the second unit of the questionnaire survey results, the Kurdish journalists have indicated the shifting boundaries of privacy understanding including concepts of public interest, privacy, and common forms of privacy invasion in Kurdish culture. Moreover, prevalent types of intrusion into private life, aspects of privacy or information privacy that can be reported by the Kurdish journalists have also been indicated. Likewise, motivations driving news media workers to reveal information about private life, styles of journalism in disclosing private information, and the professional accountability of journalists in announcing and publishing private information are also covered.

III. **Professional role orientations amongst journalism cultures:** This unit was redesigned on the lines of the works of Hanitzsch and colleagues (2016-2007). Empirically, four professional milieus amongst global journalism cultures which have been classified as *Populist Disseminator, Detached Watchdog, Critical Change Agent, and Opportunist Facilitator* have been identified by subjecting the survey answers of the journalists to cluster analysis. In this sense, the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists were measured. Besides, all scores were standardized for removing acquiescence bias, which can be a negative
influence on several statistical analyses. To discover the optimal number of clusters, the hierarchical cluster analysis was used as the first step. As a result of this, to yield the best outcomes a four-cluster solution was selected. The measurements were divided into seven dimensions, each of which describes unique functions of Kurdish journalism cultures by examining aspects of professionalism amongst news workers. Here, the aim is to define to what extent these aspects matter in journalists’ work. The Kurdish journalists have been surveyed based on their institutional roles, epistemological orientation, ethical ideologies, professional autonomy, internal and external influences on news work, trust levels in many institutions, along with the changes in Kurdish journalism more generally.

IV. **Professional background of the participants:** This unit covers the vocational characteristics of the Kurdish journalists including media outlets, media ownerships, professional positions, and professional experience. Then, journalism definitions, journalistic training, news item productions, employment terms, employment hours, monthly salaries, other paid jobs besides journalism, and miscellaneous professional activities are also taken into account. In addition, what motivated individual respondents to become journalists was also considered. Along with the essential and justifiable methods used by journalists in gathering information, and attitudes of journalists to their professional work, the challenges faced by news media workers are also covered. Finally, understanding media content regulations, trust levels of official organizations, and the position of Kurdish journalism in a state of change in the Kurdistan Region are discussed.

C. **Coding Schedule a Survey Questionnaire**

A central step in the progression of undertaking a content analysis is coding, which includes a two-core coding scheme; designing a coding schedule, and designing a coding manual. With regard to this study, the researcher has built both a coding structure and a reliability test. If the researcher’s measures are not reliable, that can invalidate the whole process (Bryman 2012). These procedures are useful for easier examination and judgment on gained data, and also for gathering the key features of coding inside the groups. This process is significant to confirm that the starter of coding is not difficult to do.
In quantitative research, categorizing and coding data collection is one of the key procedures in quantifying the frequency of specific communication responses, particularly when a proper sampling size has been achieved and all questionnaire survey forms have been completed (Frey, Botan, and Kreps 2000). The analysis of statistical data entails the use of not only gathering and collating statistical facts, but also the method of thinking about them: “Going beyond the data, making inferences and drawing conclusions with greater or lesser degrees of certainty in an orderly and consistent manner is the aim of modern applied statistics” (Cowls1980: 6). This quantitative process is normally complemented by qualitative research methods. To do so, the researchers have started by explaining what the data means to them, this answer means that the data in quantitative research allows them to analyze the procedures of data associated precisely with implementing the analysis of statistical data. All studies characterized as using some constructing procedure of coding schedule were included (Hansen, et al. 1998). This transparency leads to the use of content analysis as an objective approach to the investigation of media texts. However, practically to design coding manuals which do not need approximate clarification on the part of coders is difficult (Bryman 2012). Following the data collection from a questionnaire survey, the collected data were entered directly into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. After data cleaning, the data was transported into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-Version 21.0), which is a software program for statistical analysis. Within this program, the process of descriptive statistics, including numbers, percentage, mean and standard deviation, was conducted for all variables. Analytical statistics were utilized to find the relations between variables by using Crosstabs Chi-square, T-test, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). In this context, a p-value < 0.05 was considered as a significant association between variables. As Bryman (2012) has shown, there are four primary variables: interval or ratio; ordinal; nominal, and the dichotomous. In this study, the nature of the data is nominal variables, which are identified as categorical variables that comprise categories which cannot be rank ordered (Bryman 2012).

D. Reliability and Validity of a Survey Questionnaire
In the scholarly literature, reliability and validity are being checked as the different measures which mean that it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the consistency of a gauge of a given concept. The gauge of validity comes from the problem of whether an indicator or set of indicators designed to measure a notion, really measures that notion.
Reliability is principally concerned with difficulties of measures unity that are divided into three main purposes: a) Stability; b) Internal reliability; and c) Inter-observer consistency when making allowances to confirm the reliability of a measure (Bryman 2012). Reliability is mostly about matchmaking between the intra-coder reliability, which refers to the work of all coders, and the inter-coder reliability, which is matchmaking of diverse people doing the coding (Hansen et al., 1998). In the current survey questionnaires, the internal reliability of a questionnaire survey was conducted by using Cronbach's alpha to test ten pilot questions before the analyzing question to start data collection that was valued at 0.711. The key issue in the internal reliability “is whether the indicators that make up the scale or index are consistent in other words, whether respondents’ scores on any one indicator tend to be related to their scores on the other indicators” (Bryman 2012: 168-171). With regard to the current study, testing ten pilot questions of the survey before analyzing questions to begin gathering the data helped the current researcher to confirm the reliability of the survey questions. Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) confirmed that the final draft of a survey questionnaire was carefully revised and edited. This process was conducted for the current survey in January and July 2015 in the cities of Nottingham and Siêmanî. In this case, the suggestions and recommendations of the supervisory team of the study, along with other academic experts at the British and Kurdish Universities, as well as the participants, were useful to produce a final draft of the survey questionnaires.

As Table 5.4 revealed, the universities name, academic levels, and the name of the academic experts' group to evaluate and develop the various versions of the current survey questionnaires. As a result of this, the reliability and validity measures checking looks suitable as the phenomena focuses on the professional role perceptions of the journalists from the various news organizations. This stage could produce a generalization about other reporters and news organizations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Furthermore, the research sampling size is valid, and applicable during the period of 1st August and 19th September 2015. Finally, the View Pioneer, as a Kurdish company for development based in Siêmanî, assisted the current researcher to enter the obtained data and analyze the resulting statistics.
### Table 5-4: Academician judges group on a survey questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>University of</th>
<th>Academic level</th>
<th>Expert in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Colin Alexander</td>
<td>Nottingham Trent</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Political communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lloyd Pettiford</td>
<td>Nottingham Trent</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sabîr Bokanî</td>
<td>Slêmanî</td>
<td>Assistant professor</td>
<td>Media psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Êheib Kerkukî</td>
<td>Salahaddin</td>
<td>Assistant professor</td>
<td>Radio and Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Nezaket Êhemêsên</td>
<td>Slêmanî</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Commercial advertisement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yeîîya Rêşawî</td>
<td>Slêmanî Polytechnic</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Print media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Şêrko Cebar</td>
<td>Slêmanî Polytechnic</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Radio and Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rêber Goran</td>
<td>Slêmanî</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Television</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.3. GAINING ACCESS TO THE PARTICIPANTS

In both qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures, this study has gained access to participants in different places. The academic and journalistic background of the researcher was helpful in getting the selected respondents as scheduled before commencing the fieldwork. Only, three of the privacy victims rejected being interviewed due to the sensitivity of the topic or content of questions. In this study, most of the interviewees kindly accepted the invitation to express their insights in depth on the chosen themes. Each meeting for an interview took between 30 and 90 minutes, and the respondents gave signed permission to publish their viewpoints in different parts of this study. While their signatures do not impact the reliability of the data widely, this is an ethical way to confirm their prior permissions were given to document various viewpoints in the current research project. Most of the interviewees were living in the Kurdish cities of the Hewlêr (Erbil) and Slêmanî; they were interviewed in their offices or silent corners of the public places, including library and café centers, as well as a one and only participant who was interviewed in a hotel
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: Data Collection Methods

reception lobby in London. The participants of a survey questionnaire included news media workers in three main provinces of the Kurdistan Region. Most of the respondents came from the Slêmanî province and its surrounds. However, in Hewlêr and Dhok provinces, participants were accessed by a third party who was either the general manager or head of news desk of the news organizations. Some of the news media workers were concerned about responding to all the questions because of their time constraints, or for security reasons.

5.4. INTEGRITY AND ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS

Nottingham Trent University (NTU) as a British Higher Education Institute has been committed to supporting research integrity by providing a full national structure for blameless research behavior and its authority (NTU, 2014). Within this commitment, this Ph.D. research candidate has been required to fill the forms of the Ethical Clearance Checklist to meet the highest standards of honesty, integrity and professionalism. The individual actions must conform to the values of openness, honesty, rigor and research transparency, also in research conduct, dealing with issues and dilemmas of quantitative and qualitative practitioners is imperative (see Appendix V). It addresses both ideas and problems regarding practice-based research, which is growing in some professional zones, including journalistic practices in news media organizations. In this sense, there are numerous issues inside practice-based research that concern the important stakeholders. For instance, how susceptible are they? How well informed are they of the study and its dedications? To what extent has learned harmony for the study been required? How answerable are the practitioner-researchers to them? (Campbell and Groundwater-Smith 2007). From those questions can be determined whether the researchers have used ethical methods to collect and analysis their data. According to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), research ethics are defined as “the moral principles guiding research, from its inception through to completion and publication of results and beyond,” which aims to decrease potential harm for participants and to avoid the risk in all cases. With regard to the current study, from the project’s beginning, of research questions and survey questionnaire formulations, through the accessing of research participants, to transcribing, translation, and analyzing the data collected, the challenges of ethical issues were faced (ESRC 2010).
In each stage of the research project, the researcher was eager to apply ethical methods in order to avoid participants’ harm, whether physical or psychological. The risk in this study entails the potential psychological or physical harm in the form of stress or discomfort to participants which an investigation might produce. In this case, there are many dangers including risk to privacy, the personal social standing of a subject, personal beliefs, values and their relations to family and the broader community, along with their location inside professional settings (Ibid.). Within these definitions, the current study has been defined as a controversial topic and a sensitive field of ethics in examining the professional roles of journalists in gathering information privacy. In this sense, clarity and transparency are important in sensitive research data gathering. It is vital to let participants know what the researchers are doing and for what purpose. To address the potential ethical issues and risks, the detailed background regarding the study was prepared in Kurdish and English languages to illustrate the research objectives (see Appendix VI). In this fieldwork, some victims of privacy rights declined to be intensively interviewed face-to-face, preferring to respond by email only; other participants primarily demurred due to the questions’ content. These objections have been converted due to editing and paraphrasing the content of questions and focusing on those people who were interviewed face-to-face. For similar reasons, the researcher primarily talked to the interviewees by the phone call and/or email before the interviews were carried out.

During these communications, the investigator introduced himself and his research topic. Also, the goals of the research project along with the interview and the reasons behind the choice of participants were discussed. Additionally, a convenient time to interview was ascertained, as well as the foremost concerns along with the questions that would be considered during the meeting. As a result, the researcher reported some key questions of the study for the discussion and then sent a questions list for some through the relevant email address. By contrast, in conducting the survey questionnaires a variety of limitations have appeared. Some of the respondents have not desired to participate or responded to the questions accurately. Sometimes, individuals were not enthusiastic to take part because of the length of questions, statements were vague, and personal sensitivity issues with the researcher arose. More interestingly, a few were worried about participating in a survey, thinking that it was part of the efforts of the intelligence agency of political ruling parties or oppositions to gain their personal information. In particular, during the period of fieldwork data
collection, several financial, political, and security crises mushroomed. For example, cutting the Iraqi general budget to the Kurdistan Region, Kurdish Pêşmerge forces fighting with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and non-agreement to extend a term of the Kurdistan Regional Presidency since the 19 August 2015 all occurred during this time. All crisis has affected the news organizations, which have, in turn, cut staff and salaries, therefore such crisis has indirectly influenced the current study on a different level. However, these risk levels have been minimized as much as is reasonably practicable during the period between 1st August and 19th September 2015 by explaining the academic position of the researcher and his aims to collect the realistic data confidentially. Moreover, the journalistic background of the researcher helped him to conduct his fieldwork without too many obstacles.

One further advantage of this case study was related to the geographical position of Slêmanî, Hewlêr (Erbil) and Dhok, which were the three safest provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan Region at this time. In addition to conducting the survey, the general managers or newsroom heads of different news organizations were contacted first, in order to gain their permission. To minimize time consumption and mistakes, the majority of respondents answered a survey questionnaire form and participated in in-depth, face-to-face interviews that were very useful in avoiding fabricated answers and ensuring a complete return of survey forms. To avoid psychological harm, the confidentiality and privacy issues for respondents, mentioned above, have been considered in filling the Informed Participant Consent Form Used With Interviewee (see Appendix III). This was designed to confirm confidentiality of treatment of the participants’ information and perceptions. They were also informed that they could withdraw from the research at any time. For that purpose, a researcher's email account and his mobile number were provided to respond to any inquiries that came from the participants. To date, no requests for withdrawal have been received, though some respondents were interested to know the time of publication of this study and its results. All participants in this study live in the same geographical area, sharing a similar culture and society, and directly or indirectly know each other. Finally, in terms of data audio recording and data security, all participants’ data was recorded on audiotape after getting their permission. After removal from a computer desktop, the data was stored in a memory stick, especially during the translation and transcription of the interviewees’ voices. All obtained data and its specific information have been protected in a private place where nobody is allowed access.
5.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

From the research design and methodology chapter can be concluded that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been chosen as a core case study to examine media developments and characteristics in a developing or a post-conflict country. In this case, there are no national institutes, including national media, due to the dominance of political parties rather than governmental organizations. In this sense, the political bureau decisions of a particular ruling party are considerably more important than those of the elected Members of Parliament (MPs). For this reason, providing primary sources from a case study data collection is a significant contribution to knowledge on political and media systems in such non-Western and non-democratic societies. Given that, in-depth interviews were selected as a primary data collection method to understand the shifting boundaries of privacy concepts and how the news media workers deal with aspects of private life within information privacy invasions. This qualitative method was useful to understand the core barriers of the media environment and its role in Kurdish journalism practices in the democratization process.

A survey questionnaire has been used to understand the professional role orientations of Kurdish journalists in practicing information privacy invasions. Within this survey, the similarities and differences in personal and professional characteristics of the Kurdish journalists have been delineated. Each procedure used in the research data collection was fully explained, as were the reasons for choosing them in this study. Some of the selected participants carefully answered the survey questions as they felt that other media outlets will benefit from their answers, while different people from diverse backgrounds were invited to talk on chosen themes, the political backgrounds of the participants were clearly identified. This case led to the emergence of two main debates on the role of Kurdish media in transition to democracy. Based on Gramscian conceptions of hegemony, the first direction tends to use the media as a partisan organization to exaggerate a political ideology or even a particular leader within his or her political parties. In recent years, the partisan official media of the political parties have been challenged by the partisan unofficial media which are financially supported by political elites, whose known as the owners of shadow media that interested in retaining a status quo of the society. The second direction which is minority desires to focus on political corruption and increasing a watchdog role in government affairs.
As discussed in the third and fourth chapters, the Civil War has affected the media environment and its news workers in the KDP’s yellow zone and the PUK’s green zone. In view of that, the Kurdistan Region populations have been distributed amongst the ruling class of the ideology power. As a final point, the data collection procedures of this study were costly due to the traveling and the hospitality of the participants. This partially impacted the current study in terms of potential “bias” or skewing due to the lack of awareness regarding the position of academic researchers and their research projects. In general, the Kurdish political conflicts have led to suspicion with researchers who are being viewed as intelligence agency officers of a particular political party. However, the previous experience of the current researcher as an independent journalist and also the objective nature of the questions asked were valuable mitigating effects. In addition to the traveling cost, the financial crisis, including delays in monthly salary payment, and the growth of ISIS acted as constraints on the researcher to mostly focus on Slêmanî as an activity city during his fieldwork.

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed a flexible research methodology in media studies around this research project. A theoretical paradigm for positivist research methods in gathering and analyzing the data has been reviewed. With that in mind, both ontological and epistemological research considerations have been discussed in selecting the positivist philosophical paradigm. Within this debate, the methodology design of this study has been built on both quantitative and qualitative approaches in data collection and its analysis procedures. The chapter concluded with the principles of transparency, openness, honesty, and research rigor by examining the research integrity and ethical requirements.
On 22nd August 2013, an ordinary woman’s private life was invaded by a Kurdish news website, revealing her name and other details such as addresses of family members, her personal wedding photos, and family video footage. Meanwhile, this news website had criticized a Kurdish citizen on explicitly racist grounds when she married a black man in Canada, marriage between a Kurdish woman and a black man not being considered “nationally good” (Bakrajo 2016). From such local examples it can be seen that cases concerning information privacy invasion have increased globally; “maybe the first person to really challenge the standard view was Matt Drudge, whose online ‘Report’ broke the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky story” (Meyers 2010: 86). This acceleration in media intrusion into private lives of ordinary people, celebrities and public figures in recent years is at least partially due to expanding globalization facilities such as digitalization worldwide, and transitions in political and media systems to democracy in developing and post-conflict countries. For similar reasons, this chapter draws on results gained from the interviews and survey questionnaires in the present case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

As explained in the chapter on data collection methodology, a case study highlights in a few instances or merely an example of a particular phenomenon to, or 'intend to', offer an in-depth account of a relationship, event, experience or procedure that is happening in that individual case (Denscombe 2003). Given this definition, there are several approaches to conducting the current case study on the privacy concepts and essential features of Kurdish journalism cultures, including the current role of political and media systems in the Kurdistan Region, and interviews with decision-makers in the relevant fields. Particularly, those who have worked as media experts affected by the socio-political and legislative context of this research can make significant observations (Yin 2009).
In this study, the semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with media decision-makers who share their personal and professional relationships with the ruling and opposition political parties. Also, an extensive range of journalists who are not affiliated with political parties were interviewed, along with commentators, academics, and media policy makers. Some of these were closely affected by the research questions surrounding cultures of journalism practices and privacy understandings in Kurdish culture in the Middle East. In total, around 15 people were involved, from various backgrounds of gender, age, education, political affiliation, professional role, and experience. The variety of this group represented the reality of the Kurdish media environment and its developments. Flexibility and greater accessibility were the advantages of this approach because the current researcher had been allowed to record the conversations with the interviewee’s consent, who might nevertheless want to tell the researcher something ‘off the record’. Later, the perceptions of the interviewees have been transcribed and analyzed in detail, which leads to data that scholars cannot obtain simply by monitoring. The interviews method can carry a level of ‘performance’ by the interviewee, however, if they know the questions beforehand (Berger 2000).

In order to know the perceptions diversity of professional role orientations, 142 news media workers, including two freelancers, from 29 media organizations were surveyed in this study. They were all regularly working in different outlets, including web journalism sites; news websites and news agencies; televisions; radio, newspapers and magazines. The aim of this chapter is to explore the collected data to examine the professional role orientations amongst Kurdish news media workers and their understanding of information privacy invasions. For similar reasons, the SPSS Statistics Programme, a software package, was used for statistical data analysis from 15 September and 15 October 2015. In addition to the qualitative data insights gathered from interviews, the researcher also collected quantitative data from January 2013 to October 2015, therefore the data from the research is up to date. In this context, the priority was to ensure information accuracy and avoid bias, which is one of the main advantages of using the triangulation methods of a case study, in-depth interviews, and a questionnaire survey. As a final point, several chosen variables and themes have been statistically tested to explore the relationships between shifting boundaries of privacy understanding in different cultures of Kurdish journalism.
6.2. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS OF KURDISH JOURNALISTS

In examining the personal and professional profiles of the Kurdish journalists, this study has surveyed their socio-demographic characteristics of gender, age, academic level, employment terms, and monthly salary. This distinctive profile is helpful in understanding journalists’ backgrounds and their role perceptions of privacy and professionalism in journalistic daily practices.

As Figure 6.1 shows, the minority of participants (9.2%) were female news-workers, whereas 90.8% of the respondents were males. The way forward for greater female involvement in journalism in the Kurdistan Region has not been facilitated beyond a certain level. This circumstance may refer to traditional social norms, including discrimination and sexual harassment. With regard to age, the age range of participants was from 18 to over 48 years old. In this survey, the majority of respondents (63.8%) were aged between 28 and 37, followed slightly more than one-fifth of respondents who were aged 18 and 27 accounting for 22.5% of participants. In these groups, only 2.9% of the journalists were 48 and over, while, 10.9% of participants were between 38 and 47 years old. The reason for the high percentage represented by the age group between 18 and 27 is that the majority of news-workers inside news organizations are younger journalists with less professional experience; this can also be related to the transition process notably in post-conflict countries, which is in disarray in the Kurdistan Region. Within academic level groups of participants, 48.9% of the Kurdish journalists have a bachelor’s degree, followed by 29.1% who have a Diploma, while a minority (9.2%) of respondents have a master’s degree. The remainder (12.8%) have miscellaneous levels of primary, secondary, and pre-university or preparatory education. These figures show that the majority of Kurdish news media works graduated from one of the departments of media and journalism in the universities and technical institutes. However, they have been professionally criticized by the general managers of news organizations and heads of news-gathering due to the inability to use their academic background in covering and editing a single news story or report. As Ako Mîremed (2015), a chief executive officer at Rûdaw Media Network stated, the new generations of media and journalism who have graduated from Kurdish academic institutions have less ability and skill in transferring their theoretical studies.
into the practical field. He also confirmed that the principal reasons here may refer to a relatively weak education system in the field of mass media communications. The lack of a proper training laboratory for journalism practices in Kurdish universities or academic institutions, along with personal and educational knowledge of both students and their academic leaders or learners and their trainers, may be underlying factors in this.

**Figure 6.1:** Groups of gender, age, and academic levels of the Kurdish journalists.

Within professional background, Figure 6.2 shows that 46.5% of the respondents were working full-time, and 43.7% part-time, while a small number of journalists (9.9%) were working as a freelancer. This confirms that the majority of news media workers in the Kurdistan Region have political affiliations with the ruling parties or political elites, and also that the opportunities for a freelancer journalist are limited. In this sense, getting a higher salary or wages without serious physical violation is the attractive motivation, for similar reasons, 43.7% of the respondents had other paid jobs besides journalism because journalism has not provided a sufficient income thus far. Meanwhile, a monthly salary of journalists in Kurdish news organizations started from voluntary (1.4%) or generally within the range of 150 - 4499 American dollars (£99.99 - £2999.03). In this case, 56.0% of respondents were getting a monthly salary between $400 and $999, followed by almost one-quarter of respondents, 28.4% who have a salary between $1000 and $1499. Only 9.16% of journalists were getting a higher monthly salary of between $1500 and $4499, due to their senior positions as general managers, famous anchors and show programmers.
These are the distinct characteristics of the participants, who were being asked by this study for their perceptions and information about media ownership, workplaces, media outlets, job descriptions, definitions of journalism, professional experience, news item productions, and participation in journalistic training. These elements, taken together as part of the professional backgrounds of the Kurdish journalists, will be explained as follows. As Figure 6.3 illustrates, only 7.1% of the respondents were working for the government media due to the KRG having few mass media communication channels, particularly after the onset of the financial crises and the insurgence of ISIS since 2014. While the majority of the respondents (61.9%) were working for the owners of official and unofficial partisan media, 33.1% of the participants were practicing journalism under private media ownerships that involved the news organizations of non-governmental and non-partisan media. Some commentators, such as Welî (2015), consider all Kurdish media outlets to be political organs of ruling parties whether directly or indirectly; while this perception is not precisely accurate, others believe that minimizing the hegemonic power of partisan media in this political environment is one of the main challenges in front of the independent journalists in forthcoming decades. For that reason, Niyaz Ebidulla (2015), a Kurdish female journalist at Rdo Newa (home) suggested amending the 1993 Political Parties Law in such a way that the political parties would not be allowed to establish partisan media to an extent that stifled an equal and free environment of media competition.
She continued and reporting that the smallest political party in the current Kurdistan Region has at least twenty official news media organizations, regardless of several unofficial media outlets which have been indirectly supported by political elites. The main reason for the domination of partisan media goes back to the domination of the KDP and PUK as traditional political ruling parties, who have monopolized all sectors of Kurdish society and do not allow the emergence of real competition amongst media productions. Furthermore, the low pay of the private media workers led to a welcome for the partisan media, in particular during the economic crisis.

