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CONTENTS

MEANING AND GENERAL FEATURES OF ORGANIZED CRIME WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON KOSOVO

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Abstract

This paper addresses some of the issues and problems of the organized crime in general, with examples taken from some economically developed countries, such as USA, Germany, France and Italy. Special attention of the paper is given to Kosovo and its Criminal Law. The paper is structured in a way that in the beginning it explains the meaning of organized crime and some of the features that distinguish it from other forms of criminality, followed by the legislative aspect indicating the manner how different legislations of countries regulate this area.

Key Words: Organized crime, criminal groups, features, legislation, criminal organizations.

Introduction

This paper deals with organized crime and the manner of its appearance ranging from the meaning and definition of this dangerous criminal phenomenon, in particular in some of the more developed countries and where this form of criminality is presented and carried out in various forms. Furthermore, the paper continues to address some of the most frequent and characteristic forms of offenses committed in the form of organized crime in contemporary society.

The paper devotes a significant part to the characteristics that must exist in order to consider a criminal offense as an offense that was committed in an organized manner.

It is very difficult to imagine today that a lasting and stable peace can be achieved in modern world without preventing and combating organized crime groups, at the country level as well as in the region and beyond.

Combating this phenomenon is difficult without knowing its forms and features; it almost amounts to mission impossible. Therefore, the present paper in detail describes some of the forms and features of offenses committed in an organized manner.

1. On the organized crime in general

"Nun sacciu, nun vidi, nun ceru; e si ceru, dormivu"
(I do not know anything, I didn't see a thing, I was not there, and if I was, I was sleeping).
Sicilian saying that expresses the silence on crime (omreta)[1]

Battle with organized crime has changed significantly in recent years. With the development and advancement of technology, the risk from organized crime activities has increased and expanded significantly, and has become more complex.

Precisely for this reason, the fight against this phenomenon is not easy, in particular for our country, which does even not have sufficient capacity and tools needed to combat classic crime,[2] whereas to successfully combat organized crime in all its forms in which it appears, we need tools and far more sophisticated logistics. It is highly indicative that the development and advancement of technology has enabled and facilitated the activity of organized crime groups, which utilize the advantages offered by this technology to coordinate their activities in carrying out criminal actions. Today in the world, organized crime groups are increasingly becoming partners in crime, because they understand very well that there is more to gain from cooperation, rather than competing with each other.[3] Organized crime is a serious political and economic threat to society. Such findings have been many times repeated by various local officials and the international community, highlighting the issue of organized crime as one of the key challenges on the European integration process of the countries of the region.[4]

The influence of organized crime is not easily measured, but one thing is known - that organized crime networks manipulate and monopolize the financial markets, traditional institutions, such as unions and construction industries and many other important institutions. Organized crime groups bring narcotics into our cities, for material gain and to increase the

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[1] Raufer, Xavier, Godmother of the world, Tirana, 2005, p. 85.
[2] Latifi, Vesel, Criminology, discovery and proof of the crime, Pristina, 2011, p. 261.
[3] For more information see: www.law.jrank.org/pages/1624/organizedcrime (accessed date: 13.10.2009).
[4] Latifi, op. cit., p. 260.

level of violence in communities, corrupting officials and using bribery, extortion, intimidation and murder to maintain their criminal actions and to control certain territories.[5] Their underground businesses, including prostitution and human trafficking, wherever they take place, bring misery to the country, region and beyond. They also lead to the loss of millions every year, through various stock and financial fraud, which are intentionally done for their illicit material benefit.[6] For many scholars, organized crime is not only an object of academic study, but also a practical problem, where we all must engage in uncovering and investigation of organized crime, an extremely harmful and dangerous phenomenon for the country and its economy.

Policies aimed at combating organized crime tend to emphasize two types of strategies in relation to the issue of organized crime study. Firstly, they focus on goals or intentions of the members of organized crime groups, and secondly, they focus on structural features and relationships of organized crime with the targeted market.[7] Local and central institutions of the state use an entire arsenal to uncover and investigate criminal groups. All this is done in order to more efficiently prevent and combat organized crime. Based on this, there is no coincidence that the most important tool of the prosecution was influenced by the act or statute known as *RICO – Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations*, which was adopted in 1970.[8] Under the RICO statute, it is envisioned that the crimes which were committed by legitimate corporations or enterprises that have committed two or more offenses, within a period of ten years, were subject to prosecution.[9] All states have enacted legislation prohibiting the activities of a criminal organization. Among the acts or laws that regulate this field is RICO statute, which was enacted in the US, in 1970.[10]

In recent years, the opening of national borders, increase in Internet use and the use of money in international markets, through which the movement of goods and persons is facilitated, has caused very complex problems related to the powers of law enforcement agencies and institutions in different states, but also internally.

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[5] For more information see: www.law.jrank.org/pages/1624/organizedcrime (accessed date: 13.10.2009).
[6] Latifi, op.cit., p. 261.
[7] For more information see: www.law.jrank.org/pages/1624/organized/crime (accessed on 13.10.2009).
[8] Through RICO Statute, in the period after 1980, the most important criminal prosecutions of organized crime have been made under this Act, and the destruction of traditional organizing larger groups of organized crime, Cosa Nostra's, has been attributed criminal prosecution by the act.
[9] Jay S. Albanese, Organized Crime in America, 3rd. ed., Cincinnati, Anderson, USA, 1995, p. 197.
[10] Abdinsky, Howard, Organized Crime, Belmont, California, Wadsworth-Thomoson, 2003, p. 318.

According to the scholars, it is more important to focus on the environment within which businesses, constituting organized crime, operate than on individuals, involved in such crime. The operating environment should be the object of policy attention in combating organized crime.

Money laundering by organized crime groups in the 1980s and 1990s (especially proceeds from the drug trade) have facilitated the relationship between organized crime groups and organizations in the legitimate economies, and have enabled the interconnection of such groups and governments of different states for whom that money is a very important resource in the implementation or enforcement of their government policies.[11] For this reason, the attention should focus more on the emergence and development of the process of "money laundering", by enacting laws and policies to freeze the proceeds that offenders gain from their criminal activities. For policies on "*money laundering*" to be effective, a high degree of international cooperation is required, which, unfortunately, cannot always be achieved, because of differences in resources that are available to law enforcement or due to the involvement of political actors in such sensitive cases.[12]

2. *The definition of organized crime*

Organized crime, as a form of cooperation during the commission of criminal acts, undoubtedly represents a very serious threat to society, in particular for economic and political development of countries or states concerned. Therefore, to have a clearly defined picture of organized crime, one should address some of its essential elements, which must exist for such action to be considered as criminal offense, and then such criminal offense to be conducted as part of organized crime.

By analyzing the international literature, which deals with organized crime, we can conclude that the term organized crime was first used around the year 1896, in the annual report of the Association for Crime Prevention with headquarters in New York, USA.[13]

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[11] Ibid.

[12] For more information see: www.law.jrank.org; Organized-Crime-Controlling-Organized-crime, (accessed on: 12.07.2010).

[13] Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli, (Eds.), Organized Crime in Europe, (Concpets, Pattens and Control Policies in the Europian Union and Beyond), Netherlands, 2004/2006, p. 24.

Also, the term organized crime was used around 1920 by John Landesco, in his book "Organized crime in Chicago". This is a very voluminous research book on crime in Illinois, which was published by the Illinois Association for Criminal Law (1929).[14] Organized crime has for a long time been identified with the mafia, especially the Italian or Sicilian Mafia, as it was known differently. However, according to the criminological meaning, organized crime is defined as a joint conspiracy of two or more persons on an ongoing and secret basis, with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes and to ensure direct or indirect financial benefit or other material benefits.[15]

Since organized crime is a highly complex and widespread phenomenon, which is continuously evolving, both in forms and features, legal science, but neither practice have yet managed to have a unique and common definition, which would be accepted by all. The European Union, meanwhile, in the wake of its efforts to prevent organized crime activities in its countries, related to the definition of organized crime, has tried to give a definition of this type of criminality. In 1998, pursuant to a plan of EU states, "criminal organization" was considered the organization that has a structure consisting of two or more a person, which was created to operate at a certain time and that commits crimes or criminal offenses for which the law provides a punishment of over four years imprisonment.[16] Whereas, according to another author, criminal organization is considered the creation or use of the organization, gang, conspiracy or other association for the purpose of committing criminal offenses.[17]

A criminal plan may not even exist, but the actions undertaken by criminal groups are coordinated, as it have been previously planned. Therefore, it suffices for them to be interrelated and that other necessary elements exist, which render a criminal act as part of organized crime. According to "*The Columbian Electronic Encyclopedia*", organized crime represents a set of stable groups, organized in hierarchies, which, through violence or serious threat, have managed to obtain a monopoly in controlling large illegal markets.[18]

Organized crime is very complex and, as such, is defined not only in the scientific literature, but also in the laws and penal provisions of states, including various scientific papers

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[14]Ibid.

[15] Levinson, David, (edit.) Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, 2002, p. 112, (cit. By Gashi, Rexhep, Organized Crime, Pristina, 2011, p. 14.

[16] Hysi, Vasilika, Introduction to Criminology and Penology, Tirana, 2000, p. 52.

[17] Salihu, Ismet, Criminal Law (Special Section), Pristina, 2008, p. 243.

[18] Demolli, Haki, forms and measures to combat organized crime, Journal "The Right" Pristina, no. 2-4 / 2005, p. 55.

and international symposia. It deals with situations when there is a group of three or more persons who have a certain structure, conduct illegal activities for a relatively long time and the criminal offenses which they perform are punishable by long – term effective imprisonment, where the aim of the exercise of their activities is obtaining financial and material or any other form of direct or indirect immaterial benefit.

3. *Some features of organized crime*

Organized crime, as one of the current challenges faced by many countries of the world, is composed of, but also entails a significant number of features or specifications, that differ this form of criminality from other forms. Many different scholars and authors have written on the features or specifications of organized crime. Similarly for defining organized crime, there is no common and unique agreement, and even for features we do not have their exact number. Some authors cite more, and others less features for an act to be considered as criminal offense of organized crime.

Organized crime is characterized by several features, such as permanent connectivity of several persons in the commission of criminal activities; the existence of a hierarchical organizational structure and strong leadership power; dominance of order, discipline and accountability of members; imposed solidarity; secrecy of action and non-disclosure of the organization; absence of betrayal of the leader, etc.[19]

As a characteristic of organized crime is also seeking financial gain. For a business to survive, it must be profitable. Organized crime groups operate roughly in the same way. Thirst and desire to have everything and more and more profits, predisposes decisions and actions of many criminal organizations around the world. Another feature of criminal groups is: almost all criminal groups do not claim to be the only ones in the territory in which they operate within the country. They start from the principle that "there is enough for all". There are cases that several criminal organizations operate in one area, which in silence, respect each other, avoiding conflict among themselves.[20]

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[19] Halili, Ragip, Criminology, Pristina, 2011, p. 137-138.
[20] Ibid.

It is easily understood that all criminal groups "*do not have a vertical, or hierarchical structure*" because they operate independently of each other.[21] Some criminal groups do not have a leadership, but each member operates "*for its own interest*". It is understood that over time, due to change in environmental factors or the environment that surrounds us, and under the influence of other circumstances, organization, functioning and structure of criminal organizations also changes. Another important specific is that members of criminal groups "*often change their patrons or bosses*", thus transfer from one criminal group to another. Depending on the nature of criminal groups and the methods they use, we have violent criminal groups and less violent criminal groups. According to many experts on organized crime, if criminal groups cannot resolve their problems through talks or negotiations, they, then, "*use the language of violence or weapons*".

3.1. Commission of crime by groups of persons

Criminal offenses are considered as part of organized crime only if committed by a group of at least three persons. To understand organized crime, its essential elements should be highlighted, or, in other words, those that are required to be mentioned, such as the existence of the group, association or criminal organization. Association or organization can be large or small, depending on the number of members and their criminal activity.[22]

Regarding the naming of criminal organizations, they may also differ in principle, but their activity is almost identical in relation to forms and activities, wherever they perform criminal activities in the world. By analyzing the names used by many authors, related to the criminal groups, we can conclude that for the activities conducted by criminal groups, the term more used is "mafia" or "mafia activity".[23] As known from the literature on organized crime, orders given by officers cannot be discussed, nor is likely for members to give remarks about the way their implementation, they should be implemented in practice as the "*Boss*" wants, and in no other way. Each member of the organization is obliged to keep secrecy of the information they possess, and which are related to his criminal activity, conducted in the organization which he is part of. Otherwise, in case of disclosure, extraction or publication of any information, in

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Halili, Ragip, Some characteristics of organized crime, Journal "The Right" no. 4/2002, Pristina, p. 48.

[23] Alison, Jamison, The Anti Mafia-Italy's Fight Against Organized Crime, London, 2000, p. 5, cited by Halili R., op.cit., (Footnote no. 58), p. 47.

public, or even before the institution of prosecution, members of the organization can expect strict punishment by other members of the organization.[24]

Implementation of these measures or punitive sanctions, is always done by receiving instructions from bosses on how to act, and in most cases they are physically eliminated, and not only members who have betrayed the criminal organization, but also their family members. Also, the author *Poda* stresses that any information given by any of the members of the criminal organization in connection with the criminal plan, the members of the criminal group or other information that could harm the interests of the criminal organization, will be punished severely.[25]

3.2. The organizational structure of organized crime groups

Organized crime is a serious crime, conducted by a structured group to benefit directly or indirectly, property or financial good. Organized crime is considered a structured group, which exists for a certain time and which acts in cooperation with the intent to commit one or more serious crimes in order to gain direct or indirect financial or material benefit in the interest of criminal organization. Regarding this element, it should be noted that we need to stop at the meaning of the word "*structured group*." Structured group means any group consisting of three or more persons, which is not formed by chance, to perform momentary crime or offense and which does not mean, formally, to have defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or that it has developed structure.[26]

It is known that a criminal group cannot function if there is no organized structure which has separate roles and duties for each of its members during the exercise of their criminal activities. It should be noted that the legislation of the Republic of Kosovo provides a solution to the dilemma which often appeared in the judicial system regarding the issue of: "Can we talk about organized crime, in situations where organized group does not possess the so-called criminal plan". However, the convention against organized crime, expressly determines criminal responsibility of each person, whether the one who organizes, creates, maintains, manages or directs the activities of an organized criminal group.

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Poda, Zamir, Transnational organized crime - violence and power system, Tirana, 2003, p. 6.
[26] Article 283, paragraph 1, of the CCK.

Thus, despite not having a written criminal plan, organized crime may exist and conduct criminal actions of a great risk to society and the economy in general. Networking and sustainable structures and cooperation between members of a group or members of different groups, whether of one country or of different countries, is an important characteristic and factor for the existence of organized crime.[27] Depending on the organization of the criminal group and of the activities that it undertakes, we have the structure of the criminal group. Some organizations have hierarchical structure, and some have more flexible structure in their criminal organization. Organized crime groups generally have a defined structure, with a leading role and subordinates, through which criminal organization achieves its goals.

3.3. Violence, intimidation and corruption, as features of organized crime

One of the important features of organized crime groups is the use of violence, intimidation, or in certain cases the use of corruption, as a means way to exercise their criminal and organized activities. Violence was also used to corrupt officials and governors, in order to push people or clients that are linked to organized crime groups, to corrupt officials and governors.[28]

The success of many criminal organizations, in their illegal activity, is precisely due to the corruption of officials and those persons responsible for their investigation and prosecution. Sometimes, the connection between them is so close that it is difficult to distinguish between the criminal and the official being corrupted.[29] Corruption used by organized crime groups to infiltrate state institutions, legal economies, law enforcement and political groups, is a powerful tool of organized crime groups and at the same time a possible indicator of the potential risks arising from organized crime groups. Corruption is often difficult to be noticed and classified and its negative impact is difficult to be measured. Indeed, measuring of corruption is usually based on public perceptions on the use of corrupt influence in different sectors of society. This, however, does not necessarily give the whole picture of the level of corruption in each country. The use of commercial structures by organized crime to assist their criminal activities is ongoing throughout the countries of the European Union.

3.4. The scope of criminal activities in the whole country

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[27] Demolli, Haki, Some form of organized crime in Kosovo during the period 2002-2007, Journal "The Right ", No.3 / 4, 2008, p. 55.
[28] Togal Oguz, Mehmet, Organized Crime, Istanbul, 2006, p. 48.
[29] Ibid.

Trends or intentions of each criminal group are to have the widest expansion throughout the country, where they exercise their criminal activity. This means that it is understandable that some organized crime groups' deal only with some of the forms of organized crime, the others deal with most of the forms of organized crime, without making any difference, but only aiming to collect as much profit as possible from their illegal activities.[30] One thing is certain, all criminal groups aim to extend their activities as much as possible throughout the country, although some groups tend to expand even more, outside of the boundaries. Today, in modern day society, the majority of organized crime groups tend to expand their activities outside of the borders and beyond, because profits are many times higher. Each criminal group, which has greater extent, has higher gains. And, as we know from practice and literature, the main goal of organized crime activities is material gain for himself or other persons. This means that the intention of criminal groups is expanding and control as much as possible of the territory in which they operate. Organized crime, because of the tendency of continuous expansion beyond the borders of a country, is taking a transnational character and, as such, is more and more understood not only as a matter of state or just a region, but as issue of wider concern, thus as a broader concept of the whole international community.[31]

This makes us realize that the tendency of organized crime is not only to extend to the whole country, but that they have even bigger goals, to expand their activities further, outside of the borders, due to the enormous profits that the activities of transnational organized crime bring.

3.5. Cooperation with other international criminal organizations

Cooperation with other criminal organizations, such as those criminal organizations that operate on a national level, as well as those that operate internationally, is present everywhere in case of occurrence of criminal activities anywhere in the world. Criminal organizations aim to cooperate among themselves, because they know very well that by cooperating, profits and easements are several times higher for the exercise of their criminal activities with less obstacles.

One of the most significant advantages in the world of organized crime, is their total disregard to national borders or even conflicts with often antagonistic character, which brought wars, especially in the region of the Balkan states. Moreover, they knew how to use the conflicts

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[30] Ibid.
[31] Murati, Rexhep, Organized criminality and criminal procedural legislation, Journal, " The Right", no. 4/2002, Pristina, p. 87.

between their countries to disguise their criminal activities and to use these conflicts in their favor. The most typical example of this was the powerful smuggling with millions in income during the embargo of the former Yugoslavia.[32] The conflicts between countries were in fact a very effective shield to divert attention from their criminal activities, as organized crime bosses are completely devoid of national complexes.

On the other hand, the question naturally arises: Would organized crime be so successful if developed Western countries will take seriously the virtues which claim that they are the foundations of their civilization?[33] For this question we must find an answer, which is very simple, - no. But, what should countries that have problems with organized crime do or undertake? They should undertake a significant number of actions, ranging from the adoption of adequate legislation on criminal offenses which are committed as part of organized crime, then the establishment of institutions and professional training of officials dealing with investigation, prosecution and adjudication of criminal offenses committed as part of organized crime. There should also be more consistency in the application of laws in practice, not deviating from their application, there must be political will of holders of high state positions, etc., and all of these must be done to successfully combat organized crime.[34]

However, the anti-criminal policy against the activities of organized crime groups is not a simple, but, rather is a complicated one. This policy should be oriented towards complex strategy development, where intelligence and operational work of the relevant officials undoubtedly plays a crucial role.

We should emphasize that we have tried to examine above some of the causes or reasons that render organized crime as an overall problem in the world today, not just in a region or a country, and without doubt the most important element is the financial interest or tendency for greater economic gains.

3.6. Cooperation of organized crime groups with state power structures

The exercise of criminal activities, particularly certain criminal groups, is impossible without the cooperation with state power structures, according to most persons, and in particular according to the experts on the circumstances of occurrence, development and preventing or

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[32] For more information see: www.explorerunivers.com/t3941-ana-e-erret-e-globalizmit; (accessed date: 10.04.2012).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Latifi, Vesel; Elezi, Ismet; Hysi, Vasilika, combating crime policy, Pristina, 2012, p. 195.

combating organized crime. Some of the different forms of organized crime, in most cases, are closely interlinked with those governing bodies of the state, the persons who are charged with implementing the rule of law. In this way persons who run organized crime, are "favored" compared with other offenders who commit other offenses, because other perpetrators do not have such "collaborators" and "protectors", like the heads of organized crime have.[35] If we make an analysis of why this correlation or this liaison exists, it is clearly seen that: "Organized crime shows or displays exceptional ability of adapting quickly to new circumstances and conditions, finding space for the realization of large profits, thus criminal groups, by attaining huge profits as a result creating huge capital, exercise destructive influence on government institutions and police and legal order itself in one country".[36]

Such situations become even more brutal in places that have a fragile democracy and an underdeveloped economy, as organized crime penetrates deeply to various spheres, in those segments where there are largest and beneficial financial interests to organized crime. They do not stop on that, they try to install persons who are associated with organized crime in all important institutions, such as legislative, executive, and in the judiciary, especially in some institutions where interest is much higher, so that in case of initiation of the investigation, prosecution or trial, they can influence the decisions of these institutions, but in certain cases also to determine the policies of these institutions against members of organized crime groups.

4. *Criminal-legal treatment of organized crime*

Criminal-legal treatment of organized crime is defined in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo. We shall consider the specifics of the definition of organized crime in the following part.

The applicable Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK), in detail stipulates actions which are considered to have been committed as criminal offenses of organized crime.[37] Thus, according to the CCK, term "*organized crime*" means a serious crime committed by a structured group to benefit directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.[38] Meanwhile "*organized*

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[35] Ukaj, Bajram, Organized crime situation in Kosovo and criminal legislation, Journal, "The Right" no. 4/2002, Pristina, p.89.
[36] Halili, Ragip, Criminology, Pristina, 2011, p. 133.
[37] Article 274, Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, year 2004.
[38] Article 274 of the CCK, year 2004.

criminal group" is defined as a structured group which exists for a certain time and acts jointly with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes to gain direct or indirect financial or other material benefit. With the term "structured group" one understands the group of three or more persons, which is not formed randomly, for momentary committing an offense and that does not mean to have formally defined roles for its members or a developed structure.[39]

The CCK defines the notion of "*criminal association*" in manner that anyone who explicitly or tacitly agrees with one or more persons to commit or instigate the commission of a criminal offense or take action or other preparation for the implementation of such agreement, that person participates in criminal association.[40]

Slovenian legislation is quite convenient for fight against organized crime and for confiscation of property and income (assets acquired illegally). Slovenian legislation, the fight against organized crime is regulated by different codes. This matter includes the following codes: Code of Police, State Prosecution Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Criminal Code, and Code for the Prevention of Money Laundering etc. Through these acts, provided are the rights, duties and powers of the police, prosecution and other bodies, by being defined in full. There is no specific law against organized crime.

According to Professor Haki Demolli, organized crime requires some elements that must be met to considered an act as a criminal offense, and then as part of organized crime.[41] Key elements of organized crime, according to the author are:

a. Formal organization and structure of the group, which means that:

- The group must exist a certain time, thus not to be assembled on the spot or by chance;

- The group must necessarily be constituted by three or more persons;

- The group aims to conduct one or more criminal offenses for which a punishment of imprisonment of more than four years is stipulated;

b. Coordination and control the actions from a certain center;

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[39] Article 274 of the CCK, year 2004.
[40] Article 274 of the CCK, year 2004.
[41] Demolli, op.cit. p. 55.

c. Performing various criminal activities (i.e., it is not required to carry out crimes of only one type, but the goal is important, and that is material, direct or indirect benefit, for example: cars, land plots, business premises etc., or financial (example: cash, securities, checks, etc.).

d. These groups have good connections and are protected by corrupt local state structures, and in certain cases even by internationals.[42]

According to the Kosovo criminal law, a person who commits a serious crime, as part of organized criminal group, may be punished by fine and imprisonment of at least seven years. It is understood that to have such an opportunity to impose a criminal sanction against the perpetrator, they must first become a member of organized criminal group, and then as part of that group to have committed a serious crime. Our legislation in question does not sanction only committing a serious crime, but also sanctions active participation in criminal activities, or other activities of an organized criminal group, if the perpetrator knew that his participation will contribute in committing serious crimes by organized criminal group or when commission of a criminal offense by the organized group activity results in death.[43]

The applicable Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, [44] and the CCK, provide that state bodies, exercising their legal mandate, of uncovering (the police), prosecution (prosecution) and trial (court), specify the defendants, incriminating period, location, manner of performance and effects, and prove or argue commission of the offense of organized crime following with the conviction and imposition of criminal sanctions, confirming procedural actions with admissible evidence. Based on the practices of countries with more experience in fighting organized crime, it is imperative to have adequate laws, which clearly define the responsibilities of the institutions and allow judges easier pronunciation of sentences for perpetrators of such crimes.[45] Naturally, we consider that efforts are still needed to complete legislation that will help combat organized crime in Kosovo.

5. *Organized crime, according to international acts and conventions*

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[42] Ibid, p. 56.
[43] Article 274, paragraph 3 and 4 of the CCK, the v. 2004.
[44] Article 108, 109 and 128, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008).
[45] KDI Report, Millions of illegal, (prevention and fighting), Pristina, 2011, p. 9.

Organized crime, as a quite disturbing and very present phenomenon in many countries of the world, in addition to being sanctioned by domestic laws and regulations, is also sanctioned by various international acts and conventions. It is well known today that organized crime crosses national boundaries and is increasingly taking attributes of international crime, with numerous consequences in humans as well as in-kind. In the absence of clear definitions of national legislations related to this criminal phenomenon, it is indisputable that such a condition affects and is causing even greater consequences in all countries where organized crime groups are present.[46] For this reason, there are consistent attempts to define this notion, by different authors as well as various international organizations, such as the United Nations, European Union etc.

In the wake of these efforts, defined are some of the elements that must exist for an illegal act to be considered as a criminal offense, and a part of organized crime. Most of these elements are defined by international conventions on organized crime, which have undoubtedly helped and have been issuing guidance to national legislations of various countries, including the legislation of the Republic of Kosovo.