![Figure 6-3: Three main types of the Kurdish media ownerships.](image)

With regard to the media workplaces of the participants, Figure 6.4 shows that 63.4% of the journalists were covering events within the boundaries of Slêmanî province, well-known as a cultural capital city of the Kurdistan Region, and also an open and free environment for news media workers. A further 19.0% of the respondents came from the province areas of Hewlêr (Erbil), followed by 17.6% of the journalists who were working within the boundaries of Dhok province. These territories were distributed into two political zones, the effects of which have thus far persisted in everyday life. The Green Zone, which includes Slêmanî city and its suburbs, was controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Yellow Zone that involves each province of Hewlêr and Dhok has been controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) since 1994, when the Civil War occurred between their military forces. As a result of this, media ownerships and their news media workers can be understood by examining the application levels of democratic principles in two political zones that stem from the political background of the ruling class and their politician elites (see Chapters II and III).
Within the rest of the socio-demographic characteristics of journalists, Figure 6.5 indicates that 48.6% of respondents were mostly working for the local and satellite television channels, followed by 30.3% of the participants who were working for the daily and weekly newspapers. Then 25.4% of them for online news sites, 21.1% for local and satellite radio stations, and a minority, 9.9% of the respondents, were working for weekly and monthly magazines. These figures show that the majority of the media workers (69.7%) were interested in working for broadcasting media outlets. Similar to other regions worldwide, the print media has sharply minimized in the Kurdistan Region due to the broad influences of globalization characteristics that led to a dramatic increase in digital media consumers. Besides, Kurdish native speakers have been mostly characterized by their adoption of visual and colloquial cultures rather than the culture of reading newspapers and books. Furthermore, the limited advertising market for big business companies and the lack of an established distribution print media productions network among Kurdish cities and villages are other reasons.

**Figure 6-4:** Media workplaces in the Kurdistan region provinces.

**Figure 6-5:** Media outlets and job descriptions of the Kurdish journalists.
For further data, this study has asked the participants to determine their motivations to become a journalist. As Figure 6.6 shows, the key motivations behind 86.6% of the survey respondents to become a journalist refer to their interest in contributing to and serving the public good along with revealing corruption and working as a watchdog. These results seem closer to their ambitions than a realistic appraisal of their present situation, for the simple reason that the political parties, including the KDP and PUK ruling class, dominate the largest part of Kurdish media organizations in which the journalistic role of watchdog is severely limited. Only 4.2% of the participants became a journalist in order to support the particular agenda of a political party. In reality, the ruling parties have been dominating Kurdish society by offering vast opportunities for partisan news media workers, such as providing higher salaries and launching a higher quality of convergent media networks. In particular, during the coverage of the general election campaigns, partisan media workers neglect their journalistic professionalism to persuade electors to embrace the ideology of the political parties. Though most of the Kurdish journalists identified themselves as a watchdog on the political elites and their formal affairs, the level of various types of corruption in the Kurdistan Region institutions has increased day by day, which is at least partly due to the limited practicing of investigative journalism. Above and beyond, the Kurdish media organizations mostly do not provide job security due to there being no contract between media ownerships and workers. Both of them are basing their relationships on personal mood rather than professional job descriptions. Meanwhile, the Kurdish media productions are not qualitative and profitable; therefore, the journalism profession does not offer sufficient salaries to media workers.

Figure 6-6: Key factors to be a journalist in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Within job descriptions of the editorial staff, Figure 6.7 demonstrates that the overwhelming majority (99.3%) of the respondents were reporters and news writers, while 13.10% of them were an editor in chief, managing editor, or desk head. Given that, 60.7% of the participants defined journalism as a profession, while journalism has been described by 38.13% of the respondents as falling into the skills, jobs, and hobbies category. In this context, 48.2% of news media workers had more than 10 years of professional experience, followed by 29.8% of the participants who had 7-10 years’ experience, while a small number of the respondents (0.7%) had less than one year’s experience in journalism practices. Also, 48.1% of the participants were producing more than 15 news materials weekly, while only 7.8% of the participants were producing between one and five items. Additionally, the majority of the journalists (91.7%) were participating in training domains of journalism.

![Figure 6-7: Journalism definitions, professional experiences and news item productions by the Kurdish journalists.](image)
From these different results, it can be concluded that the patriarchy social class has predominantly characterized the Kurdish journalists profile. They are often graduates, younger and with limited experience in professional practice, although they principally participated in diverse journalism training. Furthermore, they have essentially affiliated with the political parties and the majority of them are receiving a lower salary, and the journalism profession is commonly seen as a lower paid job. In this sense, the Kurdish media worker productions are not qualitative and too locally focused, although they have gradually used the latest new media technologies in their daily work.

6.3. PROFESSIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF KURDISH JOURNALISTS

While varieties of opinion still exist, there appears to be some agreement that the concepts of journalist and journalism refer to the Latin term diurnal (daily or recurring every day) that originated from the French word journey (day of work) and was firstly used by the French Journal (Cayne 1983). However, media scholars are still looking for consensus on what constitutes journalistic professionalism, and on perceptions of journalists’ role, identity, and ideology in various cultures of journalism. Journalist is also a term frequently used in the literature to describe the profession of those persons who are practicing various cultures of a particular journalism for diverse audiences. Likewise, journalists nowadays follow many different methods for collection, selection, and distribution of the latest news and information about current events, affairs, trends, lifestyles of diverse individuals and their issues (Bainbridge et al. 2011). The concept of ‘journalist’ has been defined by Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) as a person who has editorial accountability for the transmission or preparation of news stories and extra information rather than those who are creating fiction, art, drama, or other types of media content. This targeted definition has been precisely applied in this research project because of flexibility and adaptability in making great differences between media and function contents. With regard to the current survey, the editorial responsibility of Kurdish media workers refers to: (a) senior managers such as editors in chief, managing editors, chief editors and their deputies at the top level of the editorial hierarchy; (b) junior manager, which refers to senior editors, department heads, and desk heads as the middle level of operational decision-makers; (c) non-management staff such as news writers and reporters on the lowest echelon of the newsroom hierarchy (Hanitzsch et al. 2014).
For a better understanding of their perceptions of professional activities, Kurdish journalists were asked to indicate four main activities often performed in a typical working day. As Table 6.1 indicates, the first professional activities to have widely been performed are ‘gathering information and investigation’, its statistical mean and standard deviation being $33.0 \pm 21.9$. As Helen (1931), Bland and Altman (1996) explain, the standard deviation in statistics is a measure which is applied to quantify the amount of dispersion or variation of a set of data values. In other words, a high standard deviation determines that the points of data are divided over a wider range of values, while a low standard deviation determines that the points of data tend to be close to the mean which is also called the expected value of the set. Unlike the variance, a useful property of the standard deviation is expressed in the same units as the data, in which the standard deviation of a statistical population, random variable, probability or data set distribution is the square root of its variance, which is algebraically simpler, but in practice less strong, than the average absolute deviation. From the norm can be seen other measures of deviation, such as mean absolute deviation that provide different mathematical properties from standard deviation. For instance, the mean and standard deviation for the second activity, ‘news production’, which includes writing, editing and producing, is $28.8 \pm 22.6$; also, for the third activity of ‘presenting news or design and layout’, mean and standard deviation from other activities is $16.3 \pm 17.1$; finally $17.7 \pm 16.0$ is the mean and standard deviation of the fourth professional activity of Kurdish news media workers who were doing ‘editorial coordination and management’, in other words attending meetings, and management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Activities</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean ± Standard. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information gathering and investigation;</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>33.0 ± 21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News production which includes writing, editing and producing;</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.8 ± 22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting news or design and layout;</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>16.3 ± 17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial coordination and management which includes attending meetings.</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>17.7 ± 16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above results, it can be learned that the majority of the respondents in this survey questionnaires are more interested in doing professional activities that fall into the ‘gathering information’ category than ‘editorial coordination and management’. In comparison with other areas of editorial responsibility, working as a news reporter is more common and widely available in Kurdish journalism practices. In addition, the Kurdish working journalists were also asked to indicate eleven methods of ‘gathering information’ and each method was scored on a three-point scale from ‘always justified’, through ‘justified on occasion’, to ‘not approved under any circumstances’. As Table 6.8 shows, ‘getting employed in a firm or organization to gain inside information’ is considered an ‘always justified’ method of gathering information by 32.8% of the respondents, while 27.7% of them tend to use ‘confidential business or government documents without authorization’. This is followed by 26.8% of the journalists for whom ‘to pay people for sensitive information’ is not a problem, and neither is ‘publishing stories with unverified content and accepting money from sources’.

Figure 6-8: Justifiable methods of Kurdish journalists in gathering information.
The information gathering method of ‘using confidential business or government documents without authorization’ is ‘justified on occasion’ by 60.0% of the participants, while 55.5% of them, similar to colleagues around the world, ‘accepted paying people for sensitive information’. More than half of Kurdish journalists (54.7%) focused on ‘getting employed in a firm or organization to gain inside information’, while 52.8% thought ‘using hidden microphones or cameras’ was ‘justified on occasion’. Also, 47.2% of the respondents find some justification for ‘using re-creations of dramatizations of news by actors’, followed by 46.9% of the respondents who persuaded themselves to use ‘personal documents such as letters and pictures without permission’. However, a distinct majority of the respondents (79.4%) believed that it is ‘not approved under any circumstances’ to gather information by using such methods as ‘accepting money from sources, altering or fabricating quotes from sources, and also changing photographs’, followed by 75.8% of the respondents who rejected ‘publishing stories with unverified content’, in addition to the 54.7% of the working journalists who did not want to be involved in ‘exerting pressure on unwilling informants to get a story’.

From these results, it can be seen that the Kurdish news media workers have multiple methods for gathering information, but behind their personal values many professional values have affected them to choose a more justifiable method. These outcomes suggest that the diversity of socio-demographic characteristics in the journalists surveyed lead to the use of all of these methods of information gathering by some, while others take further measures to apply the most justifiable method in their daily journalism practices. For instance, less than half of the respondents desire to gather information by changing their journalistic role or identity. Though this is nowadays one of the main methods of Western journalists, it has been generally ignored in the Kurdistan Region due to the absence or weaker presence of Kurdish investigative journalists who, in any case, have various barriers to overcome, including limited access to serious information and a limited free environment for practicing media freedom and other civil liberties. As explained in the previous chapters, the concept of journalism began with the inception of periodical publications of contemporary news in newspapers or journals on a recurring basis, while currently internet commentaries, alongside radio, television and, to a lesser extent, documentary film are all described as ‘journalism’ (Cayne 1983).
In the case of the Kurdistan Region, it is important, then, to identify the characteristics of Kurdish journalism cultures which are the particular set of practices and ideas by which news media workers consciously and unconsciously function, also legitimate journalists’ role in society, as seen by themselves and others. For that reason, Hanitzsch’s (2007) model has been applied in this study to explore the professional role orientations of journalists within four global cultures of journalism practices and its directions in the Kurdistan Region. Journalism cultures of the populist disseminator, detached watchdog, critical change agent and the critical change agent are defined in the fourth chapter; as a result, this study has determined the institutional roles, epistemologies orientations, and ethical ideologies of the Kurdish journalism cultures.

In the current study, three dimensions of the professional journalism culture's institutional roles including interventionism, power distance, and market orientation were measured by the self-perceptions of the Kurdish journalists in twelve statements. Each item was scored on a five-point scale, where the news workers were asked to choose one response from five options among ‘not important at all’, ‘a little important’, ‘somewhat important’, ‘very important’, and ‘extremely important’. As Table 6.2 shows, the following institutional roles were ‘extremely important’ for the Kurdish journalists: providing citizens with the information they need to make political decisions (49.6%) in addition to being an absolutely detached observer (47.2%), and also providing the audience with the information that is most interesting (33.8%). To concentrate mainly on news that will attract the widest possible audience (30.5%), and motivate people to participate in the civic activity and political discussion (29.6%) were considered the next most important. In comparison with the studies of Hanitzsch et al. (2007 and 2011), similar to Spain, Romania, Israel, Germany, Austria, USA, Switzerland, and Australia, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has widely embraced the journalism cultures of the Populist Disseminator and Detached Watchdog models. This is borne out by the 42.3% of participants who felt that the influence on public opinion is ‘very important’; additionally, 39.4% of the respondents prefer to advocate for social change, and another 31.7% of them focused on the act as a watchdog of the government. However, the institutional role of conveying a positive image of political and business leadership (45.1%), along with setting the political agenda (24.8%) was ‘not important at all’ for the respondents. Further roles as a watchdog of business elites, and supporting official policies to bring about prosperity and development were somewhat important for the rest of the respondents (34.3%). Based on the results, the journalism culture of the Critical Change Agent, known as an interventionist impetus, is ‘very
important’ for the Iraqi Kurdish journalists. They are similar to their colleagues in Turkey, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, Mexico, and Indonesia. More than this, similar to Russia, Chile, China, and Uganda, the Kurdish journalists are embracing the journalism culture of the Opportunist Facilitator (see Hanitzsch 2011: 481).

Table 6-2: Institutional roles of the Kurdish journalism cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional roles of journalism cultures</th>
<th>Extremely important N (%)</th>
<th>Very important N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat important N (%)</th>
<th>Little important N (%)</th>
<th>Not important at all N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be an absolutely detached observer.</td>
<td>67 (47.2)</td>
<td>46 (32.4)</td>
<td>20 (14.1)</td>
<td>7 (4.9)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as watchdog of the government.</td>
<td>60 (42.3)</td>
<td>45 (31.7)</td>
<td>28 (19.7)</td>
<td>7 (4.9)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide citizens with the information they need to make political decisions.</td>
<td>70 (49.6)</td>
<td>42 (29.8)</td>
<td>20 (14.2)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To concentrate mainly on news that will attract the widest possible audience.</td>
<td>43 (30.5)</td>
<td>41 (29.1)</td>
<td>43 (30.5)</td>
<td>9 (6.4)</td>
<td>5 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda.</td>
<td>17 (12.1)</td>
<td>19 (13.5)</td>
<td>47 (33.3)</td>
<td>23 (16.3)</td>
<td>35 (24.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To convey a positive image of political and business leadership.</td>
<td>7 (4.9)</td>
<td>9 (6.3)</td>
<td>30 (21.1)</td>
<td>32 (22.5)</td>
<td>64 (45.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide the audience with the information that is most interesting.</td>
<td>48 (33.8)</td>
<td>34 (23.9)</td>
<td>41 (28.9)</td>
<td>15 (10.6)</td>
<td>4 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To influence public opinion.</td>
<td>49 (34.5)</td>
<td>60 (42.3)</td>
<td>24 (16.9)</td>
<td>3 (2.1)</td>
<td>6 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support official policies to bring about prosperity and development.</td>
<td>18 (13.1)</td>
<td>39 (28.5)</td>
<td>47 (34.3)</td>
<td>19 (13.9)</td>
<td>14 (10.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To advocate for social change.</td>
<td>30 (21.9)</td>
<td>54 (39.4)</td>
<td>31 (22.6)</td>
<td>13 (9.5)</td>
<td>9 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as watchdog of business elites.</td>
<td>28 (20.0)</td>
<td>41 (29.3)</td>
<td>48 (34.3)</td>
<td>15 (10.7)</td>
<td>8 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To motivate people to participate in civic activity and political discussion.</td>
<td>42 (29.6)</td>
<td>40 (28.2)</td>
<td>40 (28.2)</td>
<td>7 (4.9)</td>
<td>13 (9.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of participants: 142
In this study, the working journalists were asked to determine their agreement levels into seven items which measured the epistemological orientations of the Kurdish journalism culture. These elements were scored on a five-point scale, where 5 related to ‘strongly agree’ and 1 related to ‘strongly disagree’. As Table 6.3 indicates, the majority of the respondents (83.7%) ‘strongly agree’ with an opinion that journalists can depict reality as it is, followed by 70.3% of them who remained strictly impartial in their work. Furthermore, 36.0% of the respondents who thought that they ‘somewhat agree’ that the facts speak for themselves. Another 30.2% of the journalists preferred to provide an analysis of events and issues in their work, and also 26.6% of the respondents only make claims if they are substantiated by hard evidence and reliable sources. In contrast, only 17.14% of the journalists ‘strongly disagree' with the statement that news-workers do not allow their own beliefs and convictions to influence their reporting, and the statement that they always make it clear which side of a dispute has the better position. Although most of the Kurdish journalists include their personal beliefs and convictions in news-stories, it is more prevalent in the partisan media coverages during political crises or election campaign coverage.

**Table 6-3: Epistemologies orientation of the Kurdish journalism cultures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemologies orientation of journalism cultures</th>
<th>Strongly agree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree N (%)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not allow my own beliefs and convictions to influence my reporting.</td>
<td>97 (68.8)</td>
<td>26 (18.4)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>5 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I provide analysis of events and issues in my work.</td>
<td>56 (40.3)</td>
<td>42 (30.2)</td>
<td>18 (12.9)</td>
<td>10 (7.2)</td>
<td>13 (9.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that facts speak for themselves.</td>
<td>63 (45.3)</td>
<td>50 (36.0)</td>
<td>14 (10.1)</td>
<td>8 (5.8)</td>
<td>4 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I remain strictly impartial in my work.</td>
<td>97 (70.3)</td>
<td>29 (21.0)</td>
<td>7 (5.1)</td>
<td>3 (2.2)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I make claims only if they are substantiated by hard evidence and reliable sources.</td>
<td>79 (56.8)</td>
<td>37 (26.6)</td>
<td>14 (10.1)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that journalists can depict reality as it is.</td>
<td>118 (83.7)</td>
<td>11 (7.8)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
<td>3 (2.1)</td>
<td>2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I always make clear which side in a dispute has the better position.</td>
<td>57 (40.4)</td>
<td>26 (18.4)</td>
<td>24 (17.0)</td>
<td>13 (9.2)</td>
<td>21 (14.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Forsyth (1980) developed, the ethical ideologies of the journalists in this study have measured into six central questions; three questions linked to idealism and others related to relativism measures. To examine the principles of professional journalism ethics, a five-point Likert scale was used in which the Kurdish journalists were asked to indicate from a range of ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. In this sense, strongly agree means high idealism or high relativism.

As Table 6.4 shows, most of the Kurdish journalists (70.9%) were strongly in agreement with a relativism measure that there are ethical principles which are so important that they should be followed by all journalists, regardless of situation and context. This was followed by 59.6% who supported an idealism measure that journalists should avoid questionable methods of reporting in any case, even if this meant not getting the story. Another 34.5% of the respondents somewhat agreed with a relativism measure that ethical dilemmas in news coverage are often so complex that journalists should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes of conduct. The rest of the participants (15.17%) somewhat disagreed with each relativism and idealism measures; that there are situations in which harm is justifiable if it results in a story that produces a greater good, and what is ethical in journalism varies from one situation to another. Only 12.9% of the journalists, however, strongly disagreed with an idealism measure that the reporting and publishing of a story that can potentially harm others are always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained. As predicted before, the results reported that the Kurdish journalists are more interested in abiding by relativism measures than idealism measures. In other words, media workers theoretically may choose the idealism standards of journalism ethics, while in practice they have frequently been following the relativism standards in their professional work.
Table 6-4: Ethical ideologies of the Kurdish journalism cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical ideologies of journalism cultures</th>
<th>Strongly agree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree N (%)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are ethical principles which are so important that they should be followed by all journalists, regardless of situation and context.</td>
<td>100 (70.9)</td>
<td>28 (19.9)</td>
<td>8 (5.7)</td>
<td>4 (2.8)</td>
<td>1 (.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists should avoid questionable methods of reporting in any case, even if this means not getting the story.</td>
<td>84 (59.6)</td>
<td>32 (22.7)</td>
<td>13 (9.2)</td>
<td>8 (5.7)</td>
<td>4 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical dilemmas in news coverage are often so complex that journalists should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes of conduct.</td>
<td>53 (38.1)</td>
<td>48 (34.5)</td>
<td>21 (15.1)</td>
<td>10 (7.2)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting and publishing a story that can potentially harm others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.</td>
<td>47 (33.6)</td>
<td>39 (27.9)</td>
<td>29 (20.7)</td>
<td>7 (5.0)</td>
<td>18 (12.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is ethical in journalism varies from one situation to another.</td>
<td>45 (33.3)</td>
<td>49 (36.3)</td>
<td>27 (20.0)</td>
<td>8 (5.9)</td>
<td>6 (4.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are situations in which harm is justifiable if it results in a story that produces a greater good.</td>
<td>35 (25.2)</td>
<td>36 (25.9)</td>
<td>36 (25.9)</td>
<td>15 (10.8)</td>
<td>17 (12.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of participants: 142
In their daily professional activity, journalists have been affected by several internal influences on news work, thus this study has measured some influences on the great list of questionnaire items. Five response options from ‘extremely influential’, ‘very influential’, ‘somewhat influential’, ‘little influential’ to ‘not influential at all’ were indicated by the journalists for each of the influences. As Figure 6.9 shows, the Kurdish journalists thought that the following items were very influential on news work: conventions and ethics of the newsroom (46.0%), supervisors and higher editors (39.6), editorial policy (37.1%), procedures and standards of news production (33.6%), the management of news organization (32.6%), and the shortage of news gathering resources, including staff (30.4%). However, the forthcoming items somewhat influential on news work for the respondents: pressing news deadlines (47.4%), journalist peers on the staff (38.5), journalist views and personal values (32.1%), owners of news organization (31.9%), market and audience research (30.4%), profit expectations of the news organization (29.2%), and advertising considerations (28.7). Almost one-third of journalists (33.1%) viewed the new media technology or access newsgathering sources as extremely influential on news work. More interestingly, only 5.8% of the respondents thought that the same item was not influential at all. These results suggested that the internal influences on news work, including conventions and ethics of the newsroom are more welcomed in the professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists than the respecting of information on private lives as an essential element of the human rights and professional ethics in journalism.