Organized crime has appeared at the same time in various states, and in some states even later. The first attempts to define organized crime in Europe were recorded around 1980, which were crowned with the definition of this type of crime in an "International Conference of Ministers" in Naples, Italy, in 1994. Within this conference, the governments of the participating countries, unanimously adopted the "Political Declaration of the United Nations and Global Action Plan against transnational organized crime."[47]

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, has the objective to support cooperation with the aim to prevent and combat transnational organized crime, more effectively and successfully.[48] In this case it is necessary to highlight several meanings of the notions and definitions of organized crime, according to the United Nations Convention, which are as follows: "*Organized criminal group*" means a group comprising by three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or

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[46] Gashi, Rexhep, Organized crime, Pristina, 2011, p. 12.
[47] Hysi, Vasilika, Introduction to Criminology and Penology, Tirana, 2000, p. 59.
[48] Article 1, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC), United Nations, New York, 2000.

more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with the Convention, in order to attain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.[49]

The criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group, is also specifically and explicitly defined within the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as follows:

- Each State Party shall adopt such legislative measures and other measures, to the extent necessary to prove criminal acts, when committed intentionally;

- Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involvement in an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group.[50]

In continuation of the definition of organized crime, the Council of Europe (CoE), has made efforts to define organized crime. This institution has defined this issue in the following manner: "Organized crime implies illegal activities carried out by structured groups of three or more persons, who exist for extended periods of time and have as objective committing serious crimes through coordinated actions which consist from use of violence, intimidation, corruption or other means and who have direct or indirect purpose of financial or material benefit".[51]

A more or less similar definition of organized crime was given by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). According to this definition, "Each group has a unified structure, with primary goal of obtaining money through illegal activities, often defending their illegal actions through fear, blackmail and corruption".[52]

Taken as a whole, the analysis of definitions and elements used by many institutions, but also scholars of organized crime, are more or less common or similar, although we cannot say that they are identical. Most authors emphasize the essential elements for an act to be considered as part of organized crime activities, such as: groups of three or more persons; hierarchy from top to bottom; the duration of their activity for a specified period of time;

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[49] Article 1, UNCATOC.
[50] Article 3, UNCATOC.
[51] Klaus von Lampe, Definitions of Organized Crime, for more details see:
www.organized crime.de/organizedcrimedefinitions.htm#coe; (accessed date: 05.06.2012).
[52] Nebsitt, Paul, Head of Investigation Organized Krimittë in Germany, (cit.Bresler, 1993, p. 319).

committing serious and different criminal offenses; financial or material benefit, direct or indirect, the use of violence, intimidation or corruption in the exercise of their criminal activities.

Conclusion:

Organized crime, in the traditional sense, is usually treated as organized activities of criminal groups of at least three persons, in which other members of the group are subordinate to the leaders.

First definitions on organized crime have taken into account the features of criminal organizations of earlier times, such as committing crime in the form of the profession, strong hierarchical structure of the organization, and common ethnic background of criminals, confidentiality and application of the code of silence. It is worth mentioning that the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime does not define the meaning of "organized crime", instead it defines the meaning of "organized criminal group" and "structured group", since forms of the organized crime are diverse and new forms of it are appearing even nowadays.

In the second half of the twentieth century, organized crime has seen major developments in its organization and activities. Studies conducted in European countries show that organized crime has seen huge expansion, in particular after the 90's of the XX century, and that it appears in different forms. Today organized crime is characterized by penetration into the highest levels of politics and the state. It should be noted that many states for a long time did not accept the existence of organized crime, thus covering the inefficiency of state organs and poor criminal and punitive policy.

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ASSOCIATED RISKS FOR A POTENTIAL WAR BETWEEN CHINA, USA AND JAPAN OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT DISPUTE[1]

Dr. Bilbil Kastrati

Abstract

The end of the Cold War resulted in diffusion of the level of threat worldwide and concluded the system of bipolarity in the world. Beside the European continent, where the revelries were at the highest level, consequences of the end of the Cold War were especially visible in the North-East Asia. Decrease of military activities of Russia, China and retreat of the USA from the region give way for improvement of political and economic relations between the countries of the region. The end of hostilities, produced by the Cold War no doubt have relaxed relations between countries in the region and opened ways for new more peaceful co-existence. However, this does not mean that the region is not vulnerable to some of the hot spots such as North Korea, Spratly Parcels and especially Taiwan Strait. The latter is considered to be the most dangerous and potential zone of crisis in the twenty-first century.

The East Asian countries such as China, Japan and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries are the world's most growing economies and at the same time leaders in military acquisition; therefore, the potential for conflict and crises is current and real. This article examines one of these hot spots, namely the Taiwan Strait dispute and assesses the possibility of this issue leading to a war between China, USA and Japan. In order to have a clear view of the dispute the author will reveal some data in the introduction and then will explore relations, conflicts and interests between China, USA and Japan *vis-à-vis* Taiwan and assess the risk that these countries might be drawn in potential war over the Taiwan Strait.

Keywords: Taiwan Strait, China, USA, Japan, PRC, KMT.

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[1] Article7 was firts published in the *International Security Sector Review* in 2006.

Introduction

The Portuguese, who seem to be the first Westerners to have visited the island in XVI century, named Taiwan the beautiful island (Ihla Formosa). Before this little is known about Taiwan's history; however, it is presumed that the first Chinese permanent settlers moved there in the XVI century, after the collapse of the Ming dynasty in China (1644) when their forces retreated to Taiwan. Ming dynasty was later defeated from Manchu (Ching) dynasty in 1683 who ruled the island until 1895 when China was defeated from Japan in Sino-Japanese war.[2]

According to the Treaty of Shimoneski[3] Taiwan was ceded to the Empire of Japan and for the next fifty years Taiwan was ruled by Japan. In the beginning the Japanese were harsh and cruel to the native Taiwanese, but later on they had been accustomed to the Japanese rule. The Japanese administration brought positive improvements to the island; the economic infrastructure was built as were roads, harbors and railroads, and also the agriculture was developed. Another important element that the Japanese gave was the high priority in health and education of the natives, which resulted with reduction of mortality and education of population. Under the Japanese rule Taiwan was far more developed than any part of China or other parts of Asia.

During the World War II in 1943 the USA, together with China and United Kingdom reached an agreement in Cairo (Egypt) on the intention to return Taiwan to China after the war (Cairo Declaration). Russia supported this decision later on in 1945. After the end of the war the authority over Taiwan was ceded by Japan to Republic of China. In the beginning the natives welcomed the Republic of China authorities, but this did not last long. Only two years after this in 1947, in a protest of native Taiwanese against the corrupt authorities, the government responded with a massacre of thousands of Taiwanese including most of the political elite. This incident founded hostilities between the mainlanders and the native Taiwanese for decades to come.

In 1949, the remaining forces of Nationalist Party of China Kuomintang (KMT) defeated from the Communist forces – retreated to Taiwan and established the government of the Republic of China, in Taiwan. The same year saw the Communist Party of China (CPC) creating the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and establishing its government in Beijing. From this period until

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[2] Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 1997.
[3] http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm

nowadays the PRC is exploring modalities of peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China but still did not rule out forceful unification if deemed as necessary.

China *vis-à-vis* Taiwan

The dispute between PRC and Taiwan has its origins in the Chinese civil war between China's Communist Party and the China's Nationalist Party - Kuomintang in the period between 1927 until 1949. By the end of 1949 defeat of Kuomintang was obvious so they retreated to Taiwan and established the Republic of China government in exile. On the other hand, the CCP established, People's Republic of China in October 1949, 'the victorious CCP asserted the right to rule all of China including the province of Taiwan to which the KMT had fled'.[4] The achievement of this goal from PRC was interrupted by the Korean War in 1950 and by the change in American foreign policy. The USA deployed the seventh fleet to the Taiwan Strait in June 1950, in support to South Korea, but also as a measure to prevent China's military invasion of Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the PRC continued insisting in what they believed to be the liberation of the occupied Taiwan. The government in Beijing initially wanted to liberate Taiwan by force, but when military option became unrealistic Beijing subsequently changed its policy and sought a solution through peaceful means. The Kuomintang government with American support as ally in the Cold War context consolidated its position within Taiwan and also asserted that KMT government represents all of China including its mainland. Both governments opposed and considered each other illegitimate and refused cooperation until 1980's. Nevertheless, both governments in Beijing and Taipei were initially committed to the concept of unified China which would include Taiwan within a single authority. But, their dispute was primarily over who would govern the country, the PRC or the KMT and secondly there was a dispute over political ideologies.[5]

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[4] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 2001, p. 30.
[5] Ibid.

Additionally, disputes between PRC and KMT also lie over the legal authority of Taiwan. After the Second World War according to the Cairo Declaration, territories occupied by Japan would be returned to China. In case of Taiwan authority over the island was handed over to KMT *de facto* and *de jure* by Japanese authorities when surrendered. The PRC government admits this, since the latter was not established until 1949.[6] Likewise, prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party leaders referred to Taiwan as being separate from China. Even Mao Tse-tung indicated that 'the territory did not belong to China'.[7] Apparently, afterwards the PRC's policy towards Taiwan changed and the mainland became more assertive on its rights over Taiwan.

As agreed in Cairo in 1943 Taiwan was returned to China after the end of World War II, thus ending fifty years of Japanese colonization. Local Taiwanese initially anticipated the taking over of Taiwan by China with enthusiasm; however, this sentiment took a drastic downward spiral almost immediately upon the arrival of the defeated and retreating Kuomintang army. On 28 February 1947, the 'KMT army brutally put down a local uprising an action that came to be etched deeply in Taiwanese collective memory as an instance of the slaughtering of locals by mainlanders'.[8] This incident has come to be known as the 28 February incident or the '228' event, which disrupted normal political establishment of the KMT regime and the Republic of China authority in Taiwan. Afterwards, KMT applied the martial law and took control over the political and social life in Taiwan.

1995-96 Missile Crises

In beginning of 1990's Cross Strait relations between China and Taiwan began to relax politically and there was normalization in economic relations, namely trade, transport as well as postal links being established. However, this positive atmosphere did not last long. During 1995-96 the PRC launched a missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait which was one of the most frightening military crisis of the post-Cold-War era and set the Taiwan authorities in high alert. In response to this, in light of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 the USA sent two aircraft-

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[6] Suisheng Zhao,Ed, 'Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis', 1999.
[7] Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 1997, p. 138.
[8] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 2001, p. 135.

carrier battle groups to demonstrate its determination to prevent Chinese military taking over of Taiwan. Fortunately parties involved restrained themselves and the worst scenario of war did not happen. Nevertheless, this showed the China's commitment that if needed they will use force to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which also includes Taiwan.[9]

Even today, as unthinkable as it might seem, the Taiwan Strait remains one of the most dangerous hot spots of the 21st century. Eventual miscalculation by any of the parties could lead to a war that would likely not only cause damage to Taiwan, but involve confrontations between China and the USA as well as other Asian neighbours. According to Lee, 'the crisis made it crystal clear, if there was ever any doubt, that relations between China and Taiwan are not only about trade, investment and tourism, but also about war and peace'.[10]

Since early 1950's the PRC made attempts to isolate Taiwan in the international arena and qualify the Taiwan issue as internal. Its first success was in 1971, when Beijing was given the Taipei's seat in the United Nations and as a result Taipei lost diplomatic superpower and the influence in the world affairs.[11] Moreover, Taiwan was excluded from the East-Asian regional forums: ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, due to the pressure from China.[12] Nevertheless, Taiwan continued to assert that they have created their own identity and China should accept this. In 1999, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui shocked Beijing authorities by stating that China-Taiwan relations should be conducted on a special state to state basis and should abandon the -one-China - policy. This statement from Taipei went as close to declaring independence as possible, without actually doing so.[13] Beijing authorities condemned Lee's statement and said that only -one-China - policy is a platform for negotiations and peaceful solution of the cross strait dispute.

In the meantime, both parties China and Taiwan continued to improve their military buildup. The PRC continued purchasing the newest technologies from Russia in order to have

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[9] Suisheng Zhao, Ed, 'Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis', 1999.
[10] Bernice Lee, 'The Security Implications of the New Taiwan', 1999, p.9.
[11] Suisheng Zhao, Ed, 'Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis', 1999.
[12] Alexander C. Tan, Ed, et al, 'Taiwan's National Security. Dilemmas and Opportunities', 2001.
[13] Bernice Lee, 'The Security Implications of the New Taiwan', 1999.

the supremacy over the Taiwan military capabilities, but also to confront potential USA attacks. Meanwhile, Taiwan continued its acquisition of the USA military high-tech. For example, in 2004 Taiwanese parliament allocated $1 Trillion for military hardware. Nevertheless, the latest reports show that China has improved the quality and the quantity of its military forces naval and air forces, hence it is considered that as of 2008 China has surpassed Taiwan in military capabilities which additionally raise the sense of crisis and potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait.[14]

Taiwan's Democratization

Even though Taiwan was several times a target of potential regional or international conflicts, the internal politics and the regime has undergone fundamental changes. According to Tsang and Tien, 'the real miracle in Taiwan is not its spectacular economic achievement but its political transformation in the post-war era. Within a decade Taiwan has recast its political system and changed from what looked remarkably like a Leninist party state into a working democracy, in the Western sense of the word'.[15] In the 2000 elections, Taiwan experienced an electoral earthquake, victory of Chen Shui-bian's from Democratic Progress Party and defeat of the KMT was a historic event by any measures and was clearly a nightmare for Beijing. Chen Shui-bian Democratic Progressive Party has always advocated the independence of Taiwan and was not committed to Taiwan's unification with mainland China. Chen's election from Beijing was seen as real challenge for their goal of unification.[16]

USA *vis-à-vis* Taiwan

Washington's involvement in Taiwan Strait conflict started in 1950 in the wake of the Korean War when USA deployed two aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait. This move had two dimensions; one to support the South Korea and second to avoid potential invasion of Taiwan from Communist forces of China. Later on, Taiwan occupied important role in USA foreign policy, strategically and economically. Taiwan was part of the anti-communist bloc; therefore USA supported Taipei financially and politically and also was the major security provider of

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[14] The National Institute for Defence Studies Japan, 'East Asian Strategic Review', 2005.
[15] Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, Eds, 'Democratization in Taiwan: Implications in China', 1999, p.xiii.
[16] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 2001.

the island. This helped Taiwan to develop fast economically, which lead to social changes and finally to democratization of the state institutions in the beginning of 1990's.

America was and continues to be the biggest supporter of Taiwan in the Pacific. However, the USA policy towards Taiwan started to change in beginning of 1970's when China had a breakup with the Soviet Union. At this stage the USA policy makers felt that they should relax their relations and see the possibilities of cooperation with Beijing, with the only aim to isolate Russia as much as possible. Consequently, with the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1 January 1979, the USA formally switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the communiqué, the USA acknowledges 'the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of it'.[17]

With this move the USA further contributed to the isolation of Taipei, since after this most of the countries in the region and in the world established relations with PRC. This was a low kick for Taipei, but there was and still is a sentiment among the Congressmen's in the Capitol Hill that they should support Taiwan and not let eventual forceful occupation by China. Therefore, the USA Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, under this act, 'Washington is committed to protect the security of Taiwan including its social and economic system and the human rights of the people on Taiwan. In pursuit of this commitment, Washington reserves the right to sell Taiwan arms of a defensive character in the amount that is necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defensive capability'.[18]

According to Alagappa[19] the USA policy toward Taiwan is not motivated by a genuine concern for the autonomy of Taiwan's people, but more for the USA policy that Beijing should not be permitted to get away with a forceful absorption of a democratic state. But, if such a scenario would happen, it would be devastating for the American credibility and would undermine USA alliances with other pacific countries and would also disturb the stability in the Western Pacific.

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[17] Bernice Lee, 'The Security Implications of the New Taiwan', 1999, p.19.
[18] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 2001, p.40.
[19] Ibid.

Taiwan's economic and social development has encouraged them to request that the Taiwanese new identity and autonomy be acknowledge in the Taiwan-PRC relations. The government on Beijing is insisting that Taiwan is integral part of China and seeks from USA to pacify Taipei and not let them take any steps that would be regrettable. Washington claims that it opposes the use of military force to settle the disputes, in which it would inevitably become involved and urges parties to find a peaceful solution. It seems that the continuation of the status quo is in Washington's interest, but for Beijing an indefinite delay in political talks for unification is testing its patience. On the other hand, military invasion would be at high cost for China financially and diplomatically in the region and internationally. Therefore, it seems unlikely that PRC will use military option currently, which leads us to the conclusion that even China is concurring with the status quo.[20]

Japan *vis-à-vis* Taiwan

Japan was always interested in Taiwan; however Japan became legal possessor of Taiwan according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 after China's defeat in Sino-Japanese war 1894-95.[21] Japanese's rule during the occupation of Taiwan was harsh towards the local people. Nonetheless, the Taiwanese adapted to the Japanese rule from whom they benefited later. The Japanese brought to Taiwan order, built the infrastructure - roads and harbors, and also developed the agriculture. Moreover, Japanese opened schools and health institutions which helped in reducing mortality and education of local Taiwanese. Further, Japanese transferred skills in advanced technologies to locals, which is considered one of the reasons for Taiwan's development. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, according to the agreement of the winning parties of the war and the Cairo Declaration (1943), Taiwan was ceded to KMT government from the Japanese authorities.

Today, for a number of reasons, including its colonial history and the USA - Japan security treaty, democratic development in Taiwan has political and security consequences for Japan. Since Japan is assuming increased responsibilities in matters of peace and security in East Asia, Taiwan dispute is closely observed. The stability in the Taiwan Strait is essential for

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[20] Ibid.
[21] http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_first_sino_japanese.html.

Japan's economy, the sea-lane through which Japan transports almost 90 percent of its oil supply from Middle East runs through waters of the Taiwan Strait.[22]

Like the USA, the Japanese government had to adapt to the new circumstances after the Sino-Soviet breakup. In 1972 Japan normalized diplomatic relations with PRC and as result of this relations with Taiwan deteriorated. The Japanese policy is to maintain good relations with China, while maintaining economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. At the same time, Japan does not want to be involved in the disputes between Taiwan and the PRC over its formal status. Tokyo is interested in avoiding all situations which might lead to a war that may potentially involve Japan. Its involvement in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait seems to be its worst nightmare. Therefore, Japan wants to isolate itself from the Taiwan issue since it has accepted Beijing's claim that Taiwan is an internal affair of China. However, the 1995-96 missile crisis and the growing tensions between Taipei and Beijing made Tokyo recognize the serious implications that Taiwan represents for Japan's security. Therefore, Taiwan is no longer just an economic matter for Japan, but a security one just as well.[23]

In 1997 the USA - Japan Security Treaty of 1960 was revised guaranteeing the United States the use of Japanese facilities as contribution for the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific. According to new Guidelines for USA - Japan Defense cooperation Taiwan was included in the area defined as Far East. This came after the missile crisis in 1995-96 in Taiwan Strait which was a significant security threat for USA and Japan's interest. A military conflict in Taiwan Strait could turn into a global war between the United States and China that would inevitably involve Japan.[24]

Potential Risks That Taiwan Strait Dispute Might Lead to a War Involving China, USA and Japan

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[22] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century', 2001.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

The Taiwan Strait dispute today is not merely a question of East-Asian regional security, but one of the most challenging security problem of the 21st century. As argued above, strategic and commercial importance of the Taiwan Strait and multiple interests represent a real potential to fuel conflicts between China, USA and Japan.

The PRC considers that Taiwan is a matter not only of a national dignity but also of a national survival. The Taiwan issue is related with regime's legitimacy and that Taiwan's independence will jeopardize its existence. Further, it is a question of political legitimacy, after wide support for reunification; hence no Chinese political leader can afford to remain passive if Taiwan declares independence. Also, it is a question of national unity, if Beijing tolerates Taiwan's independence, then it will be difficult to keep the country together, since there are separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia who also seek separation. However, this does not mean that Beijing prefers using force to solve the Taiwan dispute; on the contrary, it regards force as the very last alternative, but do not rule out this option.[25]

If Taiwan declares independence, it will without doubts lead to a war with PRC, and the United States will probably be dragged into it. According to the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington is committed to protecting the security of Taiwan including its social and economic system and the human rights of the people in Taiwan. If America would not intervene this would mean that it agrees with suppression of the will of the people in which foundation the United States is established. Furthermore, its commercial and strategic interests would be jeopardized, as well as its alliances with the countries in the region such as Japan, South Korea and Australia would be undermined.

Japan cultivates special relations with Taiwan, partly because of its sentiment as an ex-colony, but also because of mutual economic interests. The PRC is considered important regional partner; therefore, avoids being involved in Taiwan dispute. On the other hand, The United States is their biggest ally in the Western-Pacific, and the revised Security Treaty (1997) obliges them to support USA in an eventual war in the pacific. If Taiwan Strait war erupts the

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[25] Ibid.

Japanese government seems to be in the most difficult position. If they get involved, they would risk war with China, if not they will risk their alliance with USA. However, strategic importance of the cross-strait sea lanes through which the Japan's vital energy imports transits, makes Japanese involvement in a potential war unavoidable.

Even though, the picture looks grim, it seems that all the parties silently agree on the existing status quo. Current status of Taiwan is not a security threat to mainland China; also the big economic and naval powers of the world United States, Russia and Japan are not in favour of changing the present status of the Taiwan Strait, that of open and free international shipping canal that allows unrestricted use.[26] All these combinations of interests minimize the potential risk for war in the Taiwan Strait, but do not exclude it.

Conclusion

Many security experts regard Taiwan Strait as the most dangerous dispute and the biggest challenge of the 21st century, hence finding the right solution is difficult. The PRC, since its founding in 1949, has claimed legitimacy over Taiwan. Taiwan is considered an internal affair of China and for the present situation the USA were often accused that its intervention in 1950 has created the issue and continues to sustain it thus preventing the unification of China. However, Lee argues that, 'Taiwan's progress towards a new identity and greater self-determination seems unstoppable'.[27]

One important moment is that Taiwan was not ruled from mainland China since 1895, which makes the case unique. Also, most of the current politicians are born in Taiwan and do not have any connection with the Chinese civil war and the idea of a unified China. Therefore, they ask that the new Taiwanese identity and autonomy is recognized. On the other hand, China continues to assert its legitimate authority over Taiwan; and says that if Taiwan declares independence, they will have no alternative but to use military force to defend China's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

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[26] Suisheng Zhao, Ed, 'Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis', 1999.
[27] Bernice Lee, 'The Security Implications of the New Taiwan', 1999, p.11.

The United States commitment to deter military hostilities in the Western Pacific in general and in the Taiwan Strait in particular was key in the regions stability for decades. However, eventual conflict in the Taiwan Strait would probably drag United States in war with PRC, partially as committed by the Taiwan Relations Treaty of 1979, but mainly to protect its own commercial and regional strategic interests. Even though war in Taiwan Strait would be a nightmare for Japan they would; nevertheless, probably be involved too, in support of its alliance towards the USA as well as because of their own economic and strategic interests. Generally, this is the scenario that everyone wants to avoid.

However, without a careful management of the dispute there is a serious risk of conflict threatening not only East-Asian, but also the international security. A war in Taiwan Strait would likely affect the continued economic growth and prosperity in the region from which all states, the Unites States, PRC, Taiwan and Japan have benefited. This would be devastating especially for China who is trying to modernize its economy.[28]

Having said that and considering all of the above, the cross-strait conflict in the short term seems unlikely; however, in the medium to long term the prospects are less clear. Continued armament of China and Taiwan and big commercial interests of United States and Japan in the region makes the solution of the dispute highly unpredictable.

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TO THE HISTORY OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN GEORGIA IN 1801-1914[1]

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Statehood in Georgia was abolished in the beginning of the XIX century. While the whole century saw unheard-of technological and scientific advances in the history of humankind worldwide, Georgians spent this time struggling for the right to education and administration of church services in Georgian language. The process of formation of nation states in the XIX century Europe is near to end, whereas the Georgians under Russian Empire still demand political Autonomy.

Prominent representatives of Georgian society never stopped seeking the ways to restore statehood. Before establishing the first Republic, the process of restoration of statehood and resistance movement had undergone different stages headed by: 1. Nobility, 2. Liberals, 3. Multiparty Democrats.

The treaty of alliance and protectorate between Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom (East Georgia) and the Russian Empire, known in historiography as "the Treaty of Georgievsk" (Paychadze,1983; Butkov, 1869; Tsagareli, 1892, 156-157; Tsereteli, 1917, 3-8; Dubrovin, 1886; Avalov, 1901; Kheltuplishvili, 1901; Tsintsadze, 1960; Berdzenishvili, 1965, 185-244; 1973, 446-475; Georgievskiy Traktat, 1983.) was concluded on 24 July, 1783,which is the document of great importance and interest from the perspective of international law. The title of the Treaty clearly suggests its dualistic meaning. While *Alliance* infers equality, *Protectorate* indicates asymmetric relationships. Interestingly, the XVIII century European International Law is familiar with such form. The work of a Swiss jurist, Emer de Vattel – "Le Droit des Gens ou principes de la loi Naturelle" published in 1758, brought the author international recognition. Vattel speaks about the issue of seeking protectorate by a nation:

"When a nation is not capable of preserving herself from insult and oppression, she may procure the protection of a more powerful state. If she obtains this by only engaging to perform certain articles, as, to pay a tribute in return for the safety obtained,—to furnish her protector

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with troops,—and to embark in all his wars as a joint concern,—but still reserving to herself the right of administering her own government at pleasure,—it is a simple treaty of protection, that does not at all derogate from her sovereignty, and differs not from the ordinary treaties of alliance otherwise than as it creates a difference in the dignity of the contracting parties"(Vattel, 1959, 134).

„A weak state, which, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under the protection of a more powerful one, and engages, in return, to perform several offices equivalent to that protection, without however divesting itself of the right of government and sovereignty,—that state, does not, on this account, cease to rank among the sovereigns who acknowledge no other law than that of nations." (Vattel, 1959, 32)

Thus, according to international law norms of those times, Kartli-Kakheti remained a sovereign state. Due to the complex form of statutory obligation, researchers gave the Georgievsk Treaty various legal assessments, placing emphasis on political importance. An outstanding Georgian jurist and diplomat, Z. Avalishvili saw such confusion of vassalage and protectorate forms that he found it difficult to assign the Treaty any one category (Avalov, 1901, 142).

The list of European researchers engaged in studying the above issue is short. We should mention Frantz Liszt's conclusion about the legal state of the Republic of Georgia (Liszt, 1918), which he wrote at the commission of German government and Georgian delegation. Liszt was the most reputable jurist in German-speaking world. According to his conclusion, the Treaty represents quite an original form of vassalage, which allows to recognize Georgia as a subject of international law. In Nippoldt's opinion, the Treaty is a classic example of protectorate but at the same time, he viewed Georgian as a vassal state. Interestingly, in Nippoldt's view, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti retained the features of a sovereign state and therefore, he considered it the subject of international law (Nippoldt, 1920, 18-23; 27). His conclusion was probably based on the fact that according to the Treaty, King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti reserved the right, certainly with the consent of Russia, to negotiate with neighboring countries. The King had the right to have his diplomatic representatives at the Royal Court of Russia, while the official resident of Russia in Tbilisi was categorically banned to interfere into domestic affairs of Georgia.

Le Fur considered Georgievsk Treaty a specimen of protectorate (Le Fur, 1932). So did Allen and Lang (Allen, 1932, 210; Lang, 1957, 206). Given the fact that international law is a

very dynamic and fast changing science, we must admit that many things from today's point of view seem quite different. But Georgian politicians were basing their judgment on corresponding norms recognized in those times which allows us to conclude that Georgievsk Treaty is in fact the attempt to establish Georgia's statehood legally in accordance with international law and Russian protectorate must have been consisted in the protection of Georgian statehood.

King Erekle had the following titles: the King of Kartli, the King of Kakheti, successor and assign of Samtskhe-Saatabago, Prince of Kazakhi, Prince of Borchalo, Prince of Shamshadili, Prince of Kaki, prince of Shaki and Shirvani, Sovereign of Ganja and Erevan (Georgievskiy Traktat, 1983, 25). Thus, pursuant to the Treaty, Catherine the Great not only acquaints the population of the above territories with Erekle's rights, but also, in compliance with Article two and Article four separate, she undertakes the obligation to support Erekle and his successors in the time of war and peace to strengthen the sovereignty on the above territories. (Georgievskiy Traktat, 1983, 71; 77).