**Figure 6.9:** Internal influences of the Kurdish journalists on their news work.
In a similar way, the external influences on news work were measured by proposing twenty statements in which the Kurdish journalists could disagree or agree on the same five-point Likert scale. As Figure 6.10 indicates, 35.5% of the respondents thought that the news sources were extremely influential on news work, followed by 26.1% of the journalists who believed that the army, security, and police organizations are a little influential. Besides these, the following items were very influential on news work: access to information (44.3%), media laws and regulation (42.8%), competing for news organizations (40.0%), conventions and ethics of the profession (36.0%), readers, listeners or viewers feedback (35.5%), and censorship (23.9%).

**Figure 6-10**: External influences of the Kurdish journalists on their news work.

Other items were somewhat influential on news work by the Kurdish journalists, for example: sensibilities of the community covered (34.5%), pressure groups (31.6%), colleagues in other media (30.0%), friends, acquaintances, and family (29.8%), government officials (28.5%), and public relations in general (27.3%). By contrast, business people (40.9%), advertisers (40.3%), professional organizations such as journalism unions (38.8%), religious leaders (34.1%), politicians (31.9%), and media watch organizations (29.0%) were deemed not influential at all. From these figures, it can be seen that external influences on news work, including news sources further affect professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists, who have frequently been criticized by the celebrities and public figures, as the news sources, for invading their information privacy.
In this study, seven central notions were examined in measuring the professional autonomy of the Kurdish journalists with regard to media regulations. The respondents were asked to indicate each of these through five answer options on a Likert scale from 'strongly agree,' ‘somewhat agree,’ ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ As Figure 6.11 illustrates, 48.1% of the participants strongly agreed with the notion that the journalists were allowed to take part in decisions that affect their work whereas only 3.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed. A sizeable minority of the participants (33.1%) somewhat agreed with another statement referring to journalists having a lot of control over the work that they do, while only 5.9% of the respondents somewhat disagreed with the same statement.

![Figure 6-11: Professional autonomy in the professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists.](image)

From these figures, it can be concluded that the minority of the Kurdish journalists are not allowed to take part in decisions that affect their work. Given that, the news media workers in the Kurdistan Region have a certain amount of perceived professional autonomy in making decisions on the information privacy revealed. As a result, journalism ethics demands reporters and editors make a balance between their personal and professional values when they are gathering information. Likewise, they have been required to measure the right to privacy against the public’s right to know.
Regarding media content regulation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Table 6.5 reveals that the 56.0% of the Kurdish journalists strongly agree with an opinion stating that Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show material with a lot of violence late at night. Almost as many, 51.4%, confirmed that Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show sexually explicit material late at night. Additionally, 35.3% of the participants somewhat agreed with the notion that the removal of media regulation would make Kurdish medium/channel(s) worse. Interestingly, 10.0% of the journalists somewhat disagreed, declaring that they do not really care how other people behave as long as it does not affect them. Only 4.3% of the participants strongly disagreed with the notion that the Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to invade privacy information of spouses and first relatives of celebrities and public figures as they have a full right to protect their private life.

Table 6-5: Kurdish journalist perceptions of media content regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Content Regulation</th>
<th>Strongly agree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree N (%)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree N (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show material with a lot of violence late at night.</td>
<td>79 (56.0)</td>
<td>35 (24.8)</td>
<td>9 (6.4)</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>12 (8.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show sexually explicit material late at night.</td>
<td>71 (51.4)</td>
<td>27 (19.6)</td>
<td>18 (13.0)</td>
<td>11 (8.0)</td>
<td>11 (8.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to invade privacy information of spouse and first relatives of celebrities and public figures due to they have a FULL RIGHT to protect their private life.</td>
<td>49 (34.8)</td>
<td>57 (40.4)</td>
<td>17 (12.1)</td>
<td>12 (8.5)</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- I don’t really care how other people behave as long as it does not affect me.</td>
<td>30 (21.4)</td>
<td>41 (29.3)</td>
<td>26 (18.6)</td>
<td>14 (10.0)</td>
<td>29 (20.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Removal of media regulation would make Kurdish medium/channel worse.</td>
<td>46 (33.1)</td>
<td>49 (35.3)</td>
<td>22 (15.8)</td>
<td>14 (10.1)</td>
<td>8 (5.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These results indicate that the Kurdish journalists are interested in better identifying the Kurdish media content regulation than one of the core curbs in front of media workers in general. More recently, the broadcasting stations within Kurdish media outlets have produced late-night transmissions of several foreign movies and dramas, translated into the Kurdish language, with violent and sexually explicit content. This has led to increasing concern about the behavior of media audiences, particularly the impact of the overtly sexual material on the young, especially since there is no precise regulation and legislation on media acts of violence, including information privacy invasions.

6.4. PRIVACY VIEWS IN KURDISH CONTEXTS

Within this research project, the researcher discovered many perceptions on shifting boundaries of privacy definitions. Accordingly, the researcher intends to explore how the media content regulators, academics, experts, and journalists in their own words define and use key concepts of privacy. Among these diverse groups, academics and the more experienced journalists have displayed the most advanced understanding of the various aspects of privacy; this led to further exploration of their ideas in this study at the expense of other participants whose insights were less well defined. As explained in the first chapter, based on the work of Solove (2009 and 2006) and Tavani (2007 and 2006), the Kurdish journalists were surveyed in order to better understand their professional role perceptions of the six main concepts of privacy: secrecy; intimacy; personhood; the right to be left alone; limited access of self, and control over personal information. In this study, Figure 6.8 shows that 33.1% of the news media workers understood the privacy concept as a “personhood” that includes the right to independently make particular significant decisions about various aspects of private life, such as marriage and contraception. Then, “the right to be left alone” was recognized as another concept of privacy by 31.7% of the participants; also 27.5% of the journalists thought that privacy means “control over personal information” while “secrecy” and concealment of information was described as a privacy notion by 25.9% of the participants. Only 23.7% of the respondents viewed the notion of privacy as an “intimacy” concerning information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not share with all.
However, the concept of privacy as a “limited access of self” was not shown in the perspectives of the media workers. These results show that the professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists are less understanding of the “control over personal information” than the “personhood” concepts of privacy. These quantitative understandings could be related to the cultural norms of the Iraqi Kurdistan journalists who are still not making particular decisions based on an individualistic philosophy that allows further freedom in daily life. In the past, family privacy in Kurdish culture was more important due to the dominance of extended families in society who have saw themselves as an umbrella for collecting all family members under their power. Now, the significance of personal privacy has increased amongst a new generation, including journalists, because extended families have decreased and individuals have become less attached to traditional notions of family, therefore, understanding on the liberties and rights of privacy is gradually changing. In other words, Kurdish news media workers have personal and professional differences in their interpretations of privacy issues; for instance, they understand the meaning of privacy but still ‘invade’ other people's private lives for different reasons, such as the given political agenda of their media owners.

![Figure 6-12: Privacy concepts in the professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists.](image)

In comparison with the above results, Dr. Çoman Herdî (2015b), editor in chief of the sessional magazine of Serdemi Jn (women era), did not find it easy to precisely describe private life or the privacy concept, particularly in the Kurdistan Region. However, she has defined privacy as anything that relates to a person and his or her family and relationships, including those things that people would like to keep secret.
These might include sexual relationships, social affairs, and photos taken with friends in social ceremonies, all of which are aspects of private life. Herdî (2015b), an assistant professor and founder of the Gender Studies Center at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani, continued with an example, saying that “most often, when I sit with my close friends and tell a joke, then another one from another country phoned me and said ‘let me tell you one of your jokes’”. This personally was considered as a type of breach of her private life because she does not wish to share some activity, speech and communication with others outside her circle of close relatives and friends “due to you do not have more relation with him or her.” As Herdî (2015b) reported:

Unfortunately, there is not a particular understanding of privacy, and the persons also have not that knowledge which means I have not-offensively invaded your private life. A while ago, a boy took a selfie with his grandma who had died at that moment, then posted on his Facebook account and stated that ‘now my grandma has died’. Likewise, in publishing their private photos on Facebook in the private ceremony with family and friends until they are going to the toilet, the persons have photographed and posted on the social media. For instance, when the marriage relationship between the couples is broken, then automatically their photos have been published by somebody else who is talking about that couple. Now, there are not any boundaries between the persons, who also are not keeping their edges. (Interview with Çoman Herdî 2015b)

From this can be concluded that the phenomena understanding of privacy varies according to gender in Kurdish society, and that most of her definition has shrunk into a type of mental and communications privacy, such as private photos and contexts of sexual relationships. However, Azad Ḫeme Emîn, the head of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS), who has participated in several media content regulations in the Kurdistan Region, asserts that understanding of privacy will differ from one nation to another. For example, while Swedes may consider privacy important, contrary to that, Kurds may pay no attention to it at all, and vice versa. As a result, personal privacy has been defined by Ḫeme Emîn (2015) as:

Private life, which is a natural and daily living of the people; for example, what I have for my diet or when I travel away, I will do my best to keep the details of the journey for myself. Although at present, privacy protection is getting much less and limited; namely, amongst our Kurdish society as a Middle Eastern nation, some social and emotional traditions are dying out under the influence of today’s internet. Privacy for our oriental people is more to embrace personal daily and emotional lives; therefore, this challenge [privacy] will face Eastern nations more, rather than the Western. (Interview with Azad Ḫemeemîn 2015)
These insights from a general secretary of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate have been supported by Dr. Saman Fewzi, a former journalist and now an assistant professor of media law and regulation. He highlights that in the Kurdistan Region, due to their profession, the journalists are often more working on publishing information related to personal private life rather than governmental bodies and commercial companies. According to his view, the KRG may have some private information on individuals, but it has not published and that it would be a crime if journalists revealed government or commercial secrets, as opposed to individuals. In this case, he indicated the common components of privacy, including emotional and family life.

To take a well-known example, when an official has divorced his wife it is not necessary to publish because he has not committed any crime. Perhaps his getting married to the second wife is not allowed by the law, which would make its discussion legitimate. Fewzi (2015) turns to another aspect of privacy, that of personal living space such as home or accommodation; because of private considerations or the security circumstances of the Kurdistan Region, somebody may not wish to reveal his or her living area, which is not important to the public to know.

For instance, during the general election campaigns, we have seen house photos of a candidate published due to his or her place being a little bigger but without any document produced by the media and journalists that would indicate a problem in terms of illegal financial sources.

In the Kurdistan Region, the journalists have further invaded the emotional life of persons because viewing the emotional life here is different from another country. To date, discussing on emotional life is being allowed by the law, but it is not permitted by the society. Therefore, someone expresses an attitude that in itself is not illegal, but when a journalist has access to that information and discloses, that is influenced by people that maybe is not the same in some countries. (Interview with Saman Fewzi 2014)

In his detailed clarification, financial matters have been defined as another component of the privacy concept. For instance, the salary for some positions is not subject to privacy as those positions are a public sphere, and the public has the right to know. However, for other persons, such as a doctor, asking how much is in his or her bank account is considered a part of privacy as the doctor may not wish others to know this information. Concerning a politician who has a significant amount of money, if the
financial information is presented by a journalist, that cannot be considered as an invasion of the privacy of a politician, yet revealing this information for others is part of invasion or intrusion into private life. Fewzi (2015) explains the health issue as another dimension of privacy, in which someone who may have an infectious patient and has not disseminated that, and it is not the journalists’ business to disclose this information. If a particular patient does not want to be named, this health information is part of private life, especially as the doctor has been required to swear to keep patient information private. Based on interviewee arguments, all these private life aspects can lead to invasions of information privacy. In Kurdish culture, such civil liberties as the right to privacy have been socially breached without raising serious questions on the immorality and illegality of invasion.

For similar reasons, it is necessary for more debate here about the roots of privacy invasions in the Kurdistan Region which have occurred against the backdrop of the political conflicts, notably during the election campaigns. Several political institutions along with their own intelligence organizations are ideologically and psychologically using some privacy aspects of persons against a given opposition or others. As Herdî (2015b) explained:

In Kurdistan, private life is mostly related to sex, all things that have been considered privacy in another country, it is normal here, including putting nude images of your children and talking about your private speeches and contacts, but only those things related to the sexuality of persons have been considered as privacy. Here, the systems are working to break up the fundamental point of personal private life which is the sexuality due to it being a huge taboo, and sexual relationships of figures are not naturally made. For instance, you have seen the majority of the families are looking happy while one or both partners has several illegal relationships with each other; that may result in such sex obsession. (Interview with Çoman Herdî 2015b)

As a global media matter, the debate on media intrusion into private life has been commenced amongst Kurdish journalism cultures. Hêmin Baqr ‘Ebidul is a deputy editor-in-chief of the Livîn (movement) magazine, his understanding of privacy concerns comes from a general principle that involves everyone being free to choose their lifestyle, including clothes, eating, relationships amongst himself or herself and family, correspondence, how they spend their entertainment time and those things that are personally important to keep from the knowledge of others, even in the physiological characteristics. For him, all of these embrace the framework of private
life, protection of which should be crucial for the journalists, regardless of the public figures with more limited privacy rights. Besides, he believes that while the invasions of people's private life are currently more prevalent in Kurdish online journalism, it has not become a phenomenon so far. Regardless of the coverage of events, the Kurdish journalists have tiny distinctions between the rights of private and public lives of ordinary people and public figures. On the contrary, 'Ebidul (2014) stated that people should be careful about one thing that regards to their personal definition of private life. It has often been proclaimed that private life or privacy has been invaded by media and journalists, but in reality, it has not been invaded. For instance, a news story was published on a Kurdish Member of Parliament who was involved in gathering money for the Anfal Campaign against Kurdish people by the [former Iraqi] Ba’ath party. This politician claimed that this was an issue of his private life in the past, but that story is in no shape or form related to his private life.

One more example is related to alcohol drinking by the Mela [an Islamic religious leader]; although it is part of the people’s private life, drinking alcohol for the Mela is not private life since it is contrary to a principle that he has proclaimed. When I have reported on dresses, or the car of an official’s wife became news or an official’s son has participated in an accident that should be reported, he said that you are talking about my private life. Indeed, I am as a journalist reporting on something that is important for people to know owing to the viewpoint of whether is there a news value, or no? Maybe someone said that the reporting on a sexual relationship is nasty, but in the perspectives of journalism, sex is one of the topics that has a news value. Therefore, since in the people’s subconscious a sexual relationship has value, even if it is only interested in people consciousness there is a public interest to publish sexual relationship stories. (Interview with Hêmin Baqr 'Ebidul 2014).

Within the above definitions, it can be concluded that while the understanding of privacy is similar to that of other countries, in the Kurdistan Region several aspects of private life are covered which are not allowed to be published without prior permission (See Chapter I). Regardless, the diversity of individuals’ responsibilities in the public sphere includes ordinary people who have far more privacy rights than celebrities and public figures due to their participation and accountability in front of the public. In opposition, the news media workers have been following different duties and responsibilities that allow them to use different journalistic methods in gathering, and also revealing, information privacy. Thus, from the different perspectives of interviewed participants can be understood several similarities and differences in perceptions.
All believed that the meaning of privacy, as transposed from Western and individualistic cultures to non-Western and collectivist cultures, is totally different. In Kurdish culture, privacy means an individual’s private life which is mostly covered by sexual orientations as talking about sex, alongside politics and religion, is one of the main taboos in such non-individualistic and non-democratic cultures. However, there are differences in reference to the roots of privacy invasions, with some referring to the cultural differences in privacy among individuals in the Kurdistan Region and Sweden for example. Others considered the political conflicts as a fundamental root of information privacy invasions because Kurdish political parties have not believed in political competition so far, based on the political programme of providing relevant and necessary services in the public interest. Furthermore, they have not accepted election results without physical and psychological violations, and this also can be seen as a primary step of the political transition towards democracy in which invasion of information privacy has been used as a political agenda by the ruling class against the subordinate class. In comparison with Western media intrusion into private life which is concerned with online privacy leakages, governmental surveillance, and digital technologies such as phone-hacking, the Kurdish media, and their news media workers, are staying with the private sexual relationships of celebrities and public figures who have never tolerated publication of their private information. Otherwise, if anyone, journalists included, revealed such aspects of information privacy related to senior politicians and security officers, they would be kidnapped or even killed.

6.5. PRIVACY INVASIONS IN KURDISH MEDIA

On 6th May 2010, a Kurdish freelance journalist was found dead after publishing an article entitled: I love Mes'ud Barzani's daughter (Osman 2010), which used an ironic polemical style against the corruption and nepotism of the Kurdistan Regional president’s family; Serdeşit 'Usman (23-year-old) was kidnapped outside the university campus in Hewlêr (Erbil), the capital city of Iraqi Kurdistan. Barzani's security forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party were accused since they controlled the Yellow Zone of the Region (see Chapters IV and V). In this case, a Kurdish journalist was clearly killed by unknown gunmen after criticizing the private life of one of the senior public figures (RSF2010).
As the Reporters Without Borders for Freedom of Information affirmed, Serdeşit 'Usman was the first journalist in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region to be murdered since Soran Mame 'Eme (20 years old). Two years earlier, Soran also wrote several articles and investigative reporting on sexual relationships between the local politicians and security officials with prostitutes before being gunned down outside his home in a suburb of the northern city of Kirkuk on 21st July 2008. In both cases, revealing information privacy of public figures caused the killing of journalists by unknown gunmen (RSF 2010). Such incidents frequently become the prominent features of political and media transitions to democracy, notably in post-conflict countries, where the democratic institutions, including news media and journalists, are not allowed by the ruling political class to become independent and professional. One more example of an intrusion into private life involved a female parliamentary candidate (İvar İbrahîm) of the Change Movement (CM) opposition party. A fake video containing sexual material which purported to feature İbrahîm was made and published online by political rivals during the election campaigns on 25th July 2009. This video footage caused psychological harm to a Change candidate, who eventually used this video as part of an election campaign to reveal the unscrupulous and unprofessional agendas of the ruling political parties against their opposition. Behind election candidates and politicians, other figures are celebrities who have been pestered by the news media, and also ordinary people. As the anchor of a well-known Kurdish program, Evîn, Jn û Jiyan (Evîn, women, and life); Evîn Aso has consistently had her privacy rights interfered with, a fake sexually explicit video being published on YouTube and her story then being reproduced or reported in the media outlets. She has declared that she is one of the main Kurdish women to be victims of privacy invasion due to the various prevalent forms of discrimination, and also asserted that everyone, including celebrities and public figures, has the right to privacy. Concerning those intrusions into her private life, Evîn stated that:

Since the effects of my media activities, such as providing many modern entertainment programs that led to a large increase in viewers, I became one of the main victims of privacy rights in the Kurdistan Region. Most of the information, pictures, and video footage that were published on my private life were not true, and this publicity was more apparent for most of the people, but this publicity was not believed by most of the people. Unfortunately, the Kurdish online media in the Kurdistan Region has often carried out information privacy invasions, particularly during the crucial times of election campaigns and political conflicts. These online attacks may be related to the anonymity of the trespass and non-regulated online content media. (Email interview with Evîn Aso 2014)
These above-mentioned cases of intrusion into private life have led to the question of the balance in information privacy between individuals’ right to protect their private information and the public’s right to know has been widely discussed amongst Kurdish news media workers, regulators, and those whose private life has been invaded. Journalists working in Kurdish media organizations have been often accused of having minimum standards of journalistic professionalism and limited knowledge of privacy rights. Based on the current research results, this criticism holds true but only to some extent. The journalists still face several challenges, including the hegemony of political parties on the news media outlets, and the limited free media environment in which to work professionally. Also, the lack of right to access public information, the inadequate or undemocratic media content regulations, unequal and unhealthy competitions between media organization owners and their media workers remain significant obstacles.

To better understand the Kurdish journalists' professional role perceptions, the respondents were asked in this study to indicate one of eight motivations in examining private items of information or information privacy to reveal newsworthy stories. As Figure 6.13 shows that 47.9% of the Iraqi Kurdish journalists believed that it is "in the public's right to know", to reveal the private information of celebrities and public figures, therefore they should be accountable to the public. In addition, 34.5% of respondents referred to their "search of a new beat" in revealing such private information. Also, 26.8% of the journalists were persuaded that "it is the nature" of their job, as well as 19.0% who relied on this type of information as part of the "news values of journalism". Only 14.8% of the respondents said that they were "loyal to their editors or media owners". Otherwise, other findings suggest that 8.5% of the participants were "unaware of sources' privacy rights"; notably the news sources are mostly officials or public figures, and there is a common view that sources should be protected amongst news media workers who consider themselves as senior observers or Fourth Estate representatives. For 6.4% of the journalists, the main motivation behind their revealing private information is related to their "media policy", particularly some news media organizations are constantly working on private information as a profitable way to make more money or they basically believe that the public figures and celebrities have zero privacy rights.
From those results can be understood that the public’s right to know is the most frequently stated motivation for Kurdish journalists to reveal private information, while the political and financial loyalty of the media workers to their media ownership seems more motivated in reality. These seem quite a contrast at first glance, but, especially during political crises and general election campaigns, the news media workers become loyal party members who are directed to breach most professional journalism ethics, including the respect of privacy. Since ownership of most of the Kurdish news media is in the hands of the political ruling parties and their political partners who monopolize more than 95% of the news media organizations in the Kurdistan Region, therefore media hegemony has been used to generalize a particular ideology of ruling class of a traditional tribe or sectarians over subordinate classes and social groups. For similar reasons, it is necessary here to present a singular legal case of Kurdish media intrusion into private life in such a post-conflict and undemocratic situation.

On 29th October 2013, a Kurdish weekly newspaper and its editor in chief were fined six million Iraqi Dinars (3,752,836 GBP) by a local court of the Kurdistan Region. The newspaper offense was related to its invasion into private life concerning İhsan Mela 'Ebidul'eziz’s private photograph and his relationship with a foreign woman. In this news story, 'Ebidul'eziz was interviewed as a general director of the international relationships of the Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM) in Europe. On 3rd June 2015, 'Ebidul'eziz, as a victim, asked for a further 100 million Iraqi Dinars (62,512,3086 GBP) as personal compensation for losing his dignity and social reputation.
The punishment was based on the 2007 Press Law No. (35) that restricts the revealing of private information even if it is true. In this case, the newspaper Awene (Mirror) published Ebidul'ezîz's intimacy photo as a front page news story in issue 114 on 25th March 2008 (Xendan 2016). While the public's right to know information that was in the public interest was used by the Awene newspaper and its editor in chief as their essential primary justification, this appeal was finally not accepted by the court, who indicted them as criminal intruders into the KIM political leader's private life. As regards his legal case, Ebidul'ezîz in 2014 has been exclusively interviewed for the current study. He confirmed that the Awene newspaper published a non-genuine picture in which its story refers to older political conflicts in the era of civil war between his party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1994. Furthermore, he stated that this information was discussed off the record after recording and completing the interview, and there was no talk of having such private photos, and the Awene published without getting his prior permission.

I know all details of the faking pictures process which were mixed by the Iran State due to I reported some quotes against a neighbor country of the Kurdistan Region as well as, at that time, we were in the war. Therefore, I told the Awene correspondent that approximately 15 years passed on this story and this issue was ancient, going back to the era of the war. Besides, I do not want to talk about it again because we are now in the peace agreement with all parties. I told the reporter I was living in Britain during the 10-15 years, and I went to all public places there, including the universities, offices, and markets. If anyone comes to take a picture, someone else usually will appear who is not wearing Islamic clothes. Since I am not living in Mecca - a holy city of the Saudi Arabia - for that reason these pictures and its story are not necessary to publish, then, the reporter said ‘OK, I just wanted to know about it for myself.’ (Interview with İhsan Mela 'Elî 'Ebidul'ezîz 2014)

In contrast, Şwan Muşemed, a former editor in chief of the Awene newspaper, in an exclusive interview for this study, has mostly refused Ebidul'ezîz’s arguments. Muşemed (2015) firmly asserted that fifteen original pictures were taken in Ebidul'ezîz’s office and then validated by court experts such as the Kurdistan Photographers Union (KPU).