Despite the grandiosity of the ceremonial of signing the Treaty, Russian Empire was in no hurry to make any real steps. Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom had to pay a heavy price for the attempt of political rapprochement with Russia in 1795. The old King Erekle II having been left to the mercy of fate by his protector was unable to resist the infuriated Agha Mohammad Khan and the Persians burnt Tbilisi down. In Russian-Persian relationships, it was hugely important to possess East Georgia. In accordance to the Amasya Peace Treaty concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Georgia in 1555, the Persians viewed East Georgia as their protectorate. Therefore, naturally they would not have come to terms with the Russian orientation of the Royal House. Catherine II's oriental policy was to bring Persia under Russia's influence and thus establish links with India (Butkov, 1869, 355). In this context, strengthening the statehood in East Georgia, logically must have been in Russia's interest. Russian army invaded the South in 1796. Shortly, they occupied Darubandi, Khuba, Baku, Saliani, and Shemakha and were preparing for the invasion in central Persia but in November, Catherine II passed away. Her son and the heir to the throne, Paul I chose a different policy. Russian military units were recalled from Persian border followed by others troops having entered the country short time ago. Paul I, rather than seeing Georgia as his strong ally, directed his Caucasian policy to abolishing the sovereignty of Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom. Thus, Erekle II was once again left face to face with Persia. Tbilisi managed to avoid another devastation only because of the death of Agha Mohammed Khan in May 1797. King Erekle attempted to strictly demand from

Paul I fulfillment of the Treaty terms, finally. His ambassador was still on the way, when the old king passed away on 11 January 1798.

The heir to Erekle II, Giorgi XII faced the threat of domestic and international crisis but no protectors or allies could be seen. Therefore, in the spring of 1798, the King charged Aslan Orbeliani with the mission to seek Sultan's protection. The Ambassador was still in the country, when Erekle's envoy, Prince Davit, brought back good news about Paul I's benevolent attitude. Thus, Giorgi XII renewed relations with the Emperor. Paul I demanded that Giorgi XII applied to him with the request of his approval as a King pursuant the Treaty terms. It did not take him long to do so and asked the Emperor to award him the King's status and recognize his son Davit the successor to the throne, plus help him with 3000 soldiers (Tsagareli, 1902, 156-157). On 26 November 1799, Russian regiment headed by Major General Lazarev entered Tbilisi to festively present Giorgi XII with Royal Insignia. However, in his letter of gratitude, Giorgi XII expressed his dissatisfaction about the paucity of troops and described the complex external circumstances regarding the aggressive policy of Persia. He also mentioned that Baba-Khan had claimed to take his elder son a hostage (Tsagareli, 1902, 186-187). As a token of loyalty to Paul I, the King of Kartli-Kakheti presented a new project of the agreement to him in June 1800, in which he willfully rejected the sovereignty maintained by force of the Treaty and agreed to Autonomy with rather limited terms. (Butkov, 1869, 461-462; Tsereteli, 1916, 67-68). In November 1800, Paul I reviewed the above project and sent it back with Georgian ambassadors for the King to approve and a new delegation entrusted with King's and people's rights was to take it back to Petersburg for execution.

The Emperor was definitely stretching the time. Deterioration of Girogi XII's health was no secret to anyone. Moreover, back in October the princes got involved in dynastic rivalry and pleaded the Emperor to enthrone King Erekle's son Iulon instead of David. Meanwhile, Paul I took to his plans. On 18 December 1800, he issued a manifesto by force of which Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom was abolished and annexed to Russia. The document was secretly kept at the Emperor's Court. On 28 December 1800, Giorgi XII passed away. Major General Lazarev notified Tbilisi population about the Emperor's supreme will not to enthrone anyone until the issuance of the extraordinary decree. In transition period, Prince Ioane, Egnate Tumanishvili and General Lazarev represented supreme power (Tsagareli, 1902, 192).

Naturally, the announcement caused disturbance among people. That being under Russian protectorate did not entail apparent opposition was only due to the fact that "Treaty of

Georgievsk" was perceived by people as a warrant of Kingdom's survival. Such unheard-of defiance certainly caused anxiety and protest. Besides, supporters of maintaining Bagrationi Dynasty came against each other. Some supported Iulon, Erekle's son and others – David, Giorgi's son. Iulon based his claims on King Erekle's will, whereas David was relied on the Emperor's consent given to George XII. Paul eliminated the motives of their dispute at one dash and inner conflicts between dynasty members suited him perfectly; refraining from nominating the successor to the throne, he stated that in the given situation supporting any one of the pretender would entail domestic warfare. However, the above circumstances could not still serve the grounds for unification of the people blinded by struggle. On his words, it would have been better to abolish the Kingdom *for the sake of people's interests*. But Paul's intention was doomed to failure since he became the victim of a plot. Before the next King, Alexander I, got round to Georgia, the country had been ruled by David, but without the King's title.

Manifesto on abolishing Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom and its annexation to Russia was issued on 12 September 1801 in Petersburg. In April 1802, General Knorring, together with numerous Russian officials, arrived in Tbilisi. Manifesto of Alexander I was read in Sioni Cathedral. Knorring demanded that the attendants took the oath, and those who protested were arrested… East Georgia became a Russian governorate and the Russian rule started with repressions.

People did not understand Russian rules of governing and neither did they understand the foreign language of officials, which caused permanent conflicts in everyday life. And still it was Georgian nobility who were the first to oppose occupants' rule. Russian state legislation did not recognize Georgian rule of holding administrative positions by inheritance due to which a large part of Georgian nobility became unemployed. Nostalgia towards Georgian traditional order was growing among peasants and they supported enthroning of Iulon, Erekle II's son.

The unrest organized by nobility started in 1802 in Kakheti. About 40 000 people attended the first meeting (Bendianishvili, 1980, 32). Both, noblemen and peasantry pledged allegiance to prince Iulon and urged the population to come out. The government sent troops to dissolve the meeting but plotters repelled the attack. The movement gradually spread all over Kakheti. Conspirators sent a letter to Russian commanders-in-chief which said that entire Kakheti pledged allegiance to the Russian Emperor first and then to prince Iulon. Thus, the aim of the movement was to restore the terms of Georgievsk Treaty. Georgian historiography, qualifies it as autonomist movement (Bendianishvili, 1980, 36). Russian generalship arrested the messenger and started repressions. In response, the conspirators enhanced their campaign and

established contacts with Erekle's sons. The idea of armed revolution matured. Rebels attempted to conclude alliance with Persia. Certainly, Russian generalship could not stay indifferent to such development of events. General Lazarev brought sizeable forces into Kakheti and stifled the revolt.

Russian government takes rigorous actions. General Tsitsianov is commissioned to exile the King's family, while Tsarism seeks support inside the country. The most reliable forces were the noblemen having been stripped of rights and in the bad grace of King Erekle, whom the Emperor reinstated in their rights. Some were bribed. Oppositionists sought shelter in then sovereign Kingdom of Imereti (West Georgia).

In 1804, Russo-Persian war broke out. Representatives of the royal dynasty attempted to take advantage of the situation. Some from Imereti and some from Persia were trying to involve Georgians as well as Dagestan and North Caucasian Khans in the fight (Berdzenishvili, 1965, 320). Peasantry was under unendurable oppression, being impoverished by various taxes and morally insulted by impudence of police officials. As if the increased road and transport taxes under war conditions were not enough, Russian officials also demanded people's army. The highlanders from Kartli and Kakheti joined the army, however, instead of waging the fight in the direction of Erevan, they used their arms against Russian occupants.

In 1804 they captured Stepantsminda (Kazbegi) and Larsi. The rebels blocked the Georgian Military Road and asked Erekle's sons -Iulon and Parnavaz to take charge of the rebellion. This indicates that highlanders supported the restoration of Georgian traditional form of statehood – the monarchy. Iulon and Parnavaz immediately set out to join the rebels. Russian government took counter measures. Russian troops headed by Tsitsianov blocked the roads to highlands. General Nestaev approached Georgian border from the North with 3000 soldiers and 30 cannons. Finally, Iulon and Parnavaz were taken prisoners. The rebels were defeated. Tsitsianov continued persecution of Bagrationi family and their exile to Russia.

Russia strengthened positions and now it came the turn of Imereti Kingdom.

Towards the end of XVIII century, the feudal disunity reached classic forms in West Georgia. De jure, King of Imereti was considered a suzerain of West Georgia. However, de facto he was only Imereti ruler. Although under a three-century long aggression of Turks it did maintain political independence and never paid any tribute it lost the influence on its vassals. While Guria province remained partially in vassal relationships with the King, Abkhazian

province stayed under Turkish protectorate, whereas Mengrelian prince was trying to wage the independent policy. In its turn, prince of Abkhazia was trying to put an end to Turkish dependence. His elder son was brought up as a Muslim and the youngest one as a Christian and was related with the prince of Mengrelia by marriage. With the aim of strengthening independence and drawing on allies hoping to regain the influence on former vassals, King Solomon I of Imereti repeatedly pleaded the Russian Tsar in 1781-1782 to restore protectorate in the same form as had been promised to Erekle II. He expressed particular concern about the Turks' intention to build a castle on the Black Sea coast in Anaklia (Tsintsadze, 1960, 269-275).

At that time, Russian government was trying to avoid exacerbation of relationships with Turkey. Therefore, the Imereti King was refused in protectorate. Due to the abolishment of Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom, Solomon II naturally expected that Russian government would treat him similarly. That is why he tried to establish diplomatic links with Turkey and engage Sultan in the process of negotiations with Russia. The Turks did not want to complicate relationships with Russia at that moment, and rejected Solomon's proposal. Parallel to that, Imereti King was trying to make peace with Samegrelo so that he would exclusively represent West Georgia in negotiations with Russia. So, he was trying to unite West Georgia with Russia's help, to establish Imereti Kingdom as a single subject of law, at least de jure. This policy failed too. In 1803, Russia acknowledged the protectorate requested by Mengrelian Prince Grigol Dadiani. Thus, the Prince of Mengrelia became the subject of the Russian Empire independently with quite limited autonomous rights (Berdzenishvili, 1965, 293). Naturally, Russian government considered it a temporary measure.

In March 1804, Russian government offered Imeretian King the project of protectorate agreement, with very limited sovereignty, which he refused to sign. In response, Russian army invaded Imereti. Finally, Solomon was forced to sign the agreement on 25 April 1804 in village Elaznauri. The terms were much graver than in the Treaty of Georgievsk. Imereti King had to obey his official representative, the viceroy of Georgia rather than directly the Russian Tsar. The King retained certain Autonomy but had to execute criminal law in Russian manner. Russian troops were being stationed in Imereti (Akak, 1868, 374; 391; Tsereteli, 1917, 14-19). Such status certainly did not suit the King. That is why, in 1806 he offered another project to the new viceroy, general Gudovich (Akak, 1868, 115; 120-121). Solomon demanded a higher status, which would allow him to have direct relationships with the Emperor. Russian government estimated it as a hostile act against Russia. Military machine got off the ground.

After severe battles in April 1810, Solomon yielded himself prisoner to Russians. The old plan of Russian government about exiling the Bagrationi family representatives was still in force. Solomon was convinced he would share the same fate. Therefore, on 10 January 1810 he escaped from Tbilisi prison. The King who was taking up defense in Akhaltsikhe waged active political activities. Mass upraise started in Imereti. The rebels encircled Russian military units taking defense in castles. The rebels invited Solomon to Imereti. King of Imereti held negotiations with Persia and Turkey hoping to maintain sovereignty at the expense of confrontation of two warring parties. Mutineers achieved serious military success in the summer 1810, but on 5 September, Russian army headed by General Pauluch heavily defeated the Turks near Akhalkalaki. Solomon lost the hope for external help and moved back to Akhaltsikhe. De facto, the reign was abolished in Imereti. Solomon continued fighting, but since Russia concluded a Treaty with Turkey (1812) and Persia (1813) and Georgia was recognized as an integral part of Russia, further struggle made no sense. Solomon II passed away in 1815 in Trabzon.

In 1810, principalities of Guria and Abkhazia received the document on coming under Russia's protectorate and subordination. Later similar agreement was concluded with Svaneti (Tsereteli, 1917, 19-23; Bendianishvili, 1980, 65). Agreement of protectorate with Abkhazeti, written in Russian and Georgian languages (and not Russian and Abkhazian) concluded between Sefer Ali-Bey (Giorgi) Shervashidze and Russian Emperor deserves attention. It unambiguously confirms that Abkhazian principality was the constituent part of common Georgian political space. (Materialy i zapiski po voprosu o vladetel'skikh I imushchestvennykh pravakh potomkov svetleyshego knyazya Mikhaila Shervashidze, poslednego vladetelya Abkhazii». Wenden, 1913. Manuscript copyright. Published only 100 copies).

The limited status of Autonomy, which was so much unacceptable for Imereti King, turned out quite acceptable for the above principalities. Here we can see the signs of Feudal separatism, since pursuant to this agreement, the Vassals of Imereti emphasized their *independence*. While Russian government naturally did everything to support separatism.

Flames of revolt caused by stationing military forces in villages spread to Kakheti in 1812. Rebellions started in Dagestan, Shirvan and Shak simultaneously. Kakhetians attempted to capture the military road in order to join North Caucasian rebels. They declared Grigol Bagrationi, George XII's grandson the King and were preparing to capture Tbilisi. On 1-2 March 1812, Pauluch and Grigol met face to face on the battlefield where Grigol was defeated and surrendered to the Russian General. The unrest abated and repressions started. Erekle's son,

Alexander, who was in Persia, got actively involved in the revolt from the beginning… The war between Russia and France was going on parallel to Russo-Persian war and as Napoleon entered Moscow, Alexander arrived in Tbilisi. It was a new impetus for the revolt. Alexander supposed that he would block the military road and be enthroned with Persia's military help. However, he was prepared to settle the conflict peacefully provided that Russia would officially proclaim him a King (Berdzenishvili, 1965, 462). Battles and negotiations lasted for more than a year. Alexander became convinced that the terms of the Treaty had been long forgotten by Russians. Restoration of statehood in Georgia could not have been the result of any compromise. Russians considered the idea anti- state. The only way left was fight. In May 1813, Alexander was defeated and sought shelter in Dagestan.

Russian assimilatory policy considered household or court reforms insufficient and they were shortly followed by church reform. Pursuant to the law issued by the government in 1811, autocephalous status of the Georgian Church was abolished and Georgian Church was subjected to the synodical rule of Russian Orthodox Church. Catholicos Anton II was removed from his office and forced to leave for Russia. Barlaam Eristavi was appointed the first exarch. Church lands of East Georgia were transferred into the possession of treasury. Thus Georgian clergy was deprived of independent economic basis and were brought to the level of civil servants. This "reform" caused great disturbance in Kartli and Kakheti but ended relatively peacefully. In 1815, exarch Barlaam carried out reforms in Imereti. Imereti High Priests were deliberate to present necessary documentation for which the government deposed Barlaam and appointed Theophylact Rusanov of Ryazan an exarch. The latter, being completely ignorant of Georgian church order and traditions started transforming it into Russian manner.

Religious services were allowed only in Russian language. Theophylact did not like Georgian frescos either and they were lime washed. Autocephaly of one of the oldest churches was abolished at one stroke. Nobody ever expected this from the country having common faith with. "Neither fire-worshipers and Muslim Persians, nor Arabs or pagan Mongols and Turks had ever ventured to do anything like this to Georgian church". (Javakhishvili, 1953, 111).

Rusanov's attempts to reorganize Georgian church were strongly protested in Imereti and another revolt started in 1819. High priests as well as nobility and peasantry were dissatisfied with reforms since they turned the age-old traditions of social relationships upside down. The revolt spread to Racha and Guria as well. Rebellion leaders wanted the revolt to spread all over Georgia and North Caucasus. The question of restoration of Imereti Kingdom was raised.

There appeared several pretenders to the throne: Zurab Tsereteli, Ivane Abashidze, but most popular was Prince Alexander (Erekle II's son) who had fled to Dagestan and was in Persia at that time. (Akak, 1874, 536-537; Bendianishvili, 1980, 83-85)[2] That is how the plan of Georgia's political unification under one monarch, the successor of the King of Kartli and Kakheti, was devised. But naturally, this purely feudal legal form of unification of the state would make sense and yield results only in the event of victorious rebellion. Imeretians knew from their experience that Russian government would not satisfy their demand for self-governance, hence they were struggling for absolute independence. In April 1820, Kaikhosro Gurieli's army defeated the Russian regiment near Shemokmedi. Imereti ruler,Puzirevski died in the battle. But the success turned out to be short -lived. Russian government sent a large regiment led by general Veliaminov. The revolt was stifled. Many Georgian villages were turned into ashes. On Ermolov's words, heavy economic loss, rooting out orchards and vineyards and extreme poverty would be the punishment for West Georgia thereafter. (Ermolov, 1863, 212)

Resistance movement of nobility was aiming to restore Bagrationi family in their rights. In 1812 and 1817,Erekle II's grandson Davit Bagrationi presented his concept on Geogia's political system to Alexander I (Enikolofov, 1942, 126-165) assuming that if Russia could put up with the existence of Finland's Autonomy at the border of civilized Europe, given Russia's interests, it would be quite possible to maintain Georgia's Autonomy at Persian border. Georgian statesmen were trying to win the heart of the Russian King flattering him by saying how grateful Kings of Austria, Prussia, France, Spain and Portugal were to him for having been reinstated to their thrones and after 1266 years of reign, Georgian House of Bagrationi also deserved his benevolence and attention. Russian Royal Court considered these appeals anti-State directed against the interests of Georgian people, as Georgia had willfully joined Russia.

Public opinion established in Georgia was that Russia violated the norms of international law and arbitrarily destroyed one of the oldest states. Hence, during the fight against Russian colonialism they considered it admissible to address third states using any forms inside the country, including terrorism. In the 30s of XIX century, a secret society is being formed whose aim is to get rid of Russian officials by means of conspiration and restore the Kingdom on the

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[2] Solomon II was childless and Prince Alexander was the most active among Bagrationi family members. Revolt spread all over West Georgia. The letter of Imereti ruler, Kurnatovski to General Veniaminov proves its popular character. The letter said: "The revolt has spread globally. Nobody supports us. Gurians and Mengrelians are prepared to take joint actions together with Imeretians. Abkhazians have also chosen the same way. Government's loyalty is doubtful. Their power against nation-wide public opinion is negligible."

grounds of 1783 Treaty. In Georgian historiography, this period is also considered the example of autonomist movement (Gozalishvili, 1935; 1970; Berdznishvili, 1980; 1983; Bendianishvili, 1980, 104).

Conspirators' plan was simple. They linked the start of the revolt with the elections of noblemen's local assembly and leaders. The elections were appointed on 20 November 1832. According to conspiracy plan, that day Luarsab Orbeliani was to host a banquet in his house to be attended by high ranking officials whom the conspirators would either kill or arrest. Next they were to attack the armory and strategic sites. The revolt had to be spread all over Georgia, North and South Caucasus simultaneously. The rebels proclaimed Prince Alexander the King, who was in Persia. Before that, the country was to be ruled by Sejm headed by Erekle II's granddaughter, Princess Tamar. In their plans, they attached great importance to diplomatic activities and western countries' support. Thus, they pinned hopes on Poland's revolt. They viewed the future government system of the country as that of a reorganized and modernized monarchy (Gozalishvili, 1935, 134; Bendianishvili, 1980, 111)[3]. However, some occasional Republican preferences could also be observed (Gozalishvili, 1935, 92). Conspirators had carried out serious work; they issued a magazine and actively promoted the necessity of restoration of statehood and not only in Georgia. Their plans also envisaged the engagement of Russian army's Caucasian regiments in the war against Shamil, and they hoped to lure out the rest of them from Tbilisi by means of spreading rumors as if Prince Alexander was going to invade with his army. Russian troops, stationed near Persian border, left Tbilisi. The date of elections was postponed several times so was the date of revolt until the conspiracy had been disclosed. Participants were arrested. A new wave of repressions started. Georgian printed media was banned…

In the 60s of the XIX century, a new stage of resistance movement of Georgia unfolds. The generation educated in Russian and European universities return to Georgia. The idea of restoration of statehood acquires new, this time Republican forms. Although Ilia Chavchavadze, the leader of "Tergdaleulebi" (people with western education), was the representative of nobility like the majority of them, his work for public good was a classic example of Liberal trend. Ilia appears to be the supporter of nation state in the concept of country's self-governance.

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[3] The project considered creating "upper and lower chambers". Kings and ministers would belong to the upper chamber and the elected deputies – to the lower chamber. No information is given on the distribution of power.

"Tergdaleulebi" faced numerous problems. The major problem consisted in that Russian assimilatory policy was directed exactly at national language, national church, national identity, national pride and statehood. The task set before them was to regain the lost national values. Equipped with European education, they were under the influence of on-going European processes. The history of European public opinion of the first half of the XIX century is characterized by upsurge of Liberal-National movement. Nation state was not the end in itself. National rights were derived from human rights that are individual and universal. The doctrine on popular sovereignty considers a nation the collection of people recognizing the same justice, represented by the same legislative meeting and having same government accountable to them. Thus, it meant transition to civil nation state. National and popular interests came forth instead of previously existing abstract state interests that were equaled to dynastic interests. Civil society (bourgeoisie) had always called for unity in its theoretical aspirations since citizens' interest in disposing the capital was that of national character. In the beginning of the XIX century, Liberal-Democratic national movements primarily hoped to implement the ideas of freedom, democracy and parliamentarism in the nation state. For them, nation state was a synonym of democratic constitutional state and Parliamentary government was the only means of implementation of these ideals. The heroes of European "Risorgimento" were poets, linguists, historians who contributed to their peoples' cultural awakening and political identity in the nation state by means of word and print. These were: for the Germans – Iohann Gottfried Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fihte, Friedrih Ludwig Jahn, publicist Ernst Moritz Arndt; for the Greek– poet Rigas Vellestinlis, philologist and the creator of modern Greek language Adamantios Korais, for the Irish – Daniel O'Connell, poet Thomas Davis, for the Polish- historian Joachim Lelewel, writer Adam Mickiewicz, for the Czechs – historian Frantisek Palacky, in Italy - Giuseppe Mazzini. Their work was directed at the reform of national language and strengthening national identity. "Awakeners" of the nation based their judgment on the idea that the nation should speak one language and that language unity was the precondition of the nation state. Language boundaries were viewed as natural borders of the state. That is why, they were striving to create literature in national language. In this regard, they often appeared to be language reformers. "Tergdaleulebi" were influenced by this movement and the work of their outstanding representative, Ilia Chavchavadze is the summary of it all. Creation of modern literary language, reforming the alphabet, the slogan "Motherland, Language, Faith" speaks for the fact that Ilia Chavchavadze consistently carried out the ideas of common European phenomenon – Liberal Democratic Nationalism in Georgia. For him, Liberalism was the means of achieving national freedom through personal freedom. One of his famous heroes, Lelt

Ghunia epitomizes exactly this idea. Ilia had a perfect understanding that under given circumstances, it was impossible to speak about Georgia's full independence. Therefore, he was working relentlessly for obtaining the right to self-governance and Autonomy.

Georgian newspapers and magazines issued on the initiative of "Tergdaleulebi" actively promoted the idea of nation state, strongly supporting national movements of Italians, Polish and others. They actively cooperated with Russian Liberals (Bendianishvili, 1980, 119-123). Gradually political demand for transforming Russia into a Federal State is being matured. However, Georgian statesmen could not dare to promote the idea overtly out of fear of censorship in the 70s of the XIX century, but on the other hand, they welcomed the plans of transformation of Austria on Federal basis (Nikoladze, 1960, 73-77).

The revolt broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina against Turkey in 1875. Georgian society expressed solidarity to rebels and criticized the policy of England supporting Turkey (newsp. „Droeba" 1875, № 95). An uprising began in Ajara (which at that time was within the Turkish boundaries). Georgians did not want to fight against the Balkans being part of the Turkish army. Thus, they refused to join the army and revolted against Turkey. This ended in the attack on Turkish regular army. Georgian political leaders were watching the development of events feeling obliged to help their brothers (newsp. „Droeba" 1875, № 110). Such unanimity of Georgian people played a great role in Russo-Turkish war in 1878 for the benefit of Russia resulting in Ajara's annexation to Russian Empire and their return to historical borders of Georgia (Melville, R und Schröder H-J, 1982, 51-63; 205-225; 369-383; 473-485; Istoriya Diplomatii, 1963, 126-133)[4].

Georgian public officials approached the renewal of their relationships with Ajarian people with great delicacy. They helped them in establishing Georgian schools and print media. Religious differences, being the most delicate issue, was approached with tolerance. By progressive Georgian public, while Russian government placed emphasis exactly on the above feature trying hard to turn it into source of tension (Bendianishvili, 1980, 139-140).

The idea of possibility to use political methods instead of armed conflict was gradually maturing in Georgian and generally in Caucasian society. They considered it important to work actively in self-government bodies of the nations. Complicated external circumstances and

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[4] Although Russia ceded the Kars district, i.e. the historical part of Lazistani, according to the Treaty of Berlin, the city itself was the constituent part of Karsim, as well as Ardahani (Artaani). The return of Ajara to Georgia was an extremely important phenomenon by itself. Batumi was transferred to Russia, however was declared Porto franco, which clearly indicates the fact that the English, Turks, Prussians and Austrians had trade-economic interests in Caucasia.

"Liberal reforms" carried out by Tsarist government seemed to allow the above. In Caucasia, they fostered hopes for Speranski's work in Petersburg. Georgian newspaper "Drosha" is issued in 1873 in Paris and Caucasian statesmen supporting the idea of building up the country on federal basis rally round it. Here emerges the idea of creating Caucasian Federation and its secession from Russia. (Khundadze, 1928, 315-316)[5]

The Congress held in 1874 in Geneva was attended by representatives from all social political circles of Caucasia. Most Congress participants supported the idea except "Narodniks", who went against secession from Russia (Khundadze, 1928, 321).

Ilia Chavchavadadze was developing the idea of Russia's transformation into a Federal State with particular consistency. Thus, the issue of political Autonomy of Georgia was being considered within the context of Russian national political situation. Cooperation of Georgian political organizations or individuals with Russian Revolutionary movement was attached great importance. New generation of Georgian students studying in Russian universities had excellent relationships with leading figures and revolutionary organizations of Russia. However, they did not have their own political organization. That's why they organized the first Student Congress in 1892 in Kutaisi in which Georgian students from Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and Warsaw took part. They discussed burning issues of Georgian society, among them, national question was certainly the central one. Debators paid special attention to the definition of a nation. They pointed out that racial, ethnic and religious signs fell by the wayside. Finally, they formulated the concept as follows: **The nation is a spiritual unity of groups linked by common language, mutual love, customs and habits and history.** Besides, the Congress emphasized the great importance of territory for the nation. (Shvelidze, 1969, 56-57) The declared aim of Georgian students' organization was serving the country and Georgia's liberation from Tsarism. The Congress rejected the idea of active cooperation with Russian revolutionaries but not because they considered it impossible to fight jointly against Tsarism, but because Georgian students did not want to disperse their scarce forces. The Congress requested political consolidation of Georgian students and creation of a secret organization. The latter was called "Freedom League of Georgia". The working plan of the League looked as follows: its aim was to set Georgia on a path of new social-economic and political development, explain the reasons of its backwardness to people. The League paid great attention to the problems of other Caucasian peoples, aspired to cooperation with them so that they acquired

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[5] The idea belongs to P. Izmailov, but he was supported by Georgian public officials.

independence and unite into Federation if they desired. Georgian students devoted great attention to other non-Caucasian ethnic groups and the League had to take care of their rights. Basically they supported such formation in Caucasia which would rule out national, religious or any other type of oppression. Georgian students considered that this way they would match national interests to universal principles. Having been brought up on national discrimination, they protested all kind of inequality. (GCSHA, Fond 12, Dept. 13, folder 438, pp. 2-4)

Student organization leaders attached great importance to the relationships with Russian Social Democrats and European political organizations. It's worth mentioning that they failed to form one monolithic organization due to members' different outlook. After the League was dissolved, its members joined different parties. Majority became the members of Socialist – Federalist and National Democratic Parties, whereas minority held the Marxist position. The second Congress of the League was held in July 1893 in Tbilisi. Gendarmerie got hold of the organization documents. Most members were arrested. The organization fell apart. This was the end of the second stage of Georgian national movement.

XX century started with active social and national movements in Russia, especially before and during the first Revolution. Newspaper "Iveria" founded by Ilia Chavchavadze advocated common democratic principles in the period of the revolution but its main value was regaining national statehood. The priority of the so called *minimum programme for* "Tergdaleulebi" was to obtain the status of Autonomy. According to the plan of "Iveria" editorship, Federal South Caucasia was to enter Russian Federation which would unite territorial autonomies. "Tergdaleulebi" were trying to establish a precedent of creating Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani political autonomies. However, Armenian public officials were against such formulation. While agreeing with the Autonomy of South Caucasia they fought against the idea of building it on Federal principles. (Newspaper "Iveria", 1905, №№ 37; 38; 39)[6] Georgian national-territorial Autonomy became the subject of discussion among Georgian nobility as well. They appeal to Russian King with the request to grant Georgia the status of Autonomy. Naturally, Republican "Tergdaleulebi" were aware of nobility's desire to retain their privileges but despite this, they closely cooperated with them, since their primary objective was to gain the right of self-governance ("Iveria", 1905, №№ 41; 42; 43; Bendianishvili, 1980, 167). As true Democrats and Republicans, "Tergdaleulebi" saw their main support in broad masses of

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[6] Such position of Armenian public officials was naturally the result of their ambitions, which indicates that the conflicts in South Caucasus had to be considered from historical perspective, i.e. against the background of the dynamics of development of national political concept of Caucasian peoples.

people, the nation. Given the serious class confrontation, "Tergdaleulebi" called the nation for unification by placing the priority on consolidated national interests. "Tergdaleulebi" supposed that under the circumstances of national self-governance, Georgian nation would settle its social problems and it was only possible to defend workers' interests living on the periphery within autonomous units. "Iveria" editorship could clearly see that each social class interpreted the concept of Autonomy for their own benefit. They believed it was necessary to have a temporary agreement between the existing parties in order to achieve the common goal, since getting rid of Tsarist bureaucracy and creating free political order instead, served everybody's interests. In their opinion, such system would create preconditions for each class to defend their interests. Thus, the issue of primary importance for Ilia Chavchavadze and his like-minded people was to seek mechanisms to harmonize general national principles which in their opinion would be national Autonomy based on common democratic principles. Naturally, "Tergdaleulebi" only welcomed the involvement of nobility in the common process but this picture would be incomplete if "Tergdaleulebi" failed to involve such numerous party as Social-Democrats in their activities (Back in the 90s of XIX c. Georgian public figure G. Laskhishvili promoted the theory of expediency of uniting all political organizations on national basis. See newsp. "Iveria", 1895, № 19. Shvelidze, 1993, 25-28; Laskhishvili, 1992). Their statements on declaring Social Democratic Party a genuine advocate of working people's interests, served the above aim ("Iveria", 1905, №№ 32; 33; 60; 62; 63; Bendianishvili, 1980, 168). Therefore, Social Democrats were given their own space in the common process. But for Georgian Social-Democrats who were firmly standing on the principles of proletarian internationalism, class interests came before national. Georgian Marxists refused to demand national Autonomy for Georgia. Moreover, the doctrine of class struggle disunited Georgian political spectrum having been pieced together so laboriously. This turned out to have been tactically advantageous for the Russian Party (Georgian Marxists represented a Georgian faction of All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party) in order to come to power, but not so beneficial for Georgia. Thus, for Georgian Social Democrats, Georgian Autonomy was not a political goal at all. It was not included in their program. So unification of Georgian social political forces on common democratic basis proved impossible. The first national-democratic concept appears back in 1901-1902 – "The grounds for common actions" whose author believed that the above historical moment created the grounds for common practical actions for disputing groups. These were: 1. Protection of Georgian language, 2. Establishment of Georgian trade and industry. 3. Keeping Georgian economy in hands of Georgian people. 4. Popular-cultural work and Georgians' interference into municipal self-governance (Shvelidze, 1993, 58). The author of this theory

recognized the existence of classes and their interests but was against class antagonism in contrast to the principle of class cooperation. Thus, under national oppression, unification on national basis was given a priority over social matters. The author of the theory- Archil Jorjadze, a nobleman, supported democratic system. Not being content with theoretical work solely he started practical activities. In 1903, Georgian newspaper "Sakartvelo" was launched and the ground for the foundation of Socialist-Federalist Party was laid in Paris. The first conference of Georgian revolutionaries living abroad opened on 1 April 1904 in Geneva attended by Georgian anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and National Democrats, 26 people in total. The main goal of the conference was to establish a political party, which would unite all Georgian political organizations under one flag. Social Democrats headed by N. Zhordania left the conference since the key issue of national Autonomy turned out unacceptable for them. The resolution adopted by Conference regretfully pointed out that Georgian Social-Democrats did not represent an independent party as they remain the constituent part of Russian Social-Democrats. Therefore, Georgian Autonomy was unacceptable for them (Shvelidze, 1993, 132-136). The major outcome of Geneva conference was the foundation of Georgian Socialist Federalist Revolutionary Party uniting political groups of different trends: the group of newspaper "Sakartvelo" – was the core part, Anarchists, Socialist Revolutionaries, and National Democratic group of Liberal orientation. Such miscellaneous composition makes us think that the social issue about the forms of ownership played a minor role and the main task was to unite under the flag of Autonomy demand. In this respect, withdrawal of Social Democrats was a heavy loss. The major goals of this non-proletarian party should be viewed as follows: the final goal was full independence but in the given reality, separatism was condemned. They supported overthrow of autocracy and democratization, but not democratic centralism of Russia, which would not consider minority interests. Here is the formula: Georgian Autonomy within the Federation of South Caucasia and the membership of South Caucasian Federation within Russian Confederation. Unlike Social Democrats, declaring themselves proletarian advocates, Socialist Federalists, given the peculiarities of Georgia, considered themselves defenders of peasantry interests. They opposed the Marxist formula of turning peasantry into proletarians and viewed a peasant as a petty proprietor, producer. In order to restrict selling lands by peasants and moving to cities, they supported Socialist Revolutionaries' program. The land was to be transferred to democratically established territorial unions for public use. Certainly Socialist-Federalists were not the political party of the same orientation. They were united under "romantic-utopist" theory of common grounds. They failed to achieve the main goal – uniting all political forces. Social Democrats from the

left and separatists from the right criticized them heavily. Social-Democrats had no difficulty in assuring broad masses that Socialist Federalists were a nationalist and small bourgeois party. The hard core of the party had no mechanisms of propaganda abroad, so they can't have been Social-Democrats' competitors.

Arguments between Socialist Federalists and Social-Democrats that Georgian political Autonomy would not only break up the unity of proletarians and internationalism, but rather support their unity, made no sense either (newsp. „Cnobis Purceli", 1905, № 2805). So, Socialist Federalists were strongly opposed to Georgian Social-Democrats, although found much in common with European Social-Democrats. "Federalists in their debates concerning national question, based their judgment on Revisionists and declared themselves the followers of European Socialism" (Bendianishvili, 1980, 179). Federalists' leader, Archil Jorjadze was trying to prove scientifically the fairness of having a state for each nation. For him nation and state are inseparable concepts. Thus, Jorjadze favored the concepts of 18th century Europe (Jorjadze, 1911, 88). For Federalists, the Treaty of Georgievsk served the legal basis for demanding national Autonomy, or statehood. However, being Republicans, they were against monarchy and supported Constitutional Parliamentarism.

Georgian "Mensheviks" criticized the idea of Georgia's Autonomy. For Zhordania the demand for Autonomy is Nationalism in the sense of reactionary. He was against the idea that Federalists used Federalism as a means of implementing Socialism, as Federalism did not imply Democratism (Ani, 1917). In his work "We and Federalists", N. Zhordania, opposes the idea of national-territorial Autonomy (i.e. political self-governance). He makes a clear distinction between territorial and national Autonomy considering nationality only a cultural phenomenon, and is inclined to cultural Autonomy. Thus, Autonomy was to be granted not to Georgia, but to Georgian nation regardless of territory having only cultural-educational issues under its competence. For him, Nationalism is a reactionary, aggressive phenomenon. Contrary to that, Archil Jorjadze and Socialist Federalists' newspaper "Tsnobis Purtseli" demanded having national-territorial or political Autonomy based on Constitutional Parliamentarism and constitutional protection of minorities residing in Georgia. It clearly shows that if Socialist Federalists shared Liberal-Democratic values, N. Zhordania was under the utopian influence of Russian interpreters of Marxism. To avoid further theoretical debates it could be only emphasized that Zhordania and his party fellows did not have national statehood in their programme, even in the form of Autonomy. However, it should be noted that a group of autonomists had existed among Georgian Social-Democrats since 1905, headed by V.

Darchiashvili (Sidamonidze, 1970, 161). Presumably, Geneva Congress greatly influenced V. Darchiashvili's views. He was the delegation member of Social Democrats, although he did not leave the Conference together with his fellow party members (Shvelidze, 1993, 125-149).

As mentioned above, Federalist Party was diverse in content. From the day of its foundation, especially in the beginning of the Revolution, a clear trend of its right - National Liberal, non-Socialist wing headed by Shalva Amirejibi, Spiridon Kedia was distinguished. Besides, the political figures that never joined Socialist-Federalist Party rallied round the magazines "Tsnobis Purtseli" and "Sakartvelo". During the first Russian Revolution patriotically minded nobility and a group of bourgeois intellectuals attempted to create National –Democratic Party. "Tsnobis Purtseli" published "Georgian Autonomists' Constitutional-Democratic Party Programme" in 1906. Georgian historiography considers it the first document of National –Democratic Party (Shvelidze, 1993, 200; Mamulia, 1989). Ilia Chavchavadze became the ideological leader of a new Party. National-Democrats considered their party as class-free and national oriented (Veshapeli, 1918). Thus, their main goal was to build National Statehood, at least in the form of Autonomy. The meeting of Local government and municipal authorities of the Russian Empire took place in September 1905, which actually supported Federal system of Russia. In April 1906, Ilia Chavchavadze was elected as a member of the state council where he demanded an expanded local self-governance for non-Russian nations. In 1907, the Hague Conference adopted the Petition of Georgian people. Presumably, the document was initiated by Varlam Cherkezishvili (Laskhishvili, 1992, 240-246). "Society in Defense of Georgia" based in London passed the document over to Ernest Niss, the professor of Brussels University who presented the Petition to the Conference (See the Petition text and Earnest Niss's conclusion by Tsereteli, 1916, 59-65; 69-71) which basically emphasized that Russia's unilateral violation of the Georgievsk Treaty terms that gave the right to Georgia to restore self-governance. The text mentions the loss of autocephaly of the church, Russification policy, repressions in 1905 during the crush of the Revolution and reprisals carried out by Russia based on nationality. Thus, the tendency established in Georgian national movement was to set the precedent where international organizations would discuss the issue of Georgia on the basis of international law and raise the question on restoration of its juridical and moral rights to statehood. However, given the real political situation, the authors of the Petition never went further than demanding political Autonomy. It is noteworthy that due to Russian influence, the Petition had never been discussed at the conference.

It must be noted that the demand for Autonomy was such a fair and fundamental political instrument that it even extended to the ranks of Georgian Mensheviks. Their opinion regarding Autonomy evolved noticeably after 1905 Revolution. Initially, Zhordania's demand did not go further than regional self-governance of Caucasia. Naturally, revolutionary party would have been interested in having democratic institutions in place, as a political instrument. It was on Akaki Chkhenkeli's initiative that Social Democrats demanded cultural Autonomy in 1906, which naturally caused Lenin's rage (Lenin, 1973, 174-178).

Autonomists' movement and their ideas were hugely popular all over Russia and that is why RSDLP, the follower of Democratic Centralism, was forced to put the national question on the agenda of the II Congress. While they refused the Bundists to build their party on Federal principles, the *minimum program* included a more extensive local self-governance, the right to people's education in their language and the ephemeral right to national self-determination. Martov demanded regional self-governance for such large units, as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and Caucasia. Georgian Bolsheviks, Philipe Makharadze, Alexander Tsulukidze strongly disagreed with the idea of any Autonomy which would cut off Georgian proletarians from the rest of the world. In their view, only proletarian unity would be able to break capitalists' opposition. Thus, they were going to settle the national question only after the victory of Socialist Revolution (Newsp. "Mogzauri", 1905, №17; № 21; № 30; Newsp. "Chveni Tskhovreba" 1906, №№ 9; 11; 13. Akhobadze, 1965, 113-147). Mensheviks' printed organ "Nachalo" supported Autonomy and Federal system. It allowed autonomists group leaders of Georgian Social Democrats headed by Vladimer Darchiashvili to address the IV Congress of South Caucasian Social-Democrats in 1906 with the demand for Autonomy. Finally, Bolsheviks maintained the position of political centralism, while Mensheviks under the leadership of Noe Zhordania supported Regional self-governance of Caucasia. (Akhobadze, 1965, 246 – 256; Sidamonidze, 1970, 174-186) Georgians, Azeri and Armenians in Caucasian regional self-government had to be content with cultural Autonomy. Therefore, Mensheviks occurred among the ranks of autonomists. Archil Jorjadze, Federalists' leader welcomed this fact and considered it the important stage in the process of unification of Georgian political circles rallying round the national idea, however, he criticized Social –Democrats for inconsistency, saying that it was high time that Mensheviks finalized the national program and should not stop halfway through. (Jorjadze, 1911, 269-271)

National question was so significant in the period of a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement that even Bolsheviks paid due attention to it. Stalin wrote his famous work "Marxism

and the National Question" in 1912. The idea of the work consists in that the final resolution of national question is solely connected with building socialism, although resistance can also be minimized within capitalism. This is democratization and the opportunity for nation's free development. Stalin cynically comments: "*A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that Autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority*" (Stalin, 1946, 312). Stalin certainly left the final say to the party, assigning it the function of an arbiter and protector to recover and rescue the nations who would seek independence to their own detriment. But at the same time, Stalin gave advantage to Autonomy not based on national peculiarities that "disunite people and workers" but on territorial basis, which contrariwise unites population and divides it on grounds of classes, which is undoubtedly a "progressive phenomenon". Stalin viewed the nation as economic unity, independent from the state. According to him, the Czechs and the Poles developed into a nation in Austria, the Croatians – in Hungary, the Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians – in Russia (Stalin, 1946, 305). An exception in West Europe became a rule in the East. That is why he makes distinction between the concepts of national and territorial Autonomy. Under national he implies cultural. Such approach is purely pragmatic indeed prompted by the objective of creating socialist nation. That he calls people from Ajara[7] and Kobuleti[8] separate nations, does not stand up to criticism. (Stalin, 1946, 350) Stalin regarded the resolution of a national question in Caucasia as incorporation of belated nations into the highest cultural mainstream. (Stalin, 1946, 351) Here Stalin appears as a typical integral nationalist. In this light he supported regional Autonomy of South Caucasia which meant that demanding Autonomy for Georgian or other Caucasian nations separately, would bear bourgeois and therefore, reactionary character. According to his earnest conviction, national question depended on agrarian issues. (Stalin, 1946, 319) Yet he had to admit that it was necessary to build separate autonomies in Poland and Ukraine. Thus, Stalin equaled Caucasia to them.[9] Such approach allowed Bolsheviks to come out in a united front in the Revolution.

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[7] Ethnic Georgians of the Muslim faith.
[8] Kobuleti - A town in the Georgian province of Adjara, inhabited by ethnic Georgians - Gurians. (Guria - a province inhabited by ethnic Georgians Christian Orthodox denomination).
[9] It is worth mentioning that today's so-called "ethnic conflicts" in the Transcaucasus actually just the consequences of Stalin's conception of the "territorial autonomies" and in our opinion, should be examined precisely in this context by the scientists, or politician.

1912 Bolsheviks and Mensheviks reached agreement, about the autonomy of the Caucasus. On the contrary, the Socialist-Federalists demanded the autonomy of Georgia in the State Duma. (Newspaper "Imereti" 1912, № 75; Bendianishvili, 1980, 198)

A different, non-socialist position in the social sphere and the demand for Georgian independence preconditioned secession of National-Democratic wing from the ranks of Federalists. Despite its final legalization in 1917, they started working in this direction from the beginning. In 1913, a group called "Free Georgia" was formed in Geneva whose active member was Petre Surguladze. National-Democrats demanded Georgia's full independence, however they placed the emphasis on contractual relationships. From tactical point of view, Caucasian Federation accepted certain Autonomy but long-term program still maintained full independence of Georgia. (Chkhikvishvili, 1992)

Upon their return to Georgia, National Democrats start acting according to local reality. Petre Surguladze stays in Geneva and starts intensive work to develop relationships with the central powers in order to obtain a guarantee of recognition of Georgia's independence in case of victory. Next he establishes contacts with Mikheil Tsereteli and Giorgi Machabeli, the adherers of Anarchist ideas, who set up "The Committee of National Independence of Georgia" in Berlin whose main goal was to receive guarantees from German and Turkish governments on recognition of Georgia as an independent political body. Besides, another group of Georgian public figures headed by anarchist Varlam Cherkezishvili carries out similar activities in London with Entente countries.

This extremely significant sphere, which indeed requires due attention, has never been covered in Georgian historiography. The fact is that owing to German policy, which implied revolt in the countries bordering Russia, and based on military achievements of the central powers, activities of the committee of national independence proved to be much more effective…

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WHICH GOVERNMENT MAY CONTROL THE MASS MEDIA: IRAN AND NORTH IRAQ AS A CASE STUDY

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Abstract

This paper is the comparative study in order to discover the motives of using censorship on Media. The main argument of this study is to determine the "Using of Censorship on Media in different government states" Consistently, the study depends on document analysis method and academic sources as well.

Correspondingly, the study focuses on Media and democracy and then Mass Media in Iran and North Iraq. Finally, the law of press in Iran and North Iraq will be analysis to know the key elements of censorship in both governments.

Key words: Iran – North Iraq – Media – Censorship – democracy

Introduction:

Commonly, controlling mass media is a serious threat that faces democracy in the world; some governments practice some procedures to control the mass media, when media appeared that was happened and it have been continuing especially in the Middle East. Likewise, Media is an important issue in modern and democratic countries hence the human beings should work for freedom of expression as the human did several wars in order to speak out freely and exchange information, so how they would accept silence in twenty first century. Similarly, Nordenstreng (2001) argues that human beings cannot leave the journalism out of this neutralization, the media specifically TV has a great relation with democracy since it is a powerful democratizing power, however, the mass media could be a part to destroy public space of discourse they open up to grow the community and freedom of expression. In other words, it is the start to decrease morality among mass media and audiences thus controlling is one of the pressures completely threatening the freedom of media. Besides, DAY (2001) believes that restricting media occurs

while a specific government or individual enforces its political values on others by limiting expressions. In addition, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (2000) claims that there are Four Theories of the Press in the world; the "Authoritarian theory" in which media works for the benefits of the government, and advance the policies of the government in power and ownership can be either private or public. The second theory is "Libertarian". This theory takes the philosophical ideas that human being is a rational well-being and can differentiate between truths and false. Hence, he can make a good choice among his choices either good or bad. While the third theory is "Social Responsibility" that is an outgrowth of the libertarian theory. However, social responsibility goes beyond "objective" reporting to "interpretive" reporting. Lastly, the "Soviet-Totalitarian" or "Communism" theory aims to contribute to the success and continuance of the Soviet socialist system, and especially to the dictatorship of the party because the Ownership was public. But journalists are most interested in the libertarian theory and the social responsibility theory as a background for today's free press. Additionally, democracy is an essential condition for free media or modern media. In states where the political systems are non-democratic, such as in Islamic Republic of Iran, media is not free and it doesn't work as a modern media. In this essay threat of controlling on media will be discussed in non-democratic systems for instance in Iran and it will also compare and contrast the freedom of mass media between Iran and North Iraq.

1. Media and democracy

Some experts believe that media and democracy have great relations and they leave enormous effect on humanity to establish a modern and a new system for their lives. According to Cambridge dictionary (2011) it's potential that democracy is the norm in liberty and equality among beings, or a structure of administration created on this acceptance, in which power is whichever held by chosen senators or openly by the individuals themselves. Moreover, Jefferson (1991) states that "If it were left on me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." It has explained that media is crucial in democratic systems because if the media doesn't distribute critical information about unwanted affairs, democracy doesn't flourish. In a similar way, Dennis and Snyder (1998) maintain that modern media means a media that backs up the democratic order of liberate votes, common law, politically aware independence, common rights, characteristic government and an independent judicial system.

Democracy and media live together side by side by supporting each other through a process of cooperation about common affairs would be fruitful. Currently media is an important democratic art in human life since only mass media can deliver the public knowledge and it is essential for the democratic progress, whereas, it's not easy to work on cases about free media in non - democratic systems because it requires explaining how media work in totalitarian countries in which some politicians monopolize everything. Moreover, Vali (2004) argues that some of non-democratic governments always try to control media because they believe that media is the biggest hazard opposing their power. For example, Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the totalitarian governments that have controlled media since 1979, and that an Islamic group obtained power in the country. However, some democratic governments consider that media is one of the significant elements for any democratic country such as North Iraq. It has a modern law of journalism since 2007-2008, although it is a new region in the world without its independent territory.

2. Mass Media in Iran and North Iraq

Both Islamic Republic of Iran and North Iraq have press laws although they have a different law and culture for media and governmental systems. According to BBC (2011), it is probable that Iran became a sole Islamic Republic in 1979 when the kingdom was defeated and religious extreme individuals controlled power under "Ayatollah Khomeini." The Iranian government has a good justification to control mass media through the country and apply censor on online journalism, because the system allowed implementing technical restrictions on mass media by limiting and implementing harsh polices, that is why Censorship make bigger to political and human rights web Pages. Furthermore, a lot of Social media sites have been closed in Iran such as: "Face book, Twitter, Myspace, Flicker and YouTube." Similarly, consistent with Press Law of Iran (1986) is ratified in 1986, and its decision-making By-law in1987, the law started "Let us swear by the pen and whatever is written." it taken from "Holy Quran", whereas, the state use censor on media and freedom of expression. Besides, according to BBC (2007), Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian Nobel peace laureate, supposed that Iran is getting worse in using censorship and the country doesn't like its local affairs and actions inside the state to be reproduced in the outside world. Also, Ebadi believed the regime of Iran tries to restrict the spread of information about current issues in the world. In addition, Iranian Online journalism has encountered a big hazard by political system in the country, since the system does not accept working social

networks through the state; it also applied the control on mobile phones and every kind of online media. Additionally, Sreberny and Gholam (2010) claim that newly Iranian government intend the creation of sites booming news, editorials and blogs contain a new ethical not accessible within the command - controlled networks, for example, the telecommunication ministry of Iran in 2004 declared that it would begin filtering out 'immoral' movies and voice messages directed by mobile phones. Moreover, restriction and control operate several persons, excluding editors, authors, correspondents and normal people who follow the net to gain information to create discussion for free communication. On the other hand, the government doesn't care for freedom of mass media and the role of democracy. Besides these behaviors against media, the state keeps blocking sites. For instance, 2008 was a harsh year for media freedom in Iran, within the country creation noise about additional extending mass media, traditional controls and with the figures of bloggers and reporters in prison increasing. Furthermore, Sreberny and Gholam (2010) consider that Since 2000 the government has completed list of websites and blogs to be controlled, and 15,000 websites had already been drawn up by the government in 2003 and directed to the internet service providers to be blocked, in the same time, the government arrested some people in April 2009 like "Omid Reza" who was the first Iranian blogger to die in prison because he used online media to gain information. Additionally, According to Aljazeera (2009) the Iranian powers are killing not for only a traditional figures conflict – says their sideways of the story through country round news establishment and brawling with the story on global mass media vents. Conversely, the situation of media is very different in North Iraq because the governmental system in North Iraq is non-Islamic system it's the main factory of dissimilarity between these two systems. In the same way, Berzinjy (2001) claims that nowadays human beings live in contemporary world and it doesn't have any justification to using censorship on mass media by governments, whereas many governments use censor on media since sometimes they face some security challenges. For example, North Iraqi Regional Government in some situations used censor on media because the location of North Iraq is very hazardous as it is located in the mid of three states, Iran, Turkey and Syria. It has also a historical political conflict with these countries, thus it is not easy to publish information particularly against them. As a result, the above examples explained that censorship exists everywhere.

Differences between Iran and North Iraq are about significant democratic political cultures or modern media values. Moreover, Salih (2005) believes that Middle East is a risky place for reporters to work; Iran is the fourth state for controlling mass media in the region, and 27

correspondents were arrested in the Middle East in 2004 for ejaculation; libel the president of the country, affront Islam and publishing untrue information, half of them in Iran.

3. The law of press in Iran and North Iraq

If we want to obtain a correct comparison between Iran and North Iraq, the press laws in both countries should be taken into account. Iran's Press Law was ratified on 19 March 1986 and it's passed on 31 January 1987. In the introduction of the Press Law in Iran it is simplified that mass media has freedom of expression but the information that will be published does not infringe Islamic values or the public code, as it is stated in article 24 of the constitution. On the contrary, 2008 was the golden year for North Iraqi journalists in North Iraq because for the first time in that year the North Iraqi Regional government passed on the press law; now North Iraq has the most liberal mass media autonomy. The essential law of Journalism in north Iraq defends the reporters to keep save their sources, stops the imprisoning and illegal accusations of journalists.

According to Iranian law of press the journalists can work against colonist political for example In Chapter two, Article two explained that journalists should work against the face of colonial principles which intends to abuse Islamic ideology. It should encourage honest Islamic principles. And if they did not do it the government can charge them so it's a proper way for controlling the mass media, however, in "essential law of Journalism in North Iraq" does not have any words about this issue and if the journalists libel any nations the law charges them because the human beings should respect each other in the world.