Concerning the originality of the photos we did not lose this legal case; though the judge has finally decided that it is an invasion of information privacy, and then the court accused me and Awene newspaper as trespassers into Ebidul'ezîz’s private life. While we vigorously advocated that Ebidul'ezîz was a public figure who has no private life, the judge was
not persuaded. On professionality, this case is one of the exceptional instances that provided all journalistic standards. When we got these photos waiting for two months and a half until Ebidul'ezîz came back to Kurdistan, then we clearly during an on-the-record interview asked him about his intimate pictures and he replied that ‘I am not sitting in Mecca.’ After its publishing, one of the political bureau officials of his party verbally abused our reporter on the phone. (Interview with Şwan Muşemed 2015)

From the above legal case of Kurdish media intrusion into private life can be learned four main points. First and foremost, it is difficult to legally separate those who have been well-known as public or non-public figures as well as to separate private or non-private spaces due to the vagueness around the legality system of penal statutes. Next, protection of civil liberties such as the right to privacy is not a political or cultural issue so far, because of a lower awareness of the political party system, misunderstanding of the Islamic religion in which some of the religious leaders who have considered themselves as God’s representatives have not tolerated others interfering in their private life, while they have themselves agreed to become public figures in the society and interfered in others’ private lives via their public speeches in the mosque. Following that, the Kurdish professional journalists are still challenged by conflicts among political parties, social mores, economic crises, and a plethora of weaknesses in media policy and regulation. Furthermore, the Kurdistan legislations have no clear distinction between legal charges for libel, defamation and trespasses of privacy rights, which have been judged as the same offense and liable to the same fine. If one of these crimes has been published in the Kurdish media, the ‘journalist and the Editor-in-General shall be charged a fine no less than 1 million [Iraqi Dinars] and no more than 5 million ID’ (Press Law 2007: Article 9.1). In relation to libel and defamation, the former Iraqi print law precisely distinguishes between public figures and ordinary people. According to Article (433) in the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code, when any piece of information about a public figure is published the journalists would not be faced with any accountability if their information is supported by evidence. This means that for those types of official figures, the journalists have more freedom than for an ordinary person without public responsibility.

In the latter case, even if the accusation is true, and there are evidence and proof in front of the court, the journalists still face a legal investigation or even legal charges. A Kurdish human rights activist, Asos Herdî, confirmed that the journalists have been required to separate between public figures and ordinary people, at least according to the 1969 legislations.
He believes that the best way to draw a line between private and public figures is that, as long as an individual's conduct is covered by the law and universal human rights, it is deemed as a personal matter or privacy, and the journalists should not approach them. In addition, the legal framework is a controversial concept, and connecting law with human rights could be a more convenient framework (Interview with Herdî 2015a). Within these debates, it can be seen that the legal framework of the Kurdistan Region restricts journalists from publishing any private information on individuals, whether ordinary people, celebrities or public figures. "Anything related to the secrets of the private lives of individuals, even if true, if it offends them" (Press Law 2007: Article 9.1). In this sense, the public's right to know private information about ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures is limited based on the local legislations that refer to the Islamic Sharia Laws. As discussed in the literature review chapter, the Islamic vision of privacy goes back to the religious concept of “Hurma” that is closest to the idea of privacy in the English vocabulary (Guindi 1999). According to the context, the word “Hurma” involves two meanings: first, a woman; a sacred time like the holy month in the Islamic religion, and also a sacred space such as home or mosque. Second, anything that is illegal to take or watch outdoors without prior permissions. Both meanings are deemed pure and should remain secure, and also any interference with their sanctity is deemed sinful. In the Quran, privacy is considered in relation to a law because encouraging the respect of others through information Muslims to avoid bad behaviors and this can affect to an invasion of others’ privacy (Abokhodair and Vieweg 2016). From this religious perspective, it can be concluded that the Islamic Sharia Laws are being used as the central principle of legislation in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region, while Western laws principally rely on the universal declaration of human rights (1948) which is unfavorable or un conducive to the Sharia requirements; therefore this can be identified as one of the main differences between Western and non-Western cultures in understanding shifting boundaries of privacy.

In this study, the working journalists were asked to determine their agreement levels on three aspects of private life in Kurdish journalism practices. These figures were scored on a five-point scale, where 1 related to ‘extremely important’ and 5 related to ‘not important at all’. As Figure 6.14 indicates, 38.4% of the respondents thought that ‘public figures’ are ‘very important’ persons whose private life is a legitimate target for gaining information, followed by 37.2% who view ‘celebrities’ such as stars in art and cinema as ‘somewhat important’ figures; however, for 36.7% of the respondents ‘ordinary people’ and their information privacy are ‘not important at all’ although in
certain instances of media intrusion into private life, the news media workers do not
care about the differences in accountability between ordinary people and others. As
results confirm, the majority (75.6%) of Kurdish journalists are still following the
information privacy of celebrities and public figures rather than ordinary people, as the
information privacy of the latter group is not newsworthy or deemed in the public
interest until they become extraordinary for whatever reasons, including being affected
by such personal values as discriminations of race and gender.

Figure 6-14: More available figures who can be covered their information of private life.

The Kurdish working journalists were also given a chain of personal issues and asked
to classify the importance of private life information which they think could be
reported in the course of their professional productions of news stories. Based on the
previous studies, eleven items were presented that were scored on a five-point scale,
where 1 means ‘strongly agree’, and 5 means ‘strongly disagree’. As Figure 6.15 shows,
the five highest percentages of personal issues that can be reported by the Iraqi
Kurdish journalists are health matters (45.8%), banking/financial issues (45.1%),
marital status and history (36.6%), along with family issues (33.8%), and career
development (21.8%). The lowest scores for private issues concerned employment
history (12.7%), personal arrangements, including trips and events (11.3%), social life
such as meeting friends and family (10.6%), and personality traits, for instance,
behavior and attitudes (9.2%). More interestingly, the rest of the respondents (12.7%)
totally refused to work on private information at all due to security reasons and their
integrity as a journalist being threatened by such a stance, while some thought that covering and revealing any private information about any personalities is not part of the ethical standards of journalism practices. Also, such pieces of information privacy did not involve the public interest and were not of social importance, particularly in such a post-conflict, non-individualistic and undemocratic culture as the Kurdistan Region. From these results can be understood that the Kurdish journalists are mostly familiar with the available figures whose information privacy of private life can be revealed. Meanwhile, based on the different personal and professional values they have dissimilar criteria in choosing the important issues of information privacy that can be reported. For some news media workers, covering and revealing the health matters of others, including celebrities and public figures is ‘more important’ due to the high news values of topics that are interesting to media audiences and who arguably have a right to know such information. For example, when the first Kurdish president of Iraq; Celal Tallebanî (7 April 2005 and 24 July 2014) was ill, there was widespread interest among the Iraqi people in his health, while other issues of information privacy have less appeal to audiences in Kurdish media coverage.

**Figure 6-15:** Personal issues of information privacy that can be reported by the Kurdish journalists.

Within the above quantitative results, Ebubekr (2015) asserted that it is reasonable to talk about the public figures’ private matters, but it is not acceptable to speak about the private lives of ordinary people, who are not newsworthy.
According to these news values, the higher the rank of individuals, the more limits will be placed on their privacy rights. Based on this rule, protecting the right to individual privacy does not contradict the notions of freedom of expression and media freedom since the media provides people with prestige rather than ridiculing their reputations. He also observed that all media outlets in the Kurdistan Region have a political agenda but they do not have a precise media policy to separate their professional values from other hidden goals of the media owners. That leads to the growth of various ethical and legal obstacles, especially for those media organizations and their news workers who are being supported by the ruling political parties and their politician elites.

In my opinion, publishing any material about the personality of an individual, not their performance and behaviour, would generate hatred by the people and society toward those persons. When we defame the name of individuals without a care about their prior permission in the name of newsworthiness and the public’s right to know, we breach the ethics of journalism. Lack of professionalism and less experience in the profession of journalism are two main reasons, regardless, economic, political and social reasons which are producing psychological harm for Kurdish journalists’ personality. Most justifications of the Kurdish journalists are not substantiated; they have less awareness about the ethics of journalism, and breaches are everywhere. It has become part of the social culture. (Interview with Hevall Ebubekr 2015)

Since information about the revenue of oil and gas sectors production and consumption are vague, the private life of a minister of natural resources in the KRG along with his former wife has been subjected to considerable reportage in the Kurdish media. In this case, covering and revealing private information has been used as a justifiable method for gathering public information that is more important to the public's right to know because it is in the public interest. Kurdish employees have not been paid their full wages since 2014 when the Iraqi central government called a halt to the Kurdistan budget due to disputes over KRG’s oil agreements, as well as the economic and political conflicts with ISIS. However, there are several cases of media intrusion into private life that come from the misuse of professional role orientations of journalists and their limited knowledge and experience in investigating journalism (see Chapters IV and V). Another reason may be related to the personality of some media workers, who are interested in controlling others' information privacy by taking advantage of the journalism profession. For instance, for the sake of gifts or making more money, some news workers are non-professionally aiding and abetting the ruling and non-ruling political parties and their leaders by publishing items of information.
privacy, notably on social media networks via the anonymity afforded to internet users. Furthermore, the absence of individualism in Iraqi Kurdish society and the dominance of the political thinking of the ruling class are other reasons for violations of the right to privacy. With the above cases in mind, the working journalists were asked to indicate their levels of agreement with nine definitions of ‘the public interest’, which is not easily defined. These descriptions come from Morrison and Svennevig’s (2007) study and its definitions were retested in this current research project. Based on their primary outcomes, which have provided the term ‘social importance’ as a new concept instead of the ‘public interest’, due to the notion of social importance, which has been adopted in this study. This is truly scalable regarding intensity, in its possible applications, and also operationalizable. Accordingly, Morrison and Svennevig’s (2007) study might have been much more relevant to the current study if the authors had addressed the question of whether British mainstream media and journalists affect privacy rights of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures. Their results remain relevant, especially in the case of comparisons of developed versus developing democracies, and also Western versus non-Western cultures, for a better understanding of such concepts as the public interest and privacy. As Figure 6.16 shows, the Kurdish journalists were most likely to define “the public interest” concept as “the public rights” (55.3%), followed by 50.4% who defined it as “the national interest”, and 35.5% of the participants viewed it as “interests of the public”. While 14.2% of the respondents understood “the public interest” as “unwarranted intrusion”, it was viewed by 6.4% of the journalists as a “media excuse”, and only 2.9% of the participants understood it as “warranted intrusion”.

![Figure 6-16: The public interest concepts in the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists.](image-url)
In addition, for 43.9% of the respondents, “the public interest” was known as the “public effects, personal interests, local/community interest”. From these results can be noticed that, while the concepts of the public interest have been specified in the current survey, the concepts of the public interest have still not been well understood by the Kurdish working journalists. As a result, this study has decided to use Morrison and Svennevig’s new concept of ‘social importance’ rather than the ‘public interest’, especially when the Kurdish news media workers make a decision regarding issues of private information or information privacy.

For similar reasons, the working journalists were asked to indicate their agreement levels on seven assessments which cover what they consider acceptable acts in gathering information privacy during daily journalism practices. These assessments are more important in terms of learning the used methods of journalists in gathering private information in their daily professional work. These elements were also scored on a five-point scale, where 5 means ‘not acceptable at all’ and 1 means ‘extremely acceptable’.

As Figure 6.17 indicates, the secret observation of individuals was not acceptable at all for 57.7% of the respondents, followed by 31.3% of the journalists who thought replaying recordings of any CCTV was somewhat acceptable, and another 23.9% of respondents who felt that pretending to be someone else or going undercover to get information had only a little acceptability. In contrast, approximately 17.6% of the journalists deemed it very acceptable to record audio or video materials without sources’ permission, along with searching or ransacking people’s houses/offices and so on. Roughly half as many (8.9%) of the participants agreed that eavesdropping on people’s conversations and using a long-lens camera were extremely acceptable. These results assert that the Kurdish working journalists are still not familiar with non-acceptable acts in gathering private information that may be linked to restrictions on investigative journalism practices in the Kurdistan Region, although some of these actions may be acceptable in some circumstances where such options are the only ones available for journalists to perform their journalistic roles.
In this study, the working journalists were asked to determine their agreement levels on ten aspects which include the common aspects of private life in Kurdish journalism practices. As discussed in the previous chapters, these issues are significant in discussions of privacy in order to classify the main aspects of private life. The following items were produced by the current study based on the work of Gerard (2012) and Morrison and Svennevig (2007). These elements were scored on a five-point scale, where 5 related to ‘strongly agree’ and 1 related to ‘strongly disagree’. As Figure 6.18 indicates, 61.0% of the Kurdish journalists strongly disagreed with invading personal family issues or intimate marital secrets. These aspects seem to have been influenced by the cultural understanding of the Kurdish journalists, including religious principles. This was followed by 51.7% of the respondents who somewhat agree with the invasion of the aspects of individual privacy in the course of political events, such as voting, finance, salary and bank accounts. These results seem a little unusual since the banking system and its culture are not more common in Kurdish society due to the lack of banking trust; more than half of participants refused to reveal information privacy of financial affairs. These results are also anomalous in terms of voting because some individuals who have affiliated with political ruling parties in recent elections have sworn to let their affiliated parties know whether they vote for their candidates or not.
This happened particularly during the 2009 elections in which the opposition parties for the first time won one-third of the Kurdistan Parliament seats. However, 39.8% of the respondents somewhat disagree with invading information relating to personal health problems or medical information, along with the personal decisions such as marriage and abortion. This percentage is more predictable because most doctors in the Kurdistan Region are still seeing and investigating several patients together in a single room, so this data confirms that Kurdish patients and individuals who enter into non-marital relationships do not have a full right to privacy thus far. This mostly refers to the dominance of the Islamic religion in Middle Eastern cultures, which does not allow sexual relationships without prior formal marriage based on Islamic Sharia Laws. By contrast, only 20.21% of the respondents strongly agree with invading personal photos, video footage and sound recordings, email and social media accounts, along with personal phone hacking, including phone calls and SMS.

**Figure 6-18:** Common components of private life which have been invaded in Kurdish journalism practices.

While information privacy invasions in journalism cultures have been defined as ethical and legal issues that are quite complicated in terms of media content regulation (Morrison and Svennevig 2007), these results reinforce that family privacy is still more important than individual privacy in Kurdish daily life. In this context, the private lives of celebrities and public figures, or those who have been named as such by news-workers are most often invaded. According to Gauthier (2002), hard news is unlikely to be of interest to much of the news audience, and some of these privacy stories may concern individuals who have hitherto been unfamiliar to the public. Notwithstanding, once the news media covers someone and brings him or her to public attention,
including by heroic action or simply through being the victim of a crime or tragedy, that person may be deemed a public figure, at least by news organizations and reporters, if not amongst the broader public. If this happens, the “accidental” public figure's privacy is also at risk. In this study, the working journalists were asked to define their agreement levels according to six common expression styles which are using the Kurdish news media workers for revealing information about private life. These journalistic methods of expression are more relevant to this study in identifying the considerable and appropriate style. These elements were scored on the two-points scale, where ‘Yes’ related to the participant's agreement and ‘No’ related to their disagreement.

As Figure 6.19 shows, the majority (64.5%) of participants thought that 'news and reports' are a more popular style for revealing details of private information on others, particularly information privacy on celebrities and public figures due to their newsworthy values, followed by 39.0% of the respondents who considered the interviews style a legitimate method, in addition to 17.7% who desired to use 'opinion articles'. While 8.5% of participants believed that the 'caricature' has been used in revealing private information, only 2.1% of them tended to apply the style of advertising. From these results can be seen that while news and reports are the most available journalistic forms because of their wider influence on media audiences. Another reason could be related to the culture of reading which is not common amongst Kurdish individuals who have marked preferences for watching rather than listening or reading long prose items of information or opinion articles.
The current study has asked the working journalists to determine their agreement levels with four common claims of privacy invasion. As discussed in the literature review, these elements are important to debate privacy in order to classify the main types of privacy invasion. The following claims were produced by the current study based on the earlier work of Prosser (1960), these claims also being scored on the two-points scale, where ‘Yes’ referred to participants' agreement and ‘No’ their disagreement. As Figure 6.20 indicates, 46.5% of the respondents identified privacy invasion as “publicity” which means setting a person up through using fabrication and photographs out of context. This type of privacy invasion has been seen to be more applicable during general election campaigns or political conflicts. This was followed by 42.3% of the working journalists who thought that invasion of privacy means “public disclosure” of embarrassing private facts, including personal matters. Also, 39.4% of participants considered privacy invasion as an “intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or solitude”, such as the home, photographs and tape recordings. In this survey, only 19.0% of the respondents thought privacy invasion means an “appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness”, which is more applicable in cases of advertising, property, and copyright.

![Figure 6-20: Common claims of privacy invasion in the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists.](image-url)

From these results, it can be understood that the Kurdish working journalists in the Kurdistan Region are inconsistent in their understanding of each type of the four common claims of privacy invasion. While they have usually trespassed or invaded others' private life based on their professional judgment levels of the news values with regard to various...
responsibility of various characters in society, in making such decisions, Kurdish culture and its desires or attitudes surrounding privacy have continuously affected news media workers in their media coverage of events and information. By the same token and according to Prosser (1960), the working journalists were asked in this study to determine their agreement levels on three common types of intrusion into private life, which are preconditions of privacy invasion. These are also important to classifying the main types of 'intrusion' into private life. These types, too, were scored on the two-points scale, where ‘Yes’ means participants’ agreement and ‘No’ indicates their disagreement. As Figure 6.21 shows, a common type of intrusion into private life for 47.5% of the respondents is “trespass”, which means news-gathering in private space like a bedroom, without valid consent. This trespass intrusion is mostly carried out by independent photographers, such as paparazzi who take photos of politicians, entertainers, athletes, and other celebrities. Tabloid journalism, paparazzi and such media networks as Wikileaks do not always care about prior consent if they desire to publish information or private pictures (CNN 2016 and Derthick 2013). In addition, another 42.6% of the respondents viewed intrusion as a “misrepresentation”, which refers to invalid or exceeded consent which is often apparent in the context of undercover reporting. The rest of the participants (31.9%) identified another type of intrusion into private life as “secret surveillance”, using bugging equipment, hidden cameras, and other electronic aids. This type is more common in liberal democratic countries and Western media and its journalism cultures rather than undemocratic and non-Western cultures.

From the above results, it can be concluded that the Kurdish working journalists are more familiar with “publicity” invasions of privacy that mean fabrication or invention and photographs out of context. This type is more prevalent in Kurdish media productions, particularly amongst partisan media workers during general election campaigns. “Trespass” is also a common type of Kurdish media intrusion into private life. Culturally, the Kurdish collective society has a powerful social influence, whereby invasion has been socially allowed without accusations of trespassing. There is no clear boundary between an individual’s private space and that of their family and surrounding the community, including extended family members, teachers, and elders. Furthermore, media workers interfere in people’s private lives without seeing this as an invasion of privacy rights, therefore these unwritten cultures are particularly common in the cases of marriage and career, predominantly for women and especially in conservative, rural or small urban areas.
Figure 6-21: Common types of intrusion into private lives in the professional role perceptions of the Kurdish journalists.

Using the Kantian, Utilitarian and Transfer of Power ethical theories, the main cases of invasion of information privacy in the various periods including the political crisis and general election campaigns will be evaluated. These ethical theories can shed useful light against the backdrop of the value of privacy. The news media, editors, and reporters have appeared who could not make a decision according to respecting the persons and distinguishing them with things or particular purposes, predicting the potential harms and benefits, and also the transfer of power among news productions and news consumers. Regardless, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has had several fundamental issues relating to its systems of political, economic, social and legalization frameworks, including media content regulation and professional ethics, media ownership, media management, access to information, and discrimination on many levels (see Chapters IV and V).

Based on the Kantian theory discussed in the second chapter, since the things and persons are distinctions in the actions of people, the respect principle performs a significant role in analyzing the invasion of personal privacy. Within the Kantian model, the public’s need to know about information relating to important aspects of their lives may lead to media intrusion into private lives and invasions of their private information. In opposition, according to the application of the ethical principle of respect for persons, the public should commence with the presumption of respecting their choices regarding private life, as well as respecting the choice of topics in their stories. In this case, making a weighted or a finely judged comparison between the public's necessary information, and the importance of suitable choices is crucial but fraught with difficulty.
In such a comparison, journalists and their news media organizations need to address the following questions when they make a decision on a news story that contains information privacy:

Why is this information considered private by the subject of the story? Do these reasons make sense? [...] Would I want to keep this information private, if it concerned me? [...] How important is it to the subject and the subject’s life that this information is kept private? [...] For what specific life choices does the public need this information? [...] Are these relatively trivial or significant choices? How vital is this information to those choices? [...] Is similar information available from public sources? (Gauthier 2002:24)

Within these questions, in keeping with Utilitarian theory, the news media organizations and journalists have been requested to examine or to weigh competing claims when they are making a decision on revealing information privacy. To justify a full invasion of information privacy, the individual editors or reporters must be reasonably sure that the information revealed will absolutely benefit the public good as the community at large commonly understands it. In other words, in wielding their considerable power to uncover and reveal private information, the news professionals must avoid the imposition of their own perceptions of the public good on the rest of society. Moreover, the news media and journalists have adopted the theory of a 'Transfer of Power' to analyze the invasions of information privacy that produce the notion of individual privacy as "our control over who has access to us and to information about us" (Gauthier 2002:25-26). This theory, in similar ways to the Kantian and the Utilitarian models, has suggested that the news media organizations, editors, and reporters identify precisely the purpose of privacy invasion. This demand refers to the stripping power of the media that transfers from the person whose privacy is infringed to the public. In assessing such reporting, the most compelling idea here is classifying the purpose for which this unauthorized transfer of power occurred. In such a comparison, some questions need to be addressed: "Why would the members of the public need or even want the power over an individual gained by having information the person wishes to keep private? The most apparent reason, and possibly the only justifiable reason, may be a counterweight to the power the individual in question has, or may in the future have, over them" (Ibid:27). Behind these three ethical models can be suggested a Priority Model by the current study to examine competing claims when overcoming the barriers between the Kurdish journalists and their news organizations and the public when they make a decision on revealing information privacy within journalism daily practices (see Chapter II).
The news organizations and their media workers can be learned by the **Priority Model**, how to evaluate their professional or even personal decisions regarding any process of private information which are not easy to reveal in their journalism practices. Within this model, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the ethical and legal standards in producing a professional media production, as journalism is a responsibility with high ethical dimensions which are more important to the profession and the wider society than the pursuit of sensationalism and market profits. For similar reasons, the respondents in this study were asked to indicate their agreement levels on seven elements to identify the professional accountability of Kurdish journalists in revealing and publishing information privacy.

![Graph showing professional accountability of Kurdish journalists](image)

**Figure 6.22:** Professional accountability of the Kurdish journalists in revealing and publishing the information privacy.

As Figure 6.22 shows, most of the Kurdish journalists (66.9%) felt that they were firstly responsible to their own conscience in revealing and publishing information on private life. Almost as many, 62.0% of the participants, felt accountable to the general public or audience, while 23.3% of the journalists felt that they were responsible for their sources of information and regular readers. Interestingly, only 15.6% felt accountable to their media owners, employers, and colleagues. These results suggest that the working journalists are more accountable towards their own conscience rather than media owners who have dominated on most media contents. This indicates that the news media workers personally consider their professional values to be important but sometimes have been affected by non-professional values, including political or ideological demands in revealing private information about opposition politicians to their media owners.
6.6. ASSOCIATIONS OF PRIVACY AND PROFESSIONALISM IN KURDISH JOURNALISM

As discussed in previous chapters, one of the main aims of the current study is to identify the association between professional role orientations of journalists and their perceptions on information privacy invasions in the context of Kurdish media intrusion into the private lives of ordinary people, celebrities, and public figures. In this research project, the term 'association' statistically means significant or no significant chance. This statistical technique was developed in the early twentieth century for testing the significance of results where the p-value is the probability of attaining outcomes at least as extreme as those observed. Therefore, the null hypothesis is true, and also the significance level, α, is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis, given that it is true (Sham et al., 2014 and Johnson 2013). In statistics, p-value refers to the probability role for chance value, in this sense, if the p-value is bigger than or equal to 0.05, this means that statistically there are no significant associations between variables. In contrast, if the p-value is smaller than 0.05, this means that the association is significant statistically; meanwhile, if the p-value is smaller than 0.01 or 0.001, this means that there are high significant statistical associations amongst various variables.

At this time, the word significance does not imply importance and the phrase statistical significance is not the same as research, practical or theoretical significance.

As Babbie (2013) and Faherty (2008) explain, the phrase clinical significance comes from the practical importance of a treatment effect. In statistical hypothesis testing as Borror (2009) and Sirkin (2005) elucidate, the statistically significant results or statistical significances are earned whenever the observed p-value of a test statistic is less than the significance level defined for the study. In any observation or experiment study which includes drawing a sample from a population, there is constantly the possibility that an observed effect would have occurred because of sampling error alone. However, if the p-value of an observed effect is less than the significance level, that effect reflects the features of the whole population, such as the journalists used as the population of this study, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. As explained in the methodology chapter, a significance level is selected before collection of the data and is typically set to 5% or much lower, based on the study fields (Babbie 2013; Faherty 2008; Craparo 2007; McKillup 2006; Sirkin 2005 and Sproull 2002).
Accordingly, in examining the research questions and hypothesis, eight leading associations amongst distinct variables have been statistically identified, therefore this subchapter intends to describe the level of associations between shifting boundaries of privacy understandings and different cultures in Kurdish journalism practices in the case of the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq. In the following pages, the results and their significances will be explained.

6.6.1. Journalist Experiences and Privacy Concepts

In discovering the association between six concepts of privacy and five experiences of the group of journalists, the findings reported in Table 6.6 failed to provide empirical support for the first hypothesis in that the experience, whether greater or lesser, of Kurdish journalists is not related to their perceptions of privacy concepts such as "personhood" or "intimacy". Given that, their p-values are higher than 0.05, which statistically means that there is no significant association between these variables. The results show that the years of journalistic experience have less relevance than might be expected in understanding the Kurdish journalists’ attitudes towards privacy concepts. One of the main reasons may relate to an absence of the understanding of privacy boundaries in non-individualist cultures, as an interviewee in this study confirmed. In other words, these results suggest that the concepts of privacy did not correspond with journalists’ years of experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-6: Association between professional experiences of Kurdish journalists and the concepts of privacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of Privacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to be left alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to the self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy and concealment of information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In examining the motivations that influence Kurdish journalists' decision-making when they encounter privacy issues, Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate that there are several significant associations amongst the internal and external influences on news work and types of intrusion into private life. On the one hand, the results show empirical support for the first part of the second hypothesis that internal influences, such as profit expectations of the news organization, advertising considerations, and market and audience research lead to a type of mis-representational intrusion, which refers to invalid or exceeded consent. This is most likely in the context of undercover reporting, and types of secret surveillance using bugging equipment, hidden cameras, and other electronic devices. The p-values of each association are smaller than 0.05 and 0.01 or 0.001 which statistically mean that the relationships are a significant or high significant amongst various variables. Whereas, the personal views and values of internal influences on the journalists' news work have a weak relationship with a type of intrusion into private life that means trespass, including newsgathering in private space without valid consent. In this case, the p-values are over 0.05, which statistically means that there is no significant association between these variables.
Table 6-7: Association between the internal influences of kurdish journalists on news work and types of intrusion into private lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Influences on News Work</th>
<th>Types of Intrusion Into Private Lives</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
<th>P values</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes N (%)</td>
<td>No N (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of Trespass</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal views and values</td>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>13 (65.0)</td>
<td>7 (35.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>15 (44.1)</td>
<td>19 (55.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>17 (37.8)</td>
<td>28 (62.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>13 (56.5)</td>
<td>10 (43.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>8 (47.1)</td>
<td>9 (52.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of Misrepresentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising considerations</td>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>4 (36.4)</td>
<td>7 (63.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>4 (21.1)</td>
<td>15 (78.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>14 (35.9)</td>
<td>25 (64.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>20 (69.0)</td>
<td>9 (31.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>16 (43.2)</td>
<td>21 (56.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit expectations of the news</td>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>3 (27.3)</td>
<td>8 (72.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>4 (22.2)</td>
<td>14 (77.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>16 (41.0)</td>
<td>23 (59.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>23 (62.2)</td>
<td>14 (37.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>12 (38.7)</td>
<td>19 (61.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market and audience research</td>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>5 (55.6)</td>
<td>4 (44.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>6 (27.3)</td>
<td>16 (72.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>10 (25.0)</td>
<td>30 (75.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>25 (67.6)</td>
<td>12 (32.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>10 (38.5)</td>
<td>16 (61.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret surveillance</td>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>1 (11.1)</td>
<td>8 (88.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>12 (54.5)</td>
<td>10 (45.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>14 (35.0)</td>
<td>26 (65.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>5 (13.5)</td>
<td>32 (86.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>11 (42.3)</td>
<td>15 (57.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, the results indicate empirical support for the second part of the second hypothesis in this research project. In this sense, a strong relationship has been established with the external influences on news work, for instance, the professional organizations, such as journalism unions; the army, security and police organizations; advertisers; media laws and regulation, with two main types of intrusion into private life, including misrepresentation and trespass. The p-values of each relationship are smaller than 0.05 and 0.01 or 0.001 which statistically mean that the associations are a significant or high significant amongst various variables.
### Table 6-8: Association between the external influences of Kurdish journalists on news work and types of intrusion into private lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Influences on News Work</th>
<th>Types of Intrusion Into Private Lives</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
<th>P values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes N (%)</td>
<td>No N (%)</td>
<td>Type of Trespass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army, security and police organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>13 (76.5)</td>
<td>4 (23.5)</td>
<td>17 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>15 (55.6)</td>
<td>12 (44.4)</td>
<td>27 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>16 (50.0)</td>
<td>16 (50.0)</td>
<td>32 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>14 (40.0)</td>
<td>21 (60.0)</td>
<td>35 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>8 (30.8)</td>
<td>18 (69.2)</td>
<td>26 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advertisers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>2 (40.0)</td>
<td>3 (60.0)</td>
<td>5 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>9 (56.2)</td>
<td>7 (43.8)</td>
<td>16 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>21 (65.6)</td>
<td>11 (34.4)</td>
<td>32 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>8 (27.6)</td>
<td>21 (72.4)</td>
<td>29 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>26 (46.4)</td>
<td>30 (53.6)</td>
<td>56 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army, security and police organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>1 (5.9)</td>
<td>16 (94.1)</td>
<td>17 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>14 (51.9)</td>
<td>13 (48.1)</td>
<td>27 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>10 (31.2)</td>
<td>22 (68.8)</td>
<td>32 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>20 (57.1)</td>
<td>15 (42.9)</td>
<td>35 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>13 (50.0)</td>
<td>13 (50.0)</td>
<td>26 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media laws and regulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>9 (25.0)</td>
<td>27 (75.0)</td>
<td>36 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>27 (45.8)</td>
<td>32 (54.2)</td>
<td>59 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>16 (53.3)</td>
<td>14 (46.7)</td>
<td>30 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>2 (28.6)</td>
<td>5 (71.4)</td>
<td>7 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>4 (80.0)</td>
<td>1 (20.0)</td>
<td>5 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional organizations such as journalism unions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely influential</td>
<td>1 (11.1)</td>
<td>8 (88.9)</td>
<td>9 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very influential</td>
<td>7 (38.9)</td>
<td>11 (61.1)</td>
<td>18 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat influential</td>
<td>3 (12.0)</td>
<td>22 (88.0)</td>
<td>25 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little influential</td>
<td>18 (54.5)</td>
<td>15 (45.5)</td>
<td>33 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential at all</td>
<td>30 (56.6)</td>
<td>23 (43.4)</td>
<td>53 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From these results, it can be understood that market and audience research, advertising considerations, the profit expectations of the news organization are three main internal influences on news work, in which they have a higher relationship with two common types of intrusion into private life, including misrepresentation and secret surveillance. This relationship is clear in Kurdish journalism practices, particularly in those media organizations which have not affiliated with political parties, due to limited competition and financial support for independent media. For some, it places the onus on them and their news workers to compulsorily look to provide further financial profits rather than following such ethical standards as accuracy, objectivity and respecting the right to privacy. In contrast, the professional organizations such as journalism unions, army, security and police organizations, advertisers, media laws, and regulation are four main external influences on news work, which have a higher relationship with two main types of the intrusion into private life, such as misrepresentation and trespass. In other words, the Kurdish journalists in their news work have been influenced internally and externally, which means that they have limited professional autonomy for several reasons, not least the ideological hegemony of the ruling political parties and their politician elites.

6.6.3. Factors in becoming a Journalist, and Professional Activities in Kurdish Journalism

As mentioned before, four general professional activities have dominated Kurdish journalism practices: information gathering and investigation; news production which includes writing, editing and producing; presenting news or design and layout; editorial coordination, and management which includes attending meetings. Meanwhile, the findings suggest that there are six main factors behind people becoming journalists in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. These factors are related to serving the public, working as a watchdog in revealing corruption, supporting the particular agenda of a political party, having a degree in the fields of media and journalism, journalistic access to a wide audience, and remuneration. In this sense, it is important to answer the research hypothesis: is there a relationship between the professional activities (information gathering and investigation, news production, presenting news or design, editorial coordination or management) in Kurdish journalism and the personal factors involved in their becoming journalists?
As Table 6.9 indicates, there is a high significant statistical association among each of these activities and those factors in becoming a journalist. For those who want to contribute and serve the public or to reveal corruption and to work as a watchdog, in these cases, the p-value amongst these variables is smaller than 0.001. This is followed by 0.002 for those who have a degree in the fields of media and journalism, and 0.006 for those who thought that journalism would allow them to reach out to many people.

Above and beyond, there is a significant statistical association amongst the four professional activities in journalism and those individuals who became a journalist to support the particular agenda of the political party. The p-value of this association is 0.045; likewise, a p-value is 0.017 for those believed that the journalism provides them with a good salary. In contrast, statistically, there is no significant association between the four activities and each factor of those who entered journalism by accident, along with those for whom some of their family members and friends were journalists, the p-value of these associations being higher than 0.05.

Table 6.9: Association between factors to become a journalist and the professional activities in the Kurdish journalism with Mean ± Set. Deviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors to become a journalist</th>
<th>Four professional activities in journalism</th>
<th>P values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information gathering and investigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean ± S.D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to contribute and serve the public</td>
<td>32.57 ± 20.0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to reveal the corruption and to work as a watchdog</td>
<td>31.81 ± 21.6</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I entered journalism by accident</td>
<td>25.36 ± 19.5</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to support the particular agenda of political party</td>
<td>42.50 ± 19.4</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a degree in the fields of media and journalism</td>
<td>32.92 ± 19.7</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.6.4. Institutional Roles, Ethical Ideologies and Common Claims of Privacy Invasion

In identifying the professional role orientations of the Kurdish journalists, Table 6.10 shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between common claims of privacy invasion and institutional roles of global journalism cultures. The finding suggests that providing citizens with the information they need to make political decisions, set the political agenda, and act as a watchdog of the government are the three primary institutional roles of Kurdish journalists. These roles have no significant relationship with the three central claims of privacy invasion: namely, appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness in cases of advertising or property rights, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, and the publicity that places a person in a negative light such as fabrication or invention and photographs out of context. In this case, the p-values are bigger than 0.05, which statistically means that there is no significant association between these variables. However, conveying a positive image of political and business leadership is an institutional role of Kurdish journalists who have a stronger relationship with a common claim of privacy invasion that relates to intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or solitude such as the home, photographs and tape recording. The p-value here is smaller than 0.05, which statistically means that the association is significant.
### Table 6-10: Association between the institutional roles of journalism cultures and the common claims of privacy invasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Roles of Journalism Cultures</th>
<th>Common Claims of Privacy Invasion</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
<th>P values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes N (%)</td>
<td>No N (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Intrusion Upon a Person’s Seclusion or Solitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To convey a positive image of political and business leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>5 (71.4)</td>
<td>2 (28.6)</td>
<td>7 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>9 (100.0)</td>
<td>9 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>10 (33.3)</td>
<td>20 (66.7)</td>
<td>30 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>13 (40.6)</td>
<td>19 (59.4)</td>
<td>32 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>28 (43.8)</td>
<td>36 (56.2)</td>
<td>64 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide citizens with the information they need to make political decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>13 (18.6)</td>
<td>57 (81.4)</td>
<td>70 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>6 (14.3)</td>
<td>36 (85.7)</td>
<td>42 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>6 (30.0)</td>
<td>14 (70.0)</td>
<td>20 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>1 (14.3)</td>
<td>6 (85.7)</td>
<td>7 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as watchdog of the government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>31 (51.7)</td>
<td>29 (48.3)</td>
<td>60 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>14 (31.1)</td>
<td>31 (68.9)</td>
<td>45 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>11 (39.3)</td>
<td>17 (60.7)</td>
<td>28 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>4 (57.1)</td>
<td>3 (42.9)</td>
<td>7 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Publicity that places a person in a fails light</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>8 (47.1)</td>
<td>9 (52.9)</td>
<td>17 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>9 (47.4)</td>
<td>10 (52.6)</td>
<td>19 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>20 (42.6)</td>
<td>27 (57.4)</td>
<td>47 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>11 (47.8)</td>
<td>12 (52.2)</td>
<td>23 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>17 (48.6)</td>
<td>18 (51.4)</td>
<td>35 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From these relationships, it can be concluded that among the four models of journalism cultures, a common claim of privacy invasion is more related to the Critical Change Agent. In that aspect of Kurdish journalism culture, the journalists hold critical attitudes towards the government and business elites, but an interventionist impetus mainly drives them. They particularly emphasize the influencing of public opinion, setting the political agenda, and the importance of advocating social change. In this model, the journalists are most enthusiastic about motivating their audiences to participate in political discussion and civic activities. On the other hand, opportunistic methods of journalism are least defended by them, and they have a limited audience (Hanitzsch 2011:481 and see Chapter IV).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-11: Association between the ethical ideologies of journalism cultures and the common claims of privacy invasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Ideologies of Journalism Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim of Appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists should avoid questionable methods of reporting in any case, even if this means not getting the story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is ethical in journalism varies from one situation to another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are ethical principles which are so important that they should be followed by all journalists, regardless of situation and context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By contrast, another hypothesis from the third research question confirms that the results show a higher relationship among the ethical ideologies of Kurdish journalism cultures and the common forms of privacy invasion. As Table 6.11 indicates, two common claims of privacy invasion including “appropriation” and “publicity” have a stronger relationship with three main ethical ideologies: firstly, journalists should avoid questionable methods of reporting in any case, even if this means not getting the story. Secondly, there are ethical principles that are so important that all journalists should follow them, regardless of situation and context. The third ethical principle allows for pragmatism, acknowledging that what is ethical in journalism can vary from one situation to another. Each of these has significant relationships that statistically refer to smaller p-values than 0.05.

6.6.5. Interventionist Roles, Editorial Autonomy and Professional Experience

A systematic study of journalistic interventionism determinants has been reported by Hanitzsch, Hanusch, and Lauerer (2014). In their fascinating analysis of journalists’ professional role orientations, the authors focused on the importance of advocating for social change, influencing public opinion, and setting the political agenda. These are three primary interventionist roles of journalists that analyses at the societal level, the level of the media organizations, and the individual level of 2100 journalists from 21 different countries. In addition to their measures of the editorial autonomy of journalists, they selected only two measures. According to the results of that study, journalists in public media organizations are more willing to intervene in society, in particular in countries with restricted political freedom. Also, when journalists are more strongly motivated by the value types of tradition, power, and achievement, they are more likely to embrace an interventionist role. Furthermore, the professional role orientations of journalists are rooted in perceptions of social and cultural values (Hanitzsch et al., 2014). The questionnaire of that study would have been more useful if it had found the relationship between the three primary interventionist roles of journalists and their editorial autonomy, along with the level of professional experience in journalism. The current study has attempted to fill this gap in the case of the Kurdistan Region through applying the same measurements in answering the fifth research question of whether professional experience and editorial autonomy affected the Kurdish journalists in embracing an interventionist role.
The findings reported in Tables 6.12, and 6.13 failed to provide empirical support for a hypothesis that there is a relationship between each of the interventionist roles of journalists and their editorial autonomy and professional experience, due to the p-values being higher than or equal to 0.05. It means that statistically there is no significant association between these variables. This results suggested that the Kurdish journalists are not more likely to embrace an interventionist role when they enjoy greater editorial autonomy and have less experience. These findings confirm that the interventionist roles in Kurdish journalism culture are not common among news workers when they gather information.

**Table 6-12: Association between the interventionist roles of the Kurdish journalists and the editorial autonomy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventionist roles of Kurdish journalists</th>
<th>Editorial Autonomy</th>
<th>P values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have a lot of control over the work that I do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>8(30.0)</td>
<td>6(37.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>8(44.4)</td>
<td>3(16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>19(40.4)</td>
<td>13(27.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>7(35.0)</td>
<td>8(40.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>15(44.1)</td>
<td>15(44.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (%)</td>
<td>57(42.2)</td>
<td>45(33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To influence public opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>19(40.4)</td>
<td>15(31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>24(41.4)</td>
<td>21(36.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>12(54.5)</td>
<td>5(22.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>1(33.3)</td>
<td>2(66.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>2(33.3)</td>
<td>2(33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (%)</td>
<td>58(42.6)</td>
<td>45(33.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To advocate for social change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>15(53.6)</td>
<td>8(28.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>24(46.2)</td>
<td>19(36.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>11(36.7)</td>
<td>10(33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>4(33.3)</td>
<td>4(33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>3(33.3)</td>
<td>3(33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (%)</td>
<td>57(43.5)</td>
<td>44(33.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I am allowed to take part in decisions that affect my work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>Very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda</td>
<td>7(41.2)</td>
<td>13(68.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To influence public opinion</td>
<td>24(53.3)</td>
<td>29(49.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To advocate for social change</td>
<td>19(67.9)</td>
<td>22(42.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the lack of statistical associations between these variables showed that the interventionist journalists are fewer in number than the detached journalists in Kurdish journalism cultures, where most of the media ownerships and media workers have affiliated with an ideology of political parties or politician elites. In Gramscian theory, the journalists’ power came from the hegemony of their media ownerships. For instance, the vice president of the KDP and also the prime minister of the KRG own the Rûdaw Media Company whose broadcasting channels currently dominate Kurdish society. Conversely, having editorial autonomy and more or less professional experience has not led Kurdish journalists to any increase in willingness to undertake interventionist roles. Perhaps the limited access to information sources and the lack of investigative journalism are more prominent reasons in reality (see Chapters I, II, IV and V).
Table 6-13: Association between the interventionist roles of the Kurdish journalists and the professional experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventionist roles of Kurdish journalists</th>
<th>Professional Experiences</th>
<th>P values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 1 year N (%)</td>
<td>1-3 year N (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>1(5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>1(2.2)</td>
<td>9(19.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little important</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>2(8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>1(2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (%)</td>
<td>1(0.7)</td>
<td>13(9.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| To influence public opinion                  |                          |         |         |         |                      |
| Extremely important                          | 0(0.0)                   | 3(6.1)  | 6(12.2) | 11(22.4)| 29(59.2)             |
| Very important                               | 0(0.0)                   | 7(11.9) | 8(13.6) | 21(35.6)| 23(39.0)             |
| Somewhat important                           | 1(4.2)                   | 3(12.5) | 2(8.3)  | 7(29.2) | 11(45.8)             |
| Little important                             | 0(0.0)                   | 0(0.0)  | 0(0.0)  | 2(66.7) | 1(33.3)              |
| Not important at all                         | 0(0.0)                   | 0(0.0)  | 1(16.7) | 1(16.7) | 4(66.7)              |
| Total N (%)                                  | 1(0.7)                   | 13(9.2) | 17(12.1)| 42(29.8)| 68(48.2)             |

| To advocate for social change                |                          |         |         |         |                      |
| Extremely important                          | 0(0.0)                   | 1(3.3)  | 2(6.7)  | 8(26.7) | 19(63.3)             |
| Very important                               | 0(0.0)                   | 6(11.3) | 10(18.9)| 16(30.2)| 21(39.6)             |
| Somewhat important                           | 1(3.2)                   | 3(9.7)  | 2(6.5)  | 9(29.0) | 16(51.6)             |
| Little important                             | 0(0.0)                   | 3(23.1) | 1(7.7)  | 4(30.8) | 5(38.5)              |
| Not important at all                         | 0(0.0)                   | 0(0.0)  | 1(11.1) | 4(44.4) | 4(44.4)              |
| Total N (%)                                  | 1(0.7)                   | 13(9.6) | 16(11.8)| 41(30.1)| 65(47.8)             |

From examining different data and relationships of variables, this section has concluded that the notions of journalistic professionalism and information privacy have an inadequate theoretical, legislative basis in public debates in the Kurdish media landscape so far. Without gaining the support of particular political parties and their affiliation, the hegemony of the journalist's professional role does not apply, and has been open to abuse by different methods from time to time, particularly during the political crisis and the general election campaigns; there are no free environment for good journalism practices and no guarantees for professional journalists. Based on Gramscian conceptions of hegemony, the news organizations and their media workers have been dominated and frequently used by the prominent political ruling parties and their politician elites. They also aim to silence opposition voices in Iraqi Kurdish society by using various practices, such as gathering and revealing the information privacy. The right to free speech, media freedom, journalistic professionalism, and the right to be free of unwarranted surveillance are still too rare or limited due to several barriers, including political and media transitions from dictatorship to democracy and the lack of a media industry in terms of ownership, regulation, and education.
Research Conclusions

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

This doctoral dissertation has examined key debates over the shifting boundaries of privacy understandings and professional role orientations amongst journalism cultures in a post-conflict region of the Kurdistan. For media communications, Gramscian hegemony theory offers an ability to answer the crucial question of why the Iraqi Kurdish society has been faced with media intrusion into private life, and therefore this is an appropriate framework for this study to explain this research gap through exploration of the several different aspects of the current case study.