The Iranian law of press is very complex because in some parts it mentioned that freedom of expression is fundamental for journalists but it always revisit for Islamic values, such as in chapter three, article three illustrated that mass media has a right to spread criticisms, opinions and ideas from persons and official sources for society, but information should accordingly promoting and encouraging respect for the Islamic traditions and the greatest attention of the public. Nevertheless, the first chapter - article two in "essential law of journalism in North Iraq" explained that mass media is free and there is no restrictions also freedom of expression for every type of press, secured to all civilian in regarding to the rights and liberties of persons and their private lives. Likewise, in the second and third points in this article the journalists have right to gain important evidence and information for people from different sources according to the law, the journalists also have right to save the sources of stories gained from confidential

points, and in the fifth point clarified that the newspapers never forbidden and the authority cannot control them.

The chapter four of Iranian law of press is the biggest threat in front of democracy and modern mass media because it explained that mass media and prints are allowed to spread news bulletin just excluding it while it violates Islamic values and codes as it is defined in this chapter, for example print disbelieving articles or subjects which abuse the Islamic values and encourages issues which could disrupt the basis of Islamic Republic. In addition to spread indecent and actions which are banned by religion and printing obscene photos, topics which disrupt society decency or publishing luxury and well-being, or support people within or outside the country to act against the Islamic Republic of Iran and national interests. While spreading confidential information and evidences about the armed militaries, military plans, discussion and closed debates of the Islamic Consultative Assembly without legal permission. Moreover, belittling the Islamic leaders in hieratical levels would offend the authority. Besides, offending people who have reputation in state positions by libels, photos, and cartoons is not allowed. Regulating the commitment of plagiarism and quoting illegally from media outlets which are offending Islamic principles and laws on national and international arena would be restricted by Islamic executive law.

The fighting is a sense of human instincts that's why they apply law to reduce war against each other, but some laws indirectly has a big justifications and supports to break peace among individuals. However, some rules are help humanity to live peacefully for instant in chapter three - article six in "essential law of journalism in North Iraq" confirmed whether the newspaper spread incorrect data to the individuals, they have rights to claim legally to answer the broadcast or news, and the editor in chief should publish respond in the same page by the same magnitude, and if the newspaper did not publish the answer or correction the newspaper face fine that amount is not unless one million diner and not more than 2 million diners as punishment, and sometimes the editor can refuse the respond for example if the newspaper has an evidence that their information is correct, and when the answer send after 90 days or the answer has conflict with the law. Similarly, according to Rudaw (2011) the Labor MP Meg Munn, who served as Minister for Women and Equality from 2005 to 2007 in the UK, said: "We want to support a North Iraq that is respecting Human rights and freedom of expression; however, we understand that democracy in North Iraq is not complete yet."

Some governments are working to limit the freedom of mass media by limiting and issuing a license of the applicant for example in chapter five in Iranian press of law shows the

qualifications of the Applicant and Stages of Issuing a License such as Article nine illustrate that a real person who applies for a license must have the following qualifications: Be free of moral corruption, or a record of criminal conviction which, also according to the Islamic code, strips him/her of social rights; and almost all the officials in Iran such as in government, parliament, council, companies and banks those who have publicly spoken in favor of the former regime through the news media, radio or TV, are prohibited from publishing a publication. Correspondingly, According to Al Jazeera (2010) its certain that "the Iranian authorities have prohibited a reformist daily newspaper and a moderate weekly magazine run by the family of Mehdi Karroubi, an opposition leader." additionally, Referring to Article tenth the Press Supervisory Board shall consist of devoted Muslims who possess the required scientific and moral competence and are committed to the Islamic Revolution as follows: Entry to and exit from the country of publications shall be in accordance with the basis of religious codes and the constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic as mentioned in Article 22. The regulations covering entry and exit of publications to and from the country shall be formulated within six months via the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance and while being ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, additionally the Article 27 clarify that the Islamic republic will revoke the license of those whose writings' insult the Leader or Council of Leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran or senior religious authorities (top Islamic jurisprudents), not just the license of the publication but others who are involved as manager and editors will be subjected to punishments which are stated in constitution. On the other hand, according to the "essential law of journalism in North Iraq" everyone has right to obtain a License of publication by government. In contrast, chapter 6 in Iranian law of press is about violations and according to Article 24 in this chapter, if any one tries to publish confidential military documents and orders, and secrets of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), or, maps of military installations and fortifications during war or peace time in the press, will be treated according to law and the court decided on his punishments, and what mentioned in Article 25 is the importance of pushing people through the press, expressly, overtly instigates and encourages people for committing crimes against the domestic security or foreign policies of the state, as specified in the public penal code, if he/she accused of committing a crime while evidence be available then his/her action bear adverse consequences. However, if no evidence is found on such consequences then he/she would face a religious decision according to Islamic penal code. Also In Article 26 clarified that whoever intends to insult Islam and its principles via the press and his/her guilt amounts to apostasy, ought to be punished as leftist who violate religious principles according to the Islamic penal code. But Consistent with chapter fourth/ article seven

in essential law of journalism in KRG journalists are freelance and they have no power in the presentation of their work additional that the legislation, and the information spread by journalists should not act to public disturbance, and the journalists can save their sources, excluding by legal decision, they also have a right to attend for public conferences. This chapter illustrated if any person affront or offensive journalists, are penalized by law, and in chapter five / article eight explained impunity for journalists in North Iraq, in the first point police can't investigate with journalists and they can't search their houses unless the court authorizes to do.

The Islamic republic of Iran banned journalists when they published information against Iranian law, likewise, According to Article 28, any media outlets that offend and abuse the social decency is strictly forbidden and would be punished by Islamic law, while sticking to publish such kind of publications would case the revoke of the publication's license and facing severe punishments. Similarly, article 31 concentrated on violating and threatening personal confidential affairs, is prohibited and the manager in charge will be punished according to law. However, in North Iraq is different because when the journalists face problems and when they do not win the case, the law charge them by an amount of money according to law as penalty, for example article nine illustrated some points about fined journalists and editor in chief by an amount that is not fewer than one million diners and no extra than five million diners when they printed those points: when they abetment societies to grouch or disrelish odds and dissonance among the elements of community, despised the religious principles, sacred and spiritual, Any information relevant to the private life of people until if correct, because it leave impact on their personality or publish swearing and aspersion, if the newspaper repeat the action, the law could raise the fine amount to twice. Besides, article ten shows that conditions of article nine do not apply for the colleges and scientific research centers or scientific purposes.

4. Conclusion

In this essay a brief introduction about media and four theories of the Press in the world; have been explained, and controlling mass media in different governments like Islamic Republic of Iran and the freedom of expression in North Iraq are argued, also the Media and democracy have been clarified. Besides, Media in Iran and North Iraq have been illustrated, and then the comparison between Press law in Iran and North Iraq and both governments systems have been discussed. Finally, it can be seen that controlling media always exists in the twenty first century in some countries in the world particularly in the Middle East such as in Islamic Republic of Iran, and it has shown that North Iraq is a new region in the world however it has a modern law

for press that its better than Iranian law of press. As well as, it is revealed that "Social Responsibility" theory is the best system for press rather than "Authoritarian", "Libertarian" and "Communism" theories, because it has more freedom for mass media and it can be adapted with democracy. In my opinion, controlling media is the biggest intimidation in front of democracy and modern media.

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COMPETITIVENESS OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT

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Abstract

This paper looks at the case of Iraq in terms of competitiveness based on the facts and data from different indexes globally. This paper finds, in contrast to the previous studies that have emphasized the dependency on oil, in which Iraq appears to have reinforced its extractive capacities in acquiring strong military in the region and exercising its power over the region. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that Iraq has external and internal weakness, made Iraq to be a less competitive state, and no innovations for years. The paper sheds a light on factors and challenges for Iraq to acquire competitiveness.

Keywords: Iraq, Competitiveness, Governance, Rentier State, Taxation

1.1. The Role of the State in Competitiveness

Defining the word competitiveness is a critical concern for many researchers, since it has different implication for different regions and countries. In line with this, the national competitiveness is not defined accurately, since different institutions define the term, according to the pillars and the factors of competitiveness. Importantly, disagreement on competitiveness is a continuous on-going hot debate; Michael E. Porter links the competitiveness of a nation as "the only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level of productivity."[1] This might be true logically for the industrial countries, such as Japan, Germany, Korea, while this has no value for a rentier state like Iraq. Because, a country like Iraq has abundant natural resources while, for a long time the Iraqi government has not produced any competitive products for the world markets, and even in the regional markets as well.

According to the World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Report (2014) competitiveness is defined as "the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine

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[1] Michael, E. Porter (1990), The competitive advantage of nations, *Harvard Business Review*, March issue accessed in March 26, 2015, available at: https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-competitive-advantage-of-nations/ar/1.

the level of productivity of a country."[2] In this perspective, competitiveness is strongly linked with the productivity of the country based on the main pillars of competitiveness for each state. In contrast, Robert D, Atkinson (2013) relates "competitiveness only to the economic health of a nation's traded sector," besides, how we define the economic health, as jobs or what,"[3] yet the Iraqi economic sector is not healthy, in terms of trade balance, and according to the data available Iraq has a surplus in regard to trade. Though, Iraq has external security and an instability concern, still the economic sector is operating. The chart below explains that "the imports in Iraq decreased to 49976.50 USD Million in 2013 from 50155 USD Million in 2012. Imports in Iraq averaged 21511.81 USD Million from 1988 until 2013, reaching an all-time high of 50155 USD Million in 2012 and a record low of 2681.90 USD Million in 1994."[4] Iraq, mostly imports for nourishing the energy sector, since this will strengthen the economic growth of Iraq.

(Figure.1.1)

Focusing on one sector of the economy, it will not define the country's competitiveness, besides; Iraq is not an ideal economy to have everything in the country. Indeed, Iraq's exports are mainly from the booming oil production in the recent years, adding to this high level of imports are due to the energy industry development too.

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[2] Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014). Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf.
[3] Robert, D. Atkinson. (2013), "What really is competitiveness", *The Globalist*, September 20, accessed in March 25, available at: http://www.theglobalist.com/really-competitiveness/.
[4] Trading Economies, (nd), "Iraqi Imports", accessed on April 10,2015, available at: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iraq/imports.

(Figure.1.2)

Iraq Balance of Trade (2005 – 2013)
Source: Central Bank of Iraq

The pie chart, explains the imports by sector and it shows that the imported goods are for the oil revenue development. Indeed, Iraq is not competitive to have capacity for manufacturing the industrial needs; therefore, importing the products is a must for the energy sector to operate. Additionally, "the development of manufacturing will help Iraqi economic diversification and it meets its own industrial needs."[5]

(Figure.1.3)

Iraqi Imports by Category
Source: U.S. Department of State: Investment Climate of Iraq 2014

Discussed by Franziska, Blunck (2006), "competitiveness is the ability to provide products and services as more effectively and efficiently than relevant competitors."[6] To be noted, does a state which has full legitimacy and power in the country has competitors or not? This depends on the governance in this state and the culture of the leadership. Apparently, in

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[5] Dinar Breaking News, (nd), "what the imports of Iraq say about its economy", accessed on April 5, 2015, available at: https://dinarinsider.com/what-the-imports-of-iraq-say-about-its-economy.
[6] Franziska, Blunck. (2006), "what is competitiveness", June 26, accessed on March 26, 2015, available at: http://www.caps.am/data.php/877.pdf.

industrial field Iraq has nothing new at all, and did not try to produce something different in its history of manufacturing in the region.

In practice, the Key drivers for effective competitiveness are different, the research which has very adequately explained the word competitiveness is carried out by "Mattine Durand and Claude Giorno" in which the concept of international competitiveness is used to analyze countries' macroeconomic performance. Moreover, the paper, focus on the role of producers and exporters in a way, it suggests that to measure competitiveness three main criteria are to be used; to begin, all the sectors that are exposed to competition to be covered. Secondly, all markets to be opened for competition, eventually, the measures should be constructed from data that are fully comparable internationally."[7] In principle, this is sufficiently helpful for measuring competitiveness in a developed world, whereas that will not be helpful in developing countries and in Iraq especially, because those three basic criteria is not applicable on the real ground of the Iraqi situation as a state. For example, those indicators based on price, quality of products, the volume of export and imports, getting sufficient data about those variables are not easy and accurate, due to the fact that Iraq is in transition process yet.

In the similar reports and indexes like those that are available in Europe and globally, The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2013, this was conducted in a critical time in which in many Arab countries, governments are changed, the Arab Spring brought a more chaotic transition than stability to the governments in power. Apparently, the main components of the competitiveness as in the World Economic Forum are 12 pillars, measuring them according to the context of Iraq based on the available data, will be a critical concern. Going global will be very difficult for Iraq, even going regional currently, due to regional and domestic concerns since the invasion. In fact, comparing Iraq to even a third world country and gulf countries will not be fair. Notably, looking at a small state like "Qatar" in the same region, with a healthy economy and highly productive. It can be said that the role of government is crucial in boosting the rank for competitiveness, "The prosperity of natural resources coupled with the growing and diversifying economy means enormous access to investment opportunities and incentives."[8] In contrast, the Iraqi government in 20 years, almost could not step in the

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[7] Martine, Durand. &Claude, Giorno. (Nd), "Indicators of international competitiveness: conceptual aspects and evaluations", accessed on March 27, available at: https://oecd.org/eco/outlook/33841783.pdf.
[8] Qatar Stock Exchange, (2015), accessed on March 28, 2015, available at: http://www.qe.com.qa/pps/qe/qe+english+portal/Pages/About+QE/Qatar+Economy.

transition process to a new stage, especially, the government policy in diversifying economic sector is extremely weak.

1.2.Governance Quality and Capacity in Iraq in the Post Invasion Era

In essence, good governance at its peak or even it has not been started yet after 22years of the regime change. Iraqi transition period took long, and it was accompanied by high security risks, corruption, weak governances and political power rivalry among the Iraqi ethnic groups in power since 2005. "While good governance is increasingly viewed as a key ingredient for development,"[9] is good governance a policy for the Iraqi government or not? Is there a real assumption that the Iraqi government has an efficient contribution to development?

At this point, testing the assumptions about Iraq is challenging for certain reasons. First how to define good governance in the context of Iraq and how to measure it is neglected already; secondly the role of economic growth and democracy on strengthening good governance in Iraq is not as well defined as a governmental strategy. As there are no approaches to good governance, then no indicators to see how the governance mechanism is working in Iraq since the invasion. Therefore; defining governance is a critical concern, yet the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) addresses governance as "the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels."[10]

At the same time the World Bank defines governance as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good." In the case of Iraq during transition and regime change, as it was supported by The United States and international community, thus the federal government's capacity in governing is weakened by the political, administrative weakness, high level of corruption, ethnic tension, unstable economy, as well as high sectarian and security risks mainly in Southern and Middle of Iraq.

Importantly, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), country Data Report of Iraq, 1996-2013, reports the six aggregate governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories, including: a) Voice, and Accountability: is 10-25th extreme condition, b) Political Stability and Absence of Violence: is 0-10th percentile range , c) Government Effectiveness: is 10-25th percentile range d) Regulatory Quality: is 10-25th percentile range e) Rule of Law: is

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[9] Danielle Resnick., & Regina Birner. (2006), "Does good governance contribute to pro-poor growth?: a review of the evidence from cross-country studies", *International Food Policy Research Institute*, paper,Nub,30, p.9.
[10] UNDP. (1997), " Governance for sustainable human development", *United Nations Development Programme*, available at: http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy.

0-10th percentile range, f) Control of Corruption: is 0-10th percentile range."[11] Indeed, these indicators measure the quality and capacity of governance. Focusing on these indicators and analyzing them based on available data from different institutions, it would be logical to see how Iraq is functioning as a government.

It is not surprising to see almost all data about Iraq in all indexes, which are negative; the data indicate that the governance quality and capacity are very low in Iraq. This lead to unhealthy economic growth, additionally, the public of Iraq has no information and no role of civil society on how the resources of Iraq are raised and spent. This graph shows to what extent the government is open to the public in terms of budget: the score of Iraq is 4/100 which means no data or scant.[12]

(Figure.1.4)

To be debated, the Iraq's National Development Strategy (2005-2007) aimed at "ending ignorance, hunger, disease and sectarian conflict." The strategy was to confront the challenges that weaken the Iraqis progress and development. Significantly, the vision of the elected government was "Transforming Iraq into a peaceful, unified federal democracy and a

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[11] The Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2013), accessed on March 30, 2015, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.
[12] Open Budget Survey. (2012). "Iraq", accessed on March 30, 2015, available at: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-I.

prosperous, market oriented regional economic powerhouse that is fully integrated into the global economy." [13]

When dealing with the lack of competitiveness in a state like Iraq, considering the point of starting of governance in transition is very important. To know whether the main pillars of the National Development Strategy are implemented or not, including:

- Strengthening the foundations of economic growth.
- Revitalizing the private sector.
- Improving the quality of life.
- Strengthening good governance and security." [14]

It is to be claimed that the Iraqi government's priority was to create jobs for the young generation of the country. The strategy was to improve the lives of the Iraqi public after the invasion. The main concern in Iraq is 41% of 31.7 million people in Iraq are below the age of 15, unemployment rate in Iraq is high for youth (15-24 years) around 18% in which 27% females, and 17%male). Alarmingly, this might not be the real situation since, in a country full of security and instability challenges in different manners the data might be different, if that will be done systematically and accurately. According to Jerry Thompson a retired US Army General and Iraq Training Consultant, cited in the USAID report (2012) "unemployment poses a serious threat to stability and is likely to jeopardize Iraq's fragile democratic institutions if allowed to continue unaddressed." [15]

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government is not competitive enough to sort out the unemployment concern, thus, many Iraqi individuals suffer from poverty. It is estimated that "almost 9.5 million Iraqi individuals are living under the poverty line" [16] the Iraqi government for more than 22 years has no smart solutions to deal with what the public suffers from. According to the UNDP-Human Development Report (1980-present) 13.31% is the population in multidimensional poverty out of 33.77 Millions of total Iraqi population." [17]

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[13] Iraqi Strategic Reviewed Board (2005), cited in, Susana Jackson (2013), "Challenges and inequalities in lifelong learning and social justice", *Routledge*, first edition, p.126.

[14] Iraq's National Development Strategy (2005-2007), "Iraqi National Development Strategy", June 30, *Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation*, accessed on April8, 2015, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Iraq-NDS-July14-FINALFINAL%5B1%5D.pdf.

[15] FIELD Report 15.(2012), "Creating Jobs and Economic Opportunities in Iraq", *USAID*, September, accessed on March 30, available at: http://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/FIELD%20Report%20No%2015%20Iraq%20Jobs%20%282%29.pdf.

[16] AL monitor (2013), "Poverty rates on the rise in Iraq", April 30, accessed on March 31, 2015, available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/iraq-poverty-rates-increase-government-failure.html#.

[17] UNDP, (2015), "Human Development Report", accessed on March 31, 2015, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ.

However, the participation of Iraqis in governance gave the sense of ownership and involvement. Apparently, the Iraqis were deprived of this right during Saddam's regime; also lack of knowing about the principles and norms of governance was problem for post-Saddam governance of the institutions.

Apart from that, rebuilding governance of Iraq as a multi-ethnic country is different than the governance of any other countries. More accurately, there had always been serious tension between, Arabs (Sunni-Shia) and Arabs with Kurds, during Saddam's regime mangers who objected to Baath's ideology, were subjected to torture, death, arrest or lucky few were to escape into exile. Ultimately, creating a sustainable- well functioning administrative system for Iraq means a transparent and accountable government, which can be ruled by Iraqis and advised by Americans.

The institutional reforms in Iraq are handicapped by the economic and security challenges in post invasion. Notably, the structural and institutional reforms are to use the economic revenues of Iraq for creating a healthy economic sector which helps in the national growth. As a culture, in Iraq the state historically is the hierarchy which controls everything from economics to the social life of the public. Accordingly, until now Iraqi state has no limitations, its sovereignty is defined by the constitution. In this regard, Utilitarianism approach had never been a part of a course of action for any Iraqi government in power, according to the principle of Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian focuses on the ethical effect of the actions, "the greatest good for the greatest number."[23] No doubt at all, this was never part of any strategy of an Iraqi government in the past and present. Furthermore, "The Utilitarian aim is to distribute goods so as to maximize total welfare. Goods may be interpreted broadly to cover goods and services, rights, freedom and political power. Maximizing includes the following: goods must be produced and allocated efficiently and they must be distributed according to the principles of equity."[24]

In many governmental concerns, individuals are very important part of the state, "individuals are the unit of analysis and the measure of success of any set of institutions is the degree to which they allow individual preference to be satisfied."[25] In contrast to this approach the Iraqi governance service the self-interest of the individual politicians in power, "Principle

Sixteen Transitional Societies, Boulder, Co:, Lynne Rienner. Available at: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4090.pdf.
[23] Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, S.J., and Michael J. Meyer. (2014), "Calculating Consequences: The Utilitarian Approach to Ethics", August, accessed on March 31, 2015, available at: http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html#sthash.wPDrts7z.dpuf.
[24] Ibid
[25] Hill, P. J. (1999), *Public choice a review, Faith & Economics*— Number 34, Fall ,pp. 1–10.

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[23] Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, S.J., and Michael J. Meyer. (2014), "Calculating Consequences: The Utilitarian Approach to Ethics", August, accessed on March 31, 2015, available at: http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html#sthash.wPDrts7z.dpuf.

[24] Ibid

[25] Hill, P. J. (1999), *Public choice a review, Faith & Economics*— Number 34, Fall ,pp. 1–10.

of Fair Equality of Opportunities"[26] this approach of John Rawls welfare is violated by the self-containment of politicians which crippled competitiveness of the state by violating individual rights of Iraqis.

1.3.State-Society Relations in Iraqi Context Weakens the Competitiveness

An internal state affair are very crucial, for the state survival in the long term, the domestic affairs and especially state-society relation in Iraq had always been a real concern, which played a key role in systematic changes in Iraq. In this spirit, states are described based on the International Relations theories, in regard to Iraq, no categories of those theories can be found. Apparently, the realist scholars attributed to the peacefulness of democracies to the specific conditions of the international system. Whereas, the liberals contributed to the internal characteristics of democratic states. In this perspective, Iraq as a state cannot be in any theories; it can be admitted in the third world IR studies of states, in which the security of the state is the key that decides on the future of the state both domestically and internationally."[27] Basically, Mann mentioned that weak states are generally seen to be those states that do not have the capacities to actively penetrate society, regulate societal relationship, and extract human and financial resource from society."[28] For the case of Iraq, weakness of state is not the infrastructural power, since Iraq was and is still a rich country; it was the governance system of the totalitarian Baath regime. Since, the rise of the Baath regime in Iraq, the Iraqi state worked to acquire strong potential military power in the region; Iraq challenged domestic strength for a strong military realm among the Arab states. For Fukuyama (2004) "the weak states have received renewed attention since 9/11 and have been described as a security policy problem for the world."[29] According to this though, Iraq was ranked as a regional threat after 8 years of war with Iran and after the occupation of Kuwait in 1990. So as to understand the role of the state clearly, having a careful analysis from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber is needed, in which "state is commonly seen as the provider of the public goods and service deliveries."[30]

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[26] Rawls, J. (1971), A theory of Justice, Oxford: *Oxford University Press*.
[27] Levy, Jack (1988), *Domestic politics and war, Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4), pp. 653–73.
[28] Mann, Michael. (1993), *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[29] Fukuyama, Francis. (2004), *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st* century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[30] This view focuses on a state's purpose and its fulfilment of basic human needs. It also allows for a Minimization of the role of the state and the role of non-state actors in the fulfilment of these basic needs (Oppenheimer 1990, pp. 47 and passim).

In the most democratic and Western states, governments collect taxes, in which that is not what the rich Middle Eastern oil states are willing to do. Since, 1979, Iraqi government under the Baath regime, tried to be a successful rentier state in which government provided the public mostly the Sunni Arabs with free education, job opportunities, subsides were most for Baath party members. To that end, the target groups the Kurds and Shiie Arabs were deprived of their rights. Regarding the perception of the Iraqi local authority, Peter Futo, in his conference article on "what is local development" highlighted this sense of responsibility of government in social aspects of local development in particular, the policies, programs, and projects which are aimed to improve welfare, alleviate poverty, and improve education for the local population, very significantly, without being able to describe the stratification of local society, according to ethic, religious, educational and ownership features, since it would be impossible to measure the impact mechanism of development oriented intervention.[31] Baath regime has nationalized the oil revenues; this was an attempt to decrease external effect on the oil production in Iraq.

Baath regime was the only political party in the country; government was able to avoid any political activities particularly by the Shiie Arabs and Kurds. Viewed from this angle, it could be stated that the Iraqi state failed to see all Iraqis equally, under this circumstance, government in power moved to an authoritarian regime, and was against all democratic norms of a modern state.

1.4. The Role of Oil in Iraqi Competitiveness

In essence, Saddam's regime recorded the economic golden age in Iraq based on the oil revenue usage. According to the data, Nizar Ahmad had detailed analyses of the economic growth of Iraq from 1930 until 2003, in which the data have shown that Iraqi economy was at peak during the Baath regime's authority.

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[31] Peter, Futo. (ND), "What is local Development", *Social resource in local development conference proceedings*, Corvinus university of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary, Litofilm Ltd, p.13.

(Figure.1.5)

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1930-1958 = 7.46 billion dollars a year
1958-1963 = $ 25.3 billion a year
1963-1968 = 30.96 billion dollars a year
1968-1973 = 34.74 billion dollars a year
1973-1979 = 100.09 billion dollars annually
1979-1980 = 242.49 billion dollars annually
1980-1990 = $ 65.5 billion a year
1991-2003 = $ 9.96 billion a year, after deducting the amounts of compensation
2003-2010 = $ 37.9 billion a year, after deducting the amounts of compensation
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In the same research, it confirmed that Iraqi oil export was 3.2 Million barrels per day in 1979-1980 then a sharp decline in the oil exports by the end of Iraqi-Iranian war, 1.66 M/bpd. Besides, the worst case in Iraqi economy can be the sanctions period in which Iraq was prohibited to export oil and oil production was declined to 0.98M/Bpd.[32] Accordingly, the economic fast growth diminished slowly because of the lust of the Baath regime. The important factors behind the Iraqi economic collapse clearly were: bad-management of oil incomes, extra spending on military expenditure, bad-governance and terrorizing the citizens.

Changing the economic and political climate of Iraq is an impossible factor currently. Since, the only source of economy in the country is oil and there is no diversification of other economic sectors, as well as the lack of sufficient taxation system. The culture of paying direct taxes is not welcomed by the Iraqi population, since people had a historical motion of being free from taxes by the government. In essence, as Moore 2004; Brautigam 2008) stated "higher levels of taxation extracted by consent can finance state-provided services and goods. Moreover, the process of effective tax collection itself, because of its administrative sophistication, will further stimulate the development of state capabilities"[33] This mean taxation brings competitiveness sense to the government in power, on the contrary, for Iraq taxation had a political realm in which it helps the undemocratic authorities to stay in power for long, such as the Baath regime for more than 30 years.

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[32] Nizar, Ahmad. (2013), "An economic study on Iraqi oil money between 1930-2010", *Sulaimaniyah Chamber of Commerce & Industry (SCCI)*, February 7, accessed on March 15, 2015, available at: http://www.sulcci.com/arabic/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=3&Jmare=3.