At the beginning, the Kurdish media environment in the Republic of Iraq has been gradually developed based on daily changes in political communications and convergent media between 1991 and the present. This study offers a critical debate on a national democratic public sphere of the Kurdistan Region and its core characteristics of the political and media transitions towards democracy. It has determined the historical context of an autonomous region within Greater Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, in which the media environment and its journalism practices have emerged and developed from the first Kurdistan newspaper, published in 1898, to date. From 1920, when the Treaty of Sèvres divided the Ottoman Empire under the auspices of the League of Nations, to the popular uprising in 1991, the Iraqi Kurdish people have encountered troublesome circumstances. By shifting the obstacles they faced, the Kurds endeavoured to clandestinely issue their newspapers and magazines in the mountainous region of liberated Kurdistan, or at least in the diaspora lands. While the primary Kurdish newspapers, satellite stations, and other outlets all began in the diaspora, due to unlimited stipulations on Kurdish journalism practices imposed by the former Iraqi governments, many publications in the Kurdistan Region were clandestinely issued, particularly between 1910 and 1991. After the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein’s government, the spring uprising in 1991 has been recognized as a turning point for the Kurdistan and its developments in mass media communications due to the building of the official bodies of the parliament and government.
Since 2003, the political system in Iraqi constitutional and its legislative contexts of the Kurdistan Region has provided a different understanding of expression freedoms and a new media environment for news media workers. However, independent journalism practices remain fraught with risk, and also the post-conflict situation in Southern Kurdistan within the general deteriorations of security and political stability in Iraq has proved advantageous for targeting journalists, almost without penalty. To identify the core stages in Kurdish media developments from the beginning to the present day, many phases of journalistic experience inside Kurdish society have been highlighted through focusing on the famous periodicals, broadcasters, and significant channels that appeared during each period. Consequently, this study has distinguished the media environment developments under Kurdish autonomous rule into three decades:

The first ten years covered the period between 1991 and 2000 which has been understood as an excellent phase for Kurdish media, with constant improvements. For example, the first partisan Kurdish daily newspaper (Kurdistanî nwê) commenced in 1992, then in early 1999, when the first politician satellite channel (Kurdistan) was able to broadcast. Many prints and broadcast media outlets quickly flourished, such as an independent newspaper (Haûlatî) in 2000. Importantly, with the rise of Internet cafés in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq since 1999, the majority of Kurdish traditional media channels resorted to developing their own website versions in a bid to adapt to the new era of convergent journalism practices. The second period was called the golden age of the Iraqi Kurdish media, from 2001 to 2010 when diverse forums for critical media content emerged, including the partisan opposition media outlets like the Kurdish News Network (KNN) in 2009. In the third decade, several convergence media companies (such as Nalia Media Corporation and Rûdaw Media Network) have appeared. These have led to changes in journalistic reporting style, journalists' education, and reputation within the new media environment in Iraqi Kurdish society since 2011. During these periods, a large number of newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations with both terrestrial and satellite channels, and the newest type of convergent media companies have been mostly founded by the political ruling class, politicians elite, and their stakeholder. As a consequence of a series of cultural, social, political, and economic disturbances, the Kurdish media since its inception has experienced challenging circumstances. Given that, various concerns have emerged not only around the quality and style of the Kurdish media but also its content.
That view involves national issues, such as political rights, the educational system, and focusing on inequality of treatment toward Kurdish individuals. The different types of media in these dissimilar stages have been discussed in terms of the significance of their role in successive Kurdish nationalism movements, and against the diverse Iraqi-dominated governments. The upshot is that the Kurdish media is still prioritizing the defense of the stateless Kurdish nation rather than practicing and operating a professional media.

In comparison to the liberal democratic countries, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is still one of the largest stateless nations, colonized, and also not obeying the ruling principles of law owing to instability and fragility in its transformations from dictatorship to democracy. This semi-emerging democracy region currently faces numerous challenges, including the lack of a clear system not only in the political environment but also in all life sectors, including mass media communications and journalism practices. Accordingly, the quality of targeted audiences sought and the content of media messages carried are more relevant to the current research project than the simple definition of the media as a medium of public communications to access a huge number of multiple audiences. In the case study of the Kurdistan Region, beyond traditional media, the number of media convergence companies, including online news websites, social media networks, and weblogs has gradually increased, but most of which are deeply partisan. For similar reasons, the current Kurdish media landscape has been divided into three multifaceted models; the official and non-official media of the political parties is the dominant model that currently involves the vast majority of all Kurdish media, such as the mainstream and alternative media networks of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Change Movement (CM), and others who consider themselves to be opposition groups of communist and Islamic parties. State or government media includes online websites of the administration departments of the Kurdistan Region’s parliament, the presidency, and ministers of the government. Another minority type of media consider themselves independent media; their funding sources tend to include American and other Western cultural departments or non-profit organizations, together with local commercial companies. Within each medium in these groups, a journalistic story is differently defined, which militates against seeing the big picture, thus the current media environment in the semi-autonomous Region of Kurdistan is in disarray, though
modest endeavors are successfully moving in the right direction to ensure professional standards of journalism are abided by. In all human societies, some aspects of human behaviour can be discovered to be cultural universals, such as expressive forms, technologies, and social practices, including journalism cultures. In addition, the intangible cultural heritage of a society comes from the immaterial aspects of culture, in this case, social institutions, practices of political and media organizations viewed as the principles of the social system, philosophy, mythology, science, along with written and oral literature. Based on the social practices of journalists in relation to covering private life, this research has found the professional behaviours and attitudes of Kurdish journalists to be strongly rooted in a particular culture of journalism that consist of common traditions and values (Berganza-Conde et al. 2010; Gerber and Linda 2010). According to Hanitzsch (2007), the collection of ideas, beliefs, values, and attitudes informing the practices of cultural production have been used as a core concept of culture that underpins journalists’ thinking and acting. This is also manifest in journalistic culture, that is, the culture of news production or newspaper cultures, and the news culture of news workers.

Empirically and based on the works of Hanitzsch et al., (2007-2016), the Populist Disseminator; Detached Watchdog; Critical Change Agent, and the Opportunist Facilitator have been identified as four global professional milieus by subjecting the survey answers of the journalists to cluster analysis. For Iraqi Kurdish journalists, the following institutional roles were extremely important, such as provide citizens with the information they need to make political decisions (49.6%); be an absolutely detached observer (47.2%); provide the audience with the information that is most interesting (33.8%). To concentrate mainly on news that will attract the widest possible audience (30.5%), and motivate people to participate in a civic activity and political discussion (29.6%) were next in order of importance. The majority of the respondents (83.7%) strongly agree with the opinion that journalists can depict reality as it is, followed by 70.3% who remained strictly impartial in their work. As results show, the Iraqi Kurdish journalists are interested in following the institutional roles of global journalism cultures, but they have constantly been challenged by multiple obstacles to achieving their professional goals. In terms of ethical ideologies, the 70.9% of Iraqi Kurdish journalists strongly agreed that ethical principles are very important and should be followed by all journalists, regardless of situation and context.
In this regard, 48.1% strongly agreed with the notion that journalists should be allowed to take part in decisions that affect their work, while 33.1% of the participants somewhat agreed with another statement referring to having a lot of control over their work. For other Iraqi Kurdish journalists, the following aspects were very influential on news work: conventions and ethics of the newsroom (46.0%); supervisors and higher editors (39.6); editorial policy (37.1%); procedures and standards of news production (33.6%); the management of news organization (32.6%), and shortage of news gathering resources, including staff (30.4%). By contrast, the forthcoming items were not influential at all, such as business people (40.9%); advertisers (40.3%); professional organizations like journalism unions (38.8%); religious leaders (34.1%); politicians (31.9%), and media watch organizations (29.0%). Ironically, the vast majority of respondents had no trust at all in politicians in general or big corporations (83.8%), in religious leaders or the military forces (67%). Within this descriptive data analysis, this study has found that the Iraqi Kurdish journalists are theoretically interested in abiding journalism professional ethics, while in practice they use unorthodox and even unethical methods for gathering and revealing information, notably when they have been affected by political, business, and religious leaders during the war and crisis. The majority of journalists working in the Kurdish media are relatively young, with a diploma or university degree in the fields of media and journalism. While clientelism and loyalty to the ruling political parties and their leaders are currently more helpful for a more comfortable, privileged life, almost half of the Kurdish media practitioners have other paid jobs as they have limited journalistic experience and their wages or monthly salaries are too low. This status quo has been viewed as a part of new emerging democracies because too many people who consider themselves journalists, but in reality, they are working as media officers of the partisan public relationship.

Churnalism and the propaganda model are a more common style in the current media environment, not only in Kurdistan but also across the world, thus distortions and lies dominate media coverage and news reporting. This unethical production leads to ignoring or non-abiding by the codes of journalism ethics which have been classified as one of the key differences between non-professional and professional journalists. Based on the current research data analysis, the KDP led by Mes'ud Barzani, and the PUK led by Celal Tallebanî, as the two traditional ruling parties or tribes along with their families, who have dominated the vast majority of the life aspects and democratic
institutions within two dominated political zones, Yellow and Green, have remarkable financial resources and levels of media ownership. As the key results show that the Kurdish media are ideologically and financially dependent on the Kurdish political parties. This local media has consistently contributed to support of the colonialist governments and beyond, and this reproduces the identity of Kurds in building their imagined political network inside and outside the countries of the Middle East.

Ironically and sadly, after the 1991 spring uprising when the Kurds established their semi-autonomous parliament together with the government in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish ruling parties used their ideological and partisan media power to silence Kurdish society, as well as to exercise control over Kurdish journalists and opposition voices. This dark scene affected the public national bodies, such as lacking each of the national government, national courts and judiciary, the national intelligence agency, and even the national media institutions like the BBC. More ironically, some news organizations and their media workers have financially and politically been affiliated with intelligent agencies of the two ruling parties. According to Gramscian concepts of hegemony, this model of partisan media has extensively struggled to dominate the Kurdish society, particularly during such political crises as the Kurdish Civil War (1994 and 1998). Thousands of people were killed or seriously injured due to the partisan media hegemony, as well as in general election campaigns, in particular of 2009, when the opposition political parties for the first time won more than one-third of the 111 Kurdistan Parliament seats. In such heightened political and media circumstances, the private lives of candidates and their political leaders were seriously violated by the partisan media organizations and their workers. The political parties customarily use information privacy invasions as the political power to loophole their political rivals or win more voters (see Chapters III, IV, and VI). However, minority media networks and journalists outside the ruling class were to some extent successful in establishing nonpartisan media channels; when one was weakened or closed down, another would start to publish or broadcast. This unbalanced atmosphere has occasionally caused the KDP, PUK, and even the KRG to revise their policies on working outside official media; they then commence establishing several non-formal media channels which are known as the Shadow Media. In other words, despite their limited human and financial resources, the private media or those known as Independent Media workers have forced the official partisan media channels to make
changes that have increased journalistic professional standards and reduced undemocratic practices. In reviewing scholarly literature, the core concepts of privacy and professionalism have been associated with codes of journalistic ethics; it follows that the main hypothesis of the current study is that the levels of media intrusion into private life will automatically decrease if the levels of journalistic professionalism increase. With regard to Kurdish journalism cultures, the data analysis of this research project has revealed the lack of professional role orientations in collecting, reporting, writing, and presenting information, mostly private information. Expectations of the right to privacy for the layperson and the professional journalist are different, thus personal and professional perceptions affect media workers in making decisions about protecting the private life of others in different ways. In this sense, many journalism cultures have selectively limited the professional role orientations of journalists towards shifting boundaries of privacy understandings, including the invasions of information privacy which can cause spiritual, physical and emotional harm.

In Iraqi Kurdish culture, 33.1% of journalists have defined privacy as a concept of “personhood” that includes an independent right to make particularly significant decisions, such as marriage or contraception, while 46.5% identified invasion of privacy as the “publicity” that places a person in an unfavourable light, such as fabrication and photographs out of context. The statistical relationship of Kurdish journalists with their perceptions of privacy concepts as a "personhood" and as an "intimacy" tend to depend on level of experience; journalists have more understanding of the concepts of privacy when they have more experience in journalism practices. In this vein, 42.3% of the participants viewed the invasion of privacy as a “public disclosure” of embarrassing private facts, including personal matters and newsworthiness, but 47.5% understood a common type of intrusion into private life as a “trespass” which means newsgathering in a private space without valid consent. In this context, 38.4% thought that public figures could be covered legitimately, but secret observations of people were not acceptable act at all for 57.7% of the Iraqi Kurdish journalists, though 8.9% agreed that eavesdropping on conversations and using a long-lens camera were extremely acceptable acts in gathering information privacy. Just 20.21% of the respondents strongly agree with invading the form of personal photos, video footage and sound recordings, emails and social media accounts, along with personal phone hacking, including SMS and phone calls.
Overall, the results suggested a strong relationship between the ethical ideologies of Kurdish journalism cultures and the common forms of privacy invasion, while there is no statistically significant association between the common claims of privacy invasion and institutional roles of Kurdish journalism cultures. However, the increase of internal and external influences on news work leads to increases in the levels of intrusion into the private life of celebrities and public figures rather than ordinary people. The public’s right to know is ostensibly the primary motivation behind the Kurdish journalists to reveal private information, while political and financial loyalty of the journalists to their media owners seems a much stronger motivation in reality. Given that the four factors that influence the decision-making of Kurdish media workers when encountering privacy issues comprise ordinary people, celebrities or public figures, the revealing of information in a public forum, and the revealing of information for the purpose of saving lives or public interest. Therefore, in this study ethical decision making is examined as essential in assisting media content producers in sound moral thinking, considering the outcomes of their journalistic actions and relying on the professional values learned within their cultural and religious environment.

Conversely, there is a highly significant statistical association between the professional activities of Kurdish journalism (information gathering and investigation, news production, presenting news or design, editorial coordination or management) and their personal motivations for becoming journalists. These factors consist of public service, working as a watchdog in revealing corruption, supporting the particular agenda of a political party, having a degree in the fields of media and journalism, allowing journalism to reach a wide audience, and good financial remuneration. Consequently, professional experience and editorial autonomy have not caused the Iraqi Kurdish journalists to embrace an interventionist role. The 66.9% of respondents felt that they are firstly responsible to their own conscience in revealing and publishing information on private life. From these different results, this study can conclude that the vast majority of Iraqi Kurdish journalists have understood the concept of privacy as the individuals' private life, mainly in terms of sexual orientation, whether heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and even asexuality. This understanding of privacy comes from the Islamic Sharia Laws or oriental cultures, where the practice of sex is one of the main taboos whereby interpersonal relationships, including emotional,
physical or sexual intimacy outside formal marriage is not permitted. Even though double standards apply as they do in other societies, such moral strictures will be used against others when expedient, as a form of social control. Though understandings of the nature, definition, and importance of privacy values have been changing across diverse cultures; for example, family privacy in Iraqi Kurdish culture still plays a significant role because of the durability of the principles of collectivism rather than individualism. Even in recent decades, extended family groups are still common in conservative, rural, and small urban areas of the Kurdistan; also they share a single household, and blood relationships amongst individuals are intimate and have considerable power. Hence there is no clear boundary between an individual’s private space and those of their family and the surrounding community. They enjoy the advantages of a sense of belonging and security because of a shared, extensive pool of family members to help during a crisis, and a rich source of cultural and behavioural role models. In such Iraqi Kurdish cultures, similar important support networks have usually been offered after marriage by the extended family, whilst young adults have anticipated leaving home to begin their own nuclear-based households within the same locality amongst their parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles.

From those families, it can be clearly seen that the individuals have been taught to feel emotionally and financially responsible for supporting and helping others, therefore everyone has the same predilections to offer any type of information, even concerning private life. These cultural norms reflect the public spheres, political and media systems, and individuals, including media workers who interfere in people’s private lives without seeing this as an invasion of the right to privacy that should be ethically and legally respected and protected. In other words, there have been inadequate theoretical, legislative and public debates about individualism and protecting civil liberties from different surveillance powers due to the Iraqi Kurds have different priorities and are primarily interested in achieving political rights. For similar reasons, the right to privacy in the private and public spheres has less attention as a result of the vagueness around the legality system of penal statutes, a lower awareness of the political party system, and an increased mixing of the Islamic Sharia Laws with Kurdish social manners, such as in the case of female genital mutilation (FGM). As a result, the vast majority of Iraqi Kurdish women have been prevented from becoming journalists as a result of religious, cultural, and political structures.
Gender discrimination and sexual harassment amongst news organizations lead to an unbalanced participation of men and women, and therefore the Kurdish media have mostly dominated by the patriarchal ideas of the men. In such Kurdish cultures, unmarried women are often not allowed to independently work for a long duration or distance outside the home. While many females in recent decades have individually participated in media communication studies abroad, such as the KRG-Scholarship program for Human Capacity Development (HCDP). As Pratchett and Lowndes (2004) confirm that the equal sharing of decision-making power between men and women of various backgrounds strengthens and enhances democracy. In this shared relationship, democracy requires women to be part of a democratic government, and also to participate in the major decisions which are necessary to develop laws and systems. While having a high profile in the Kurdish democratizing process, females have typically become privacy victims, particularly when they try to access the higher positions in politics and the media. In most developing and post-conflict countries, women have often been used to decorate the men’s power; for example, of the 23 ministers in the current KRG cabinet, only one position is filled by a woman.

In addition to other results, this study finds several factors, including the Islamic Sharia Laws, social norms, and the political changes which have affected Kurdish journalists in two different ways. Firstly, based on the professional role orientations amongst global journalism cultures, the Iraqi Kurdish journalists provide the public's right to know public and private information if it is in the public interest or considered of social importance. Secondly, the political ruling classes have used Kurdish journalists, particularly partisan media workers, to gather and expose the private lives of political rivals or enemies in order to control them or silent any opposition voices.

Within those conflicts, the journalists and politicians in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have not coordinated relationships among themselves and sometimes have even used their journalistic or political power to control each other. In this context, both journalists and politicians blame and accuse each other of being unprofessional in their respective field, hence a prominent Kurdish commentator’s statement that the fields of media and politics in the Iraqi Kurdish society have still not been practiced or filtered according to academical and professional standards (Interview with Serdar Ebidulla 2015).
Throughout 2011 and 2012, a series of judicial public hearings were held by Lord Justice Leveson’s inquiry into the culture, practices, and ethics of the British press following the News International phone hacking scandal. This study adapts the recommendations of the Leveson inquiry committee that the existing situation of mass media communications in the Kurdistan Region and the United Kingdom are similarly far from satisfactory. Mainly, the press should advance further elaborate mechanisms of self-control, establishing a new regulatory body named the ‘Public and Press Council’ which will be anchored in law, and funded by organizations that are detached from the media and government. In addition, the new independent regulator should be empowered with greater and unprecedented authority, along with substantive sanctioning abilities. In comparison with the Leveson inquiry, Kurdish independent media are too rare or limited due to the vast majority of media sectors being dominated by the political ruling class, while the British media are mostly free from political parties and are primarily independent businesses. When reporters and editors are faced with circumstances where they have to decide between business interests and other interests, business considerations are likely to take precedence rather than professionally reporting the news, investigative journalism, and serving as a watchdog of government offices. In the case study of Kurdistan’s emerging democracy, the primary business interests are mostly related to the political parties and their stakeholders that lead to gradually grow professional standards of journalism and legal cases of the media intrusion into people's private life or invasion of the right to privacy. In this case, there is a weaker understanding of information privacy invasions and limited practice of journalistic professionalism. Likewise, investigative journalists are not common in Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures, notably amongst partisan media outlets, as a result of an inadequate development of professional roles and the lack of a free media environment.

As Cohen-Almagor (2014) reported, the current reality is simple; newspapers exist to make money, therefore the necessity of such a Public and Press Council organization to adequately represent the public should emphasize the necessity for balancing press interests versus public interests. For determining that crude business interests will not revoke ethical norms and legal dictates, it is necessary to equip that organization with substantial powers. However, this will not be possible if freedom of speech and media freedom have not become important values, the sine qua non for promoting political
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS: Findings and Recommendations

and civic liberties along with facilitating individual autonomy. As Petley (2012) stressed that the freedom of media must carry the duty to keep the public informed on developments with regard to its common good because an instrumental good is the media freedom that is good in so far as it results in the supporting of democratic ideals and public interest. Certainly, freedom does not mean misuse of such concepts as the “public right to know” as an excuse to overstep ethical norms and laws. That is why this study has strongly suggested a Priority Model for news organizations and media workers to assess news gathering and balance public and private information between the individual's right to privacy and the public's right to know, or between civil and political liberties.

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), the political and media systems in the Kurdistan Region have been characterized as a Polarized Pluralist or Mediterranean Model (see Chapter II and III). The Iraqi Kurdish media have partially influenced political society transformations from totalitarian rule to a democratic system. However, there is a shortage of such professional media roles as the watchdog, stabilizer, agitator, socializer, mobilizer, educator, along with transparency and accountability, checks and balances in producing the basis for Kurdish political legitimacy and the agreement of new political patterns, routines, and practices. In new democracies, trained journalists cannot execute a watchdog role in surveying the government and the political elites. In other words, formulating procedures for making political figures accountable to the public is a crucial basis for transformation to democratization in post-conflict societies (Voltmer 2006). With regard to rational-legal authority, the Kurdistan autonomous region has weak regulations of media outlets. The 2007 Press Law does not cover broadcast and converging media, which increasingly represents the bulk of media output. To date, the intellectual and political elites' view of journalism has been very traditional, being mostly restricted to the print media. This is in addition to the corruption, favouritism, and clientelism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq that lead to the likely non-implementation of precisely such legislations. For similar reasons, it is quite difficult to build and expand non-partisan and non-state media channels, while many cultural, legal or institutional barriers still remain between journalism practices and government affairs. The dependent judiciary system being one of the most important institutional buffers in the ruling parties’ vision of the role of media in society, it has been dominated by the KDP and PUK since 1992. Self-censorship and
“envelope journalism” or bribery in the name of cultural, societal and national values or traditions are further obstacles in generating a professional journalism industry. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is still undergoing a period of transition, in which a power struggle continues between differently positioned political parties or tribes, who have ideologically manipulated principles of dictatorship and democratization to date. This power struggle is reflected in media ownership as well as the content of media production, which has led to gradual increases in media intrusion into private lives. The fragility of this situation causes serious difficulties in developing a democratic political system and in building a stable and plural society with formal accountability mechanisms and institutions that can hold authorities accountable. In this case study, mass media communications have been found to be an inadequate medium for strengthening democracy through multiple vantage points of information and opinions. Moreover, the dominant partisan media does not impartially inform voters of relevant information that may encourage them to consciously and voluntarily participate in the election process. To deliver a true democracy in Iraqi Kurdish society, these model of mass media communications should be more independent economically and detached from political and governmental institutions. In addition to the primary role of a free media which is essential to promote communication amongst individuals in society to generate public opinion, and this is also a crucial precondition for a transition to democracy (Weber and Grosz 2009; De Smaele 2006).