[33] Brautigam, D. A. (2008), "*Introduction: taxation and state building in developing countries",* in: D. A. Brautigam, O. H. Fjeldstad., &M. Moore (2008). "Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent", Cambridge: *Cambridge University Press*, pp. 1–32.

As Safa Fadhi (2013) highlighted that "in Iraq cooperate income tax is 15% and individual income tax does not really exist." [34] According to many Iraqis pay direct taxes does not make sense, since the government is rich and does not need to collect taxes, yet people jeopardize their well-being, since in Iraq people are not free to monitor and question government on how the budget is spent. An on-going debate for years had been about the Iraqi oil to make the country more competitive in economic terms. At this glance, oil as the infrastructure of Iraqi economy could not record competitiveness for Iraq. In fact, Competitiveness for Iraq as oil-based single economy is impossible; the security issue of the country makes it difficult for being a competitive state on its own. In the index of state weakness in the developing world report 2008, Iraq was ranked number 4 according to the scoring out of 10; overall Iraq got 4 scores among the 141 weak states.

(Figure.1.6)

INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
(20 INDICATORS)

The 141 weakest states and their indicator scores are presented below. A score of 0.00 represents the worst score in the sample, a score of 10.00 signifies the best.

Color Coding Key
Color coding and quintiles are based on full sample of 141 countries

BOTTOM QUINTILE
2ND QUINTILE
3RD QUINTILE
4TH QUINTILE
TOP QUINTILE

Country	Overall Ranking	ECONOMIC BASKET					POLITICAL BASKET					SECURITY BASKET					SOCIAL WELFARE BASKET				
		GNI per capita	GDP Growth	Income Inequality	Inflation	Regulatory Quality	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability	Control of Corruption	Freedom	Conflict Intensity	Gross Human Rights Abuses	Territory Affected by Conflict	Incidence of Coups	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Child Mortality	Access to Improved Water and Sanitation	Undernourishment	Primary School Completion	Life Expectancy
Somalia	1	0.12	--	--	--	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.72	2.37	0.92	10.00	0.37	2.07	1.21	--	--	2.90
Afghanistan	2	0.16	6.03	--	5.81	2.44	2.33	1.43	2.77	0.96	3.33	1.54	0.67	0.45	4.60	1.45	0.91	2.30	--	1.26	--
Congo, Dem. Rep.	3	0.03	4.26	--	5.83	2.91	1.68	2.31	1.88	1.09	2.50	1.06	0.46	1.87	5.10	1.39	2.80	2.48	0.14	2.11	2.06
Iraq	4	0.95	2.98	--	--	3.02	1.44	1.58	2.11	1.20	2.50	1.84	0.00	3.60	10.00	0.00	5.71	7.58	--	6.68	--

At the same time, The Fragile States Index as the annual ranking of 178 nations which is based on their levels of stability and the pressures, the countries encounter, Iraq is leveled as 13th in the high alter in 2014, while since 2005 Iraq has been among fragile states.

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[34] Safa, fadhil. (2013), "Iraq's low tax rates driving development or corruption?" *The Kurdistan Tribune*, August 10, accessed on March 15, available at: http://kurdistantribune.com/2013/iraqs-low-tax-rates-driving-development-or-corruption/.

(Figure.1.7)

Fragile States Index Top 10 Lists, 2005-2014								
	2005	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
1.	C. d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2.	Congo, D.R.	Congo, D.R.	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Congo, D.R.
3.	Sudan	C. d'Ivoire	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4.	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	Congo, D.R.	Chad
5.	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	Congo, D.R.	Congo, D.R.	Haiti	Zimbabwe
6.	S. Leone	Chad	C. d'Ivoire	Congo, D.R.	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan
7.	Chad	Somalia	Congo, D.R.	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti
8.	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	C. d'Ivoire	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	Yemen
9.	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq
10.	Haiti	Afghanistan	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	Pakistan	Pakistan	C. d'Ivoire	C.A.R.

Measuring the economic growth not even in Iraq, but in the region, according to "Gallup's global Economic Confidence Index stood at +11 in 2013, similar to the +12 measured in 2012."[35] The decline is sharp in the MENA region, and this is mostly related to the oil price fluctuation on one hand and regional security crisis on the other hand, which mostly affects economic growth. "Since 1990, there have been 21 "destabilizing" events that have occurred in the Middle East."[36] Another serious risk concern on economic growth in oil exporting countries, among them Iraq chiefly, is the oil price; the oil price fluctuation affects the Iraqi economic infrastructure negatively, due to heavy depending on the energy sector. It is mentioned by Bill Greiner (2014) that the OECD countries which are developed countries consumed 72% of world's oil production in 1992, whereas currently it has fallen to 49%, compare it to 51% consume for developing countries. Besides, the data show that the oil crisis does not affect US economy as it was before, since oil consumption declined from 21 million barrels per day in 2004, to 18.8 million bpd nowadays. And also, domestic production of American energy is increased from 5 Million bpd to 12.8 million barrels. Eventually, this means the affected economies will be oil economies and Iraq is the potential one, due to instability and civil war in the country. **(Figure.1.8)**

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[35] http://www.gallup.com/poll/174803/economic-confidence-index-declines-middle-east.aspx.
[36] Bill, Greiner. (2014), "Instability in the Middle East and its global impact", *HULT International Business School,* June 16th, accessed on March 18, available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/billgreiner/2015/03/12/nega-coups-and-the-implications-of-negative-interest-rates-on-the-global-economy.

Economic Confidence Worldwide, 2012 vs. 2013

Ranked from lowest to highest 2013 confidence

	2013	2012	Difference
World	11	12	-1
European Union	-36	-35	-1
Middle East and North Africa	-33	-17	-16
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	-9	10
Americas	1	5	-4
Former Soviet Union	3	10	-7
Asia	28	27	1

Includes 131 countries with studies conducted in 2012 and 2013
Analysis includes population weight

After the invasion it was expected that the economic growth will be faster than before in Iraq. Apparently, the Central Bank of Iraq believed that the GDP will grow 9.4% from 2012-2016. Besides, the World Bank stated that the GDP grows 12.6% in 2012, and 10.2% in 2013. Whereas, International Monetary Fund (IMF) has predicted 11.1% in 2012, and 13.5% in 2013. Additionally, the Iraqi Central Bank predicted GDP goes from roughly $170 billion in 2011 to $360 billion by 2015."[37] According to the mentioned data, it was predicted that the economic growth will be tremendous in Iraq. However, that was not what Iraq had in the real ground, Iraqi instability and civil war costs Iraq more than it is expected, besides the data was expected based on the oil price increase, while currently it was reversed. Iraq is not in the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, due to the violence and political instability in the country since 2014.[38]

1.5. Iraq as a Competitive State where it Stand Today

Historically, it seems that oil was a source of headache for the Iraqis, sorting out what matters to be a competitive state, is to have the main pillars of competitiveness in the state. Notably, analyzing what competitiveness means for the oil based economy is what the Arab writer Mohammed Munif in his book entitled "cities of Salt", Mudun al Milh,[39] this symbolic irony has different interpretations for different researchers. But, looking at Salt as a subsistent that can easily melt with water and a city of salt is fragile too in the connotation. Then, what a

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[37] Musings on Iraq, (2013). "Behind Iraqi's impressive GDP growth rate", *Iraq News, Politics, Economics, Society* May 14, accessed on March 20, 2015, available at: http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.hu/2013/05/behind-iraqs-impressive-gdp-growth-rate.html.
[38] http://www.heritage.org/index/country/iraq.

[39] Abdelrahman, Munif. (1987), "*Cities of Salt*", July 17, (Cities of Salt Trilogy, Vol 1), New York: Vintage.

rentier economy is in reality, it is like the "cities of salt" which gets harm from any direct or indirect economic pressure or risk, any market change, any international or regional political concerns.

Accordingly, the fundamental political and economic reforms in Iraq, which supposed to achieve meaningful progress were failed by the Iraqi government. It is to be mentioned that the power change, brought more devastation than construction and reforms. The country under Nuri Al-Maliki's power has turned into a bloody country since "the Maliki regime strongly favored itself and Arab Shi'ites over Arab Sunnis,"[40] the government did nothing to change the per-capita income, boosting economy, increasing job opportunities for Iraqis. What it can be said is widening the gap of inequality the same as what Saddam Hussein's regime did. In line with this "Maliki and his cabinet did not plan for development in economic sector, in removing barriers to stable investment and growth, they did not address education and health reforms, and petroleum sector was not managed well too"[41]

Basically, the competitiveness pillars do not exist for Iraq, the main question that could be asked here is, why the US and UN failed in developing Iraq to be a competitive state, like the most Western states. The poor performance of the Iraqi institutions and the public sector in post invasion era has shown that the invasion does not improve anything in Iraq. Indeed, as it is highlighted by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) "the success is directly related to the effectiveness of the organization, which is the effect of leadership and organizational culture."[42] Definitely, this is what is missing in the case of Iraqi institutional competitiveness. According to the Council of Ministers endorsed public administration (PAR) roadmap planning "2014-2018" the Iraqi government plans to have "A capable public sector that enables the government to perform its roles, manage its resources, and to deliver services to citizens efficiently and effectively to achieve sustainable development."[43] The figure explains the competitiveness pillars which none of them exist in Iraqi state context currently, or they are weak. **(Figure.1.9)**

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[40] Anthony,H.Cordesman. (2014), "Iraq; the economic and governance sides of crisis", *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* August 18, accessed on March 30, available at: http://csis.org/publication/iraq-economic-and-governance-sides-crisis.

[41] Ibid

[42] Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990), Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation. *Administrative science quarterly*, pp. 128-152.

[43] Quarterly e-newsletter, (2013), "Iraqi Public Sector Modernization Programme", .issued by *Higher Committee for Administration Reform,* No. 4, Dec.

Institutions
Concepts related to protection of property rights, efficiency and transparency of public administration, independence of the judiciary, physical security, business ethics and corporate governance
- Public institutions
- Private institutions

Infrastructure
Quality and availability of transport, electricity and communication infrastructures
- Transport infrastructure
- Electricity & telephony infrastructure

Macroeconomic environment
Fiscal and monetary indicators, savings rate and sovereign debt rating

Health & primary education
State of public health, quality and quantity of basic education
- Health
- Primary education

Innovation
Capacity for, and commitment to technological innovation

Higher education & training
Quality and quantity of higher education, and quality and availability of on-the-job training
- Quantity of education
- Quality of education
- On-the-job training

Business sophistication
Efficiency and sophistication of business processes in the country

Market size
Size of the domestic and export markets
- Domestic market size
- Foreign market size

Goods market efficiency
Factors that drive the intensity of domestic and foreign competition, and demand conditions
- Competition
- Quality of demand conditions

Technological readiness
Adoption of the technologies by individuals and businesses.
- Technological adoption
- ICT use

Financial market development
Efficiency, stability and trustworthiness of the financial and banking system
- Efficiency
- Trustworthiness and confidence

Labour market efficiency
Labour market efficiency and flexibility, meritocracy and gender parity in the workplace
- Flexibility
- Efficient use of talent

Concluding Remarks

Handicapped by the current crisis, the weakness of its infrastructure, lack of qualified human resource, and low level of the industrial development, besides of being not well integrated into the regional and global system. Iraq needs to begin to make significant institutional reforms, in particular by focusing on the role of the state towards its essential mission with the help of private sector in delivering the needs to the public. Moreover, promoting the developments by strengthening the role of civil society, and strengthening the economic policies for building strong economic infrastructure, this will be supportive for the Iraqi government in terms of job creation, decreasing poverty, and boosting the life-standard of the Iraqis. As well as, strengthening the rule of law for reducing corruption and bring equality to the public.

Recommendations

In the case of Iraq, the government is better to analysis the facts on certain points, like why the European Commission, USAID, UN, and many foreign missions that worked and funded Iraq for improving institutional strength, and human capacity building are not fruitful? For example "EC support to Iraq from 2003 to the end of 2008 amounted to €933.1 million in grants. This

includes reconstruction and humanitarian assistance."[44] Among the funded programs, are Health, Education, Good Governance, Rule of Law, Security and Political reforms, yet the Iraqi people have not enjoyed the basic services, and the country is at its peak of violence and corruption.

- The most pressing concerns, following the lack of competitiveness for Iraq as a rich country, are security concern and political chaos, which must be taken into account by the Iraqi government to support the growth of the Iraqi economy.

- The most important part of the Iraqi competitiveness is the infrastructure development (hardware) combined with public administration development (software), which will be the key to economic transformation to a more stable and healthier economy.

- A long term strategic planning is necessary in Iraq, for improving the role and involvement of the private sector, since the private sector often sets the standard of efficiency and benchmarking of quality and competitiveness.

- Iraq suffers from high levels of corruption, thus the infrastructure development should be operated on the principle of transparency and accountability with respect to public interest and social development objectives.

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IRAN'S NEW SOCIAL MEDIA-FRIENDLY APPROACH[1]

Mojtaba Barghandan[2]

Abstract

The Islamic Republic of Iran entered into a new era of public diplomacy following the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 presidential elections. Iran seeks both to revitalize its soft power tools and reach out to the international community through a more moderate, tolerant, and open dialogue policy. Digital diplomacy and social media have become increasingly important to this end. The author expounds on the new administration's social-media friendly approach to fulfilling its foreign policy goals, in addition to taking stock of the soft power initiatives undertaken by international actors and the possible obstacles for Iran in employing these same methods.

Key Terms: Public Diplomacy, Media Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy, Soft Power, Foreign Policy

Introduction

Through exploring the nature and role of concepts of "Soft Diplomacy, Media Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy" on Iran's foreign policy approaches and the way Iran applied these tools to fulfill its foreign policy goals, this article aims at giving a comparative argumentation together with descriptive and analytical discussion by contemplating the approaches adopted during 9th - 10th governments (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 's administrations) and a shift that international communities witnessed since 2013 which, in fact, made the world to refrain from misunderstanding and contextualizing Iran's foreign policy solely by" hard approaches ".

Iran's nuclear dossier is the core effective issue on transformation in Iran's approaches and policies since 2013.

The effect and role of digital diplomacy in general and in special context for Iran, is also discussed. In the concluding perspective section, new discourses initiated by the 11th administration discussed and it is concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran will insist that current approaches be upheld considering the crucial support given by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

as well as popular support continues because Iran is well aware that any inconsistency in this regard will once again provide opportunities for other actors', better said, opponents' public diplomacy in exploiting these inconsistencies and generating new fronts for attack against Iran's interests.

Iran's Utilization of its Soft Diplomacy: Historical – Political Background

Iranian civilization has always been a pivotal actor in global developments. Tracing back 2,500 years ago, for example, the Persian Empire invented *Chapar* (courier), the most developed communication system at that time.[3] Although *Chapar* may seem quite simple, Iran's emperors[4] expanded their control of and influence over different parts of the world using this system.[5]

As a country historically proven to be capable of applying soft diplomacy, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been under "cultural invasion" alongside economic and political sanctions of the West. The US has employed hard and soft power tools toward Iran, particularly since the administration of President George W. Bush, who approached Iran with what his administration called a "two clock strategy." That is, the US government directed its policies at fulfilling two coercive objectives: changing both Iran's behavior and its regime through instruments of hard and soft power. The change in behavior was geared at curbing Iran's nuclear program, which was described as "non-peaceful." Consequently, the US government tried to slow down and/or reverse this clock (i.e., change behavior) through economic and political pressure. At the same time, it tried to speed up the clock of regime change through instruments of soft power by employing some of the powerful radio channels such as Voice *of America* (*VOA*) *Persian*, which is a method that is still employed today.

In light of the White House's detrimental policy on Iran, traditional diplomacy tools employed by Iran have not been helpful. Iran began to believe that in order to win the diplomacy

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3 "Chapar Khaneh" or "Chapar-Khaneh" is a term in Persian, meaning the "house of courier" referring to the postal service used during the Achaemenid era. The system was created by Cyrus the Great the founder of the Persian Empire and later developed by Darius the Great. Xenophon, *The Cyropaedia: or, Institution of Cyrus, and the Hellenics, or Grecian history. (Literally translated from the Greek of Xenophon) TheClassics.us*, 12 September 2013.
4 Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire* (Eisenbrauns, 2002), pp. 62–64.
5 Herodotus, *Herodotus: The History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

War, it should resort to public diplomacy programs that attract, inform, persuade, and influence – that is, the necessity of public diplomacy became almost impossible to ignore.

To that effect, in 2013, after at least one decade of hard work on identifying its deficiencies and the country's need for infrastructural changes in soft diplomacy tools, Iran entered into a new era in terms of the use of its new public and digital diplomacy tools.

In the Digital Age of the 21st century, in which states have to compete in "net wars" and against "networks", the coming to power of President Rouhani and his 11th administration heralded a much-needed reinvigoration of Iran's public and digital diplomacy.[6] There was a recognition that continuing to practice diplomacy as usual without effective public diplomacy was like trying to run a car without an engine. Rouhani's administration realized that the Internet and social media should be at the forefront of efforts to craft an alternative narrative to long-propagated narratives on Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and also promote the much-maligned status of Iran.

The US, on the other hand, reached the same level of understanding of the necessity of transformation through its coercive and sanction-oriented policies on Iran to a negotiation and soft diplomacy-based policy beginning in 2013. As US President Barack Obama stated in an interview published in *Huffington Post*, "We have done the same thing over and over again and there hasn't been any change – [we] should try something different…"[7] President Obama has taken charge of "trying something different" with Cuba and Iran by initiating discrete and patient diplomatic approaches.[8]

A New Start: New Strategies, New Discourse

News production and information-processing techniques and strategies adopted by global media giants are a clear indication of huge efforts undertaken by countries to utilize media as leverage in protecting and consolidating the superiority of their ideologies; achieving their policy goals in economic, cultural, and political issues; and shaping public opinion to be in line with their interests. This trend is indicative of the role and influence of media on public opinion, and these

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6 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy," 5 November 2001. Pagels 1989; Castells 1996; Powell 1990.
7 William Luers and Thomas Pickering, "Cuba and Iran: A New Era for American Diplomacy?" *Huffington Post Blog Series* "*90 Miles: Rethinking the Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations*," 20 January 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-luers/cuba-and-iran-a-new-era-f_b_6508150.html
8 Luers and Pickering (2015).

strategies represent the most effective instrument in current world politics – the symbol of a new era providing grounds for diplomacy and a "must" for foreign policy.

Despite the national security-related closure of some press and publishing agencies in Iran during the post-2013 election and, further, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency, the current administration has adopted supportive measures toward the press. The Rouhani administration has provided support to strengthen the relevant infrastructures based on the necessities for promotion of its media diplomacy through the collaboration of its official news agency, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). Working together with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Press TV and some other media agencies has paved the ways for close interactions of media diplomacy and foreign policy, though such efforts are not yet completely constructive or comprehensive.

The common understanding in Iran has been that public diplomacy should be explained in the same frame as official diplomacy and state diplomacy. However, it seems that the responsible executive bodies in the country have so far made little attempt to distinguish between these core elements, which have left the field of public diplomacy in favor of the opponents.

The rhetoric used by Iranian officials during specific periods for the sake of defending the country's national security was harshly inverted and misinterpreted as the "warmongering nature of Iran." This not only put the nuclear negotiations at risk, but also provided opportunities for the West to use such language as leverage in making the dossier more security-oriented rather than peaceful, as well as making sanctions harsher. This approach has both provided legitimate grounds for public diplomacy of Iran's opponents and prevented the world-view and self-view of Iran from being well-settled and harmonized both internally and with the international community. Faced with this challenging misinterpretation, the 11th administration began its attempts to resolve it through new diplomacy tools based on maximum engagement, in contrast with previous administration, as well as employing a new rhetoric based on a "patience-oriented friendly approach" towards diplomacy.

In understanding this challenge, Iran had begun to implement new strategies since 2013 by determining its goals and setting a new agenda that included consideration of factors such as infrastructure improvements. Thus, the public diplomacy department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became active and involved. Furthermore, other related organs and entities became

more organized and collaborative through cooperation with the IRNA, IRIB, Press TV, and other relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations. Previously, the works and activities of these media organs proved relatively inconsequential in terms of cooperation that could lead to achieving a certain common goal. However, with the 2013 government, a professional public diplomacy approach was ushered in, which focused on the power of soft diplomacy to confront both propaganda and international pressures blocking Iran from fulfilling its foreign policy goals.

Iran wielded media-based strategies such as the distribution of books and pamphlets, production of motion pictures, and promotion of radio, television and Internet as well as other soft diplomacy tools such as cultural exchanges, negotiations, and an emphasis on cultural and civilizations values. This process has become more consistent and focused since 2013. In addition, Iran stepped forward to begin direct talks with other countries in an international diplomacy framework for its foreign policy initiatives.

Iran believes that strengthening the model prescribed by Islam regarding defending the legitimate rights of Muslims and rejecting the dominance policies of expansionists will make states play an active role and restore their rightful status in achieving an Islamic model of democracy, such as in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Bahrain, and, lately, Yemen. Unlike some regional countries which have either been meddling and/or interfering in the internal affairs of these war-torn countries, Iran has applied more reasonable soft power-oriented policies.

Golf diplomacy" is a notion currently being uttered by some mid-level officials in Iran, and is believed to be a magic move for public diplomacy and foreign policy goals. As patience is a common element of both golf and diplomacy, it seems that the new administration, in contrast to the previous era, has adopted a "patience-oriented diplomacy" backed by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

With its efforts, the current government has created a supranational psychological operation to either confront international media hegemony or to implement dynamic diplomacy in order to connect with and/or meet the will of public opinion. This approach helped the government, in one way, to neutralize psychological warfare employed by some main actors through diplomacy. In another way, this approach was used to convince the influential states, especially on issues like the legitimate and inalienable right of Iran to employ nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes that had placed it under constant pressure, including four decades of sanctions on accusations of so-called "non-peaceful use of nuclear technologies." This approach has emerged to be more tangible and effective with Iran's nuclear negotiations being handed over to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs under the new administration. Today, despite the politically challenging aspects of the Syrian crisis coupled with the beginning of Yemeni war, this approach still proves to be effective.

New Rhetoric and a Social Media-Friendly Approach

The foreign policy approach of Iran's pre-2013 administration seems to have made the gaps with the West more prominent and caused the securitization of the nuclear dossier. This trend was misused by some key international actors as a bargaining chip against Iran. Adding fuel to the fire, any attempts by Tehran at emphasizing the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities were ineffective in such a tense political atmosphere and gained no success in de-securitizing its peaceful nuclear activities or repairing its image. Given this falsely harsh and violent image of Iran based on rhetoric, the establishment or improvement of constructive ties and communication with the international community, as well as the promotion of exports and foreign investment became undoubtedly arduous. This is, in fact, a clear indicator of the significance of public diplomacy or people's diplomacy to promote a positive image of Iran in the international arena. To move Iran forward, there is an inevitable need to couple public diplomacy with digital diplomacy, which centers around the use of the Internet and new information technologies to help achieve diplomatic objectives, whether it be to promote Iran's international reputation or combat foreign media propaganda.

Given the challenges that Iran has been facing, recommendations to re-create a separate institution dedicated to public diplomacy, in addition to the relevant bodies established previously, have been taken seriously by President Rouhani since the beginning of his presidential campaign. His election strategies sought to coordinate the myriad of information operations being carried out along with particular emphasis on the use of the Internet and social media technologies charged with monitoring, analysis, exposure, and countering of adversary propaganda and disinformation activities on a sustained basis. In the course of Rouhani's campaign, Iran started to experience the real power of digital diplomacy.

The active involvement of Iran's diplomatic body, especially the great efforts by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's first "Digital Minister," increased the enthusiasm and hopes of the Iranian public towards the country's foreign policy. At the same time, Dr. Zarif's

highly sophisticated application of new social media in presenting a reasonable and rational image of the Iran, in fact, was an attempt at the de-securitization of Iran's peaceful nuclear activities.

From its rise to power in 2013, the current administration and its cabinet have concentrated on social media and social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This, in particular, indicates the vast capacity that helped Iran to recover its public diplomacy strength at home and beyond its borders. President Rouhani explained this in a tweet proclaiming: "All my efforts are for Iranians to benefit information from around the world, as this is their right."

President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif's embrace of social networking has helped cast the new administration in a moderate light while also distancing it from the manner of diplomacy of the 9th and 10th administrations under Ahmadinejad. For example, in a Twitter exchange with Nancy Pelosi's daughter, Zarif effectively declared that Holocaust denial was not Iran's national stance.[9] Another example is Zarif's Twitter response to a carpenter from Texas who challenged Zarif's tweet regarding the use of chemical weapons and militarism. When the carpenter asked: "Does that include nuking Israel," Zarif replied: "We do not have nukes, they do."[10]

Zarif's YouTube video titled "Iran's Message: There is a Way Forward" also contributed to efforts to gain support for the country during the nuclear negotiations. The nearly six-minute clip in English, released in November 2013 just before the interim nuclear agreement was signed, shows Zarif defending Tehran's nuclear program based on the principles of "dignity and respect."

Without access to such a message, Western journalists and interpreters would have had to translate and analyze the words of Iranian officials and could have conveyed it in their own frame. Social media has helped Iranian officials shape the narrative around their nuclear ambitions.

The relatively considerable shift in perceptions toward Iran since 2013, especially the perceptions in the US and Europe, could be due in part to the public relations campaign that is being conducted by Iran through both social media and public diplomacy initiatives. Rouhani's administration has used social media in an effort to garner international support and use it as a medium to convey its position to the outside world.

A Concluding Perspective: Looking Ahead

9 Javad Zarif's personal Twitter page, www.twitter.com @JZarif 9:54 AM – 5 September 2013.
10 Javad Zarif's personal Twitter page, www.twitter.com @JZarif 8:38 AM – 5 September 2013.

The most daunting hurdle for Iran's public diplomacy has been how to best use its soft diplomacy tools to reach out to the world, as well as harmonizing and reconciling inconsistencies between its foreign policy and public diplomacy. Embracing digital diplomacy has been key in these efforts.

It is clear that, since coming to the office President Rouhani has committed to changing the status of Iran in the international community. Iran, as part of a new statecraft initiative, has begun to use new media technologies to engage in "digital conversations" with the West and the East to better convey his message of peace and solidarity as the sole answer to the world problems.

The West's "whiz-kids" have taken to heart the notion that "it is not whose Army wins but whose story wins."[11] Rouhani's digital (Digi) diplomats, on the other hand, recognized digital diplomacy as a great chance to focus efforts on crafting a message that will appeal to stabilizing peace and security both for the region and Iran.

The way President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif used Twitter to wish Jews around the world a happy Rosh Hashanah in September 2013, commanded world attention and seemed to herald a new era of social media diplomacy and public exchange. This stunning exchange of direct Twitter diplomacy from Tehran represented a fundamental change for a nation that for years seemingly cared little about its capabilities in the application of soft diplomacy.

Iran has thus initiated a new discourse based on soft diplomacy, but is being challenged by the hawkish stances of some key international actors that have demonstrated a considerable shift from their soft diplomacy in recent years by maximizing the application of their massive hard diplomacy tools. The defeat of their hard power and aggressive stances, and the success of Iran's win-win diplomacy in recent months in the framework of nuclear negotiations with P5+1, proved to be a prime example of how diplomacy can resolve crises. This success has once more proved Iran's historical capability to take advantage of soft power diplomacy, either for interaction or for confronting the regional or international counteraction exhibited by others.