In comparison with Taiwan in the Republic of China, the current role of media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can be manifested as an ability to enjoy the freedom of speech, but that has been interpreted to mean a democratic license to trespass on the private lives of those in the public spotlight. In this sense, political communication is largely a vertical (top-down) process that conveys government-approved propaganda, information, and news (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2012). Any attempt to subvert the law is met with harsh punishment; for instance during former Iraqi governments (1968-2003) and the period of 1994 and 1998, when the Civil War occurred amongst Iraqi Kurdish political parties and even in recent years, hundreds of civil activists, reporters, editors, and writers have been harassed, interrogated and regularly jailed. As a result, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has yet to see a national channel working according to the ethos of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), and also Public Television Service (PTS). In comparison with Hanitzsch et al. (2011), Iraqi Kurdish journalism cultures are
mostly characterized by Populist Disseminator and Detached Watchdog models. Similar findings have been produced in Spain, Romania, Israel, Germany, Austria, USA, Switzerland, and Australia. In this study, 42.3% of the participants felt that the influence of public opinion is ‘very important’; additionally, 39.4% of the respondents referred to advocacy for social change, and another 31.7% of them focused on acting as a watchdog of the government. Meanwhile, the institutional roles of conveying a positive image of political and business leadership (45.1%), along with setting the political agenda (24.8%), are ‘not important at all’ for the respondents. The further roles of acting as a watchdog of business elites and supporting official policies to bring about prosperity and development are somewhat important for the rest of the respondents (34.3%). While Kurdish journalism cultures have changed from time to time, they remain mostly characterized by the Populist Disseminator and Detached Watchdog models which have dominated among the professional role orientations of Iraqi Kurdish journalists, who have still mixed and ambiguous interpretations of respecting individuals' private life.

On the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony, this study has discovered that the Western professional norms or the ideology and power of journalists’ professional worldviews have affected local modes of practicing Iraqi Kurdish journalism because the hegemony of Western journalism cultures has dominated Kurdish journalist methods in gathering and presenting information. This hegemony has been particularly the case since 2003 when a new generation of Iraqi Kurdish journalists was trained by American and European media advisors within such organizations of the IWPR, IREX, IMS. In addition, the ruling political parties and their politician elites are hardly working to maximise democratic institutions in restricting the environment of professional media workers and launching several dependent or shadow media companies to preserve their ideological power and leadership in Iraqi Kurdish society.

Furthermore, this study finds many important results in relating hegemony to the context of Kurdistan as a liminal political space. For instance, Iraqi Kurdish society has differently experienced core components of authoritarianism, conflict, post-conflict, provincialism, independence, and semi-democracy. For similar reasons, the hegemony of Western journalism norms and of Kurdish leadership’ overreach are incomplete hegemonic processes; consequently understandings of privacy reflect that hegemonic liminal status.
Similar to the former Baathist regime in Iraq (1968-2003), the ruling class of the Kurdistan Regional Government (1991-present), the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have used the vast majority of mass media communications and their workers in retaining the status quo of Iraqi Kurdish society. In this sense, “their ruling class worldview becomes the worldview that is imposed and accepted as the cultural norm; as the universally valid dominant ideology that justifies the social, political, and economic status quo as natural, inevitable, perpetual and beneficial for everyone, rather than as artificial social constructs that benefit only for the ruling class” (Bullock and Trombley 1999: 387-88). The main difference is that the former Iraqi Baathist regime did not allow publication or broadcast of any opposition voices, while the Iraqi Kurdish government has gradually provided some marginal political and civil liberties. In both regimes, the mass media communications industry and its workers have constantly been employed as the trumpet of the ruling class to retain dominance. Within this media environment, investigative journalism and professional journalists are under threat and due to the lack of competition in media production, churnalism and the propaganda model will predominate. This, in tandem with neglect of journalistic professionalism and increasing media intrusion into private lives, will also lead to a boom in fake news.

Finally, this study can be concluded further outcomes by including an inadequate understanding of privacy boundaries and professionalism orientations in Kurdish journalism practices and interference from the political ruling class in mass media communications which leads to dependent ownership and unbalanced competition. In addition, there is much repetitious discrimination, unprofessional media management, undemocratic media regulation, a dependent judiciary system and non-applicable laws, in addition to a lack of updated education in mass media communications and convergent journalism practices. For regulating their own media outlets, Iraq and its Kurdistan Region similar to the Israel, Canada, and Australia can mix or adopt democratic media regulation models of Britain and carefully observe the changes in the British model, particularly after consultation on the Leveson inquiry and its implementation. Since along with the growth of new kinds of competition and rapid technological developments, journalism is in transition as it is challenged by financial austerity and also by offline and online platforms. As Peters and Broersma (2012) argue, each one of the credibility, autonomy, and professional authority are eroding, and also mainstream audiences are on the decline due to easy access to the Internet.
and its low cost, and speed, that has led to the failing financial health of the news industry. In terms of online privacy concerns, groups or even individuals may enjoy the anonymity of internet services that the universal nature of the World Wide Web offers as an attractive alternative to the print media. Nowadays, there are no barriers, secrets, or proprietary content due to the open culture and free exchange of ideas and information based on competition rather than collaboration, all of which have been identified as a critical convergent culture in the promotion of new convergent technologies and the shaping of new media.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

After building an essential cornerstone of the professional role orientations of Kurdish journalism cultures and their motivations behind information privacy invasions in a post-conflict region of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, further expansions of the study could embrace the methods of decision-making that media workers should complete to disclose or conceal a source’s private information. Hence, journalists have to balance between the public's right to know versus the individual’s right to privacy. In this sense, the media intrusion into the people’s private lives during political crises; including war and general election campaigns, along with privacy rights and media freedom, will be useful to examine. Additionally, the recommendation for further study could be combined with a comparative fieldwork study of the multiple language media networks on the issue of information privacy invasions among different ethnic media inside and outside Kurdistan. This suggestion would make further contributions to the investigation, and its consequences could interpret the entire population of news media producers; including reporters and editors amongst Southern, Northern, Eastern, and Western regions of Greater Kurdistan inside Middle Eastern societies. Moreover, information privacy invasions should be compared amongst various Kurdish media outlets. Technological developments and cultural differences in professionalism orientations and privacy rights in global journalism cultures suggest an investigation into better understanding the cultural effects on information privacy invasions of internet users. For similar reasons, this study invites readers, including Kurdish native and non-native speakers to reflect on the concepts manifested here to examine new methods of studies on the professionalism of convergent journalism practices and information privacy invasions along with its challenges, advantages, and
the suitable approach to discussing those difficulties. Cases of data privacy invasions among journalists of different ethnicities could also be studied. Even so, the legal and ethical responsibilities of media content producers anywhere are to inform, remind, reinforce, educate, enlighten and entertain their constituencies. As a result, these media practitioners should first of all be thoroughly versed in their professional roles by studying the various arguments on professional ethics standards in journalism, specifically invasion of information privacy issues. Further studies of media content regulations regarding the right to privacy and professional accountability of journalists are recommended. In addition to the further research design and methodology, it can be included further qualitative and quantitative approaches of critical discourse analysis, ethnography, and focus groups.
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I. List Of Asked Questions Used In In-Depth Interviews

1. How do you briefly describe your personal and professional background?

2. In your opinion, what are the historical developments of Kurdish media in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and currently what are the main particularities of that development?

3. In the Kurdistan Region, what are the levels of having freedom of speech, media, and access to the information? It has been said that there is freedom of the press in the Kurdistan Region, but there is no freedom for journalists to work; what is your opinion?

4. What is the professional role orientations of a journalist? Why did you become a journalist? Which characteristic of journalism is important to you?

5. What are the reasons behind non-professionalism of Kurdish media in the Kurdish Region and what are the key obstacles of that? Why don't we have professional Kurdish journalism?

6. To what extend Kurdish media - as a fourth power- has impacted over other powers like; legislation, justices and implement? What is the impact of Kurdistan Region’s journalism and journalists on the public opinion? If they do not have it why?

7. Do you think that the Kurdistan Regional Government and its political system are one of the main dilemmas in front of restriction of freedom of speech and press? How and why?

8. How can intrusions of patricians, sociological traditional, using an intermediary, favoritism by the official and public figures have an impact on non-transparency and non-independency on Kurdish media?

9. To what extent do the classification of Kurdish media ownership is accurate into journalism of patrician, shadow and independent; what sorts of them are more influential on the transparency, dissemination of corruptions and more forcing principles of democracy? How and in which way?

10. What are the main impacts of the Internet and its online journalism on breaching the private rights?

11. To what extent Kurdish journalists are familiar with the principles of professional ethics, especially online journalism?

12. In what level ethical principles into Kurdish journalism followed and in what way they do not follow, particularly during the coverage of political crisis and general election campaigns?

13. Why are Kurdish journalists not abiding by the principles of professional journalism ethics and which principle is more breaching?
14. Are the information sources of Kurdish journalism transparent and truth or unknown and concealment?

15. Is it normal for Kurdish journalists to breach ethics of journalism and privacy rights in the name of national security for Kurdistan region’s journalists?

16. Talking about sex, politics, and religion within Kurdish journalism culture are taboos triplet yet or to what extent talk about these topics abiding principles of professional ethics? In the Kurdish culture and particularly in Kurdistan Region how can privacy concept and protection of privacy rights be defined?

17. What do you understand the concept of personal privacy? Do you think that everyone should have a certain degree of privacy? Why?

18. As a journalist, have you ever encountered situations where an individual’s privacy was affected by your actions? How often does this occur? How did you feel? Did you think that your actions were necessary? Why?

19. When you and your colleagues encountered these situations, did you consult anyone / get their advice before taking actions? Or did you act based on your own instinct/gut reaction?

20. Looking back at the situation, do you think you made the right decision? Was your decision justified? Or would you have done it differently? Why?

21. Do you think that the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS) code of ethics would have been helpful in the situation? Do you think an ethical code/policy on privacy in your company would be useful?

22. Does your company have such a policy? Have your editors/supervisors ever discussed the issues relating to privacy with you? Have you ever received any complaints on the issues of invasion of privacy?

23. Do you think that journalists are justified in publishing information that affects an individual’s privacy? Why? And in what circumstances?

24. On the issue of privacy, do you find your personal values conflicting with your professional values? How often does it occur? Why?

25. As a journalist, who do you feel most accountable/responsible to?

26. On the issue of privacy, do you think your personal views are more important than the codes/principles/ editor’s opinions/ public views?

27. Do you think that the invasion of person’s privacy rights in the Kurdish media are generally becoming a phenomenon or not yet? How and why?

28. Which one of the officials or public figures, political parties and politician elites, commercial companies, and the journalism are more intruding privacy rights? How and why?

29. Do you believe that the breaching privacy rights in traditional journalism are less than online journalism in the Kurdistan region?
30. Sometime, journalism and Kurdistan region’s journalists being justified of providing “public interest” and “knowledge right” to access facts to the audiences, who are intruding privacy rights; in your opinion to what extent do these justifications are logical?

31. Do you think that the Kurdistan region’s journalists in covering of events and personal views during the collection and dissemination of news, opinion, photo and video footage, will consider the protection of privacy rights or still they have not disseminated between public and private rights of ordinary people and the public figures?

32. What are the main justifications of privacy rights and its breaching by Kurdish journalism and journalists?

33. Which elements of person’s privacy rights (such as; health, sex, information, photo and so on) are more invaded by new-media workers in the Kurdistan Region?

34. Do you believe that the intrusion into private life is more common during the coverage of general election campaign rather than normal times? How and why?

35. Which type of Kurdish media (government, partisan, and private) is more invading privacy rights of ordinary people, celebrities, and the public figures?

36. It has been said that the political parties’ hegemony, independent redneck traditions, and injustice system in the Kurdistan region weaken the implementation of power legislation which has made offenders to ignore the decision of the court and its punishments? What is your opinion?

37. What are the legal, political, economical and cultural justifications of Kurdistan region’s journalists to invade privacy rights?

38. To what extent civil liberties and privacy rights will be protected in the Kurdistan region? In which juristic mechanism, the victims of breaching privacy in the Kurdistan region are defending their civil rights?

39. Do you think that the protection of person’s privacy rights is contrasting with freedom of speech, media freedom and democratic system in the Kurdistan region? Or do you think that is it necessary the Kurdistan Regional Parliament will introduce an independent law of privacy rights protection for restricting privacy invasions from the Kurdish traditional and online journalism?

40. Is the absence of limited media content regulation regarding the professional organization of journalism practices in the Kurdistan region causing more intrudes privacy rights and breaching person’s privacy life?

41. In your opinion, does the Article 35 of 2007 “regulation of journalism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, the Article 6 of 2006 “communication abuse in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, and the Article 8 of 2013 “the right to access information” play any role in protecting privacy rights? What are the main shortcomings in this regard? In your opinion, does play any role to protect privacy rights on ordinary citizens and public figures?
II. List Of Participants Used In In-Depth Interviews

### A. List of the academics group of interview participates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Interviewee</th>
<th>Academic level</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>MR HEVALL EBUBEKR</td>
<td>Assitant professor</td>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>Slêmanî University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MR SAMAN FEWZİ</td>
<td>Assitant professor</td>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>Humanity Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>MRS ÇOMAN HERDÎ</td>
<td>Assitant professor</td>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>American University in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>MR NEWZAD CEMAL</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>Salahadin University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>MR JANROJ KELES</td>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>Research fellow</td>
<td>Middelsex university</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. List of the journalists group of interview participates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Interviewee</th>
<th>Academic level</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>MR ASOS HERDÎ</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>General manager</td>
<td>Awene Media Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MR AZAD ŢEMEEEMİN</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>General Manger</td>
<td>Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>MR. HÉMIN BAQR ĖBIDUL</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Editor-in-chief</td>
<td>Lvin Media Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>MR. REBWWAR KERIM WELİ</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>Rûdaw Media Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>MR ŞWAN MHEMED</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>Editor-in-chief</td>
<td>Spee News Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>MIS. NIYAZ ĖBIDULLA</td>
<td>Dipolom</td>
<td>Anchor</td>
<td>Newa Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>MR. AKO MHEMED</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>General manager</td>
<td>Rûdaw Media Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>MR. SERDAR EBIDULLA</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>Commentator</td>
<td>Freelancer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. List of the victims group of interview participates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Interviewee</th>
<th>Academic level</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>MISS. EVIN ASO</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Entertainment presenter</td>
<td>NET TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>MR. İHSAN MELA ĖLİ EBULEZİZ</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>Political bureau member</td>
<td>Kurdistan Islamic Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Informed Participant Consent Form Used With Interviewee

Research Title:
Understanding the information privacy invasions and professional role orientations among Kurdish journalists in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Location: will be informed later (e.g. public places and participant’s office)
Investigator: SHWAN ADAM WASIM - AIVAS
You should complete this form yourself

Please Cross Out As Necessary:
1) Have you read and understood the participant information sheet?  Yes/No
2) Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?  Yes/No
3) Have you received enough information about the study?  Yes/No
4) Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason which will not affect you in any circumstances whatsoever? Yes/No
5) Do you agree to take part in the study? Yes/No
6) Do you understand that this study has nothing to do with any organisation nor serve an interest of any party? Yes/No
7) Do you agree to publish the participant information in the study? Yes/No

Signature of Participant:
Date:
Name: (in block capitals)

I have explained the study to the above participant and he/she has indicated his/her willingness to take part.

Signature of an Investigator:
Date:
Name: SHWAN ADAM W.AIVAS
IV. A Questionnaire Survey Form Used With Working Journalists

College of Arts and Sciences, Arts and Humanities School; Post Graduate - PhD studies, Department of Communication Culture and Media Studies,
A Questionnaire Survey Form on the:

Information Privacy Invasions among Professional Role Perceptions of Kurdish Journalists

Dear Contributor,

Knowing the professional role perceptions of journalists in the Kurdistan Region aims of this survey questionnaire form. It is used to collect data information on the dimensions of Kurdish journalism cultures about shifting boundaries of privacy understanding. A survey questionnaire form is designed to better understanding Kurdish media intrusion into private lives in the case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The principal aim of this survey is better naming the professional role orientations of Kurdish journalists and their perceptions on information privacy invasions of ordinary people, celebrities, and the public figures. This project identifies the common forms of intrusion and invasion of privacy rights amongst news-media workers in Kurdish journalism practices. Therefore, rest assured that all responses are confidential, and it will only use for academic purposes. Meanwhile, your efforts would be much appreciated if you could take a moment to complete this survey accurately.

With kind regards,

SHWAN ADAM AIVAS
A PhD Researcher
shwanadam@gmail.com
First Unite: Socio-Demographic Background of Journalists
Please choose (√) the most correct answer

1. Gender group:
   o (  ) Male
   o (  ) Female

2. Age group:
   o (  ) 18 - 27 year
   o (  ) 28 - 37 year
   o (  ) 38 - 47 year
   o (  ) 48 year and more

3. Academic level:
   o (  ) Primary
   o (  ) Secondary
   o (  ) Diploma
   o (  ) Bachelor
   o (  ) Master
   o (  ) Doctoral

4. What is your best word to describe journalism?
   o (  ) Profession
   o (  ) Skill
   o (  ) Others

5. Why did you become a journalist?
   o (  ) I want to contribute and serve the public
   o (  ) I want to reveal the corruption and to work as a watchdog
   o (  ) I entered journalism by accident
   o (  ) I want to support the particular agenda of political party
   o (  ) I have a degree in the fields of media and journalism
   o (  ) Journalism allows me to reach out to many people
   o (  ) Journalism provides me with good pay to make more money
   o (  ) Some of my family members and friends are journalists
   o (  ) Journalism provides me job security
   o (  ) Other, (please record verbatim) .................................

6. How many effective years have you been working in journalism, without any interruptions?
   o (  ) Less than one year
   o (  ) 1- 3 years
   o (  ) 4 - 6 years
   o (  ) 7 - 10 years
   o (  ) More than 10 years

7. What form of media do you work in most? (Please choose (√) only ONE answer unless specified otherwise)
   o (  ) Newspaper (Daily, Weekly, Occasionally, Other: .....................)
   o (  ) Magazine (Weekly, Third per-month, Monthly, Other: ................)
   o (  ) Radio (Locally, Satellite broadcasting)
   o (  ) Television (Locally, Satellite broadcasting)
   o (  ) Other, (please record verbatim) .................................
8. Which of the following categories best describes your current position in your newsroom? (Please add name of organization verbatim)
   o ( ) Editor in chief
   o ( ) Managing editor
   o ( ) Desk head or assignment editor
   o ( ) Department head
   o ( ) Senior editor
   o ( ) Producer
   o ( ) Reporter
   o ( ) News writer
   o ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) 

9. Did you attend a formal journalism apprenticeship or internship?
   o ( ) Yes
   o ( ) No

10. Which of the following categories best describes your current employment?
    o ( ) Full-time employee
    o ( ) Part-time employee
    o ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) 

11. How many hours are you required to work each day?
    o ( ) 8 hours per-day
    o ( ) No specific requirements
    o ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) 

12. Besides working as a journalist, do you have other paid jobs?
    o ( ) Yes
    o ( ) No

13. On average, how many news items do you produce and/or process in a usual week?
    o ( ) 1 - 5 items
    o ( ) 6 - 10 items
    o ( ) 11 - 15 items
    o ( ) More than 15 items

14. Journalism is in a state of change. Please tell me whether you think there has been an increase or a decrease in the following aspects of work in the Kurdistan region. (5 means they have increased a lot, 4 means they have somewhat increased, 3 means there has been no change, 2 means they have somewhat decreased, and 1 means they have decreased a lot).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Kurdish journalism</th>
<th>Increased a lot</th>
<th>Somewhat decreased</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Somewhat increased</th>
<th>Decreased a lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journalists' freedom to make editorial decisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average working hours of journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time available for researching stories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions of journalists with their audiences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
technical skills
The use of search engines
The importance of having a university degree
The importance of having a degree in journalism or a related field
The credibility of journalism
The relevance of journalism for society

15. Which of the following are the MOST challenges to the journalists in the Kurdistan Region?
- (    ) Government control over the media
- (    ) Corruption in government institutions
- (    ) Commercial company pressures
- (    ) Physical violence against journalists
- (    ) Religious group pressures
- (    ) Non implementation of laws
- (    ) Tribes and other social groups
- (    ) Traditional values and norms of society

16. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements of Kurdish media content regulation? (1 means you strongly agree, 2 means somewhat agree, 3 means neither agree nor disagree, 4 means somewhat disagree, and 5 means strongly disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media content regulation</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show material with a lot of violence late at night.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish medium/channel(s) should not be allowed to show sexually explicit material late at night.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't really care how other people behave as long as it does not affect me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of media regulation would make Kurdish medium/channel worse.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. In which of the following categories does your monthly salary fall?
   - ( ) 400-999$
   - ( ) 1000-1500$
   - ( ) 1499-1999$
   - ( ) 2000-2499$
   - ( ) 2500-2999$
   - ( ) 3000-3499$
   - ( ) 3500-3999$
   - ( ) 4000-4499$
   - ( ) 4500-4999$
   - ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) .................

Second Unit: The Dimensions of Journalism Culture in the Kurdistan Region
Please choose (√) the most correct answer

18. There are basically four general types of professional activities in journalism. Approximately what percentage of your time do you spend on each of these following types of activities on a normal workday? (Please read four activities and fill in percentages. Make sure the total does not exceed 100 percent).
   - (.......... %) Information gathering and investigation.
   - (.......... %) News production which includes writing, editing and producing.
   - (.......... %) Presenting news and design/layout.
   - (.......... %) Editorial coordination and management, including attending meetings.

19. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. (1 means you have complete trust, and 5 means you do not trust an institution at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Complete trust</th>
<th>Somewhat trust</th>
<th>Neither trust nor trust</th>
<th>Somewhat trust</th>
<th>Not trust at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Kurdistan Regional Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary/ the courts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians in general</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big corporations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable or voluntary organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The news media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. The following list describes some of the things the news media do or try to do. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how important is each of these things in your work? (1 means you find them extremely important, 2 means very important, 3 means somewhat important, 4 means little important, and 5 means not important at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional roles of journalists</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Little important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be an absolutely detached observer.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as watchdog of the government.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide citizens with the information they need to make political decisions.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To concentrate mainly on news that will attract the widest possible audience.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To set the political agenda.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To convey a positive image of political and business leadership.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide the audience with the information that is most interesting.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To influence public opinion.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support official policies to bring about prosperity and development.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To advocate for social change.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To act as watchdog of business elites.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To motivate people to participate in civic activity and political discussion.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. The following statements describe different approaches to news coverage. For each of them, please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how strongly you agree or disagree. (1 means you strongly agree, 2 means somewhat agree, 3 means neither agree nor disagree, 4 means somewhat disagree, and 5 means strongly disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemology and ethical role of journalists</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not allow my own beliefs and convictions to influence my reporting.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I provide analysis of events and issues in my work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that facts speak for themselves.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I remain strictly impartial in my work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I make claims only if they are substantiated by hard evidence and reliable sources.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that journalists can depict reality as it is.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I always make clear which side in a dispute has the better position.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I always stay away from information that cannot be verified.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are ethical principles which are so important that they should be followed by all journalists, regardless of situation and context.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists should avoid questionable methods of reporting in any case, even if this means not getting the story.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical dilemmas in news coverage are often so complex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that journalists should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes of conduct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting and publishing a story that can potentially harm others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is ethical in journalism varies from one situation to another.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are situations in which harm is justifiable if it results in a story that produces a greater good.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Here are two statements about your journalistic professional autonomy.
(Please tell me, on the same scale of 1 to 5, how strongly you agree or disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have a lot of control over the work that I do.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am allowed to take part in decisions that affect my work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Some of these limits can come from within the news organization. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how influential each of the following is in your day-to-day job. (1 means it is extremely influential, 2 means very influential, 3 means somewhat influential, 4 means little influential, and 5 means not influential at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal influences</th>
<th>Extremely influential</th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Somewhat influential</th>
<th>Little influential</th>
<th>Not influential at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your personal values and beliefs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your peers on the staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your editorial supervisors and higher editors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The managers of your news organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The owners of your news organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The editorial policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising considerations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit expectations of the news organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market with audience research and data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New media technologies or availability of news-gathering resources</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions and ethics of the newsroom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of news-gathering resources, including staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressing news deadlines or time limits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures and standards of journalism ethics in news production</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Other influences may come from outside the news organization. Again, please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how influential each of the following is in your work.