With the nuclear negotiations continuing, albeit with ups and downs, paying attention to some of the basic strategic goals and priorities of foreign policy – the de-securitization of its international position, recovering its global status, and the constructive and effective interaction with the international community – gives us the idea that Iran has optimistically embarked upon a long and

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11 Ellen Hallams, "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America's Soft Power,"*Journal of American Studies*, <u>Vol. 6, No. 1 (</u>Spring 2011).

challenging path of engagement with the world. What if, however, the ongoing nuclear talks were to bear an unexpected result or be prolonged? Would this affect Iran's newly restructured soft diplomacy and new friendly approaches towards social media? While it is ultimately the strength and seriousness of the will of the government and the nation – rather than the sheer volume of tweets, blogs, and texts – that would ultimately shape success for Iran, the entirety of Iran's domestic and international issues will influence the condition and future of its social media-friendly approaches to diplomacy.

Whatever the effects may be, Iran will insist that current approaches be upheld considering the crucial support given by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as well as popular support continues. Iran is well aware that any inconsistency in this regard will once again provide opportunities for other actors', better said, opponents' public diplomacy in exploiting these inconsistencies and generating new fronts for attack against Iran's interests.

TURKEY – EURASIA RELATIONS ON THE FIELD OF ENERGY

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Abstract

This article mentions that, the relations between Turkey and Eurasia Region on the field of energy. Turkey has important location in terms of strategically and also this location provides transit energy corridor from Eurasia to Europe. For this reason Turkey always forms a good alternative route in order to passing energy sources that have Eurasian roots. At this point the existence of Russian Federation is undeniable in Central Asia and Caucasus so Turkey sometimes is a rivalry but it sometimes is an alternative route according to Russia and the other Eurasian countries pay attention Turkey's energy corridor because both its economy and decreasing dependence from Russian ways. At this point this paper reach a conclusion that Turkey should to use its alternatives in a able manner in own foreign policy by this way Turkey able to provide a diversification to its energy dependence and Turkey's economy might benefit from Turkey – Eurasia relations.

Key Words: Turkey, Eurasia, Energy, Oil, Natural Gas, Pipeline

Introduction

This paper will explain that Turkey – Eurasia relations on the field of energy because Turkey has important location in terms of energy transition corridor therefore Turkey as like a bridge between Eurasia and Europe. The main research questions of this paper are; why Turkey is a good alternative pipeline route and why Eurasia region is important to Turkey. These questions were chosen because these questions give us the answers about how should be Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia region. At this point when we look at the Turkish foreign policy, Turkey pursues a multidimensional approach to achieve its goal of becoming an energy hub. Therefore, once again the link between energy and foreign policy can be traced since, in line with Foreign Minister Davutoglu's 'zero conflicts with neighbours foreign policy Turkey maintains all possible transport options for energy resources open, ranging from the Caspian Basin region to the Middle East and

Russia.[1]Under this circumstances first of all the conceptual framework on will be Turkey's location and its advantages and disadvantages in the context of energy foreign policy and Turkey's strategic importance. Afterwards this paper will be explaining the relations in Eurasia region with state by state and this paper will be mention that main important pipelines which are passing over Turkey.

1. Strategic Importance of Turkey on the Field of Energy

Turkey has most important location in terms of a transit energy corridor because, Turkey has Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits and they provide a transition corridor from Asia to Europe. On the other hand, Turkey's Black Sea maritime region carries another strategic importance in the way of Black Sea is energy transit corridor for Europe. Under this circumstances Turkey is like a natural bridge between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe, so Turkey is good alternative route for transferring the energy sources from Eurasia to Europe. When we look at the main pipeline routes between Eurasian regions especially Russia and Europe, there were a lot of problems and conflicts. For example, Russia – Ukraine gas crisis which Russia claimed that Ukraine sometimes steals gas from Russia via pipeline routes in own territory by this way Russia cut the going gas to Ukraine therefore all the European countries affected negatively for this reason. In this respect Russia do not want to send its natural gas over Ukraine so, Turkey become more preferable in terms of energy security according to Russia. Besides, Caucasian region is another significant area in Eurasia that has richest energy reserves and these reserves could be suffice to European energy needs in addition to this Europe do not want to depended to Russia in terms of energy needs therefore Turkey is the good alternative for passing Caucasian energy reserves to Europe as well as economically and physically. Because building of pipeline is very expensive for this reason short ways provides an alternative to decrease the costs so Turkey has the most suitable conditions therefore Turkey is the neighbor both Caucasia and Europe. On the other hand Turkey's physical conditions is more appropriate especially in North in other words Black Sea region because pipelines have to build over the ground so if a problem or explosion could happen, the urgent intervention provide by the best way, in this respect Turkey's Black Sea maritime is secure as well as mountainous zone and its distance to accommodation unit and there is not a existence of terror organization in this region. To sum up Turkey always continue a good way for Eurasian energy reserves in terms of economically, physically and security.

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[1] Krauer Ksenia – Pacheco, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Turkey as a Transit Country and Energy Hub: The Link to Its Foreign Policy Aims,No:118, December 2011.

When we look at the numerical results; 73% of world's proven oil and 72% of the world's proven gas reserves are located in Turkey's neighborhood, which includes the Russian Federation, the Caspian and the Middle Eastern countries as suppliers. As a result, Turkey has emerged as an energy transit country, yet with further aspirations to become an energy hub, and even an energy center.[2] Besides, Eurasia Region has strategic importance last 20 years in terms of natural energy sources. Especially when we turn to history, Central Asian energy reserves always protect their importance and big powers wanted to control these sources, firstly United Kingdom and Soviet Union has a rivalry between each other so, this conflict called "Great Game". But now; USA, Russian Federation and European Union and sometimes China want to control these sources as a result of this, the name of conflict was changed new name called "New Great Game". In this context, Russia is an important producer of the world, especially in producing natural gas Russian Federation is the first on list. On the other hand Russian Federation has a control on pipelines, so Russian Federation is an effective state for EU countries. (EU provides %55 natural gas from Russian Federation.) [3]Especially, with the starting the presidency of Vladimir Putin Russian Federation foreign policy changed and economy focused o energy foreign policies. However this situation was created a big dependency on its national budget. For this reason three main title come forward on Russian Federation's foreign policies.

1. Russian Federation wanted to protect their monopoly on Central Asia and Russian Federation wanted to prevent to opening new alternative pipelines which are not under the controlled of Russian Federation.
2. By-pass the transit-states and built new pipelines for EU countries.
3. Russian Federation wanted to purchase European transportation system by Gas-Prom by this way the alternative projects could be prevented.[4]

Under this context, Russia is most important and dominant actor in Eurasia Region and the existence of Russia cannot refuse in this region and the international area.

2. Central Asia and Turkey

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[2] Bilgin, Mert, Bahcesehir University, Turkey's Energy Strategy: What Differences Does It Make to Become an Energy Transit Corridor, Hub or Center? UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 23, May, 2010.

[3] Kantörün Ufuk, Bilgesam Strategic Research Center Regional Energy Policy of Russia, April 2010, http://www.bilgesam.org/tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=652:rusyann-boelgesel-enerji-politikalar&catid=131:enerji&Itemid=146 .
[4] Ibid.

Now we will examine the other states in Eurasia Region and its relations with Turkey. These states generally have to stay under the control of Russia Federation, but some of them are working create new policies for national dependency and develop their economies.

2.1 Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a landlocked state which borders near the Russian Federation, China, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan declared that, our foreign policy would be a multilateral foreign policy because of develop and increase strategic, economic and diplomatic relations. Actually this policy is very logical because Russian Federation and China are the neighbors of Kazakhstan and both states are the most important actors in international system so a unilateral policy could not reach a successful policy results in terms of Kazakhstan. At this point, Turkey is the first state which recognized to Kazakhstan, besides the relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan has developed level because of our cultural ties. Under this framework Turkey should improve relations with Kazakhstan, because Kazakhstan wants to use its whole advantages in terms of energy sources. But in this respect big powers also could want to control these energy resources so Turkey should provide balance between interest of major powers and its national interests. However, Kazakhstan locates in Caspian Region so it oil reserves more qualified and petroleum industry forms 30 % of its GDP.

Kazakhstan's most important oil fields are; Tengiz, Uzen, Karachanak and Kashagan and they are locating in Caspian. But, Russian Federation affected negatively to the export of Kazakhstan because Russian Federation did not want to export oil without going through the Russian oil pipelines. Because Central Asia is a landlocked area but on the other hand, this region isolated from its close neighbors outside former Soviet Space, so Kazakhstan have to use former Soviet route for exports its oil. However, Kazakhstan has natural gas reserves, but this situation is also still valid for natural gas export. Under this circumstances Turkey should be play a mediator role between Russia and Kazakhstan and by this way Turkey might provide gain and important status for its national interest and energy needs.

2.2 Turkmenistan

Turkey is a first state which recognized to independence of Turkmenistan. President Niyazov declared that; multilateral approaches with bilateral relation articulated thought the

concept of "Positive Neutrality".[5] At this point Turkey always support to Turkmenistan's neutrality status. Turkmenistan is also established cooperate with Russia because the existence and effect of Russia is still continuing against to this state. Turkmenistan has the biggest natural gas fields, so many states want to use Turkmen natural gas without Russian ways. But the current pipelines routes locate in Russian territory since USSR period. However the export of natural gas provides an increase on Turkmenistan's GDP.

TANAP (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project) is also important at this point because by this project Turkmen gas could be transfer from Turkmenistan to Europe and pipeline route will pass over the Turkey. In this respect this situation is significant for Turkey's energy needs and its strategic importance. Building of TANAP was started in 2013, it will end until 2015, and export capacity of TANAP will be 30 bcm3 per year.

2.3 Uzbekistan

Turkey is the first recognizing state to Uzbekistan in 1991. The diplomatic relations were started in 1992 and it still continues. Since 1991 the super-presidential regime of Islam Kerimov in Uzbekistan has successfully defended from outside powers like Russian Federation, China and USA.

Since 2002, Uzbekistan's aim is increase efficiency on use of energy and energy saving. Besides with the beginning of Putin's presidency period in Russia, Uzbekistan established cooperation with Russian Federation and also Uzbekistan signed supply natural gas agreement for 10 years with Russia in 2002. After that period Gazprom started some research in Uzbekistan's territory for finding natural energy sources. This point is important because Uzbekistan has relations with China so, Russia do not want to Uzbek-China relations by this way Russia always make investments in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is important for Russian Federation according to him, the region of Uzbekistan is largest and most strategically located state and it is bordering of all four of Central Asian states. In this respect Turkey should be continue and increase its relationship level with Uzbekistan.

3. South Caucasus and Turkey

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[5] Varol Tuğçe, 21st Century Turkey Institute, Head of Energy Security, International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Importance of TANAP in Competition Between Russia and Central Asia, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2013, pp.352-359, www.econjournals.com.

Caucasus, especially South Caucasus is another strategic and important region in Eurasia and South Caucasus state are the neighbor with Turkey, so they have strategic importance for foreign policy of Turkey.

3.1 Georgia

Georgia was the first former Soviet Republic state to leave Soviet Union, after that Turkey recognized to its independence.

The geographic proximity of Georgia to the Black Sea region, the Caspian and Central Asia makes this transit country an important player in relation to the current and future energy exports from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and possibly Uzbekistan.[6] By this way western energy companies want to by – pass to Russia for new pipelines routes. Many scholars said that, that is the main reason of to realize Rose Revolution in Georgia, because with this revolution western powers especially European Union and NATO would expected, Russia – Georgia relations could be weaker as a result of new regime. In opposite to this now Russia an Georgia is in cooperate for a lot of new energy pipeline projects and also new negotiations is still continue. At this point Turkey should join these negotiations process. Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum pipelines is still protect their importance, but new projects for example Shah-Deniz Gas to be transported by the South Caucasus pipeline so, Turkey should create diversifications for its energy interest. In this respect new energy routes could be decrease Turkey's energy dependence to Russian Federation. When we look at the IEA (International Energy Agency) results, Turkey depended to Russian gas the rate of 65 %. Because, during the Georgian – Russian crisis when the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline was frozen, so Azerbaijan had to diverted its oil via Russia's Novorrossiisk pipeline route. As it appears this situation showed us, if Russia wants to anything, it would be cut of energy supplies to achieve its goals. Under this circumstances Turkey should continue the relationship with Georgia for own energy interests.

3.2 Azerbaijan

When we look at the history, Azerbaijan is always famous about its energy sources in 1806 Azerbaijan began oil production even the first export went by river, road and railways to the

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[6] Yenikeyeff Midkhatovich Shamil, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, The Georgia-Russia standoff and the future of Caspian and Central Asian energy supplies, August 2008, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Aug2008-GeorgiaRussiastandoff-ShamilYenikeyeff.pdf.

Russian cities. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkey is the first state that recognize to Soviet Union, Turkey is the first state that recognize to independence of Azerbaijan.[7] At this period Elçibey who was the founder leader of Azerbaijan refused to participating Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and also Russia immediately cut the access road of oil. Thereupon in 1992 Azerbaijan and TR entered into negotiation for building of Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan pipeline project, because Azerbaijan wanted to develop its oil and gas sector without Russia for this reason Turkey could be a good alternative route for Azerbaijan in terms of economic, security and physically. Because if its oil and gas could be reach Turkey, this energy sources would be reach to European market by easily way. In this process European Countries and USA establish close relations and enter into cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan so they wanted also benefit from new energy sources without Russian Federation because European Countries had to depend to Russian energy sources.

Furthermore Nowadays Shah Deniz Project started to gain important, this project is important for Turkey because if this project will be realize, Turkey would be a transition state, for passing. Shah Deniz Project was started in 2007 and the buildings will be finish between until 2014-2016. In opposite to this Russian Federation offered a new project. It's called Shah Deniz II, by this project there would be create new alternative route that passing from Russian way. At the end of the negotiation process Azerbaijan deal with Russian Federation about Shah Deniz II. When we look at the totally, Russian Federation always develop new strategies for its national interest at this point Turkey was by passed to umpteen times by Russian Federation, so under this circumstances Turkey should create new strategies with using its strategic importance for own national and economic interest. Besides the dealing between Azerbaijan-Russian Federation, in doing so, Azerbaijan not only weakens Turkey's position as a major transit state for delivering Azerbaijani and Central Asia gas to Europe but also undermines EU and USA interest in reducing Europe's dependence on Russia gas.8

3.3 Armenia

Armenia is a small country in Caucasia and it have landlocked on west of Georgia. Since 1989, Azerbaijan has closed railways and pipelines traversing its territory to Armenia and also

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[7] The Rebuplic Of Turkey Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Report, Turkey – Azerbaijan Relations, www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-siyasi-iliskiler.tr.mfa.
[8] Op. Cit.(Varol Tuğçe, 2013), pp.352-359.

Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1993. These obstructions have had a negative impact on Armenian economy since it is heavily dependent on energy and raw materials.[9] For this reason there were only two options to Armenia, the first one is raw material needs could be provided from Iran and secondly, energy sources needs could be provided from Russian Federation by the way of import.

The energy foreign relations of Armenia is still continue with Russian Federation and Russia made a lot of agreement with Armenia about pipeline routes and also Iran signed with some agreements with Armenia. These situations were not benefit from Turkey, because if mutual relation would be good, Turkey could be joining these agreements as a transition country.

Under these circumstances, we turn back Turkey's position and examine some pipelines that are passing thought to Turkey, because all these situations effected to Turkey sometimes positively but sometimes negatively.

4. Gas Pipelines of Turkey from Eurasia

4.1 Blue Stream Pipeline

In 1996 Russia and Turkey started to negotiation additional natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea, and the in 1997 the agreement of Blue Stream Project was signed by mutually. After the construction period the gas flow from Russian Federation started in 2003 and this pipeline route still continue to protect its strategic importance, so in terms of Turkey Blue Stream is also significant route for Turkey's energy needs and Turkey's economy. According to official statistic, the capacity of pipeline is 18 bcm₃, so this situation created an important energy dependency on Turkey against Russian Federation.

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[9] Nichol Jim & Kim Julie, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, December 2001, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB95024.pdf .

Table 4.1: Turkey as an East – West Energy Corridor, East – West Energy Terminal.[10]

4.2 Nabucco Gas Pipeline

Many of European Countries wanted an alternative route so, these western countries supported to Turkey about new alternative route and this route's energy sources should be provide from Caspian Region without Russian Federation. At this point we can see Turkey's geopolitical importance because Caspian energy sources could be come without Russian Federation under Turkey's territory to Europe. But Russian Federation did not please due to this situation. Thereupon Russian Federation started the process of South Stream Project and at the end of this period South Stream Pipeline was realized and it carries natural gas to Europe from Russian Federation, for this reason Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project did not realized, so Turkey lost this game in the international arena. Now, TANAP is most important alternative route instead of Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project.

4.3 Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline Project is planned to carry oil between Black Sea Mediterranean in Turkey. This pipeline project's construction is still continue and main goal of this projects is decreasing the Bosporus's traffic and by this way Samsun port could be more important in terms

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[10] http://www.eia.gov/cabs/Turkey/NaturalGas.html

of strategy. With this project Turkey could provide benefit to its national interest, so Turkey's energy dependency from Russia might be passing more advantages conditions. Under this circumstances the status this project will continue an unresolved way because if Samsun – Ceyhan

Oil Pipeline project could be realized, Turkey can be export to Middle Eastern Region without dependency of Russia. It furthermore serves the objective of transforming Turkey into an energy hub, by transporting Caspian and Russian oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea and thus providing the opportunity to re-export this hydrocarbon to the world markets.[11]


Table 4.2: Samsun - Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Projects and potential export routes to Middle East.[12]

4.4 Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTS) Oil Pipeline and Baku – Tbilisi - Erzurum (BTE) Gas Pipeline

Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum pipelines designed for European energy needs firstly with BTC oil pipeline Caspian oil sources could flow under Turkey to Europe without Russian effect. At this context, US supported to this project against Russian Federation. Turkey as well as the Caucasian states, Azerbaijan and Georgia, shared this interest and therefore participated in the project. Turkey moreover supported this pipeline because it by passed the transportation of oil through the Bosporus Strait. In this respect, Kramer assures that Ankara

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[11] Op. Cit. (Krauer Ksenia – Pacheco, 2011), p.38
[12] https://iakal.wordpress.com/2014/09/13/the-israel-lebanon-war-of-2006-and-the-ceyhan-haifa-pipeline/

played the card of Turkish straits to promote this pipeline against the increase in the traffic of oil tankers from the Russian part of Novorossiisk from Georgia's port of Supsa.[13]

Eventually, Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline provides energy diversification for Europe and it is important in terms of transportation at Caspian energy sources.

Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline transported natural gas from Baku to Georgia and then to Turkey in Erzurum. The aim of Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline is to transport natural gas to European Union and Turkey.

Besides Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan gas pipeline occurred some problems during the period of NATO operation in Georgia because Turkey stayed between NATO and Russian Federation, therefore during the operation process some pipelines passing was cut, this situation create an alarm period in Turkey, so Turkey protested to NATO operation. The main reasons of Turkey were, protect Montreux Agreement and Turkey depended to Russia in terms of energy that at the same period General Staff of Russian Federation stated that, if the ship of NATO could be pass in Bosporus, Russian Federation would reject Montreux Agreement. For this reason Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted to play a mediator role between NATO and Russian Federation, because Turkey did not want to run a risk in the way of its energy dependency from Russian Federation. As a result of this Turkey's energy relations are continuing in a successful way with Azerbaijan and also effect of Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipelines occurred new advantages. For example; Turkey-Azerbaijan signed new contracts on Shah Deniz Gas Project. Nevertheless, once this field is operational, it will have a projected production of 18.4 to 22.4 million tons of oil per year in phase 1, with peak production of 74.7 million tons of oil per year in phase 2, planned for 2019.[14]

5. Tanap and Legal Status of Caspian Sea and its Effects to Turkey

The legal status of Caspian Sea does not still reach a resolution. Because of this the new alternative ways should be create in this respect, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed TANAP project mutually. With this project could supply the gas needs of Turkey and Europe. But there are some

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[13] Ibid., p.32.
[14] Ibid., p.32.

problems between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, because both States depend to energy in terms of their economy. In this respect there is not a legal status of Caspian Sea since the beginning of their independence for this reason. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan sometimes disagree with each other. When are look at the Caspian's Status, since the collapse of Soviet Union, new states create in this region. In this period many western companies started to get interested to Caspian region. Before the collapse of USSR only Iran and Soviet Union has the share of Caspian but then Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan occurred that are the littoral states of Caspian Sea after the break – up of the Soviet Union so Caspian Sea's share holder increased very well, this situation caused to starting to problem about sharing of Caspian energy sources. Beside USA and Chine wanted to take energy pie with their energy companies, in this manner "new great game" shaped considerately.[15] Nowadays, Caspian Sea's legal status do not reach a certain resolution, but some littoral states made some temporary agreement mutually and these agreement based on a median line approach, Russia signed agreements with Kazakhstan in 1998 and then with Azerbaijan in 2001 and with both again in May 2003. But Iran still continue to reject about it share, because according to Iran, its energy pie should be more than the other littoral states, in fact Iran wants to have share like in the period of USSR. Besides when we look at the median-line approach's results:

The share of like this; Azerbaijan – 21 %, Iran – 13.6 %, Kazakhstan – 28.4 %, Russian Federation – 19 % and Turkmenistan – 18%.

Table 5.1: TANAP[16]

Under this circumstances Iran is the biggest loser and Kazakhstan could has biggest share of Caspian because of their geographic advantages and disadvantages. To sum up the lack of consensus on this matter sees like, birth new significant tensions between the littoral states, and

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[15] Varol Tuğçe, 21st Century Turkey Institute, Head of Energy Security, Türkiye Türkmen Gazını Ancak Uzaydan Alabilir, September 2012,http://www.21yyte.org/tr/arastirma/enerji-ve-enerji-guvenligi-arastirmalari-merkezi/2012/09/24/6741/turkiye-turkmen-gazini-ancak-uzaydan-alabilir
[16] http://www.tanap.com/

this situation might be create some dispute over the pipeline routes, so Turkey effected this disagreement directly. When we look at the last 20 years, the Economy of took a lot of foreign investment with energy export by this way the economy of Azerbaijan decreased high level. At this time, Turkey declared that, we want to carry to Gas of Turkmen via TANAP, in opposite to the Azerbaijan side argued that this project is impossible. Because if Turkey wants to realize TANAP, the status problem of Caspian Sea would have to reach a solution. So that, if Caspian Sea problem reach a solution, Azerbaijan could lose their charm. On the other TANAP project has a potential of big rivalry to Russian Federation, so Russian Federation did not want to this project.[17] Besides Anatolian Transit Gas Pipeline Project has another important, this pipeline project will represent a serious challenge to the Nabucco pipeline project since it will cross Turkey from east to west (as the Nabucco route does), so the Nabucco project would lose all support.[18]

Conclusion

This article focused on foreign energy relations of Turkey with Eurasia region. This analysis will be provides how Turkey shaped its relation for own energy needs because Turkey want to be an energy hub therefore Turkey should provide diversification in terms of energy. At this point, Caspian Region has big energy sources, after the collapse of USSR, the western companies interested in Caspian energy sources especially Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. When we look at the natural energy sources of Turkey, Turkey has not enough natural sources and Turkey did not implement a search and managed techniques on their natural sources so, Turkey depended to foreign Energy.[19] By this way Turkey is a big energy corridor for Europe, so if Turkey use this status rightly way, Turkey would provide gain from Central Asia (Caspian) Region and also again When we look at the distribution of energy sources on the world, some places has scarce energy but sources but some places has big sources especially in Middle-East Region and Central Asia Region and Russian territories. (Eurasia Region), so Turkey's position is like an energy corridor so Turkey effect to all conflicts, in this respect Turkey should make cooperation with energy producer countries especially Russia, because Turkey depended to foreign energy.

Under these circumstances, Central Asia region and its energy reserves always continue to protect its importance from the history, by this way big powers had continue want to control these region and sources so, Turkey geopolitical position is important at this point and all these pipelines and new projects would create both negative and positive impacts on Turkey. In this manner

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[17]Op. Cit.(Varol Tuğçe, 2013)., pp. 298 – 313.
[18] Op. Cit.(Ksenia Krauer-Pacheco,2011), p.37.
[19] Pamir Necdet, Turkey Energy Symposium Paper, Eurasian Pipelines Energy Security and Turkey, 2001.

disadvantages and advantages are equal in terms of Turkey; in short Turkey's foreign policy should shape under this framework.

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Emotional Intelligence and its Effects on Leadership

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Abstract

The research which titled (Effects of Emotional Intelligence on Leadership behavior) aims to identifying the effect of the emotional intelligence on the foundation universities leaders (academic and executive staff) behavior and how it shapes their ability to lead and influence their teams to achieve organizational objectives and their ability to mobilize efforts of staff. It aims at identifying the different variables and competencies needed for effective leadership. This research adapted the Traits emotional intelligence model of Petrides with its four components well-being, self-control, empathy, and sociability and their effects on the leadership style as defined by the full range leadership theory. The researcher adapted a descriptive analytical approach which depends on data collection, analysis using SPSS and interpretation of the results to determine the hypothesized relationships. An internationally accepted measurement tools were adapted, translated, and modified to suit the purpose of the study. A significantly negative relationship was also proved to exist between emotional intelligence and laissez faire leadership style. The results also proved that there are no significant differences among respondents attributed to the personal and professional traits of gender, age, academic qualifications, and years of experience, grade and supervisory capacity. The research has presented some recommendations concerning the application of emotional intelligence at the workplace and some other recommendations for future research.

Keyword: leadership, emotional, intelligence, behavior

Introduction:

Studies on emotional intelligence are not free from criticism. Researchers are debating over its models, measurement tools, and pedagogy. However this controversial debate has motivated there searchers to study the construct in more details. This controversy gives contrasting views about the study of construct of emotional intelligence. Some are of the view that it is a "myth".

While are of the view that study of emotional intelligence is scientific in nature same like the controversies about the study of Emotional intelligence, its relationship with leadership success has also been a subject of debate among researchers. For researchers and practitioners it is important to know about the nature of leadership, the ways leaders make decisions and role of emotions in decision making. She advised to study emotional intelligence and leadership relation in more depth. Similarly for better understanding of the concept of emotional intelligence, suggested to study its role in leadership. Lebanet.al., are of the view that success of a project depends on the emotional intelligence ability of the leader But contrary to it, Brown et al., found no significant relationship between leadership success and emotional intelligence ability of the leaders. This study is aimed at investigating the previous literature that does emotional intelligence really affect leadership success or it is a buzzword as claimed by Zeidner et.al.

This will help HR practioners in career development decisions which can improve the performance of the employees as well as of the organizations. It will also be helpful for future researchers to empirically test these relations.