(1 means it is extremely influential, 2 means very influential, 3 means somewhat influential, 4 means little influential, and 5 means not influential at all).}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External influences</th>
<th>Extremely influential</th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Somewhat influential</th>
<th>Little influential</th>
<th>Not influential at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your friends, acquaintances and family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues in other media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers, listeners or viewers feedbacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing news organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media laws and regulation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Third Unite: Journalists Understanding on Privacy Boundaries**

Please choose (√) the most correct answer

25. Which of the following concepts best describes your current understanding of ‘privacy’?

- (    ) The right to be left alone
- (    ) Limited access to the self
- (    ) Secrecy and concealment of information
- (    ) Control over personal information
- (    ) A personhood that includes an attention independently to create significant particular decisions such as marriage and contraception
- (    ) An intimacy that refers the sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not share with all

26. Sometimes the media argue that intrusion into private life is justified because it is in the public interest. What does ‘the public interest’ mean for you?

- (    ) Public rights
- (    ) Public effects
- (    ) National interest
- (    ) Interests of the public
- (    ) Personal interests
- (    ) Local / community interest
- (    ) Unwarranted intrusion
- (    ) Media excuse
- (    ) Warranted intrusion
27. Which one of the following claims of privacy invasion is MORE common in Kurdish culture. (Please read and tick appropriate boxes. Multiple responses allowed).
- ( ) Public disclosure of private and embarrassing facts
- ( ) Intrusion
- ( ) Fails light
- ( ) Misappropriation

28. Which one of the following types of intrusion into private life have been used by Kurdish journalists? Please read and tick appropriate boxes. Multiple responses allowed).
- ( ) Trespass, which means newsgathering in private space without valid consent
- ( ) Secret surveillance that using bugging equipment, hidden cameras, and other electronic aids
- ( ) Misrepresentation, which refers to invalid or exceeded consent (often in the context of undercover reporting).

29. Which of the following information of private life that you think can be reported in the practices of journalism? (Please read and tick appropriate boxes. Multiple responses allowed).
- ( ) Family matters
- ( ) Banking / financial matters
- ( ) Career development
- ( ) Personality traits (e.g.: behavior and attitudes)
- ( ) Health matters
- ( ) Marital status and history
- ( ) Social life (e.g.: meeting friends and family)
- ( ) Employment history
- ( ) Personal arrangements (e.g.: trips and events)
- ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) ..................

30. The following list describes some of the methods in gathering the information of private life. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 which of the following methods are MORE acceptable in your daily professional work. (1 means you find them extremely acceptable, 2 means very acceptable, 3 means somewhat acceptable, 4 means little acceptable, and 5 means not acceptable at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of information privacy gathering</th>
<th>Extremely acceptable</th>
<th>Very acceptable</th>
<th>Somewhat acceptable</th>
<th>Little acceptable</th>
<th>Not acceptable at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Using of long-lens camera</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eavesdropping on people’s conversations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio / video recording without sources permission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretly observing people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-playing recordings of any CCTV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31. What are the reasons you reveal the sources of private information? (Please read and tick appropriate boxes. Multiple responses allowed).

- ( ) I want to avoid being “scooped” by competitors
- ( ) I am loyal to my editors / employers
- ( ) I am unaware of sources’ privacy rights
- ( ) I am in search of a new beat
- ( ) I believe in the public’s right to know
- ( ) It is the newspaper’s policy
- ( ) It is the nature of my job
- ( ) It is part of the news values of journalism
- ( ) Other, (please record verbatim) ……………

32. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 which of the following persons are MORE important to cover their privacy information in your daily professional work. (1 means you find them extremely acceptable, 2 means very acceptable, 3 means somewhat acceptable, 4 means little acceptable, and 5 means not acceptable at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different persons</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Little important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public figures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. Are you agree that the spouse and first relatives of celebrities and public figures have a FULL RIGHT to protect their private life from the media and journalists invasion?

- ( ) Strongly Agree
- ( ) Somewhat agree
- ( ) Neither agree nor disagree
- ( ) Somewhat disagree
- ( ) Strongly Disagree

34. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5, how strongly you agree or disagree with the following elements of private life, which have been intruded by Kurdish journalists? (1 means you strongly agree, 2 means somewhat agree, 3 means neither agree nor disagree, 4 means somewhat disagree, and 5 means strongly disagree).
### Elements of Information privacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Information privacy</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal photos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal video footages and sound records</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal chats and correspondence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal email and social media accounts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal health problems or medical information</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal decision such as marriage and abortion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal phone hacking (cell and SMS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal family issues or intimate marital secrets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal political perspectives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal finance, salary and bank accounts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Given an important story, which of the following, if any, do you think may be justified on occasion and which would you not approve of under any circumstances? (1 means it is always justified, 2 means it is justified on occasion, and 3 means you would not approve under any circumstances).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of information gathering</th>
<th>Always justified</th>
<th>Justified on occasion</th>
<th>Not approve under any circumstances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paying people for confidential information</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using confidential business or government documents without authorization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claiming to be somebody else</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exerting pressure on unwilling informants to get a story</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making use of personal documents such as letters and pictures without permission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting employed in a firm or organization to gain inside information</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using hidden microphones or cameras</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using re-creations or dramatizations of news by actors | 1 | 2 | 3
Publishing stories with unverified content | 1 | 2 | 3
Accepting money from sources | 1 | 2 | 3
Altering or fabricating quotes from sources | 1 | 2 | 3
Altering photographs | 1 | 2 | 3

36. To reveal the information of people’s private life, what sort of expression styles are MORE used by journalists?
- ( ) News and reports
- ( ) Interviews
- ( ) Opinions
- ( ) Advertising
- ( ) Caricature
- ( ) Other, please specify: ..............................................................

37. As a journalist, whom do you think you are responsible to?
- ( ) General public (audiences)
- ( ) Myself (own conscience)
- ( ) Media owners / Employers
- ( ) Media colleagues
- ( ) Advertisers
- ( ) Sources
- ( ) Regular readers
- ( ) Others, please specify: ..............................................................

Please make sure that you have finished the questions altogether
Thank You for Contributing
V. A Clearance Ethical Checklist Form Used For This Study

All staff and PGR students wishing to conduct an investigation involving participants in order to collect new data in either their research projects or teaching activities are required to complete this checklist before commencement. It may be necessary after completion of this form to submit a full application to the Joint Inter College Ethics Committee (JICEC). Where necessary, official approval from the JICEC must be obtained before the research is commenced. This should take no longer than one month.

IF YOUR RESEARCH IS BEING CONDUCTED OFF CAMPUS AND ETHICAL APPROVAL FOR YOUR STUDY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY AN EXTERNAL ETHICS COMMITTEE, PLEASE SEND DETAILS TO THE PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT RESEARCH TEAM FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CHAIR. YOU WILL BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF APPROVAL FROM THE EXTERNAL ETHICS COMMITTEE AND THE TERMS ON WHICH THIS APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANTED.

IF YOUR RESEARCH IS TRANSFERRING INTO NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY AND APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED FROM YOUR ORIGINATING INSTITUTION, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT ON THE UNIVERSITY TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE APPROVALS ARE IN PLACE.

If you believe either of these statements applies to your research, please contact the Professional Support Research Team adbresearch1@ntu.ac.uk with evidence of former approval and the terms on which this approval has been granted.

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTIGATORS AND/OR SUPERVISORS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS APPROPRIATE INSURANCE COVER FOR THEIR INVESTIGATION.

If you are at all unsure about whether or not your study is covered, please contact the Finance & Planning Manager in your Finance team to check.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Applicant:</th>
<th>SHWAN ADAM WASIM - AIVAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School:</td>
<td>Art and Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title of Investigation:</td>
<td>Kurdish Journalism Cultures: Shifting Boundaries of Privacy Understanding in the Professional Role Perceptions of Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAFF</td>
<td>STUDENT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Briefly outline the objectives of the research. [75 words]

My Ph.D. research study has had several objectives. First, to understand the boundaries of private life and invasion of privacy in Kurdish culture including media and journalists. Second, to examine the professionalism dimensions by examining the worlds of journalism cultures. Third, to evaluate the opportunities and challenges of journalists’ interventionist roles in their professional experience in post-conflict regions. Fourth, to ascertain the relationship between the influences of professional dimensions of journalism cultures and the levels of privacy invasion among Kurdish news-media workers. Fifth and finally, to contribute to the debate on how to balance the right to privacy against the rights of the press investigates matters for public interests such as the private lives of politicians.

### Briefly describe the principal methods, the sources of data or evidence to be used, and the number and type of research participants who will be recruited to the project. [150 words]

I have prepared a questionnaire survey form which is expanding the scope of my thesis to include the dimensions of journalism cultures within professional role perceptions of Kurdish journalists. Within this questionnaire form, the boundaries of private life and invasion of privacy within the institutional roles, epistemological orientations and ethical ideologies of Kurdish journalism cultures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have been examined. I will conduct a survey with 142 Kurdish journalists among 29 diverse news-media organizations. In each medium, I will choose senior manager such as editor in chief, managing editor, general manager. Besides, junior managers like desk head, department head, and senior editor. Also, non-management staff such as reporter, news writers. Furthermore, I have expanded the number of interviewees through using the in-depth interview with approximately 30 people who have divided into academics/expertise, managers, ownerships, politicians, activities and victims of privacy invasion. These extensive interviews are related to the current role of Kurdish media generally, including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s media and political systems. Another aim understands privacy boundaries and its invasion extensively concerning culture, politics, legislation. In addition to conduct survey form and in-depth interview, a case study of Kurdistan Region would be analyzed. More than this, the questions mostly will be delivered in person. Also as the interviews are taking place off site, I have completed a risk assessment.

**Do you intend to use published research instruments/resources (e.g., questionnaires, scales, psychometrics, vignettes)?**

If YES, complete the next 3 questions
If NO, proceed 4 questions

Yes, I have used a questionnaire survey with Kurdish journalist.
### RESEARCH APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you included with this application a full electronic copy or link to each published research instrument/resource?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I don’t use electronic copy or link</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If you are using published research instruments/resources, do you have permission to use them in the way that you intend to use them?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I have permission to use them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What steps will be taken to ensure compliance with the requirements of copyright rules for the use of published scale?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have got the signatures of participants and their agreement to use and publish their perceptions including the detail of their demographic backgrounds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you developing your own research resources/instruments to collect data?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If YES, complete the questions below. If NO, proceed to the next section.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Briefly describe the research resources/instruments you are developing. [50 words]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If applicable, please include an electronic copy of your own bespoke/self-developed research instrument(s) that you will use to collect data with this application.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Familiarisation with policy - Please answer as appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please confirm if you are fully acquainted with the policies for guiding ethical research named below:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NTU research ethics policy</strong> and the procedures for ethical approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The guidelines for ethical research promulgated by a professional association, as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NTU Data Management Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Regulations for the Use of Computers</strong> (see NTU website)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guidelines for Risk Assessment in Research</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you answered NO to any of these questions, please note that you must study these guidelines and regulations before proceeding to complete the remainder of this form.

### External Ethical Review - Please answer as appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has a favourable ethical opinion already been given for this project by any other external research ethics committee?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An external research ethics committee means any research committee other than those at Nottingham Trent University. Submission of this form is not a submission to an external research ethics committee.
Will this project be submitted for ethical approval to any other external research ethics committee?

An external research ethics committee means any research committee other than those at Nottingham Trent University. Submission of this form is not a submission to an external research ethics committee.

If you answered YES to either of these two questions, please complete section C sign the declaration at the end of the form and submit it (together with a letter confirming ethical approval from the external committee) before starting any research.

If you answered NO to both questions, please proceed to the next section.

### Investigators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No**</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do investigators have previous experience of, and/or adequate training in, the methods employed?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If involved will junior researchers/students be under the direct supervision of an experienced member of staff?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If involved will junior researchers/students be expected to undertake physically invasive procedures (not covered by a generic protocol) during the course of the research?</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are researchers in a position of direct authority with regard to participants (e.g. academic staff using student participants, sports coaches using his/her athletes in training)?</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** If you select ANY answers marked **, please submit your completed Ethical Clearance Checklist accompanied by a statement covering how you intend to manage the issues (indicated by selecting a ** answer) to the JICEC.

### Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your research involve vulnerable participants? If not, go to the next section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If your research does involve vulnerable participants, will participants be knowingly recruited from one or more of the following vulnerable groups?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 years of age (please refer to <a href="#">published guidelines</a>)</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with mental illness</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners/Detained persons</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>please specify: ____________________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESEARCH APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Is a DBS/Overseas Police Check required?</strong></th>
<th>Yes☐</th>
<th>No☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>If required, do you have a DBS/Overseas Police Check?</strong></td>
<td>Yes☐</td>
<td>No☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Please contact NTU Disclosures, details can be found on the address book.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To the best of your knowledge, please indicate whether the proposed study:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves procedures likely to cause psychological, social or emotional distress to participants</td>
<td>Yes*☐</td>
<td>No☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is designed to be challenging psychologically in any way</strong></td>
<td>Yes*☐</td>
<td>No☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposes participants to risks or distress greater than those encountered in their normal daily life</td>
<td>Yes*☐</td>
<td>No☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chaperoning Participants**

**If appropriate,** e.g., studies which involve vulnerable participants, taking physical measures or intrusion of participants' privacy:

| **Will participants be chaperoned by more than one investigator at all times?** | Yes☐ | No*☐ | N/A ☐ |
| Will at least one investigator of the same sex as the participant(s) be present throughout the investigation? | Yes☐ | No*☐ | N/A ☐ |
| Will participants be visited at home? | Yes*☐ | No ☐ | N/A ☐ |

If you have selected N/A please provide a statement in the space below explaining why the chaperoning arrangements are not applicable to your research proposal:

If you have selected any of the * answers for any question in section D please provide details (50-75 words):

Chaperoning of participants is not necessary for this study. The main reason is relating to the journalistic background of the investigator, who familiarises with each of interviewee and journalists. His background makes an easy job to meet them face-to-face in their workspaces at an office, house or some public place like cafe-shop and library. The basic principle of choosing participants is related to their professionalism and expertise in journalism theories and practices. In other words, each of them has not any serious problem that needs somebody to chaperoning.

**Advice to Participants following the investigation**

Investigators have a duty of care to participants. When planning research, investigators should consider what, if any, arrangements are needed to inform participants (or those legally responsible for the participants) of any health-related (or other) problems previously unrecognised in the participant. This is particularly important if it is believed that by not doing so the participants well-being is endangered. Investigators should consider whether or not it is appropriate to recommend that participants (or those legally responsible for the participants) seek qualified professional advice, but should not offer this advice personally. Investigators should familiarise themselves with the guidelines of professional bodies associated with their research.
## Observation/Recording - *Please answer: yes or no*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the study involve data collection, or the observation or recording of participants?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note that data collection includes the re-use of material originally collected for a non-research purpose (e.g. client or student data already in your possession) and includes anonymous data</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will those contributing to the data collected (or being observed or being recorded), or the appropriate authority, be informed that the data collection, observation or recording will take place?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have answered **NO** to question to the first question in section E, because you are not undertaking empirical work, proceed to the declaration at the end of this form. If you have answered **NO** to question the second question, an application for ethical approval needs to be made to the JICEC.

## Consent and Deception - *Please answer: yes or no*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informed Consent &amp; Data Withdrawal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will participants, or the appropriate authority, be fully informed of the objectives, and of all other particulars of the investigation (preferably at the start of the study, but where this would interfere with the study, at the end)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will participants, or the appropriate authority, be fully informed of the use of the data collected (including, where applicable, ownership of any intellectual property arising from the research)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For detained persons, members of the armed forces, employees, students and other persons who may not be in a position to give fully independent consent, will care be taken over the gaining of freely informed consent?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If your research involves children under the age of 18 or participants who have impairment of understanding or communication:

**My research has not involved any children under the age of 18 or participants who have impairment of understanding or communication**

- will consent be obtained (either in writing or by some other means)? | Yes | No* |
- will consent be obtained from parents or other suitable person? | Yes | No* |
- will they be informed that they have the right to withdraw regardless of parental/guardian consent? | Yes | No* |

For investigations conducted in schools, will approval be gained in advance from the Head-teacher and/or the Director of Education of the appropriate Local Education Authority? | Yes | No* |

For detained persons, members of the armed forces, employees, students and other persons judged to be under duress, will care be taken over gaining freely informed consent? | Yes | No* |

Will participants, or the appropriate authority, be informed of their right to withdraw from the investigation at any time (or before a specific deadline) and to require their own data to be destroyed? | Yes | No* |
### Deception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is deception part of the study?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the answer is no, proceed to section G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes, please explain the rationale and nature of deception (50-75 words):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will participants be de-briefed and the true object of the research revealed at the earliest stage upon completion of the study?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has consideration been given on the way that participants will react to the withholding of information or deliberate deception?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G. Storage of Data and Confidentiality

Please see University guidance on [https://www.ntu.ac.uk/intranet/policies/legal_services/data_protection/16231gp.html](https://www.ntu.ac.uk/intranet/policies/legal_services/data_protection/16231gp.html). If you are a member of NTU staff you can obtain direct access to this with your staff username and password. If you are not a member of NTU staff, please request a copy from your supervisor or course leader.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does your research need to be compliant with the RCUK Regulations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes, please attach your data management plan (please use dmponline.ddc.ac.uk to design your plan based around the funders requirements, if you have any queries please email: <a href="mailto:ResearchDataManagement@ntu.ac.uk">ResearchDataManagement@ntu.ac.uk</a>).</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will all information on participants be treated as confidential and not identifiable unless agreed otherwise in advance, and subject to the requirements of the law of the relevant jurisdiction?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will storage of data comply with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the law of any non-UK jurisdiction in which research is carried out?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will any video/audio recording of participants be kept in a secure place and not released for use by third parties?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will video/audio recordings be destroyed within six years of the completion of the investigation?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes*</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have incentives (other than those contractually agreed, salaries or basic expenses) been offered to the investigator to conduct the investigation?</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will incentives (other than basic expenses) be offered to potential participants as an inducement to participate in the investigation?</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** If you select ANY answers marked **, please submit your completed Ethical Clearance Checklist accompanied by a statement covering how you intend to manage the issues (indicated by selecting a ** answer) to the JICEC.

The design of the participant information sheet/consent form and of any research instrument (including questionnaires, sampling and interview schedules) that will be used, have been discussed with my supervisor(s).

**Compliance with Ethical Principles**

If you have completed the checklist to the best of your knowledge and selected an answer marked with * or ** your investigation you will need to seek full formal approval from the JICEC.
Please return to completed Ethical Approval Checklist with the following documents as necessary to the Research Team, Maudslay 312, City Campus, or via email adbresearchteam1@ntu.ac.uk:

- A copy of the research tool you are using
- Consent Form (if necessary)
- Data Management Policy (if necessary)
- Risk Assessment (if necessary)

Please note that the ethics form does not abrogate your need to complete a risk assessment.

Declaration
I have read the Ethics & Governance Statement http://www.ntu.ac.uk/research/research_at_ntu/research_integrity/index.html. I confirm that the above named investigation complies with published codes of conduct, ethical principles and guidelines of professional bodies associated with my research discipline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Assessor’s Name: (Internee i.e. the Student)</th>
<th>SHWAN ADAM WASIM AIVAS</th>
<th>Module Leader’s Name:</th>
<th>Dr. COLIN ALEXANDER</th>
<th>Planned Review Date</th>
<th>TBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Signature of Applicant
(Research Student or Principal Investigator)

SHWAN ADAM WASIM AIVAS
Date

Signature of Supervisor/Line Manager
(Director of Studies/ATL)

Dr. COLIN ALEXANDER
Date

Signature of JICEC Chair

Date
V1. A Risk Assessment Form Used For This Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internship Activity Description</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The internship of the fieldwork will entail a combination of desk based activities, such as using display screen equipment to redesign the research tools of data collection including the interview and survey. Besides, coming back from the UK to a number of cities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. It aims undertaking in-depth interviews with several people including media experts, media regulators, media general managers, civil activities, senior media advisors, members of parliament, and the victims of privacy invasion. Then, distributing the questionnaire survey forms among journalists in differ news organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons at Risk - Affected Groups:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A - Self (you the student/internee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Hazard</th>
<th>Existing Controls</th>
<th>Risk level with controls (low/medium/high)</th>
<th>Additional Controls or Required Action and Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive topic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No further action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The detailed background of the study will be prepared in Kurdish and English languages to illustrate the research objectives for participants.
- Some victims of privacy invasion and other participants will...
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<th>Existing Controls</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be primarily rejected to be interviewed intensively face-to-face due to the content of questions. Alternatively, the email interview will be used or will be focused on their privacy cases instead of interviewing directly. - Similar to other cultures in the Middle East, there is three main sensitivity in Kurdish culture, such as sex, religion, and politic that were considered these various affiliations during the period of data collection. Besides, they have been informed in withdrawing from the research at any time. For that purpose, a researcher’s email account and his mobile number were provided to respond any inquiries that came from the participants.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No further action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical issue and Not completed the survey</td>
<td>- Using hardcopy of survey form instated of electronic version due to the lack of electricity to access the internet. - Conducting the survey face to face to complete the survey sooner and correctly</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No further action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>length of questions and its options,</td>
<td>- Reducing the numbers of question and its options. Then making clear statements by</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No further action</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>statements and vague</td>
<td>providing the examples.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No further action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychological Stress</td>
<td>Make sure the data will use in academic project confidentiality.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To avoid psychological harming the respondents who took their time in participating this research, the confidentiality and privacy issues have been considered in an informed consent form. It clearly was designed for confirming the participants who would be confidentiality treated with their information, and perceptions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Isis fighting</td>
<td>Conducting the fieldwork in three main safest provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan Region including Sulaimany, Hewlêr, and Dhok. These cities far away from the areas of fighting.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Initial Risk Assessment:**
This risk level has been reduced as low as is reasonably practicable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessor’s Signature: (the internee/student)</th>
<th>SHWAN ADAM WASIM - AIVAS</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>15 December 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Module Leader’s Signature:</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Review</th>
<th>2nd Review</th>
<th>3rd Review</th>
<th>4th Review</th>
<th>5th Review</th>
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<td>Module Leader’s Name:</td>
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<td>Date of Review:</td>
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<td>Review Comments:</td>
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<td>Enter below details of outcomes of Risk Assessment Reviews as appropriate; actions/steps taken should be recorded.</td>
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