Emotional Intelligence

Has been a subject of debate since long. For better understanding of the concept of emotional intelligence, in Antonakis, suggested to study its role in leadership. Goleman is of the view that to be the most successful and effective leader one must be Emotionally Intelligent along with strong IQ level and analytical ability. He identified five components of Emotional Intelligence which are self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy and social skills. Alsoit was Goleman's child brain that came with the idea of Emotional Intelligence. In the words of Salovey and Mayer "Emotional Intelligence is the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to

discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's own thinking and actions". According to them major utilizations of emotional intelligence include "flexible planning, creative thinking, and mood redirected attention and motivating emotions". In George, identified four aspects of emotional intelligence which can affect the effectiveness of leadership. These are the appraisal and expression of emotion, the use of emotion to enhance cognitive processes and decision making, knowledge about emotions and management of emotions (p. 189). Carmeli suggested to empirically test the impact of Emotional Intelligence on leadership success. Gardner et. al., found that success of leadership largely depends on emotional intelligence of the leader. Downey et.al. asserted that major reason for the success of managers was their level of emotional intelligence. Further to this Higgs et. al., found that leadership potential depends upon emotional intelligence. Similarly Transformational leadership was associated emotional intelligence. Also Palmer et.al. identified Emotional Intelligence as an important in dictator of effective leadership. And effectiveness of leadership was found to be higher due to higher level of Emotional Intelligence. Similar to this Brown et.al. are of the view that EI influences the leadership success and ultimately the organizational outcomes. Sivanathan et.al. found that perception of the followers about the effectiveness of a leader was his/her emotional intelligence. Humphrey, is of the view that emotionally intelligent leaders were found as good performer at work. As discussed earlier that Goleman in identified five components of emotional intelligence, let us see the relationship between leadership effectiveness and each component of emotional intelligence.

Self-Regulation & Leadership Effectiveness:

An emotionally intelligent person is always monitoring his/her actions and also the acts of others according to the norms and values of the organizations, so that he/she could get better outcomes. Salovey et.al. Are of the view that regulating own-self leads to get desired results from subordinates. Later Tsui & Ashford found that one of the major reasons of leaders' effectiveness was self-regulation. Earlier in 1991 both of them found that self-regulation through feed-back was positively related to effectiveness of the managers. Sosik et.al. Found a positive relation between self-regulation and leadership success. So it can be proposed from the support of previous findings that a leader who is self-regulated can be an effective leader at work.

Self-Awareness & Leadership Effectiveness:

Self-awareness is one of the components of emotional intelligence and found that it has a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of a leader. Further to this Fleenor et.al. Found that people who were well aware of their abilities were found more effective as compared to those who were unaware about themselves. Then McCarthy et. al., found self-awareness as a reason for effectiveness of a leader. Later Moshavi et.al. found that a person who is more aware of his/her self can get better results from the followers. Prati et. al., studied that emotionally intelligent leaders always remain in search of feedback from their followers to mend their behaviors accordingly to get the support of their followers. Further to this Fletcher et.al. Suggested that performance of a leader depends on his/her self-awareness and both are positively linked. Sosik et.al. Concluded that relationship between emotional intelligence and performance of a leader depend on the level of self-awareness, the more the leader is self-aware, and the more strong relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness is. Hence it can be said that a manager/leader that is aware of his/her strengths and weaknesses can tackle the situation at work accordingly and can be an effective leader.

Motivation & Leadership Effectiveness:

The passion to achieve the objectives i.e. motivation and its appropriate use is one of the component of emotional intelligence. Motivation and leadership were positively related to each other. Barbuto, found a positive relationship between motivation level and effectiveness of a leader. It has a positive and significant impact on the success of a leader as found in. Earlier, Prati et. al., found that an emotionally intelligent leader has the ability to boost the morale of the employees by motivating them and can get the work done more effectively. Choi, J. is of the view that a leader who is able to understand the emotions of his followers has the passion to work with more zeal and can effectively persuade the followers to produce the desired results. Similarly Iordanoglou found that an ambitious and motivated leader not only can produce better outcomes but also motivates his/her subordinated. Recently Gilley et. al., found that a talented and effective leader has the ability to motivate his/her followers to achieve specific desired goals.

So it is concluded in the support of previous literature that an emotionally intelligent leader is motivated, motivate his/her followers and can get the desired results.

Empathy and Leadership Effectiveness:

Goleman, defined empathy as, "The ability to understand the emotional make-up of other people". It is proposed that a leader who is well aware of the emotions of followers is an effective leader as George, is of the view that effectiveness of a leader depends on his empathetic ability i.e. how he/she treats people according to their emotions. Wolf et. al., concluded that empathy a component of emotional intelligence has positive impact on the success of a leader. Skinner et.al., concluded that empathic concern makes an organizational leader effective. Choi, J. is of the view that empathetic ability of a leader influences the behavior of the employees makes them committed to the organization. Almost same results were found by Butler et. al. However Gunther et. al., found a weak positive relationship between empathy and success of a leader. Kellett et. al., are of the view that to influence the followers, leaders get help from empathy. Later in Kellett et. al., found the same results.

So from the above evidences from the previous literature, it can be said that empathy, a component of emotional intelligent can positively influence the success of leadership.

Social Skills & Leadership Effectiveness:

Social networking and strong interpersonal and intrapersonal skills make a person successful in the today's organizational environment. Riggior et.al., have defined social skills as, "Social expressiveness is ability to communicate verbally and skill in engaging others in social interaction". They are also of the view that social skills and effectiveness of leadership are significantly and positively related with each other. Pratch et.al., find that leaders with an ability to express themselves make relationships with others were found more effective in the organizations irrespective of the gender. Prati et. al., are of the view that an emotionally intelligent leader develops social networks and builds relations with others to influence them and hence can produce desired results effectively. Similarly Butler et. al., are of the view that besides

empathy, while studying the relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness, another important component of emotional intelligence is social skill. They said that leadership success is strongly associated social skills of a leader. Cummings et. al. (2008) found that extended social networking shows the effectiveness of a leader.

Research Methodology:

This section relates to methodology that was used in the research, it's explains the strategy followed in the analysis of the effects caused by emotional intelligence on Leadership Behavior and in foundation universities in Istanbul. This section explains the nature of the research community and the response rate. This includes Research Design., Sources of the data, and the population of Research, the Pilot study, the degree of Validity, and The reliability of the questionnaire and Statistical tests used.

Based on Petrides and Furnham 2003 emotional intelligence traits model composed of 4 EI dimensions which defined as the following:

1- **Well-Being.**
2- **Self-Control.**
3- **Emotionality.**
4- **Sociability.**

So the researcher adapted this model to explain and dissolve the emotional intelligence.

In the part of Leadership, the researcher defined the three styles of Leadership, these three styles of leadership styles was based on the recognition of Burns theory of leadership in 1978, and then the researcher designed the questionnaire of the thesis based on these variables, the styles of Leadership was as the following:

1- **Transformational Leadership.**
2- **Transactional Leadership.**
3- **Laissez-faire Leadership.**

The main research question was "**To what extent does emotional intelligence affects these five foundation universities Staff behavior (Style)?**" and under this main question I have put forward several hypotheses as the following:

Main Hypothesis 1:

H1: There is a statistically significant difference at (α=0.05) in aspect of **emotional intelligence** and **leadership behavior** attributed to the respondents personal traits such as age, sex, experience, academic qualifications and grade level.

Main Hypothesis 2:

H2: There is a statistically significant correlation between **Emotional Intelligence** (leaders' well-being, leaders' ability of self-control, the ability of the leaders to empathize, leaders' social skills) and **leadership behavior.**

It was a descriptive study in addition to a statistical analysis. The data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The secondary resources include the books, journals, statistics and web pages. The primary data were collected by using questionnaires that was developed specifically for this research. An internationally accepted measurement tools, Traits EI Questionnaire Short Form (TEIQues SF) to measure EI and Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), were adapted, translated, combined and modified to fit the purpose of this research ended up in developing one questionnaire distributed to the targeted respondents to collect the primary data.

A questionnaire was designed to measure the emotional intelligence and leadership style of the faculties' managers as reported by the subjects itself and as perceived by their subordinates. The questionnaire was composed of three parts:

Personal and Professional Traits: This part was designed to collect personal and professional information including, gender, age, academic qualifications, years of experience, years of work under the supervision of the current faculty manager, professional category, grade, and supervisory capacity.

Emotional Intelligence Traits: To measure emotional intelligence the researcher has adapted a measurement tool that was specifically developed for this purpose. A psychometric test was developed by Petrides and Furnham in 2003 based on their emotional intelligence traits model composed of 4 EI dimensions with 15 subdimensions. These dimensions are **Well-Being** including *happiness*, *self-esteem*, *optimism*, and *self-motivation*; **Self-Control** including *emotion regulation*, *low impulsiveness*, *stress management*, and *adaptability*; **Emotionality** including *emotion expression*, *empathy*, *emotion perception*, and *emotions management*; and **Sociability** including

social awareness, *relationships*, and *assertiveness*. The tool was then translated with some alterations and amendments to suite what it was intended to measure and to fit the research culture.

Leadership Traits/Style: To measure the leadership traits or style, the researcher adapted the multi leadership questionnaire of Stumpf 2003. The questionnaire is based on the Avolio and Pass questionnaire developed in 1990. The construct is based on the full rage leadership theory. The tool was then translated amended and modified to suit what it was intended to examine. The questionnaire is composed of 3 dimensions and 9 sub dimensions to determine the leadership style. **The transformational style** is measured through 5 sub dimensions including, *idealized influence (behavior)*, *idealized influence (attributed)*, *inspirational motivation*, *intellectual motivation* and

individualized consideration. The **transactional leadership style** is determined through 3 sub dimensions including *contingent reward*, *management by exception (active)*, and *management by exception (passive)*. And the **laissez faire** is measured through 4 questions.

The population includes 200 staff working in 5 foundation universities in Istanbul city. The stratified random sample was calculated using the scientific sample calculation formula at a confidence interval of %95.

The data analysis based on six sections, it tested the variables with these sections to measure the effective of these variables on it. These six sections was:

— Gender.
— Age.
— Academic qualifications.
— Job Title.
— Years of Experience.
— Years of experience, years of work under the supervision of the current faculty manager.

The number of respondents to the survey were 170 people at the rate of 85%, and that is a very good result for analysis, distributed as follows:

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Gender		
Male	79	46.47
Female	91	53.53
Age		
Less than 30	78	17.6
30 to less than 40	53	34.7
40 to less than 50	53	31.2
50 to less than 60	28	16.5
Level of Qualification		
Less than Diploma	14	8.2
Diploma	30	17.6
Bachelor	62	36.5
Advanced Degree	64	37.6
Experience		
Less than 5 years	40	23.5
5 years to less than 10 years	45	26.5
10 years to less than 15 years	70	41.2
15 years and more	15	8.8

Current Job Experience

Less than 5 years	64	37.6
5 years to less than 10 years	70	41.2
10 years to less than 15 years	32	18.8
15 years and more	4	2.4

Job Category

Professor-Doctor	41	24.1
Teaching-Research Assistance	48	28.2
Executive Staff	40	23.5
Managerial Staff	41	24.1

Test of the hypothesis with the demographic variables and its results was like the following:

Two-independent samples T Test for testing the differences due to gender

No.	Field	Test Value (T)	P-value (sig.)	Mean	
				Male	Female
1	Emotional Intelligence	0.706	0.481	3.84	3.80
2	Leadership Behavior	0.622	0.535	3.90	3.86

One-Way ANOVA Test for testing the differences due to the age variable

No.	Field	Test Value (F)	P-value (sig.)	Mean			
				Below 30	30 to below 40	40 to below50	50 to below 60
1	Emotional Intelligence	1.431	0.236	3.91	3.73	3.84	3.85
2	Leadership Behavior	1.168	0.323	3.98	3.81	3.90	3.86

One-Way ANOVA Test for testing the differences due to the qualification variable

No.	Field	Test Value (F)	P-value (sig.)	Mean			
				Less than diploma	Diploma	Bachelor	Advanced Degree
1	Emotional Intelligence	6.498	0.000*	3.50	3.63	3.87	3.91
2	Leadership Behavior	7.544	0.000*	3.50	3.70	3.94	3.98

One-Way ANOVA Test for testing the differences due to the experience variable

No.	Field	Test Value (F)	P-value (sig.)	Mean			
				Less than 5	Between 5 and 10	Between 10 and 15	More than 15
1	Emotional Intelligence	0.925	0.430	3.72	3.82	3.85	3.86
2	Leadership Behavior	1.919	0.129	3.80	3.84	3.97	3.76

One-Way ANOVA Test for testing the differences due to the current job experience variable

No.	Field	Test Value (F)	P-value (sig.)	Mean			
				Less than 5	Between 5 and 10	Between 10 and 15	More than 15
1	Emotional Intelligence	2.298	0.079	3.88	3.79	3.80	3.34
2	Leadership Behavior	1.975	0.120	3.95	3.82	3.89	3.52

One-Way ANOVA Test for testing the differences due to the job category variable

No.	Field	Test Value (F)	P-value (sig.)	Mean			
				Professor / Doctor	Teaching / Research Assistance	Executive Staff	Managerial Staff
1	Emotional Intelligence	1.533	0.208	3.85	3.72	3.80	3.90
2	Leadership Behavior	2.969	0.034*	3.91	3.76	3.83	4.02

From these tables we can extrapolate these points:

1- The gender dose not influence the study sample opinions towards the study fields. This simply means that gender's opinions makes no deference on the study.

2- Age does not represent a difficult variable can be relied upon in these cases. This simply means that age's opinions makes no deference on the study.

3- The study sample individuals have a different vision over the study fields with regard to their qualification, and this confirms that the qualification does influence the study sample opinions towards the study fields. This result indicates that there are differences among the respondents in their opinions over the study fields attributed to the qualification variable.

4- There are no differences among the respondents in their opinions over the study fields attributed to the experience variable.

5- This result supposes that there are no differences among the respondents in their opinions over the study fields related to the current job experience variable.

6- There are no differences among the respondents in their opinions over the emotional intelligence field related to the job category variable, but there are differences among them over the leadership behavior field in relation to the job category variable.

Then the researcher tested the effects between variables each other, main and sub-variables, after tested it researcher got these results as the following tables:

Field	Pearson correlation coefficient	P-value (sig.)
Emotional Intelligence and Leadership	0.697**	0.000
Sociability and Leadership	0.622**	0.000
Self-Control and Leadership	0.457**	0.000
Well-Being and Leadership	0.552**	0.000
Empathy and Dominant Leadership Style	0.248**	0.000

Notes About the previous table:

1- This test is general measuring the whole relationship between EI, and the Leadership. And the result confirms a positive relation indicating a statistical significance between "*The Emotional Intelligence*" and "*Leadership*". The results tallies with the foundations of the EI traits mode (Petrides and Furnham, 2003), the foundations of mixed models of happiness in Goleman model

(Goleman, 1995) and general mood of Bar-On model (Bar-On, 1997). The leader's general feeling of optimism, self-esteem, and self-motivation (well-

being) are important facets of EI and contributes to the leader's ability to lead and influence followers.

2- The second test shows that the correlation coefficient between "*The Sociability*" (i.e. leaders' social skills) and "*Leadership*" equals (0.622), and the p-value (sig.) equals (0.000) which is less than (α = 0.05). This result confirms a positive relation indicating a statistical significance between "*The sociability*" and "*Leadership*".

3- The third test shows that the correlation coefficient between "*Self-Control*" and "*Leadership*" equals (0.457), and the p-value (sig.) equals (0.000) which is less than (α = 0.05). This result confirms a positive relation indicating a statistical significance between "*Self-Control*" and "*Leadership*".

4- The forth test shows that the correlation coefficient between "*Well-Being*" and "*Leadership*" equals (0.552), and the p-value (sig.) equals (0.000) which is less than (α = 0.05). This result confirms a positive relation indicating a statistical significance between "*Well-Being*" and "*Leadership*".

5- And the last test shows that the correlation coefficient between "*Empathy*" and "*Leadership*" equals (0.248), and the p-value (sig.) equals (0.000) which is less than (α = 0.05). This result confirms a positive relation indicating a statistical significance between "*Empathy*" and "*Leadership*".

What is the meaning of these results?

The results of the hypotheses agrees and confirms results from previous studies that leadership is a critical factor in the success or failure of an organization, or even, any given society. Excellent organizations begin with excellent leadership and successful organizations reflect their leadership. Emotional intelligence has been linked to leader performance in a variety of corporate settings. Hypothesis two investigated

the joint effect of the dimensions of leadership behavior on emotional intelligence. Four dimensions of leadership emotional intelligence (**Well-Being**, **Self-Control**, **Emotionality**, and **Sociability** had a significant and unique impact upon the emotional intelligence of leaders in the study. One dimension, idealized behavior's, did not. A study found relationship management to be the best correlate of leader performance compared to the four factors of emotional intelligence. Hypothesis three suggested the same and this unique finding was replicated by the present study.

Managing the emotional side of relationships had greater impact on job performance than awareness of emotions or management of the self. Relationship management is considered to be the ultimate outcome of emotional intelligence; a skill whose foundation is built upon the other three skills in the model.

Conclusion:

A lot of arguments have been given for and against the subject of emotional intelligence and its impacts on leadership effectiveness. Researchers like Judge et. al., are of the view that there is no such stronger relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership success as was previously found. Hence contrasting views and results have been found among the researchers. However on the whole it is concluded that most of the researchers found positive relations between the two. The findings of this study showed that EI has a statistical significant relationship on perceived leadership effectiveness and outcomes. Emotional intelligence has been found important because it provides an excellent framework to look at how people understand and manage emotions. Emotional intelligence considers how people interact in a way cognitive ability theories cannot fully account for. Research findings such as this suggests that this intuition is accurate and that leaders who use emotional intelligence to build solid relationships usually well in their jobs. Emotional intelligence is very appealing to most leaders, at the same time daunting for some to explore emotions and feelings in a work setting. Hence, providing a leadership assessment that is not too cumbersome or abstract is important in achieving successful outcomes.

Recommendation

From the results and findings of this research, the relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership has been proven to exist. Leadership behavior is affected and is shaped by the level of emotional intelligence of the leader. Hence the researcher would recommend the following:

- More attention to the concept of emotional intelligence and increase awareness about this concept because it represents a great importance in all leadership and management levels of foundation universities in Istanbul.
- Based on the results of the research of the gab existing between leader self-assessment and followers rating, the researcher recommends encouraging team work and effective communication as means to create a leader follower interactive exchange. That will bridge the existing gab and eventually will lead to more comfortable and hence effective leadership and more productive work environment.
- Training managers and leaders of foundation universities at all levels, especially senior ones on how to use an optimal combination between the different aspects of leadership role, both transformational and transactional.
- Set up special training courses for the staff of all foundation universities in Istanbul all the managerial and leadership levels, improved behavioral and cognitive level about emotional intelligence concepts, and try to follow up the application of these behaviors in the reality of work in order to achieve good outcomes can be built upon.
- Designing special tools such as tests, 360 degrees evaluation reports, and staff surveys to measure the level of emotional intelligence of the potential leader recruits in the internal recruitment campaigns.
- Designing tools such as tests to measure the level of emotional intelligence to be used as part of the assessment and criteria in the recruitment and selection of external candidates applying for managerial and supervisory roles.
- Conduct more research to identify potential future leaders who have higher emotional intelligence capacities from among foundation universities middle managers.

- More research is needed in the area of emotional intelligence and its relation to leadership. Future research may use different emotional intelligence model to examine the relationship.

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• Ensure that the **spelling** of names, terms, and abbreviations is **consistent**, including in tables and figure legends.

• **Abbreviations,** except for very commonly ones, must be defined the first time they are used and a list supplied with the manuscript.

• Please always use internationally accepted signs and symbols for **units**, so-called SI units. Use positive and negative exponents, e.g., g L^{-1} instead of g/l.

• **Chemical compounds** should be named according to the systematic rules of the IUPAC or Chemical Abstracts.

• Species and genus names, mathematical/physical variables, and prefixes in chemical compounds should be set in *italic* type (*cis/trans, d/l, E/Z, o/m/p, R/S, t*-Bu, *tert*-butyl).

• L and D indicating optical activity should be set in SMALL CAPITALS (D- and L-dopa).

Tables

• Number the tables consecutively using the chapter number (e.g., Table 1.1) and ensure that all the tables are cited in the text in the correct order.

• Give each table a **heading**.

• To format the table columns, use the **table function** in your word-processing program.

• Do **not** use the space bar to separate columns, and do **not** use Excel to create tables.

• If a table cell is to be left empty, please type a hyphen (-) in it.

• Please do not treat simple, **one-column lists** as tables, but instead set them as part of the running text.

• Save the tables in the same file as the text, references, and figure legends.

Equations

• Equations of the type $a^2+b^2=c^2$ can be written as normal text.

• For all other equations, please use Math Type or the Microsoft equation editor, and insert the graphic into your text file as an object. Prepare the whole equation in this way and not just part of it.

• Please ensure the different styles are defined in the program itself:

Style	Font	Bold	Italic
Text	Times		
Function	Times		
Variable	Times		✓
L.C.Greek	Symbol		✓
U.C.Greek	Symbol		
Symbol	Symbol		
Vector-Matrix	Times	✓	
Number	Times		

• Do not insert the equation number from the equations editor.

• Please do not insert symbols or special characters that are not part of equations as graphics or using the formula editor if they are available in the *Symbol* or *Zapf Ding-bats* fonts.

• Formulas/equations should appear on separate lines. Formulas are numbered chapterwise (1.1-n.n). The formula number is given in parentheses as right aligned text next to the formula

$$(a+b)^2 = a^2+2ab+b^2 \qquad (3.1)$$

• If the equation is part of a sentence, the equation itself should end with a punctuation mark (not after the equation number).

Literal Text

In order to distinguish the literal text of computer programs from running text, we re-commend using a font such as *Arial* or *Helvetica*. If you need a font for your programs in which every character has the same width, please use *Courier*.

References

References may be cited in the text in two different ways:

• Author name/s and year of publication in parentheses:

> One author: (Miller 1991),
> Two authors: (Miller and Smith 1994),
> Three authors or more: (Miller et al. 1995);

• Reference numbers in square brackets:

> [3, 7, 12].

The **reference list** should be alphabetical (even if reference numbers are used). If there are several works by the same author, the following order should be used:

- − First, all works by the author alone, ordered chronologically by year of publication,
- − Next, all works by the author with a coauthor, ordered alphabetically by coauthor,
- − Finally, all works by the author with several coauthors, ordered chronologically by year of publication.

Examples:
Monographs:

Snider T, Grand L (1982) Air pollution by nitrogen oxides. Elsevier, Amsterdam

Anthologies and proceedings:

Noller C, Smith VR (1987) Ultraviolet selection pressure on earliest organisms. In: Kingston H, Fulling CP (eds) Natural environment background analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211-219

Journals:

Meltzoff AN, Moore MK (1977) Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science 198:75-78

Please use the following abbreviations:

vol (volume)

edn (edition)

ed/eds (editor/s)

p/pp (page/s)

Please do **not** put commas between names and initials, and do **not** put periods after initials or abbreviations.

Sources

If you copy text passages, figures, or tables from other works, you must obtain **permission** from the copyright holder (usually the original publisher). Enclose a copy of the signed release form with the manuscript. The source must be acknowledged in the legend or table heading. If the source is in a foreign language, please provide a **translation**.

Index

Please indicate one or two keywords per manuscript page to be included in the index. Mark the relevant terms on the printout or use the **indexing function** in Word.

Figures and Illustration Data

Digital Illustrations

If you can supply illustration material (photos and drawings) in digital form, this will simplify production, providing that you follow a few basic rules.

If you have any questions on how to compile the illustrations or problems complying with these specifications, please contact us for advice.

Scanning

• Please scan all the illustrations in the same size that they are to appear in print.

• The minimum resolution for scanned **line figures** is 600 dpi.

• For scanned **photos**, 300 dpi is sufficient.

Image Processing

• Please use illustration programs such as *Adobe Illustrator, Macromedia Freehand*, or *Corel Draw* to produce **graphics**.

• *Adobe Photoshop* or *Corel Photo paint* is suitable for processing and retouching scanned **photos**.

- Programs such as MS Excel, MS PowerPoint, Designer, Harvard Graphics, Visio, MS Word-Graph, or MS Graph are **not** suitable.
- For **chemical structural formulas** and reaction diagrams, it is best to use *ChemDraw* (http://www.camsoft.com) or in some cases *ISIS/draw* (http://www.mdli.com). Save the files both in the original format (e.g., *.cdx for ChemDraw) and in EPS format.

- If illustrations are to appear in black and white, do not produce them in color. Instead of color, use dot patterns with a maximum of three gray tones of 12%, 25%, and 40% (ensure that there is a clear contrast to the text).
- The lowest line weight is 0.4 pt in the final size (approx. 0.15 mm).

Lettering
- To add **lettering**, it is best to use Helvetica or Arial. The font size should be approx. 2-3 mm (8-10 pt).
- Avoid effects such as shading, outline letters etc.
- Lettering should not be added until **after** scanning, i.e. to the graphics file.
- Please do not insert any **figure legends** or figure headings in your illustration file.

Saving and Printout
On no account should graphic data be saved as part of the text file; instead, each illustration should be submitted **as a separate file**:
- Save each illustration individually, in the same size as it is to appear in print.
- Check that all the details, including any lettering, are clearly visible, and enclose a printout. (If there are any discrepancies, we will assume that the electronic version is the correct one.)
- To **name the graphics file**, please use the chapter and figure number (e.g., Fig6_10.eps)
- Suitable **data formats** are TIFF and EPS (remember to include any fonts used). Data for color illustrations should, if possible, be compiled in four-color (CMYK) mode.
- Large volumes of data may also be submitted in **compressed** form in *zip*, gzip, *tar*, or *sit* format.
- In addition to your name and the title of the work, please label the electronic file or **disk** with the file name and the operating system and program versions (including the compression program) that have been used.

Figure Legends and Numbering
- Number the figures consecutively using the chapter number (e.g., Fig. 1.1), and put the **legends** at the end of the chapter in the text file.
- Ensure that all the figures are cited **in the text** in the correct order.

Checklist		
Title page	Title	❏
Name(s) of author(s)		❏
Mailing address(es)		❏
e-mail address(es)		❏
Table of contents	Decimal numbers	❏
Headings the same as in text		❏
Text: Only left justification, no hyphenation at the end of lines		❏
Text: In *Times New Roman*, special characters in *Symbol* order *ZapfDingbats*		❏
References	Citations in text agree with the reference list	❏
All entries in the reference list mentioned in the text		❏
References follow the guidelines		❏
Journals abbreviated according to *Index Medicus*		
Abbreviations	List of abbreviations in text file	❏
Figures	All figures mentioned in text enclosed, complete and on separate sheets and as separate files	❏
Consecutively numbered within a chapter		❏
Consecutively cited in text		❏
Legends separate, after the references		❏
Tables	Prepared with the table function	❏
Placed at the end of the text after the reference list and figure and scheme captions		❏
Consecutively numbered within a chapter		❏
Consecutively cited in text		❏
Electronic manuscript	Controlled	❏
Title of the book and author's name noted on file label		❏
Text files saved in original format and as RTF		❏
Each chapter saved as separate file		❏
Graphics saved as separate files on disk in original for-mat and in EPS or TIFF format		❏

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